ZAMINDARS
IN THE MUGHAL SUBAH OF GUJARAT
DURING
THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Thesis submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
for the award of the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

Certified that the thesis entitled *Zamindars in the Mughal Subah of Gujarat During the First half of the Eighteenth Century* submitted by Sh. Shaukat Ullah Khan for the Ph.D degree has not been previously submited either in part or in full for any other degree or diploma in this or in any other University.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Mughal ruling class was primarily concerned with the expansion of the empire and consolidation of the gains of conquest during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - the days of relative political and military stability. The landed aristocracy, or as it was known, the zamindars in spite of persisting contradictions with the higher echelons of the Mughal ruling class, had rendered valuable service to the empire during the period. Some scholars [1] have examined the position and working of the institution of zamindari during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - the period that witnessed the empire at the zenith of territorial expansion - in some detail. These studies have, however, been confined to the broad features of the institution and, in view of nature and scope of the works, inter-regional and intra-regional variations have not been examined in adequate details. The vastness of the empire with all the local variations require a closer examination of the position and role of zamindars at regional level.

In contrast to their role during the days of 'cohesion' and 'stability' the question as to what kind of role did the zamin-

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1. For example, please see, S Nurual Hasan, "Zamindars Under Mughals", *Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History,* (ed.) RE Frykenberg, Wisconcin. pp 17-31; by the same author, *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in Mughal India.* N Delhi, 1973, pp 30-8; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India.* Bombay, 1963, pp. 136-89 BR Grover, "Nature of Land Rights in Mughal India" *IESHR*, Vol I, no. 1, 1963, pp 1-23; by the same author, "Nature of Dehat-i-Taalluqa (zamindari villages) and the evolution of the Taaluqdari system during the Mughal Age", *IESHR*, Vol II, no 2, October, 1965, pp 166-72; *Ibid*, Vol II no 3 July, 1966, pp 259-75; N.A. Siddiqi; *Land Revenue Administration Under The Mughals 1700-1750,* Bombay 1970, pp 21-40; AR Khan, *Chieftains in the Mughal Empire during the reign of Akbar,* Delhi 1977.

dars play during the ensuing period of 'instability and 'conflict' though interesting subject of study, has so far not been studied in adequate detail. In his work, *The Land Revenue Administration Under The Mughals. 1700-1750*, N.A. Siddiqi has discussed their role during the said period but only as part of Mughal revenue administrative machinery. The study has also 'excluded from its purview' the 'provincial and regional variations'.[1] The author, moreover, has not made any deliberate attempt to correlate the changes in the position of zamindars with the over all changes taking place at various levels during the period of study.

The present work, essentially a preliminary attempt in the direction, seeks to trace the pattern, process and drift of possible changes in the position and role of the zamindars during the first half of the eighteenth century. The study proceeds with the task of identifying variously designated constituents of the class, delineating each section or category, and tracing the sources and mode of variations between them. Attempt has also been made to ascertain the elements of continuity and change vis a vis the Mughal State, the peasantry and the zamindars themselves. It has also been attempted to answer the question : could the state enforce and retain uniform pattern of relationship with the zamindars ? Did it make any tangible efforts to arrest the process of declining imperial hold over them? and did the zamindars play such a role which had bearing on the fortunes of the Mughals in the *subah*? The study also proposes to ascertain the nature, extent and magnitude of imperial control and, incidentally, clarify if the imperial control over the zamindars was only superficial, or else the state could erode their power base and

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1. N.A. Siddiqi, *op.cit.* p 2

weaken them at the grass-root level. Finally, the study may also incidentally suggest whether the process of change and, or its impact, strengthened or else eroded the Mughal's authority. Above all, the study may indicate the final outcome of the possible changes in the position and role of zamindars. The discussion, it may be seen, is mainly focussed on the changes in the state--zamindar relationship and incidentally on their relationship among themselves, a limitation imposed by the nature of available evidence.

It is a well known fact that the zamindari right represented a range of variously designated superior claims. The 'generic' term *'zamindar'* which, as Irfan Habib notes, gained currency during the Mughal period, in essence implied a superior right in land or its usufruct.[1] In spite of the fact that the zamindars were designated as *malik* (owner) and their possessions as *milkiy-at* the zamindari right does not signify an absolute proprietary right over land in the modern sense of the term : the right co-existed with other rights and claims on the produce of the soil.[2] The right represented a range of variously designated superior claims, the one "other than and standing above the peasantry" in land or its usufruct.[3] The right was basically associated with land and its holder enjoyed a share in the produce even without

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1. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System,*, pp 138-9.

2. For a detailed view, *Ibid* pp 139-40, 154; S Nurul Hassan, 'Zamindars Under The Mughals' pp 17-8; BR Grover, 'Nature of Land Rights in Mughal India' pp 1-23;

3. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System,* ; pp 138-9.

directly engaging in the actual process of economic production.[1]

Since the term *'zamindar'* implies a range of superior claims, modern scholars have sought to delineate clearly the levels which constitute the class of zamindars.[2] Irfan Habib categorized them into the 'chieftains' and the zamindars under direct administration whom he also terms 'ordinary zamindars'.[3] In BR Grover's categorization, Irfan Habib's zamindars under direct administration' are termed 'petty zamindars' the other ones have been designated the same way.[4] Although NA Siddiqi also regards the nature of state-zamindar relations as the criterion of differentiation he prefers to designate the 'chieftains' as the *peshkashi'* and the other ones as the 'land revenue paying' zamindars.[5] These scholars have either wholly excluded the holders of intermediary positions, such as *chaudharis*, *muqaddams* etc, or counted them in the category of revenue officials treating them merely as the leading members of the village community.

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1. For a detailed exposition of the views, see *Ibid*, pp 141, 144-7, 154-7; NA Siddiqi; *Land Revenue Administration*, pp 21-2 30-2, BR Grover, 'Nature of Land Rights in Mughal India' pp 1-23.

2. Earlier, " the generally accepted view" observes Irfan Habib, seems to have been " that the *zamindar* in Mughal times really meant a vassal chief and could not exist in the directly administered territories". *Agrarian System*. p 136; For an exposition of the earlier view, WH Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslim India*, Allahabad, 1929, pp 122, 279; P Saran, *The Provincial government of the Mughals (1526-1658)*, Allahabad (reprint) p 111 & n.

3. Irfan Habib *Agrarian System* pp 182-3.

4. BR Grover 'Nature of Land Rights in Mughal India' pp 16-23; by the same author, Nature of *dehat-i taalluqa...*' *IESHR*, II no 4 pp 166-72; *Ibid* II no 3 259-65.

5. NA Siddiqi, *Land Revenue Administration*, pp 21-2, 28,38,139, 151.

On the other hand, Professor S.Nural Hasan takes the forms of zaminari rights as the main basis of differentiation and neatly divides the class into three categories, viz, Chieftains, Intermediary and the Primary zamindars.[1] In view of its comprehensiveness we propose to follow S Nurul Hasan's categorization, though with some qualifications.

The use of the term 'Chieftain' has been avoided. This term connotes an autonomous native ruler who folowed the rule of primoqeniture in the matter of succession under the suzerainty of the Mughal empire.[2] Their position as autonomous ruler of their patrimony was accepted by the Mughal Emperors and as such had 'legal' sanction. But we come across a considerable number of zamindars [Chapter I (1) and (2) below] who hardly enjoyed autonomy or enjoyed it in a limited sense of the term, did not follow rule of primogeniture, were not rulers of any standing and a large number of them happened to be ordinary members of a dismembered ruling family, still enjoying a status distinctly superior to the members of the other categories. Secondly, during the period there emerged a number of zamindars who were autonomous rulers but had no legal sanction behind their position as zamindars. During this period, such zamindaris were carved out of the Mughal empire rather than incorporated into it as was the case with native rulers who were absorbed into the empire at the time of conquest. In order to avoid any ambiguity and in view of certain features peculiar to the zamindars of Gujarat the use of the term 'Chieftain' has been avoided and the 'Superior zamindar' is used instead.

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1. S.Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars Under the Mughals" pp. 17-31

2. *Ibid* pp 17-23; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 182-9; BR Grover "Nature of Land Rights", pp 18-22.

Though we shall be using the term 'Primary zamindar' we propose to exclude the 'peasant-proprietors' from the category, though Professor Nurul Hasan's term includes them. The right of a peasant-prprietor may not be equated with that of a Primary zamindar, the latter's right being the one other than, distinct from and superior to that of the former. No doubt, the peasants like the zamindars were 'often designated as *malik*. But all right over land designated as *milkiyat* were not zamindari rights.[1] The two rights i.e. zamindari and the peasant's could exist, as they did, independently of each other and be enjoyed by different persons over the same piece of land; still the two rights were not necessarily exclusive of each other and could simultaneously be possessed by the same person.[2]

The position of the above mentioned three dategories constituting the class of zamindars vis a vis provincial authorities & between the zamindars themselves is sought to be determind on the basis of their sources of power, extent and location of their territorial possessions, productivity and manageability, identity of the boundries of zamindari with the administrative unit (village/*pargana*/*sarkar*), position of zamindar in the ruling hierarchy i.e. whether the zamindar enjoyed a *mansab* or any administrative position, the degree of autonomy enjoyed in the internal affairs as against the nature, magnitude and continuity of administrative pressure exerted, or sought to be exerted by the authorities, mode and method of calculating and levying imperial share and proportion thereof, nature of service obligation, rule of inheritance and other relevant things which the evidence may suggest. Their role vis a vis the Mughal state has

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1. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 113-4, 140-1, 175.
2. *Ibid* ; please see also Chapter V below.

been examined on the basis of the extent of their actual performance of their obligations. These factors are also given weightage for ascertaining continuity and change in the position of zamindars vis a vis Mughal state, the peasantry and each other.

Since we propose to trace the possible changes in the position and role of zamindars during the period of political turmoil and administrative instability which is to be discussed a little later, it seems pertinent to determine the position and examine their role for the period when the state machinery operated at the peak of efficiency. Its necessity arises more because of the fact that the studies so far conducted are more a survey for the whole of empire rather than a detailed study of the class with particular reference to the regional and intra-regional variations in adequate depth.[1] More so these studies so far the zamindars of Mughal *subah* of Gujarat are concerned, are based atmost exclusively on the well known Persian chronicles. We have, therefore, also sought to determine the position and analyse their role during the seventeenth century. It may also be seen that some of changes which occurred particularly during the later half of the century acquired momentum and unmanageable dimensions during the period of present study.

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1. A R Khan (*Chieftains in the Mughal empire during the reign of Akbar)* has discussed at length the political relations between the empire and the chieftains, as established or sought to be established under Akbar. But the author does not cast sufficient light on the administrative aspects and the actual working of the arrangements, as also on the varying positions held by various chiefs. Moreover, the part of his work which relates to the zamindars of Gujarat, is based exclusively on the Persian chronicles and has not been enriched by utilising other sources of information. Also the author's identification of the Chieftains is not free of defects. See Chapter I (1) & (2) below.

In view of above, each category of the zamindars is discussed in two different Chapters, viz, every Chapter discussing their position and role during the first half of the eighteenth century is preceded by a Chapter wherein the given category's position and role are discussed during the preceding period.

In the first [Chapters I (1&2), III and V] of each of the two Chapters devoted to each category, we have examined the position of Superior [Chapter I (1) & (2)], Intermediary (Chapter III) and the Primary zamindars (Chapter V) vis a vis Mughal state, peasantry and the zamindars themselves as it finally emerged during the seventeenth century. Simultaneously, effort has been made to bring into focus the levels of stratification that existed between the zamindars, inter-category as well as intra-category. Particular attempt has been made to highlight the fluctuations and changes in the zamindars' position emerging in consequence of the interaction between two forces working in diametrically opposite directions, viz, the state attempting to acquire greater controlling position over the zamindaris and enter into direct communications with the *riaya*, and the zamindars' endeavours to resist it and throw away, or at least minimize the degree of imperial hold already acquired over them. The study takes due note of the emerging pattern and its direction alongwith the sub-regional variations. Despite all this, it represents relatively harmonious relationship between the zamindars and the state, recognized and on the whole arduously maintained by the latter during the heyday of the Mughal rule in the *subah*. The keynote of the relationship was the careful and vigilant control exercised by the centre over the province and by the provincial authorities over the zamindars.

The next three Chapters (II, IV & VI) which come in succession to the above-mentioned ones, open with the onset of the

eighteenth century.[1] In these Chapters we have analyzed the position of the Superior (Chapter III), Intermediary (Chapter IV) and the Primary zamindars (Chapter VI) as it emerged during the first half of the eighteenth century. In these Chapters we seek to study the emerging pattern of relationship between the provincial authorities and the zamindars during the period of turmoil. What was from the point of view of the empire a deteriorating state of affair between the two, constitutes the focus of discussion in these Chapters. As far as evidence helps us to do, light is also thrown upon the inter-zamindar relations beside highlighting the emerging pattern of state-zamindar-*riaya* relationship. The state of affair was marked by the loosening grip of the empire reflected in the increasing disregard for administrative

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1. First few years of the eighteenth century constitute an important phase in the history of Mughal Gujarat. Shujat Khan, the *subedar* (1685-1701), died in office in 1701. In the wake of his death leading zamindars of the *subah* withdrew their troops (1701) and ceased to serve for good. Other zamindars followed in their foot-steps. (For details please see Chapter II below.). The next *subedar* Prince Mohammad Azam who had only reluctantly accepted the office (1701) observed laxity. He not only failed to take remedial steps but also did not undertake the military expeditions into the *subah* as was required of a *nazim* as a matter of routine administrative norm. He preferred to stay at the provincial capital instead. Ali Mohammad Khan, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I (Persian text), Baroda 1928, pp 345-6; and Chapter II below. The prince was allowed to leave the *subah* (November 1704), long before the arrival of the next incumbent. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*) I p 360). His withdrawl was followed by Maratha attack inflicting a crushing defeat on the Mughal forces. As a result Mughal officials were demoralised and the zamindars stood in revolt (March 1705). The Marathas attacked the *subah* again in the wake of Aurangzeb's death (1707). The attack demoralised the Mughals further. Such a state of affairs followed by the provincial authorities' submission before the Marathas further weakened the administrative pressure, making the empire more vincible. The damage done to imperial interest in 1701-7 could not be repaired in the subsequent years. (For details please see discussion below.) These events left their imprint on the subsequent developments.

norms, rising degree of recalcitrance and successful defiance of authority on the part of zamindars. Playing an active role in the ongoing process of the downward devolution of power, the zamindars replaced the state authority at village level. In these Chapters we have emphasized the new position and role that the zamindars were assuming vis a vis the Mughal administrative authority and the other constituents of the agrarian community.

The last Chapter (No. VII) deals with the changing composition of the class of zamindars. In the Chapter, we examine the changing modes of the emergence of zamindaris during the period. The zamindaris were carved out of the Mughal empire by the use of force and manoeuvre instead of being created in accordance with the established rule. We have not attempted to discuss the emergenceof all the zamindaris, instead a few of them i.e. Palanpur, Junagadh, Radhanpur, Idar, Surat, Bharuch and Khambat have been examined, each a typical case of one mode of the emergence of a zamindari.

Sources of Study: --The present work is based mainly on original Persian works. In addition to the well known Persian sources we have also consulted a large number of documents which were either authored, prepared or compiled in the *Subah*.

The sources whether authored at the imperial centre or in the region itself, are of great value. A slight difference lies in the fact that some of the (imperial) terms like '*zamindar*' and (the regional one like) *giras* and *girasia* find a more definitive and unambiguous usage in the regional works in contrast to their 'generic' and ambiguous usage as found in the works which happened to be authored at the centre.

Beside the chronicles, we have also consulted the *farmans*, *hasb-ul-hukms*, *nishans*, *parwanas*, *chaknamas*, *khasra-i mazruat* papers, *Yad-dashts* of various description, *tamassuks*, *destur-ul*

amals, *ragbabandi* documents, *mawazna-i dehsala mawazna-i dehat*, *nuskha-i zamindaran*, *nuskha-i peshkash*, some documents about *jama-o kharj* and *jagirs* and many other documents of different description of the empire, *subah-sarkar-parganas* -village and *jagir* level throwing light on the composition, inter-relation of and differentiation between the zamindars and actual working of the institution of zamindari, particularly in its relationship with the Mughal state.

In order to identify the zamindars and trace the changes, alongwith the pattern, in the position and role during the seventeenth century it is found necessary to make a study of the well known works written during the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century. The relevant evidence contained in these sources has been utilized and correlated with the other contemporary and near-contemporary works.

Evidence contained in the *Mirat-i Sikandri*, a useful regional source of information about the period of Gujarati sultans, has also been utilized.

'Chronologically exact' description of events in *Mirat-i Ahmadi* and statistical account based on the revenue records of the *diwani* office in the *Supplement* by Ali Muhammad Khan, the last *diwan* of the *subah*, so far known the best work on Gujarat constitutes our one of the most important sources of study. The *Mirat-i Ahmadi* which for its richness has been compared to the *Ain-i Akbari* of Abul Fazl [1]needs no introduction. However, its author who looks at the historical events mainly from the seat of provincial power, has also made casual comments and at times does not bother to give relevant details to substantiate the comments. Indeed by comparison with the details given elsewhere in the

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1. J.N. Sarkar, 'Introduction to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *(Tr) Baroda*, 1927,

Mirat itself a few of his general comments stand contradicted. It may also be kept in mind that Ali Muhammad Khan attributes the origin of every major development affecting the Mughal's position adversely in the *subah* to the post - Aurangzeb period, particularly to the year of the emperor's death (1707), though it was not invariably the case. We have, therefore, tried to check the statements against the quantitative data contained in the same and other works of the period.

No less important is the *Diwan's Book of Account*, a treasure of valuable information about the revenues and related matters in respect of zamindars and other constituents of revenue paying society of Mughal Gujarat. The work contains important details about the (Superior) *'zamindaran'* who have been duly identified, listed and categorized. The document furnishes information about the various form of zamindaris, obligations and rights of zamindars and details of land-survey on different points of time; the *hasil* and *peshkash* figures are also provided alongnwith the *dasturs*, norms, provisions and working of the administration. Its comments on the emerging change are of great value.

The work referred to above is entered as *diwanu khatanu pustak* (MS No 227) in the Apparao Bholanath collection, Ahmadabad. It is neither entitled nor carries the name of its author. But in all probability the work was compiled by Ali Muhammad Khan, the last *diwan* and author of the *Mirat*. The *Mirat* mentions one Mithal Kayasth, a hereditary *subah-nawis* who had 'aided and assisted' Ali Muhammad Khan in obtaining information from the villages, cities and *parganas* and 'compiled together in the form of a book all the documents in one volume'. Ali Muhammad Khan had made use of this information in the preparation of the *Supplement*

to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*.[1] On a closer view of the two works it becomes evident that the *Supplement* contains the summarised version of the informations available in the *Book of Account*. Secondly, Ali Muhammad Bahadur was favoured with the issuance of a *farman* (dt. 10th Shoban, 1167 AH) on the coronation of Alamgir II. The addressee who refers to himself as *fidwi* (the devoted servant) gave effect to its contents after seeking permission of the then Maratha Governor, Sripatrao, details of which are given in the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*. [2] The *Book of Account* cites the same *farman* as addressed to the same person (Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur). The addressee then, seeks Sripatrao's permission stating that a *farman* has been issued in his name (*banam-i fidwi*) and he wanted to give effect to its contents. The addressee - recepient of the *farman* is Ali Muhammad Khan who, in both the works, refers to himself as *fidwi*[3], an expression used by one for himself. Evidently the two works were authorid by the same person, i.e. Ali Muhammad Khan.

Mention may also be made of the Pune documents which though lying unindexed are categorised as *Farsi Daftar*. These documents which seem to have been collected by Maratha Sardars from various parts of the empire are available in the form of loose sheets, bundled together in *Roomals*, 71 in all. The documents relating to Mughal Gujarat are spread in various Roomals in a hapazard manner. The *Roomals* contain documents for the entire Mughal-period of administration in Gujarat from the level of the *subah* down to that of villages on the matters and persons related with the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I p. 9.

2. Ali Muhammad Khan *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, 1927, Baroda, pp 435-6.

3. (Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur) MS No 227 *Diwanu Khatanu Pustak*, Apparao Bholanath collection (hereafter *Account*) f 103b read with *Mirat-i Ahamadi*, II pp 435 -6

revenues. These documents cited as Pune preceded by the *Roomal number* (R N), constitute a rich source of information and have, therefore, been extensively utilized in the present study.

In addition to consulting the various kind of documents preserved at the district record offices of Surat (fort), Palanpur, Junagadh, Bhaonagar and Bharuch and Baroda and Rajkot archives we have also been able to utilize various sources preserved by a number of individuals and private establishments. Thus M/S S H Desai, last secretary of the extinct Junagadh state, Sardar Saiyid Haider Inamdar, a descendent of emperor Jahangir's physical Hakim Nooruddin Bharuchi, the present Jadeja descendent of the ex-ruling house of Bhuj (Rao of Kutch), Kale Khan Pathan, a personal friend of the present descendent of the ex-ruling family of Radhanpur; the *imam* of Jama Masjid (*Shehr qazi*) Palanpur, Jama Masjid Bombay Library, Pir Muhammad Shah Library (Ahmadabad), Cama Oriental Institute and Forbes institute of Bombay and some other individual and private or semi-private agencies are in possession of good deal of sources relevant to our study. The same have been utilized with due care.

During his extensive tour of Gujarat, the present researcher could also procure some documents in original. Most of these were purchased at a nominal cost from a junk trader (Sidhpur) who had purchased the same by way of junk from the ex ruling houses of Palanpur and Radhanpur. These documents which are quite identical to those of Pune, are referred to as Personal collection (*P.C*) in the present study. These two sets of documents coupled with the *Diwan's Account* are of immense value as they provide us with an insight into the process and pattern of change concerning some important aspects of the institution of zamindari in Gujarat.

In addition to above, some published sources, the *farmans*, *chithis* and *kharitas* etc. reproduced in the modern works and the

Bikaner collection of *akhbarat* have also been used in the course of the study.

The three works of local history *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh Manuscript), *Mirat-i Mustafabad* and *Tarikh-i Palanpur* need a word of explanation. The two former works were written by two *diwans* of the *nawabs* of Junagadh during the early nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Since the author of the *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, Sheikh Ghulam Muhammad, did not hold Diwan Ranchhodji, the author of *Tarikh-i Soreth* in high esteem, he looked at the work with skepticism and also tried to contest the authenticity of Ranchhodji's statements. The description of the events in the three works is, among other, based on the family records of the Babi and Jalori families and the documents and *farmans* available in the *diwani* offices. As such the works in spite of being of much later date bear considerable significance. Likewise some British works have also been used. However, these works have not been used to yield primary information.

The Milieu of Study

The first half of the eighteenth century constitutes an important land mark in the history of Mughal Gujarat. Having passed through an era of relative peace and stability for more than a century, the *subah* entered into a phase which was marked with administrative instability and political chaos. As the imperial Mughal control began to recede in the first half of the eighteenth century, a new scenario of local level tensions and subsequent realignment of authority and power began to emerge. With the recession of Mughal imperial control over Gujarat, authority devolved downward at all levels and the devolution seems to have stopped at the level of zamindar. The loss of Ahmadabad to the Marathas in 1753 merely signified the culmina-

tion of a process which had increasingly excluded Gujarat from amongst imperial concern.

At the outset of our period, the *subah* of Gujarat occupied a significant space in the imperial scheme. The region formed a bridge between the empire's northern and southern territorial units. Political developments in the bordering provinces of the Deccan and Ajmer had their direct impact on Gujarat.[1] That the *subah* of Gujarat comprised an important link in the commercial life of Mughal India, is too well known to be discussed in any detail.[2]

Administratively the *subah* was regarded as a sensitive region, a problem province.[3] The author of the *Mirat* who surveyed the landscape from the view point of a revenue official, found the *subah* 'a mine of mischievous persons', 'abode of disturbing

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1. P. Saran, *Provincial Government*, pp 127-30; M.S. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, II N Delhi 1957, pp 199-205, G.S Sardesai, *New History of Maratha People*, II, Bombay, 1948, pp 105-10.

2. For instance, Surendra Gopal, *Commerce and craft in Gujarat - 16th & 17th centuries*, N Delhi 1975; B G Gokhle, "Ahmadabad in the 17th century". *Journal of the Economic and social History of the Orient*, vol XII, pt II April 1969; A.D. Gupta, "The Merchants of Surat" -c 1700-1750"; *Elites in South Asia*, Edmuned Leach & S M Mukherjee (ed) Cambridge University Press, 1970; Kotani, "Politico economic condition of 17-18th century Gujarat", *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol XXX No.2.

3. Emperor Aurangzeb described Gujarat as a 'refractory' region (Gujarat... *zortalab ast)*. S.M. Azizuddin Husain, (ed) *Kalimat-i Taiyibat* by Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, Delhi, 1982 p 114; please see also *Ibid* pp 84-5. In one of his letters addressed to prince Mohammad Azam, then *subedar* of Gujarat (1701-4), the emperor advised him to follow the foot prints of Shujat Khan (noted for his continual and effective administrative control), "otherwise this is the province of Gujarat, may God forbid, there will be disorder and confusion". J H Billimoria (ed), *Ruqat-i Alamgiri*, Delhi, 1872, letter no XIX, pp 24-6.

rebels' who were forever possessed by the 'wind of revolt and passion of rebellion'[1]. The *Mirat* further points out that the Rajputs and Kolis (i.e. the zamindars) "always created disturbance when they noticed a slight weakness in the control of *nazims*".[2] Also, the mischief mongers attacked and plundered many places finding the place without a *faujdar* or a *thanedar* i.e as and when an office was not occupied.[3] The restiveness and quick response to a favourable situation is evident from the fact that the time between the arrival and the departure of the incoming and outgoing *Nazims* and dependent officials transferred with them, was capitalized by the Rajputs and Kolis much to their advantage.[4]

The above mentioned factors seem to have compelled the authorities to make necessary administrative arrangements. Thus, only a *mansabdar* who enjoyed high rank was appointed *subedar* of Gujarat.[5] He was also assisted by 900 *mansabdars* with a total

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 174, 178, 210-11, 255-6. For the identification of zamindars with the Kolis and Rajputs, please see Chapters I & V below.

2. *Ibid.* I pp 173-4

3. *Ibid* I pp 273-4, 307, 345.

4. Thus, *subedar* Shahabuddin Ahmad Khan "had established nearly 80 (additional) *thanas*. The moment his men (*faujdars* and *thanedars*) left the *thanas*" (after the *subedar* had been recalled) the Rajputs and Kolis "laid most of the fortresses (the *thanas* and *faujdars'* strongholds) waste and raised head in revolt". *Ibid* I pp 143-4. Further, any untoward development in and around the *subah* significant enough to detract provincial authorities' attention was, likewise, followed by disturbances and revolts. For instance, please see *Ibid* I pp 245, 251-2, 255-6, 294-5, 357-61, 370, 394.

5. *Kalimat-i Taiyibat*, p 114; M Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, Delhi 1970 p 147.

sawar rank of 26030 posted permanently in the *subah*.[1] Then, there was established a *thana* in the centre of few villages, but in locales where the populace was perceived to be more turbulent, there was a *thana* in each village.[2] In its efforts to intensify administrative pressure, or else meet the challenge of increasing recalcitrance, the Mughal state raised the strength of "major and minor stations (*makans*) of *faujdars* and the *thanas* from 252 under Akbar to 414 by the close of the seventeenth century.[3] According to the *Mirat* these were the real nerve centre through which the *Nazims* succeeded in exercising effective administrative control over the *subah*.[4] The *Nazim* was assisted by the *faujdars* and the *thanedars* who, at the time of need, had to furnish half of the troops maintained by them against their conditional (*mashrut*) and unconditional *mansabs* for serving directly under the *Nazim's command*.[5] Finally, the troops furnished by the zamindars also served under the command of the *Nazims* and the *faujdars* in addition to policing the areas of their respective possessions.[6]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 266; *Mirat-i Ahmadi' Supplement*, (Persian Text), Baroda, 1930, p 169 *Account* f 16a.

2. *Account*, ff 78a-9b, 425a-7a, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*; pp 188-223, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad which consisted of 193 villages, was divided into 12 groups, called *taraf*. Each *taraf* had a head village and a *faujdar/Thanedar* who was subordinate to the *faujdar-i gird* (*faujdar* of the environ) of the capital. *Ibid*, pp 169-83;.

3. *Account*, f 14b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 26. For the process of establishing additional *thanas* etc, *Ibid*, I pp 143-4, 211, 215, 219; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 171, 190; *Account*, f 19b.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 26, 174; K Kamdar, "*Thanas* in Saurath during Aurangzeb's reign", *Proc I H C*; 1959, pp 318-9.

5. *Account* of 76a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I p 26; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p 169.

6. For details, please see Chapters I (1), (2) and V below.

In order to maintain continual administrative pressure the empire took preventive steps to keep the office always occupied. It was provided that the outgoing *subedar* should leave the office after the arrival of the next incumbent. [1] Emperor Aurangzeb also ordered that the incoming and outgoing *nazims*, and implicitly, the officials associated with them, must perform the ceremony of arrival and departure in a single meeting on the same place, instead of separately as it was done previously.[2]

With a view to bringing to bear extra administrative pressure and ensure effectiveness of the existing one, preventive military expeditions were undertaken into the region, special task force was deputed from the centre, incapable officials were replaced by more competent ones, new fortresses erected and *thanas* were established, or the strength of the existing one was raised on the trouble-spots, complaints of the *riaya* were entertained and necessary redress was provided to remove the immediate cause of discontent.[3]

The provincial administration was divided into two mutually independent halves - the *nizamat* and the *diwani*[4] each being answerable to the sovereign. The purpose of the " ingenious administrative device was to create a most potent and reliable

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 224, 289, 372, 348.

2. *Ibid* I p 372. In case of an official's death in ofice, the establishment of the deceased was retained until the alternative arrangement had been made. *Ibid* I pp 302, 306-7, 326, 345-6, 389.

3. For the representative instances *Ibid* I pp 137-8, 141-2, 148-51, 188, 190-1, 209-10, 217-8, 234, 266, 305, 333-4, 336, 338; Nicolo Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, ed & tr by W Irvine, London 1907, I p 198; P. Saran, *op cit* pp 68, 144 and Appendix to Chapter III, *Ibid* pp 75-80.

4. For details, please see, P Saran, *op cit* pp 157-164, 169-80, 193, 196-97;

check on the highest officials of the province".[1] The administrative system of 'checks and balances' and division of functions designed as a safeguard against the abuse of power and authority, had generally "narrowed down the opportunity of revolts" by officers.[2] Its keynote was the 'careful and vigilant control exercised by the imperial centre' Just how much respect the 'centre could enforce for the system of checks and balances, depended on its strength'.[3] Obviously it was liable to be upset by severe struggle for power at the centre and disaffection in the nobility. Such a struggle and disaffection emerged at the centre during the first quarter of the eighteenth century, gradually breaking down the administrative arrangements which had been so meticulously evolved and enforced with relative tenacity during the preceding century.

CHANGING MILIEU :

The Imperial scene

There seems to have started a downward process of devolution of power from, if not earlier than, the reign of Bahadur Shah. To beginwith, the Mughal emperors lost their commanding position over the state apparatus, particularly the nobility. The power and authority of the emperor came to be grabbed by one or the other group of nobles that exercised it for subserving the factional interests and regardless of the emperor's authority. The imperial power and authority virtually came to be vested with

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1. *Ibid,* pp 180-1.

2. H K Naqvi, "Incidents of Rebellion during the reign of Akbar", *Medieval India, A Miscellany,* II 1952, p 155.

3. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court - 1707-1740,* N Delhi, 3rd edn; pp liii-lv.

the dominant faction of nobles at the court.[1]

Despite the fact that the nobles successfully grabbed the emperor's authority and made him dependent upon them, they failed to provide effective leadership to the empire.[2] Scramble for fertile and easily manageable *jagirs* and the conflict and confontration for *wizarat* widened the rift between sections of the nobility. The recurrent strife of rival factions 'tore the'ruling class apart. The power shifted repeatedly hence no single noble (or group of nobles) could enjoy the power continuously. Also in order to retain and acquire power, the group of nobles had to enter into bargains and make compromises which affected cohesion and effectiveness adversely. Consequently, the nobility and, for that matter, the imperial centre lacked cohesion and uniformity, much less consistency in approach. So everything there was in confusion.[3] In the process the strength of the centre declined consistently; thus it found increasingly beyond its capacity to enforce respect for the administrative norms which were thrown to the winds. Continued friction disorganized and even paralyzed administration at all levels.[4]

The Provincial Scene:

The kind of struggle that had started at the imperial cen-

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1. For a detailed view of these developments, *Ibid*, pp 18, 27-8 & n, 43,60, 64-9, 77 101-14, 134, 136-44, 147-54, 168-71, Zahiruddin Malik, The *Reign of Muhammad Shah, 1719-48*, Asia, 1975 pp 6-12, 57-61, 76-85, 92, 96-7.

2. Satish Chandra, *op cit*, pp 57-60, 82-3, 127-8; Zahiruddin Malik, *op cit* pp 3-18.

3. Satish Chandra, *op cit*, pp. 27-9, 60-1, 116, 168, 197; Zahiruddin Malik, *op cit*, pp 7-9, 12, 79-85; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 48

4. Satish Chandra *op cit*, pp 81, 116; Zahiruddin Malik, *op cit*, p 13.

tre, had its direct bearing on the affairs of the province of Gujarat. The process of devolution of power and authority seems to have gone further downward. The *nazims* gradually grabbed the authority of imperial centre and, due to erosion of the imperial vigil, the power and position of such others who were directly and exclusively dependent upon it. In their turn, the *Nazims* too could not retain control over their sub-ordinates and develop a power base in the face of opposition of the locally strong nobles, the zamindars and the Mrathas. The process of downward devolution of power went on and seems to have stopped at the level of zamindar.

The Nazims:

A definite change in the position and role of *Nazims* is discernable from the available evidence.

Appointments of *Nazims* came to be made not so much in recognition of efficiency, merit or loyalty as much for narrow and immediate factional considerations.[1] Ghazi-ud-din Khan Ferozjang who was considered unfit to render any useful service in battle was, at the instance of Khan-i Dawran Momin Khan, appointed Governor of Gujarat (September 1708) where military operations were the call of the hour.[2] Similarly Saiyid brothers managed appointment of Daood Khan Panni (1713) for "some state reasons", even though he was 'a poor and careless' administrator'[3]. Maharaja Ajeet Singh (1715), a 'careless' administrator who was not even trusted by the emperor, was likewise granted *subedari* on

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1. For earlier period, P Saran *op cit*, pp 159, 167.

2. Satish Chandra *op cit* pp 33-4; Zahiruddin Malik; *op cit* p 27; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 382-3, 385, 388.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 401, 403, 412; The tenure of his predecessor, Shahamat Khan, lasted only three months. Satish Chandra, *op cit*, p 100.

extra-administrative considerations i.e. the Saiyid brothers had entered into a secret understanding to which the king was not a party[1]. The next incumbent, Muiz-ud dawla Haider Quli Khan got the *subedari* in recognition of the effective role he had played in the fall of Saiyids[2]. Nizam-ul-mulk's claim for the *subedari* was, for the emperor, too difficult to resist[3]. Similarly, Mubariz-ul-mulk Sarbuland Khan whose record of service in Kabul had been 'most unsatisfactory', and Maharaja Abhay Singh got the office on extra-administrative considerations[4].

The strong nobles desire' to procure administrative positions in the province and not to move away from the court, gave rise to the practice of governing the *subah* through *naibs*, gradually extended to the province of Gujarat [5]. Thus, Asaf Khan acquired the *subedari* of Gujarat (March 1712), decided to stay at

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 3, Satish Chandra, *op cit* pp 92, 102, 110 and.n. The Maharaja got a second tenure (1719) in recognition of the valued support he had provided to the Saiyid brothers against emperor Farrukhsiyar even though his first governorship had evoked numerous complaints. *Ibid* p 179; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 11-2 21.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 35-8; Satish Chandra *op cit* p 169; Zahiruddin Malik, *op cit*, pp 75-8.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II, pp 45-7; Satish Chandra, *op cit* pp 172-3; Zahiruddin Malik, *op cit* pp 86-7.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 54, 116-8; Zahiruddin Malik, *A Mughal Statesman of the eighteenth Century, Khan-i Dawran*, Asia, 1973, pp 30, 56, Satish Chandra *op cit* pp 197, 206-7; *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp 92-7.

5. The 'practice of plurality ' (i.e. one person holding several appointments simultaneously) also arose as the strongmen at the court came to hold other administrative arrangement in the province *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, 12,15,18, 21, 33, 206-7; Satish Chandra, *op cit* pp 24, 40, 80, 120-1, 206-7. Please see also discussion in the following pages.

the court and govern the *subah* through deputies [1]. Similarly, Khan-i dawran (1717-19), Maharaja Ajit Singh (second tenure - 1719-21) and Maharaja Bakht Singh (1744) did not even visit the *subah* [2]. Impact of running the *subah* with the help of deputies, presumably enjoying low ranks and the indifferent administrators, is not difficult to perceive [3].

Effective performance of the assigned duties could hardly be expected from the *subedars* who were appointed on extra-administrative considerations. Thus Daood Khan Panni (1713-5) did not look after the Governor's establishment well. He did not bother to ensure enforcement of imperial orders concerning transfer of *faujdar*, take the required sureties from the rebellous element whose raids became a 'regular' feature from the period of his

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 396-7. During his tenure which lasted little less than an year, the *subedar* appointed Mohd Beg Khan, Iftekhar Khan and Sarbuland Khan in succession as deputies. The last of them appointed as the *naib's naib* and left the province soon after Jahandar Shah's dethronement. *Ibid*, I p. 397.

2. *Ibid* II pp 12-3, 21, 25-6, 28, 31, 34, 38, 48; Balmukand Mehta, ***Balmukand Nama***, ed., Satish Chandra, Asia, 1972, pp 11-2, 36-7, 49-50. Similarly Nizam-ul-mulk governed the *subah* through a deputy. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 34, 38, 48. Moreover, Haider Quli Khan (April 1721 - October 1722) took more than an year to reach (June, 1722) the *subah* only under great pressure *Reign of Muhammad Shah* pp 172-3). Sarbuland Khan too (May 1724-Oct 1730) reached the *subah* (December, 1725) after more than a year of his appointment. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 54, 79-80. On the other hand some of the *subedars* left the *subah* without seeking prior approval and long before the arrival and appointment of the next incumbent. *Ibid* II pp. 11, 20-1.

3. During the years 1700-43 the centre appointed 15 *subedars*. The *nazims* ruled the *subah* in person for 27 years. During the remaining period it was governed by deputies, interim-governors, or *naib-i subah* whose number comes to 26. Then no *subedar* was appointed during September 1707 to September 1708 and November 1710 to March 1712. Please see the Appendix.

administration.[1] From the time of his *subedari*, the Governors virtually abandoned the policy of defending the *subah* against the Marathas on the frontier, leaving the officials to fight against them single handed[2]. Also the local officials who indulged in infighting were not brought to book[3].

The *subedars* committed illegalities which had damaging effects on the administrative arrangement itself. Thus Ferozjang (1708-10) extorted Rs. one *lakh* out of the revenues of *jagirs* of some eminent nobles, occupied *mahals* of *khalsa* and *paibaqi* and appropriated revenues for himself[4]. Shahamat Khan (1711-2) followed in his foot steps.[5] Muizaddawla (1721-2) occupied *khalsa* and *paibaqi* lands, and the *jagirs* of the *mansabbars* posted in and outside the *subah*.[6] He defied the centre with boldness and 'raised the banner of absolute authority.[7] Muizuddawla's "this innovation remained as his memento and a deed of boldness on the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 27, 341, 403, 412-3.

2. For details, please see discussion in the following pages.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I pp 410-12.

4. *Ibid*, I pp 401-2, 408-9, The court compensated the *mansabdars* by paying them out of the provincial treasury. At the death of Firozjang in office, his *naib* resisted by force auditting and escheat of his master's property. *Ibid*, I pp 292-3, 401-2, 408-9.

5. *Ibid*, I pp 401-2, 408-9. At this time Shahamat Khan held the *subah* independently as no governor was appointed. Likewise Asad Khan's *naib* (1712) and later on Shahamat Khan (1713) appropriated revenues which were disportionate to their claims. Again, the provincial treasury had to bear the burden. *Ibid* I pp 401-2, 409.

6. *Ibid* II p 40.

7. *Ibid*, II pp 45-7. The *nazim* also captured the imperial stable. SH Askari (ed), *Iqbalnamah* by anonymous, N Delhi, 1983 p 101.

part of other *Nazims*".[1]

Nizam-ul mulk's *naib* Hamid Khan also occupied the *Khalsa*, *paibaqi* and *jagir* lands and ceased office records, relieved *diwani* officials of their duties, leaving the *diwan* with no duties to discharge.[2] His successors retained the *diwani* establishment under their control.[3] Hamid Khan and his successors also occupied *sair mahals*, *bait-ul mal* and the mint, thus allowing the *diwan* to exist but in name.[4] As such the provision of 'checks and balancers' as done away with. The Nazim thus emerged as the sole authority at the level of province.[5] In consequence of the seizure of *jagirs* the *mansabdars* posted in the *subah* lost their means of livelilord and 'spent their lives in starvation.[6] The development rendered the office of the provincial *bakhshi* meaningless and deprived the *nazims* of their own base of power in the province.

Behaving almost as sovereigns the *Nazims* from the time of Firozjung levied illegal exactions, particularly from the relatively vulnerable section of populace.

Firozjung imposed a 'slight duty' on the items of trade which were brought from the rural areas to the markets in Ahmadabad[7]. Maharaja Ajit Singh's *naibs* 'extorted many taxes' from the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 45.

2. *Ibid* I p 8 *Ibid* II pp 64, 78, 271-2.

3. *Ibid* I p 8; *Ibid*, II pp 64, 99-100, 118, 136-7, 143, 256-7.

4. *Ibid*, I, p.8; *Ibid*, II, pp.64, 78, 140-1, 256-7, 271-2, 348.

5. The *Mirat* particularly mentions that the matter was brought to the notice of imperial centre. But the centre could not make even an enquiry. *Ibid*, I p 8.

6. *Ibid* II pp 64, 78, 99-100, 118; *Account* f 16a.

7. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 11.

populace of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad during both the tenures of his governorship[1]. Since the *nagar seth*, Kapur Chand, resisted levying of illegal taxes, the *naib-subedar* had him done away with[2]. Similarly, other *subedars* levied illegal exactions from the populace of Ahmadabad and came into clash with the *nagar seths* as also faced the ire of the people on different occasions[3].

Likewise, Hamid Khan "extorted a fixed amount with force' from all sections of people' of Ahmadabad by way of *bewra*, a tax which the author of the *Mirat* had not even heard of earlier[4]. Subsequently all the *Nazims*, without exception, imposed the unpleasant tax and other cesses on various pretexts.[5] The *naib* of Maharaja Abhay Singh mixed copper with silver and gold coins as a result of which the Ahmadabad mint lost its credibility.[6]

Daood Khan Panni imposed a new levy, called *chhattaman* (release) from the holders of the *madad-i ma'sh* lands[7]. Similarly, Maharaja Abhay Singh's *naib* levied a separate cess on them

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1. *Ibid* II p 34.

2. *Ibid* II pp 34-5. For a view of position and role of *nagar seth*, Dwijendra Tripathi and M.J. Mehta,"The Nagarsheth of Ahmadabad: The History of an Urban Institution in a Gujarat City," *Essays in Medieval Indian Economic History, Satish Chandra*, ed., Delhi, 1987 pp. 261-75

3. For instance, please see *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 36 136-9, 170-2. Sarbuland Khan imprisioned the *seth* but the one during Maharaja Abhay Singh's *subedari* fled the town. *Ibid* II pp 136-9, 170-2.

4. *Ibid* II pp 67-8, 92, 95.

5. *Ibid* II pp 67-8, 92-3, 95, 97, 99, 104-6, 136-41, 143, 163-4, 170-1, 190, 204, 256-7.

6. *Ibid* II pp 143, 256-7.

7. *Ibid* I p 413.

and appointed separate *amils* and *tehsildars* for the purpose.[1]

As such the *Subedars* from the time of emperor Bahadur Shah onwand encroached upon all the sources of revenue and levied new taxes and revived the prohibitted ones. The Governors thus encroached upon the emperor's prerogatives, *jagirdas'* rights, and the provincial departments which had virtually been rendered ineffective and defunct.

The *nazims* seem to have, particularly from 1722, refused to share revenues with the imperial centre. Prior to 1722 the *Mirat* mentions the remittance of revenues to the emperors and the imperial court.[2] But during the post 1722 years the only reference appears in 1734 when the court commanded then *naib-subedar* Ratan Singh Bhandari to remit the revenues. The *naib* remitted Rs. 1,23,000 out of which Rs 75000/- were contributed by the *mutasaddi* of Khanbat only.[3] The remaining claim on *jagirs* (i.e. of the *mansabdars* posted at the imperial centre) was "never complied with".[4] At a later date (1747) the emperor ordered the *subedar* and the port officer of Bharuch, each to remit a meagre sum of Rs 10,000 but neither of the twoo obeyed.[5]

It has already been discussed that every *subedar* from Ibrahim Khan (1705) onward resorted to such activities as under normal circumstances would have invited imperial wrath leading to punishment of varying magnitude. But now the only sword of pun-

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1. *Ibid* II pp 141-2; for similar references, *Ibid* I p 364; *Ibid* II pp 40, 45, 64, 78, 99-100, 118, 136-7, 256-7.

2. *Ibid* II pp 385-6, 401-2; *Ibid*, II pp 4, 19, 24, 27, 30-3, 37-8.

3. *Ibid* II pp 162, 167.

4. *Ibid* II p 167.

5. *Ibid* II pp 380-1.

ishment the imperial centre wielded was dismissal and even the burden of ousting him from office came to lay with the noble appointed to replace him.

Some of the *subedars*, during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, left the *subah* without having been served with the transfer orders. Ibrahim Khan (1705 - Sept 1707) left the *subah* after resigning the post on his own accord 'for leading retired life' without prior permission.[1] Sarbuland Khan, the *naib* of *subedar (wazir)* Asad Khan, (May 1712-13), nominated his *naib* and left (Feb, 1713) 'due to exigency of time',[2] which seems to be the fall of *wazir* with the rise of Farrukhsiyar to power in January 1713.[3] Likewise Shahamat Khan (May 1713-July 1713), Daood Khan Panni (Aug. 1713-July 1717) and Shams ud-dawla Khan-i dawaran's (May 1717-18) *naib* Haider Quli Khan appointed their respective *naibs* on their own accord and entrusting the charge to them left the *subah* well before the transfer orders were served on them.[4]. It was in violation of the long established norm govern-

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1. *Ibid*, I p 381. It seems that the Khan found it inconvenient to serve under the new regime. *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p. 5.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 397, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah* p 10.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 349, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p 10.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 401, 413, , *Ibid*, II p. 20. It may be pointed out that Shahamat Khan (as *naib*) was transfered for accommodating Mohammad Beg Khan, an old associate of Asad Khan who enjoyed supreme position at the court. *Ibid*, I p 395. As *subedar* he was transferred at Kokaltash's instance (Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics* p 32, 70n). Daood Khan Panni and Shamsuddawlah were transferred to accommodate Maharaja Ajit Singh for subserving factional interests. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 11, 21 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics* pp. 97, 101-2, 145, 147 *The Reign of Muhammadshah*, pp 11-3, 19, 20.

ing transfers[1] and standing imperial orders specifically meant for the *subedars* of Gujarat as mentioned earlier.

Maharaja Ajit Singh (1715-1717) appears to be the only *subedar* whose oppressive acts finally led to his dismissal[2].

Shamsuddaulah Khan-i Dawran, the next incumbent, managed his ouster secretly through Abdul Hamid Khan (ex. *diwan*) who bore enmity towards the *Raja*.[3] During his second tenure (1719-21) the Maharaja's *naib* had been disobeying imperial authority, maladministering the affairs and oppressing the people; his dismissal, however came in the wake of the Saiyid's fall for the *Raja* had always been their staunch ally.[4] Haider Quli Khan, the next incumbent managed *Naib Subedar* Anup Singh Bhandari's expulsion with the help of Mehar Ali Khan a leading local noble (ex-*diwan*)

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1. The *farmans* of appointment or transfer were sent through a *sazawal* whose duty it was to announce the news to the *Nazim* and escort him to his new charge asking the outgoing incumbent to make over charge to the new arrival. P Saran *Provincial Government*, pp 163-64.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p. 11; Satish Chandra, *Parties and politics*, pp. 137n, 179; The charge of oppression on Ajit seems to have been of old standing. On August 22, Sept., 5, and 27, 1715 there were complaints that the Rajputs of Ajit Singh were laying their hands on the royal *mahals* and the *jagirs* of the royal *mansabdars*. The *mutasaddis* and the *jagirdars* dared not say anything as the news writers were in collusion with the Raja. The Rajput sources attributed the cause of dismissal to his friendship with Saiyids. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p 137.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 11-2. At the time the news was received, the Maharaja was away in Dwarka. Abdul Hamid Khan occupied the capital in his absence and placed it in the state of preparedness. The Raja was further dissuaded from his design of war by Nahir Khan. *Ibid.*

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 31-33, 35-8, Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics* pp 170, 179.

with whom he had come into confontration.[1].

Haider Quli Khan who had turned a rebel from the begining of his stay in the *subah* (July 1722-Feb 1723) was, likewise, determined to resist his transfer. But when he "reviewed his companions" he found them "not powerful enough" to fight Nizam-ul mulk who headed a 'large army and heavy artillery'.[2]

Nizam-ul mulk was transferred after he had been declared a rebel.[3] His *naib*, Hamid Khan was ousted by Shujat Khan, the deputy Governor under Sarbuland Khan (1724-30). [4] With the assistance of the Marathas, Hamid Khan reoccupied Ahmadabad defeating and killing the leading imperialist in action. [5]

Sarbuland Khan could succeed in expelling Hamid Khan with the active support of the local officials who were promised positions and promotions.[6] In his turn, Sarbuland Khan turned a rebel (December 1725 - October 1730) [7]. Even though he had resigned (1728) but he was transferred (1730) only after he fell in disfavour with Amir-ul umra Shamsuddawlah. The dismissed *subedar* put up armed resistance but failed to resist Maharaja Abhay Singh who was assisted, among others, by the leading officials of the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II,d pp 37-40. Bhandari had to jump out of window of the fort to save his skin from the furious populace of Ahmadabad. *Ibid*, II p 40.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 45-7.

3. *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp 89-90, 93.

4. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, II, pp 54-55.

5. *Ibid*, II, pp 58-79.

6. *Ibid*, II p 79-81, 82-86.

7. *Ibid*, II p 91-94, 99-101.

region.[1]

Likewise Maharaja Abhay Singh and his *naib*, Ratan Singh Bhandari defied the imperial authority and oppressed the people from the very beginning of their administration.[2] His transfer was contemplated only after he fell in disfavour with his patron, *Amir-ul umra*, and the latter found in Momin Khan (*mutasaddi* of Khambat and enemy of the *naib-subedar*) a candidate who could, as desired, oust the Bhandari who had already annoyed the leading local nobles.[3] Thus Momin Khan, a candidate picked up from the region itself, succeeded, unassisted by the centre, in ousting the *naib* after a fight of one year with the assistance of local officials and the Marathas.[4] The formal *farman* appointing him *Subedar* was issued only after he had occupied Ahmadabad.[5]

None of the three *subedars* appointed subsequently could assume charge in the face of opposition put up by a local noble, Jawanmard Khan Babi who had occupied the capital during the crisis that followed Momin Khan's death (Feb. 1743).[6]

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1. *Ibid*,; II pp 118-28, 129-30.

2. *Ibid* II pp 133-41, 157, 162, 164-5, 170-72

3. *Ibid*, II pp 183, 195-6; For details, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp 219-23.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 195-7, 212-27, 231-6, *The Reign of Mukhammad Shah* pp. 219-23; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*; Orient Longmans, 1957, II pp. 459-65.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. pp 242-3; *The Reign of Muhammad Shah* p 124 M.S. Commissariat, *op.cit.* II p 476

6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II pp 277-8, 302-3, 312, 314-5, 321-2, 326-31, 374-5. At the time Jawanmard Khan Babi occupied Ahmadabad, the town folk were happy to see that the man of the region had come to power: *Sakna-i baldah umuman b' tasawwur-o-khayal een k'al hal Nazim hum-watni shude khushiha namude. Ibid*, II p 312.

The centre as such failed to field a suitable condidate strong enough to oust Jawanmard Khan Babi, a *faujdar* from the region itself who had thus risen to the highest seat of provincial power in his own right and continued to hold it until (1753) the surrender of Ahmadabad to the Marathas.

Thus, in the down ward process of devolution of imperial authority and power the noble's dominant faction at the court was replaced, at the provincial level, by the Governor(s) whose authority was finally grabbed by sub-ordinate official (*faujdari*) who, obviously, commanded power in the region in his own right.

Despite their successful moves to acquire hold over all the provincial departments and the determination, particularly from Muizuddawla onward, to retain the *subah*, none of the duely appointed *subedar* could succeed. The cause appears to be worth probing into the available evidence suggests that the *Nazims* could not pool required resources even to regularly pay salary to thier soldiers, much less develop a strong financial base. From the time of Sarbuland Khan each *Nazim* was confronted with the same difficulty.[1] In the year 1750-51 the entire income of the *subedar* from all sources, according to the *Mirat*, stood at a meagre sum of Rs four *lakh* only[2] - the amount was not even equal to the income from the *haveli* Ahmadabad of the opening years of the century. It was despite the fact that the *Nazims* had encroached upon all the legitimate sources of income and levied illegal exactions whenever and wherever they could so.

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1. *Ibid*, II pp 86, 93-5, 99, 107, 110-4, 116-9, 129-31, 139, 163, 170-2, 193-4, 234-5, 262, 278, 284-6, 300-1, 310, 337-9, 410-13, Muhammad Kashim Khawfi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II Bib. Ind; Calcutta, 1874, p 971.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 396-7.

Among the factors which led to a sharp decline in revenues the one appears to be the Maratha occupation of lands in Gujarat.[1] But the income also declined even from those areas which were still under Mughal control. It would also appear from the available evidence that the fall in revenues was also caused by frequent transfers (in early years) of officials and internal strifes.[2] More particularly may be mentioned the fact that some Mughal officials failed to effect assessment and collection of revenues whereas the more competent and strong ones refused to share their resources with the *Nazims*.[3] Moreover, the *Nazims* own capacity to effect collection of revenues suffered set backs in the face of increasing opposition put up by the zamindars who were emerging as the real authority at village level.[4]

The Faujdars:

The *faujdars* seem to have followed in the foot prints and stepped into the shoes of *Nazims* at *sarkar/ pargana* level. They too tried to corner all administrative powers. But only a few of them who could stand in their own right, could succeed.

To beginwith, the criterion of selection of *faujdars* as it came to be influenced by extraneous considerations, underwent a change. Thus Kunwar Abhay Singh and later on Kunwar Bakht Singh, were appointed *faujdars* of *sarkar* Saurath and *sarkar* Pattan

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1. For references see discussion in the following pages.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 401-2, *Ibid* II pp 2, 12, 54-8, 82-3, 108-9, 234-6.

3. *Ibid* I pp 403-5, *Ibid* II 241; For further references on the officials' incapacity, Chapter IV below. For the process and outcome of the officials' refusal to share income with the *Nazims* see discussion in the following pages and Chapter VII below.

4. For details, see Chapters II, IV and VI.

during the period of Maharaja Ajit Singh and Maharaja Abhay Singh's *subedari*[1] Both of them governed the affairs through their deputies.[2] Likewise Bakhshi-ul mamalik Qamar-ud din acquired port-officership of Surat, and Amir-ul umra Shamsuddawla's father-in law got the *faujdari* of Saurath.[3] Such appointtees discharged their administrative responsibilities through deputies.[4] Moreover, the principle of heredity became a common, if not universal practice as the administrative positions came to be usually granted to son after father.[5] But, so far as our knowledge goes, the *naibs* as were deputed from the centre failed to retain the position once a noble commanding influence locally stood up in arms against them.[6]

The practice of cornering more than one official positions in one person acquired momentum during the first half of the eighteenth century. The administrative practice of granting

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 401, *Ibid*, II pp 41-2, 196-7. Kunwar Abhay Singh's men resorted to plundering traders and caravans. His *naib* also resisted his transfer under the Maharaja's instigation *Ibid* II pp 8-9. For similar instance of politically motivated appointment and its consequence, *Ibid* I pp 347, 374. It may be recalled that Aurangzeb prefered to appoint *faujdars* who "enjoyed respect" in and" communicated with the inhabitants of" the concerned area. *Ruqat*, letter nos. XIX, XXXVI-VII, pp 24-6, 38-41 addressed to the Governor of Gujarat

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 401; *Ibid*, II pp. 8, 41-2, 196-7

3. *Ibid* II, p 37, also *Ibid*, II p 48. For similar instances *Ibid*, 41,47-8,101,103,163,166-7 245 *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp 206-7.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 37-8, 41-2, 47-9, 101, 162-63, 166, 246.

5. *Ibid*, II pp. 30, 101, 117 132, 163, 201; Chapter VII below;, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah* pp 206-7.

6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 9-11, 166-7, 196-7, 246-7. For the governance directly by the appointees and then their continuity in possession, see Chapter VII, below.

faujdari rights to the *jagirdars* crept into the eighteenth century.[1] But the practice in the *subah* came to an abrupt end with the confiscation of all *jagirs* by the *Nazims*.[2]

In violation of the well established norm of keeping the revenue matters independent of the executive during the closing years of his reign, Aurangzeb appointed (1699) one Mir Muhammad Beg as *faujdar* and *amin* of Dholqa.[3] From Bahadurshah's reign (1707-11), the revenue positions (i.e. *amil*, *amin*, *mutasaddi*) came to be frequently associated with the executive (i.e. *faujdar*, *Kotwal*) officials as a matter of routine administrative practice.[4] The *faujdars* aggrandised their positions further by contracting *ijara* rights.[5] As such the *faujdars* followed in *Nazims*' footprints at *sarkar / pargana* level. The system of 'checks and balances' so for as it was based on the principle of 'division of power' was thus rendered meaningless at *pargana* and *sarkar* level also.

More so as the *faujdars* thus vested with extra authority over revenue matters, also came to enjoy immunity from administrative actions. There is evidence to show that the imperial

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1. *Ibid*, I pp 226, 230, 231-2, 235, 274, 276, 279, 306-7, 328.

2. For references see discussion in the preceding pages.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 342. Emperor Aurangzeb, according to the *Mirat*, had sanctioned the *faudari* of Vijapur to Safdar Khan Babi (1703 A.D)" as he had no relation with *Diwani*." (*Ibid*, I.p. 355). It may be inferred that the *faujdars* were not desired even to be remotely linked with the financial affairs.

4. *Ibid*, I pp 304, 390-1 (*Kotwal* and *Karori*, *Faujdar* and *amin*) *Ibid*, II, p 48, 88, 91, 105-6 (*Faujdar* and *Amin*), *Ibid*, II p 6 (*Naib-faujdar*, *mutasaddi* and*amin*), *Ibid*, II, pp. 264, 270 (*Faujdar* and *amil*); also see *Ibid*, II pp 1-2, 6-8, 13-4, 38-42.

5. Please see Chapter, IV.

authority during its heyday took action, such as dismissal from service, reduction in *mansab*, imposition of fines, confiscation of property, imprisionment etc, against the erring officials.[1] But during his closing years, Emperor Aurangzeb showed leniency in taking actions against such officials.[2] Subsequently, the Mughal officials who indulged in infighting, embezzled state revenues, refused to settle accounts and resisted audits and transfers continued to hold positions and hardly faced punitive action.[3] Some of them who had indulged in the acts of gross indiscipline were , on the contrary, favoured with promotions and other administrative assignments because of the patronage extended by a strong noble at the imperial court.[4]

With the passing of the entire administrative authority of the *subah* into *Nazims'* hands as discussed above, the Imperial as well as the Governor's authority and power came to be gradually devolved upon the *faujdars*.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 142-43, 209-10, 217-9, 234-5, 266, 305, 333-34, 336, 350, 352, 355, 371-72; also see, P Saran, *Provincial Government*, pp. 180, 186-888 and n; M. Athar Ali, *Nobility under Aurangzeb*, pp. 149-50; *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p. 204 and n.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p. 261-2, For leniency shown against the oppressive *jagirdar*; *Ibid*, I p 263, 275, for the leniency shown towards a noble who induged in exacting money illegally, *Ibid*, I, p. 338; towards levying unpaid labour; *Ibid*, I. pp 266, 360-61;towards *mansabdars* on not maintaining required troops. M. Athar Ali, *Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, p. 150.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 392-3, 402-3, *Ibid*, II. pp. 14-5, 31-3, 39-41.

4. See for instance, Muhammad Beg Khan (ex-*naib subedar*) resisted auditing but was favoured with the position of *mutasaddi* and then *subedari* because of Asad Khan, *wakil* with whom he had "old relation." *Ibid*, I pp. 392-4; also see *Ibid*, II pp 41, 47-8.

The prevailing political situation--internal strifes and Maratha invasion--placed the local officials in general and locally influential nobles in particular, in a highly bargainable position which they endeavoured to utilize for attaining and retaining administrative and other positions.

Since each *subedar*-designate particularly from the time of Nizam-ul mulk's *subedari* was called upon to oust the *subedar*-in power, the former (for wänt of effective imperial assistance) had to enlist support of the locally influential and well informed nobles.[1] Thus, for instance, Salabat Muhammad Khan and Jawanmard Khan Babi agreed to assist *Subedar* Mubariz-ul-Mulk against Hamid Khan only after they extorted a promise for the grant of *faujdaris* of Viramgaon (Biramganm) and Pattan.[2] Later on Jawanmard Babi and Muhammad Babi procured through Maharaja Abhay Singh, under a similar situation, *watandari*(?) of Badnagar (Vadnagar) and *naib faujdari* of another *pargana.*[3] Likewise Momin Khan "induced and persuaded" Jawanmard Khan Babi (junior) "to assume charge of *pargana* Pattan" on 'condition of confederation with the former against the *Subedar*-in- office.[4]

In addition to their procurement of offices by extending valued support to the *subedars*, some of the local nobles success-

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1. Thus, the Babis ' assistance was sought because they were "well informed and in accord with the people" of Gujarat *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 86. For details about the Babis M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II pp 169-70, 405, 435. Please see also Chapter VII below.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p. 86. The two nobles had been close associates of Hamid Khan and now were pursuaded to change side, *Ibid*, II pp 69, 73, 78.

3. *Ibid*, II pp 133, 145; also *Ibid* II pp 119-20, 132.

4. *Ibid*, II, pp 196, 239.

fully captured offices fraudently and by applying their military might.[1] The power of purse was also put to effective use for acquiring hold over administrative apparatus, as in Surat, and for procuring orders of appointment as in Palanpur, Bharuch, Cambay etc.[2] Some of them also contracted *ijara* rights and acquired administrative position on *'bilmuqte'* basis and stronger amongst them, tried to retain the position even after the expiry of the period of contract.[3]

As regards the consistency in their attitude towards the Governors, the nobles in the *Subah* may, broadly, be categorized into three groups: There were the nobles like Muhammad Iraj (*Faujdar-amin* of Dholqa under Mubariz-ul Mulk) Himmat Dil Khan, Zanbil Khan (*Faujdar-i gird* and *amin*) and other who consistently stood by and assisted the *subedar*-in-office.[4] These officials emulated and even surpassed the Governors, their patrons, in assessing the land revenue arbitrarily, levying cesses under various pretexts and imposing fines etc.[5] Under the *Nazims* pa-

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1. For details, Chapter VII below; also *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 82-3.

2. For details, see discussion under the *Nawabis* of Surat, Bharuch, Cambay and Palanpur, Chapter VII below.

3. For details, *Ijarahdars*, Chapter IV below.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 88, 93-4, 104-6, 164, 256-7.

5. *Ibid*, II pp. 94-5, 105-6, 164-5, 256, 260 J H Gene, D.R. Banaji (ed.) *The Gaikwards of Baroda, English Documents*, Vol. I (1720-68) Bombay, n.d. (Hereafter *English Documents*) Letters dated 4th May 1725, 22nd January 1734, 20th May 1743, 16th February, 1744.

tronage these officials enjoyed immunity from punishment.[1] As these officials continued to assist the *Nazim* even when the latter resisted his ouster from office, their tenure depended on his pleasure and ended with that of the *Nazim*.[2]

But then, the officials like Abdullah Beg (*naib-mutasaddi*) of Bharuch under *Mutasaddi-subedar* Mubariz-ul mulk) continued to hold the office even after the *subedar's* expulsion. Once the *subedar* was placed under transfer, the *naib-mutasaddi* withdrew his support and did not participate in the battle of resistance fought by Mubariz-ul mulk. To ensure his continuity against the imperial desire and counteract the new *subedar* Maharaja Abhay Singh's design, the Beg obtained a *sanad* of deputyship from Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah whom thus he chose as his new master.[3]

In the third category may be counted the Babis and their ilk who also assisted the *Subedar* in power but with a difference.After making due bargains they threw in their lot invariably with the *subedar*-designate and actively assisted in his efforts to oust the dismissed *subedar* from office.[4] Unassisted by the imperial centre the *subedar* had to lean heavily on their support for assuming charge and running the administration

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1. Our sources do not speak of such actions as having been taken on the basis of their oppressive acts against any of them. Instead they are continously noticed in office until the *Nazim* himself was dismissed. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 94-5, 105-6, 164-5, 250, 260.

2. *Ibid*, II pp. 94-5, 105-6, 164-65.

3. *Ibid*, II pp. 135-6. For details please see 'Nawab of Bharuch' Chapter VII below; A.K. Forbes,, *Hindoo Annals of Western India*, (*Rasmala*) Reprint, New Delhi, 1973, pp 362-63.

4. For references see discussion under Nawabi of Radhanpur, Chapter VII below.

of the *subah*.[1]

From the time of Maharaja Abhay Singh's period of *subedari*, the position of local officials vis a vis the Governor underwent a further change. The Maharaja's *naib* alienated and annoyed most of them who, in turn, refused to serve him.[2] Henceforth the leading amongst them like Muhammad Ashraf Khan Ghorni (*faujdar* of Barasinwra), Jawanmard Khan Babi (*faujdar* of Pattan and Viramgaon) Zorawar Khan Babi (*faujdar* and *watandar* of Vadnagar agreed to serve only after they had "settled expenses" with the *subedars* "by way of daily expenses" for their soldiers and thus tended to turn mercenaries, aligning the same way with the Marathas as and when it served their purpose.[3]

The alienation of the nobles that commanded respect and power in the region by *Naib-subedar* Ratan Singh Bhandari, cost the Maharaja his *subedari*. Momin Khan (*faujdar* of Khambat) who bore ill-will towards the Bhandari, rallied round him other annoyed officials and with their help expelled the *naib* out of office.[4] Subsequently the centre appointed three *subedars*, one after another, but none of them succeeded in assuming charge of the *subah*, as Jawanmard Khan Babi, strongest of the local nobles,[5] had captured power after Momin Khan's death (1743) and

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1. For *subedars'* keenness for registering their support, *Ibid*, II, pp 119, 196.

2. *Ibid*, II, pp 186, 191, 196.

3. *Ibid*, II, pp 257, 288-9, 327-8.

4. *Ibid*, II pp. 184, 191, 196, 236.

5. Thus Fakhruddawlah, the *subedar*-designate, had sent *sanad-i nayabat* without naming anyone with the condition "that anyone of the provincial *mansabdar*... able to discharge responsibility" could be appointed *naib*. As "there was none who could hold the office", Jawanmard Khan wrote down his own name as *naib*. *Ibid*, II p. 322.

proved too strong to be ousted by the imperial nominees.[1] As such the actual power of whatever had remained of it with the imperialists, passed into and came to stay with the locally influential section of provincial officials.[2]

The developments discussed above must have, cumulatively, disturbed the administrative arrangements, disrupted continuity and consistency of administrative control and eroded its intensity.

Struggle For Power

The Marathas:

The Maratha penetration into Gujarat that had started during Shivaji's times, became a common feature with the opening of the eighteenth century and culminated in the conquest of the provincial capital, Ahmadabad in 1753. But well before the fall of Ahmadabad, the province had, as discussed above, ceased to be an administrative concern of the imperial centre as its authority had come to be devolved practically upon its own officials. Acting as a catalyst, the Maratha presence accelerated the process of deterioration which had already set in and hastened the extinction of Mughal power from the *subah*.

The Maratha conquest of the *subah* was the consequence of their endeavours spread over more than four decades. The phased conquest may broadly be divided into three stages as discussed below:

During the first phase (C. 1701-1724) the Marathas seem to have, by and large, remained confined to south Gujarat which

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1. *Ibid*, II, pp 302, 314-8, 321-2, 326-30, 374-5.
2. For references and details, Chapter VII below.

included *sarkars* of Ramnagar, Nadot and Surat.[1] The Marathas did make some headway during the period but it is quite important from other angle also.

In the first place the imperial defence strategy for the province seems to have undergone a vital change. During the years 1701-12 the reigning emperors endeavoured to deny the Marathas an entry into the *Subah* by fighting them on the frontiers, ensuring availability of necessary resources for taking preventive steps by the Governors and other officials who were specifically directed to do so.[2]

During the years 1713-24 the *mutasaddis* of Surat, and not the *subedars*, are mentioned as fighting defensive battles against the Marathas well inside the Surat *sarkar*, instead of on the frontiers of the *subah*.[3] It seems the imperial authorities had virtually abandoned the policy of defending the *subah* on the border after 1712 [4]. Secondly the set-backs which the Mughals suffered at Marathas' hands affected the provincial administrative control and the imperial credibility adversely. The Maratha forces inflicted a crushing defeat, imprisoning a number of

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1. *Kalimat-i Tayyibat*, pp. 11, 36, 40,46, 57, 61; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 342, 347, 351-57, 359-64, 373, 377-78, 381-2, 385, 387, 392-3, 394, 397; *Ibid*, II pp 27, 52-3, 58-9; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 209-10, 212, 386, 388.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 342, 351, 360, 362, 367, 370, 373, 381-2, 385, 387, 391, 392, 394 397; *Kalimat-i Tayyibat*, pp, 11. 36, 40, 46, 57, 61.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 29, 52-3, 58-9, M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 389, 391, 401, 402.

4. During this period our sources do not mention the reigning emperors issuing instruction as for the preceding years. Instead, the *mutasaddi* and *giledar* of Surat are shown as indulging in in-fighting and going un-punished. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 402-3, 410; *Akhbarat*, No. 2099, dt ? Jamadi I, 4th Ry Farrukhsiyar.

officials, *mansabadars*, including the commander of the Mughal army, the *naib-subedar* at Baba piyara pass near Surat in 1705.[1] The battle not only exposed the deplorable state of Mughal *mansabdars* but also shattered their morale.[2] The defeat, moreover, caused ' a great commotion and vast relaxation in the administrative control leading to ' disorder and anarchy'.[3] The Kolis, in general raised disturbance and plundered Baroda.[4] The zamindars of Rajpipla and Jagat rose in rebellion.[5] A similar situation prevailed in the *subah* following Maratha attack of 1707 that was made soon after emperor Aurangzeb's death.[6]

Further, *Naib-mutasaddi* of Surat Sheikh-ul Islam's defeat (1718-19) opened the flood gates of Maratha's "repeated annual incursions" into *Sarkar* of Surat.[7] Pilaji Gaikwad fixed upon the hilly country in the neighbourhood of Songadh, befriended the zamindar of Rajpipla and secured his consent to erect small forts between Nadot (Nandot) and Sonpara (Sagpara), attached to his cause the Bhils and Kolis of the neighbourhood and finally (1719)

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 359-67.

2. Many of the *mansabdars*, had not even the horses to ride' and could gather 2000 troops as against the required strength of 25000 *Ibid* I p 361. The *mansabdars* were "so seized with horror that they are unable to perform duties as *faujdars*" noted the *Mirat*. *Ibid*, I, p. 367.

3. *Ibid*, I pp 366-8.

4. *Ibid*, I p 366

5. *Ibid*, I, pp 370-71.

6. *Ibid*, I, 377.

7. *Ibid*, II p 27.

secured from the Bhils the hill fort of Songadh.[1] With the defeat of Momin Khan, the Port officer of Surat in 1723-24, the Maratha ascendancy in *sarkar* Surat increased further.[2]

The second stage begins with the year 1724. In this year the Marathas entered other parts of Gujarat and their incursions may be said to have continued henceforth from year to year without a break till they secured mastery over the *subah*.[3] More particularly Hamid Khan, deputy of Nizam-ul-mulk, in the wake of his master's dismissal and his expulsion, allied himself with the Marathas for recapturing the *subah* and surrendered to them the *chauth* and *sardesmukhi* thus inflicting a severe blow on imperial authority in the province.[4] Subsequently none of the *subedars* could resist the Maratha claims to *chauth* and *sardesmukhi* successfully.[5] The imperial court, however, did not (technical-

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1. M.S. Commisariat, *History of Gujarat*, II p 401 James Campbell etc. (ed.) *Bombay Gazetteer*, II (Surat and Baroda) Bombay, 1892, pp. 168-69. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, (II, pp. 52-3) does not mention the year and the act of befriending the Bhils and Kolis. Elsewhere the work however speaks of the Kolis etc. as rising into rebellion, against the Mughals and thus lending tacit support to the Mratha in Surat-Baroda region. *Ibid*, II, pp 89, 144-45, *English Documents*, Letter dated 10th April 1725; By this date the Marathas had imposed a *dakhla* tax @ Rs 2.5 per cent "on all goods (on which) the king receives custom". Also see *Rasmala*, pp 360-61.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p. 52-3; M S Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II p 402.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 58-64, 78; M S Commissariat *History of Gujarat*, II p 402 *Iqbalnamah*, pp 118-19.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 52-64, 78 M S Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II pp 411-16.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 92-3, 157, 160-1 RBG Chimmanji, D.B. Parasnis (ed.) *Selections fom the Satara Raj And The Peshwa Diaries-I, Shahu Chhatripati*, 1907 Poona, Doc No. 105, p 47. *English Documents*, dt 7th April 1731. MS Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II pp 425-7, 438-40. pp 118-22.

ly) approve of the *Nazims* act of surrendering the *chauth* for quite sometime as will be pointed out a little later.

As regards the defence mechanism, the imperial authority continued to rely, almost exclusively, upon the *subedars* who were left to cope with the situation as best as they could.[1] Lacking resources and determination, the *subedars* entered into agreement with the Marathas, fighting them only when they were hit directly.[2] The *subedars* did not come to the rescue even of such *pargana*/sarkar level officials as were attacked by the Marathas for levying *mal-i amani* (also called *khandni*, meaning security-money) or *chauth* or for capturing the area itself.[3] The centre thus left the *subedars* to cope with the situation single handed who in turn passed on the responsibility to local officials. Every official thus chose his own course of action independently of others.[4]

Having successfully enforced their claims to *chauth* and *sardesmukhi*, the Marathas endeavoured to make outright annexations. In addition to their territorial acquisitions in South Gujarat they made prized acquisitions in central, eastern and northern parts of the *subah*.[5] Thus during the second phase the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 79-81, 87-8, 160-1, Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p 188., *The Reign of Muhammad Shah* pp. 118-24,

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 92-3, 150, 160-61, 164-5, 186-7; *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 48-51,

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II,pp 52-3 55, 58-9, 62, 64-6, 68-9, 89-90, 99-100,101-2, 157, 160-4 167-8 MS Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II pp. 518, 550.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 52-3, 55, 58-9, 62, 64-6, 68-9, 74-81, 89-90; *English Documents*, pp 8-9; M.S. Commissariat. *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 417-8,426,447,451, 453, 474; See also Chapter VII below.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *II p 82-5, 90-102 186-9, 263. M S Commissariat*, History of Gujarat, *II 426. 437.*

Mutghal defence mechanism had broken down and the Marathas had become a power that had to be reckoned with in the affairs of the region.[1]

The third stage begins with Momin Khan's agreeing to share with the Marathas as equal partners the income from the entire *subah* and the administration of the provincial capital in 1736.[2] The development was facilitated by the half hearted decesion, as also inability of the imperial court to oust the then *Subedar* in Office.[3] Not strong enough to undertake the task, Momin Khan allied himself with the Marathas to fulfil the pre-condition for obtaining the *Subedari*.[4] Thus there began the joint Mughal-Maratha rule (1737). With the issue of the *farman*, the Marathas gained formal imperial recognition of their new position though the Maratha - Momin agreement carried tacit approval of the court from the very beginning.[5] The same arrangement, it may be mentioned, continued till after the close of the period of the present study.

In the light this discussion, it may be suggested that the process of Maratha conquest was gradual, spreading over a little less than half a century. The process seems to have been rendered easy and its speed accelerated by the prevailing factionalism,

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1. Please see particularly the imperial advice (1737) asking Mominod Khan to behave well with the Marathas. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, II. pp. 195-6.*

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 195-96, 219-20; MS Commissariat, *History of Gujarat* II p 460; *Historical selections from Baroda State Records*, I (1724-68), Baroda, 1934, p. 19 Doc No. 23 dt. 20 May 1737.

3. Mirat-i Ahmadi, II. pp 195-6, 198-212.

4. *Ibid*, II. pp. 195-6, 198-9.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 261, 273-4, The *Reign of Muhammad Shah* p 125.

internal dissensions and strifes among the Mughal nobles. Also the role played by the zamindars of the province in the struggle for supremacy does not appear to be insignificant.

The Zamindars

In the ongoing multi-cornered struggle for power in general and the Mughal-Maratha struggle for supremacy in particular, the role of zamindars seems to have been detrimental to the imperial interest.

In the year 1707, the *Mirat*, for the last time, notices the Rajputs and Kolis to have turned up to serve the Mughals against the Marathas.[1] In another instance *desai* of Viramgaon is also mentioned espousing the imperial cause when the place was attacked by the Marathas.[2]

On the other hand, there are more instances to show the zamindars serving the Maratha interest. When the Mughal forces pressed the Marathas hard (1725-26) the Kolis of Kaparbanj provided them with shelter.[3] A little later they were sheltered in the zamindari land of Ali Mohan.[4] The zamindars of Rajpipla, Sonpara and Sadarbisal allowed the Marathas to erect fortresses.[5] Moreover, the *muqaddam* of Padra, *desai* of Viramgaon, Kolis of Thasra and Kaparbanj rendered valuable help to the Marathas for occupying Baroda, Viramgaon and Kaparbanj.[6] Likewise the zamindar

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 378. Leading ones among them had ceased to serve from the year 1701 itself. PLease see Chapter II below.

2. Please see *desais*, Chapter IV below.

3. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, II, p. 89.

4. *Ibid*.

5. *Ibid*, II, pp. 27, 52-3.

6. *Ibid*, II, pp. 167-8, 186-7, *Rasmala* p. 363.

of Lunawara helped Marathas plunder Birpur town.[1] The administrator of the affairs of the zamindars of Jhabua is noticed in the Maratha camp against Mughals in 1724-25.[2] It may also be mentioned that the Kolis and Rajputs are sometimes noticed as ravaging and occupying Mughal lands, and particularly after the Mughals suffered setbacks.[3]

Even though the instances showing the zamindars espousing Maratha cause are not many, however the very fact that they ceased to serve the empire[4] is worthy of consideration. Here it seems important to point out that from the point of view of the zamindars the emerging conditions were quite favourable: The Marathas' very presence in and around the *subah* must have meant that the Mughals would be much less able to concentrate on the front opened by the zamindars; then the imperial administrative control was declining and its consistency being disrupted. The shrinking Mughal authority was not simultaneously being replaced by the Marathas. The situation thus being propitious for advancing their own cause, the zamindars grasped and endeavoured to capitalize it.[5]

In their endeavour to do so the zamindars seem to have emerged as the ones who exercised state authority and power at the level of village, the lowest point where the power had thus come to be devolved.

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1. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, II p. 338.

2. *Ibid*, II. p 65.

3. *Ibid, I, pp. 359, 366, 377,* Ibid, *II pp. 27, 95-6, 144-45.* English Documents, *dt. 23rd April 1725, p. 7* Akhbarat *No. 1448, 21 Shawwal, 4th Ry Farrukhsiyar, B.N. Rieu, "Another letter of Maharaja Abhay Singh about the murder of Pilaji",* Proc. IHC, *1943, pp. 284.*

4. For details, Chapters II & VI below.

5. For details Chapter II IV VI and VII below.

Appendix

Subedars of Gujarat (1700-50)

S.No	*Subedars* with tenure	*Subedar's* period of actual stay in *subah*	S.No.	Interim/*naib subedars*/*naib-i subah*	Period of administration of *naib* etc.	References
1.	Shuja't Khan (1685-1701)	1685-1701	-	---	----	*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 311, 345
2.	Prince Mohd. Azam (July 1701-Nov. 1705.)	July 1701-Nov. 1704	1.	Kh. Abdul Hamid	July 1701-Nov.1701	*Ibid*, I, pp. 346,348,356-7.
			2.	-do-	Dec. 1704-March1705	*Ibid*, I pp. 357,360-61.
			3.	Mohd. Beg Khan	Apr.1705-June 1705	*Ibid*, I pp. 360-61, 366.
3.	Ibrahim Khan (1705-1707)	Feb. 1707-Aug. 1707	4.	Prince Mohd. Bedar Bakht	July 1705-Feb.1707	*Ibid*, I pp. 357, 367, 369, 372-4, 381.
	-----		5.	Mohd. Beg Khan	Sep.1707-Sep.1708	*Ibid*, I pp. 381-2.
4.	Ghazi-ud din khan Firuzjung (Sep.1708-Nov. 1710)	Sep.1708-Nov.1710		----	-----	*Ibid*, I pp. 382-3, 389.
	------		6.	Mohd. Beg Khan	Nov. 1710-Apr.1711	*Ibid*, I pp. 389, 391.
			7.	Shahamat Khan	Apr. 1711-May 1712	*Ibid*, p. 391.
5.	Asaf-ud dawal Asad Khan (1712)	-----	8.	Mohd. Beg Khan	May 1712-Aug.1712	*Ibid*, I pp. 395-96,
			9.	Iftekhar Khan	Aug.1712-Sep.1712	*Ibid*, I pp. 396-7.
			10.	Sarbuland Khan	Oct. 1712-Feb.1713	*Ibid*, I pp. 396-97.
			11.	Saiyid Aqil Khan	Feb.1713-May 1713	*Ibid*, I pp. 397-8.
6.	Shahamat Khan (1713)	June 1713-Aug. 1713.	--	------	-----	*Ibid*, I pp. 398-99, 401.
7.	Daood Khan Panni (Sep.1713-July 1715)	Oct. 1713-July 1715.	12.	Abdul Hamid Khan	Sep.1713-Oct.1713	*Ibid*, I p. 401.
			13.	Ghazni Khan Jalori	July 1715	*Ibid*, I pp. 401, 413.
8.	Maharaja Ajit Singh (July 1715-July 1717)	Feb. 1716-July 1717	14.	Bajeraj Bhandari	July1715-Feb.1716	*Ibid*, I, pp 413, *Ibid*, II pp.1, 11-2.

9.	Shams-ud dawla Khan-i dawran (May 1717-19)	-----	15.	Abdul Hamid Khan	May 1717-Dec1717	*Ibid*, II pp. 12-3.
			16.	Haider Quli Khan	Dec.1717-Dec1718	*Ibid*, II pp. 12-3, 20.
			17.	Ghazni Khan Jalori	Dec. 1718-Feb 1719	*Ibid*, II p. 20-1.
10.	Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-May 1721)	-----	18.	Meher Ali Khan	Feb.1719-Apr.1720	*Ibid*, II p. 21, 23, 31.
			19.	Anup Singh Bhandari	Apr.1720-June1721	*Ibid*, II p.31.
11.	Muizud Dawla Haider Quli Khan (Apr. 1721-1722)	July 1722-Jan. 1723	20.	Shuja't Khan	June1721-July1722	*Ibid*, II pp 38, 39, 43, 47.
12.	Nizam-ul Mulk (Dec.1722-Aug. 1724)	----	21.	Safdar Khan	?	*Ibid*, II, p. 47, 48.
			22.	Hamid Khan	Jan.1723-Sept.1724	*Ibid*, II pp.48, 54.
13.	Sarbuland Khan (1724-1730)	Dec.1725-Oct. 1730	23.	Shuja't Khan	Oct. 1724-Dec.1724	*Ibid*, II pp54,58-60,80,129-30
			24.	Hamid Khan (*de facto*)	Dec. 1724-Apr.1725	*Ibid*, II pp. 58-60,80,83,86.
			25.	Sardar Mohd. Khan Ghorni	May 1725-Dec.1725	*Ibid*, II pp.83,86,118,129-30.
14.	Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37)	Oct. 1730-33	26.	Ratan Singh Bhandari	1733 - May 1737	*Ibid*, II pp 118,119, 129-30 162-3, 195, 234-5.
15.	Momin Khan (1736-43)	May1737-Feb. 1743	--	-----	-------	*Ibid*, II pp 195-6,234-6,277.
16.	Fida-ud din Khan and Muftakhar Khan (1743)	Feb. 1743-Aug. 1743.	--	-----	-------	*Ibid*, II pp 277-8,301,312.
17.	Maqbul-i Alam (By Forgery) (1743)	----	27.	Jawanmard Khan Babi (*de facto*)	Sep.1743-53.	*Ibid*, II pp, 301,312,319-21, 411, 413.
18.	Muftakhar Khan (1743)	Fails to oust Jawanmard Khan Babi	--	-do-	-------	*Ibid*, II pp 301-2, 312, 314.
19.	Fakhr-ud dawla Fakhr-ud din Shuja't jang (1744)	-do-	--	-do- *de jure naib* *de facto* Governor	-------	*Ibid*, II pp 321-2, 326-7, 331 411, 413.
20.	Maharaja Bakht Singh (1745)	----	--	*de facto* Governor	-------	*Ibid*, II pp 374-5,377,411,413

CHAPTER - I (1)

THE SUPERIOR ZAMINDARS

On the eve of the eighteenth Century

A significant feature of the Mughal *subah* of Gujarat was the large number of big and small, autonomous and semi-autonomous principalities spread all over. Like their predecessors[1], the Mughals effected a complete conquest of these principalities whenever and wherever it was possible but in many cases where subjugation was impracticable they contented themselves with either the exaction of tribute or military service, or both from them.

Before examining the position and the role played by the Superior zamindars in society it may be worthwhile trying to identify them and determine their territorial sway.[2] This may be done with the help of evidence contained

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1. For a brief sketch of the various chiefs during the period of the Sultans of Gujarat, S.C. Misra, *The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat* Bombay, 1963, pp.204--6.

2. Some initial explorations in this direction have already been made. For example, P.Saran in his *The Provincial Government of the Mughals 1526-1658* (pp 117-24, 137-41) makes a selective study of the noted 'Chiefs. Irfan Habib's identification of the 'autonomous chiefs' though useful in a number of ways is, however, not wholly dependable. Not very exhaustive in detail,his observation that "the entire *sarkar* of Soreth was held by the tributory Chiefs" apart from being incorrect is contradicted by his earlier statement that "the villages of certain *mahals* of *sarkar* Soreth" being *raiyati* were situated outside the sway of zamindars; see *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, pp 142 and n,188. In his

i Akbari, other works of the same period and the

adi of Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur, last *Diwan* of

The *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, the best work so far known on

rat, is particularly important for the first half of the eighteenth century. Last but not least is the *Diwan*'s *Account* which is a compilation of documents that were available in the provincial office during the sixth decade of the eighteenth century. The work furnishes almost an exhaustive list of all the Superior Zamindars, and their *watans* that existed as late as, if not later than, the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

To beginwith, the term '*zamindar*' finds a definite usage with specifiable connotations in the regional documents pertaining to the *subah* of Gujarat and in the *Diwan*'s

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...Continued...

descriptive study of the chieftains during Akbar's reign A.R.Khan delineates the territories of 'Chiefs' of Gujarat, (*Chieftains in the Mughal Empire During the Reign of Akbar*, pp 77-96). His identification, however suffers from two major defects: he has not been able to identity all the chieftains, overlooking, for example, the chief of Sunt, all those who are identified as chiefs do not always fall in this category. Thus for example *girasias* and some of th lands like *giras*, which were not the chieftaincies is have been included among their possessions. For detailed references please see the discussion in the following pages and Chapter V below.

Account.[1] In these sources, the *'zamindars'* (*zamindaran*) formed only a section of the landed aristocracy whose possessions were called *'makan-i zamindari*[2], *talluqa-i zamindar* and sometimes only *'zamindari'*. A part or the whole of the offering made by them to the imperial government was termed "*peshkash*". Their possessions *(makan-i zamindari)* were grouped into *zilas* which, as will be seen later, were units other than *parganas*, *mahals* and *sarkars*. The *'zamindars'* enjoyed a position distinctly superior to the one held by

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1. In the chronicles, particularly written at the seat of imperial power, the term *'zamindar'* has been used so loosely as to make it difficult to differentiate even between an autonomous chieftain holding vast tracts of land and a petty zamindar holding merely a fraction of a village in a directly administered territory --- a problem that has been commented upon by a large number of historians. See for example, Irfan Habib "The Zamindars in the *Ain*," *Proceedings Indian History Congress-* XXI session, 1958, pp. 320-3. B R Grover "Nature of *dehat-i Taaluqa* (zamindari village) and the evolution of *taaluqdari* system During the Mughal Age", pp 166-67; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 136-39, S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars under the Mughals" pp 17-8 N.A. Siddiqui, *Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals (1700-1750)*, pp 21-3; 28-30.

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2. It may be pointed out that the term *'makan'* is not exclusively applied to the possession of zamindars. In the available sources it is applied to the area of jurisdiction *(makan-i faujdari)*, territorial administrative unit *(sarkars of the Subah)* and the territorial unit(s) held by rebellious elements *(makanat-i mufsidan)*.

other members of the class.[1]

Such evidence as is available throws light on the origin of two distinct sections of the superior landholders in Gujarat. During the reign of Sultan Muzaffar, and even later on, many '*zamindaran*' who were duly accepted as being beyond the effective reach of administrative pressure retained their possessions (*aksari zamindaran k' dast-i zor waqai b' anha n' raside*) undivided in return for payment of annual tribute (*peshkash-i harsala*).[2] Likewise 'the big *zamindars* who held many (literally, most) *parganas*' were also permitted to retain their possessions undivided 'on condition of joining service and maintaining troops'.[3] They appropriated revenues of their *watans* in lieu of service and therefore were exempted from paying the *peshkash*.[4]

The same Sultan also expelled a section of Rajputs and

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1. The other section is termed *girasia* whose possessions are decribed as '*giras*', '*bantha-giras*', '*bantha-chauth-giras*' and payments made to the government exacted from these holdings, are termed *salami*. This section though not exclusive of the '*zamindaran*' under discussion, categoriesed as 'Primary Zamindar' is discussed in Chapters V and VI below.

2. *Accounts* f.106 b, Besides, a few zamindars who embraced Islam were given a preferential treatment. They were also allowed to retain their possession undivided on terms of offering *peshkash-i harsala*. *ibid* ff 106 b, 173 b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p 190.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 173-4.

4. *Ibid*, I. p 22; *Account* ff 9b, 10b-11a.

Kolis from their possession; they in turn rose in rebellion and forced the Sultan to come to a settlement. Accordingly, the Kolis and Rajputs were allowed to retain a fourth part of the land called *bantha*' of their native places (*awtan*) and villages.' The remaining three parts of their possessions 'were attached to the government'.[1] A particular section of the holders of *bantha* (*banthadaran*) also came to be termed '*zamindaran*' whose possessions (*makan-i zamindari*) were subject to the payment of *peshkash* from the time of the above named Sultan.[2]

Emperor Akbar is said to have confirmed the above mentioned zamindars in their respective *makans* on the Sul-

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1. *Account*, f. 106 b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 173-4, *Ibid, Supplement*, pp 228-9. In actual practice it was the land of a village, and exceptionally the villages themselves, which were thus divided. The produce of the *bantha* land, or village, was also subject to divisioning between the state, the *banthadar* and the *riaya*. For detailed view, please see Chapters I, (2) and V below.

2. *Account*, f. 106 b. The statement is followed by a detailed list of zamindars alongwith their *makans* and *watans* in the *subah* and the amount of *peshkash-i muqarrari-i nizamat* (a fixed but revisible amount of tribute to be collected annually and assigned as the salary of *nazim-i subah*) shown against their *makans*. The other section which also held *bantha* lands was termed *girasia* and it was required to pay *salami* on its *bantha*. For details see Chapter V. The author of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*. (*Suplement* pp 228-9) mentions only *salami* as a claim on the *banth*. The statement is, however, followed by details of *peshkash* exacted by *nazims* from specified *makan-i zamindari* which were subject to payment of *peshkash*. Other payments are also mentioned in the *parganas* that followed, exclusively, the *banth-talpad* system, as will be seen below.

tan's patterns after he had conquered the region.[1]

The '*zamindaran*' that we propose to designate 'Superior zamindars' were, during the Mughal Age, sub-categorised into three distinct sections, namely the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi*, *zamindaran-i ismi*, and the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*, presumably in the order of precedence.[2] In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to discuss broad features of the three sections, determine their role, positions and nature of relationship subsisting between them and empire during the heyday of the Mughal rule and ascertaining pattern of change, if any, by the onset of the eighteenth century.

A. *ZAMINDARAN-I SARKARAT-I PESHKASHI*: Six *Makans*:

At the close of the seventeenth century, the province of Gujarat was divided into two categories of *sarkars*,

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1. *Account* f 105b; See also *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.p. 173.

2. *Account* ff. 105a - 9 b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 224-5, 228-9. The latter work specifries the first two sections whereas some details of the third section though without naming them, are also provided. In the regional dialect these zamindars were described as *Rawat*, *Rana*, *Rao*, *Raja*, *Jam*, *Thakur*, etc. For the appellations and gradation based on the appellations in the region, see, Alexander Kintoch, *Hindu Annals of Western Goozerat*, *Rasmale* (reprint) 1973, N. Delhi, pp. 568-9. pp 568-69.

   The *Account* specifies 539 *Makan-i zamindari* existing around 1723-25. (ff 106b-219b).

namely, the *peshkashi* and the *kharaji sakars*.[1] Of the sixteen *sarkars* of the *subah*, six--- *Sirohi*, Dungarpur, Bansballa (Banswara)[2] Sunt, Ramnagar (Dharampur) and Sulaimannagar (Kutch-i *buzurg*) --- have been described as *sarkarat-i peshkashi* as also *mulk-i zamindari* and *wilayat* belonging to zamindars (*Taalluq-i zamindaran*) who are also termed *umdah*.[3] Each of the six *sarkars* formed one *makan-i zamindari* administered by one *zamindar*.[4]

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1. The term *peshkashi* indicates that no *mal-i wajib* was collected from the peasants by the imperial officials. The revenue paid by the zamindars of these *sarkars* was called *peshkash*. The *kharaji sarkars*, on the whole were subject to the payment of *mal-i wajib* by and large determined on the basis of detailed assessment by the imperial officials. However, within these *sarkars* there were the lands of the zamindars who paid *peshkash*. N.A. siddiqi. *op.cit* p 23, also see the discussion in the follwoing lines.

2. The first three of the six *sarkars* are reckoned as *parganas* of *sarkar* Sirohi (*Subah* Ajmer) in the Abul Fazl's *Ain-i Akbari* (Asiatic Society, Calcutta, II, pp 132-3). Later on during empror Aurangzeb's reign the three were raised to the position of *sarkars*. *Mirat-i Amhadi*, *Supplement*,, pp 224-5 N.A. Siddiqi. *op.cit* p 23. Ramnagar is now called Dharampur. The old capital Ramnagar, now known as Nagar, stands 24 miles South West of Dharampur, the new Capital. JN Sarkr, *Shivaji and His Times*, VI edn. Calcutta, 1961,p 186 n.

3. *Account* ff. 105 b -6 b, 109b - 10b 126b-27b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 25, 175; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 24-8. Before the year 1662 Navanagar was also counted as one of the *peshkashi-Sarkars*. In this year it was annexed and turned *Kharaji*. (*peshmashi bud.... kharaji gashte*). In the present discussion refrences to Navanagar are made for the pre-1662 period. For references, please see the discussion below.

4. *Account* ff. 105 b -6 a, 109 b-12a. As will be seen below the territorial limits of all these zamindars did not invariably coincide with the boundries of *sarkars* placed under each of them.

By virtue of their location the six *makans* enjoyed considerable significance. All the six *sarkars* being situated on the outskirts of the *subah* came almost to ring the *kharaji sarkars* on the landside and, thus, all the land routes to and from the *subah* passed through the territory of one or the other *peshkashi sarkar*.[1] Situated far off the seat of provincial power the six *sarkars* also enjoyed a favourable geographical position.[2] Besides each of them commanded strong forts which were further protected by the

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1. *Ain*, II, pp 119-20, *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 224-8, *Account*, ff.105 b-6a, 107 a, 109 b-12 a, J.N. Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, pp. 186, 200, Kunwar Rafaqat Ali Khan, *The Kachhawahs under Akbar and Jahangir* N.Delhi, 1976, pp 32, 36.

2. The Kutch, according to the *Ain* (II, p,119), 'is largely a desert.' The region through which the route passes "is a saltish plain", says the *Mirat-i Ahamadi* (I, p.114), "sweet water is absolutely unobtainable... there is a kind of mud at most places... It is not possible for a few horsemens to go abreast of one another on the road". The region of Sunt and Ramnagar, observed Hamilton Walter, "is strong, difficult to penetrate, extremely troublesome to subdue, expensive to retain and wholly unproductive as to revenues; Himilton Walter, *Geographical, Statistical and Historical Description of Hindoostan and Its adjoining territories*, J. Murry, 1820, I,p. 685. *History of Dharampur state (prant Dharampur) 1262 to 1937*, published by state Council (Author's name not mentioned), pp 13-5. Smilarly, Dungarpur, Banswara and Sirohi were also situated in hilly region infested with forests and partly deserts. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 246-49, *Account*, ff. 105 b, 109 b, 110 a, 111 b; James Tod, *Travels into Western India*, Delhi, (Indian reprint), 1971, pp 59, 61, 68.

surrounding jungles.[1]

The zamindars of *peshkashi sarkars* commanded considerable strength in men and equipment. The zamindars of Dungarpur and Banswara, each, commanded a force of 5000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, that of Sirohi commanded 2000 cavalry and 5000 infantry and the zamindars of Bhuj and Navanagar 10000 cavalry 50,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry and 8000 infantry respectively at the end of the sixteenth century.[2] The zamindar of Navanagar was capable of raising his strength of cavalry to 12000 at about the same time[3] and the zamindar of Bhuj was in a position (1662) to dispatch 7000 mounted spearmen within a short period to help his clansmen outside his territory.[4] From the account of the forces commanded by these zamindars it is, however, evident that

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1. *Ain*, pp 119, 132-3, *Account* ff 110a, 111b, ; *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement* p, 227; *History of Dharampur*, p 317; WW Webb, *Chronicles of the Hindu States of Rajasthan*, Delhi, 1972, p 29; Hamilton Walter, *op.cit*, I, p 685; It may be mentioned that there was a ban on the construction of new forts by the zamindars and the permission to construct a fort could be obtained from the imperial court only. *Account* f, 15a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, p. 109. The Mughals seem to have allowed them to retain the forts which they possessed at the time of conquest.

2. *Ain*, II, pp. 119, 132-3.

3. *Ibid*, II, p 119, Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri* (hereafter *Tuzuk*), ed. H. Bevridge, Delhi, 2nd edn, p 443.

4. Munshi Muhammed Kazim, *Alamgirnamah*, ed. Maulvi Karimuddin, Asiatic Society Clacutta, 1868 (hereafter Kazim), pp-770-1.

the majority of their troops consisted of the infantry[1]. But the evidence cited above also suggests that they commanded forces which might have possessed considerable striking capacity and were not means for fighting merely defensive battles.[2]

Moreover, the zamindar of Bhuj is also reported to have maintained his own park of artillery (*lawazma-i topkhana*) during the seventeenth and the following century.[3] The zamindar of Navanagar is also noticed as commanding his own park of artillery which he had pressed into action against the invading imperial forces in 166.2.[4]

Besides, the caste and clannish ties of the zamindars seem to have formed the main sources of strength of some of them. In our sources, the zamindars of Bhuj and Navanagar who. belonged to the Jadeja clan are described as *marzaban*,

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1. For a detailed view, Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 163-4.

2. The zamindars of Bhuj and Navanagar had supported the cause of Sultan Muzaffar Gujarati against emperor Akbar. Though our sources donot spefify the composition of the zamindars' forces fighting for the Sultan, the element of swiftness in their movement suggests that they were in command of a good cavalry; for details, AR Khan, *op. cit*, pp 78-80; for the offensive moves taken by the zamindars of Bhuj, Khawaja Nizamuddin Ahmad, *Tabqati-i Akbari* (hereafter *Tabqat*), Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1935, II, pp 374, 386.

3. *Account* f. 111 b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p 227. Under the existing rule to manufacture the cannons and guns by the zamindars was probibitted.

4. Kazim, *op. cit*, p. 770.

Sahib-i jamiat and *qabiledars*.[1] There is evidence to show that the forces of Bhuj that raided imperial territory during Akbar's reign and later on (1662-71) rendered assistance to the zamindar of Navanagar consisted of (jadeja) Rajputs.[2] Likewise Rai Singh and later on his son, Tamachi were equally supported by their Jadeja clansmen in their struggle for acquiring the *gaddi* of the zamindari of Navanagar.[3]

The trouble that erupted between the members of the ruling family over succession to the *gaddi* of Navanagar highlights the fact that active support of the clansmen was not the less important than the imperial favor for the purpose of attaining and retaining the zamindari. Chhatrasal, the nominated successor of the ex-chief (died 1660). "succeeded his father in accordance with the royal mandate and usage of zamindari and became the leader of his community

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1. *Tabqal-i Akbari*,, II, 379-80; Kazim, *op. cit*, p.296; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 194.

2. *Tabqat-i Akbari*, II, pp 374, 380 396, Kazim, *op. cit.* pp 770-71, G.H.Khare, (ed), *Aurangzeb darbarachye Akhbar, Aetihasic Farsi Sahitya* Vol. VI, 1973, letter No. 92, dated 2 June, 1667. Besides, the zamindar commanded support of family *Bhayads* at this point of time. *Account*, f. 111 a; Rushbrook William, *The Black Hills of Kutch in Legend and History*, London, 1958, pp 3-15. *Bhayads* were the junior members of the ruling family that followed the rule of primogeniture in the matter of sucession, Himilton Watter, *op. cit* . I pp 639-40.

3. Kazim, *op. cit*, pp 770-73.

and *raja* of that land".[1] His uncle, Rai singh, "persuaded" the Jadejas to 'desert his nephew' and 'won them over to his side'. He also reached an accord with the Jadeja chief of Bhuj[2], strengthened his position with his help and later on (1662) fought the imperial forces with the help of his clansmen for retaining the *gaddi* which in the meantime he had occupied.[3] Evidently, Chhatrasal, the imperial nominee could not retain the *gaddi* for he failed to muster support of his own clansmen both within and without. Though Rai Singh was killed in action, his son continued to fight the imperial garrisons with the clansmen's support. He exerted so much pressure that the empire was forced to compromise with the Jadeja leader.[4]

The zamindars of Ramnagar and Sunt though belonging to the Rajput caste were, however, assisted by the Kolis and the Bhils, in addition to their own caste brethern when

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1. *Ibid*, p 768, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 254.

2. According to the *Akbarnamah*, the zamindar of Navanagar being ex junior member of the Jadeja ruling house of Bhuj acknowledged the overlordship of latter and sought his approval regarding the succession and in other matters. Abual Fazl, *Akbarnamah*, Bib, Ind., Calcutta, 1877, III, p. 472; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p..194.

3. Kazim, *op. cit*, pp 768-70, Muhammad Saqi Mustaid Khan, *Masir-i Alamqiri*, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1939, pp. 42-3, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, 254-5, 284-5.

4. For further developments and references please see the discussion below.

they fought against the Mughals during emperor Shah Jahan's reign and later on against Shivaji.[1]

Among the zamindars of the six *sarkars* Rajputs enjoyed a domineering position as members of one or another of their clans held these zamindars.[2] This apart, right from the time the zamindars submitted to the empire to the close of the period of the present study (1750), the zamindaris, with some interruption, as will be seen below, were retained by the same famillies.[3]

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1. Anonymous, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, Bombay Royal Assiatic Society MS. No. 10 (78425), ff 2-3; JN Sarkar, *Hosue of Shivaji*, pp 186, 200; G. S. Sardesai, (ed) *New History of Marathas (1600-1707)*, 2nd imprint, Bombay, 1957, I. p. 208.

2. *Ain*, II pp 119-20, 132-3; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp 284-5; *Ibid. Supplement*, pp 225-6; *Account*, ff.105b-6a, 109b-10b. There is contradictory information regarding the caste of the zamindar of Ramnagar. Relying on the unpublished *English Factory Records*, Sir. J.N. Sarkar notes that it was held by a Koli. *Shiva Ji and His Times*, 6th edn. Calcutta, 1961; p. 186. But the author of *Hadiqat-u Hind* states that from the pre-Sultanate period the state was held by Surajwanshi Rajputs and it remained in their possession even during the period under review. The author adds that Raja Ram of Ramnagar, a contemporary of Shah Jahan, was son in law of Bhariji, the zamindar of Baglana, a Rathor Rajput. (*Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.4; *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam* MS No. 2348, Old accession, Jama Masjid Bombay, ff. 279-80.

3. *Ain*, II, 119-20, 132-3; *Akabarnamah* III, pp 189, 196, 821; *Account*, ff. 105 b - 6 a, 109b-10a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp-225-7; *History of Dharampur*, pp11--9; Lala Sita Ram, *History of Sirohi Raj*, Allahabad, 1920, pp 172-6, 188,193. Later on the British also found the same families holding these zamindars.

Though described as zamindars of the *peshkashi sarkars*, the territorial extent of the zamindaris of some of them was far from being identical with the boundaries of the *sarkars* held by them. The zamindar of Kutch held a few *mahals* in the *sarkar* of Pattan and *subah* Thatta in addition to his own zamindari comprising the *sarkar*.[1] The Jam of Navanagar, on the other hand enjoyed a share in the produce of two *mahals* in *sarkar* Kutch.[2] Each of these zamindaris was regarded as one *makan-i zamindari* and this included the possession outside the *sarkars*.[3] The other zamindaris consisting of one entire *sarkar* each are likewise and separately reckoned as one *makan-i zamindari*.[4] Thus a *peskhashi sarkar* could form a single *zamindari-makan* though this was not invariably the case. The term '*peshkasi-sarkar*' seems to have indicated not

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1. *Account* f. 111 a, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, 1, pp 179-80, *Ibid, Supplement*, pp 224-5; for a similar position of the zamindari of Sunt, *Account*, f. 112a, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 19-20, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f 2; for Sirohi, *Account* ff. 119b-20a. The lands outside the *peshkashi sarkars* formed part of the terrritory of the *kharaji sarkars*.

2. *Account* ff. 111a, 112a. It is not known whether the amount of *peshkash* was paid, if at all, through the zamindar of Bhuj or directly by the Jam of Navanagar. Most probably, the Jam who was an ex-junior member of the ruling family of Bhuj continued to hold these lands in his capacity of *bhayad* of the senior branch of the house.

3. *Account*. ff. 109b-12 a, 118b, 122a, 126b-7a.

4. *Ibid.*

so much the territorial extent of the zamindar's possession who held it as perhaps the boundaries of the administrative unit placed under the zamindar.[1]

In the absence of dependable information a comparative study of the economic strength of the six zamindars may not be possible.[2] However, from stray references available in the sources, the zamindar of Navanagar emerges as the richest among the six.[3] Basically the economy of these zamindars was essentially agrarian, as one would expect. However Bhuj and Navanagar because of their geographical position were more favourably exposed to trade and commerce, the two zamindars commanded ports which were visited by ships of

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1. The zamindars do not seem to have been placed under the authority of imperial *faujdars* who were not appointed in their lands. Instead, the zamidnars virtually held the position of *faujdars* and in this capacity they were designated *sarbarahan*. *Yad-dasht*, *peshkash-i Sarbarahan* R. No. 40 Pune.

2. The three known factors--extent of the area, *jamadami* which is not known for all, and the amount of *peshkash* may perhaps hardly be relied upon. The zamindari of Kutch, the largest in size, was " largely barren and sandy:. (*Ain*, II, p 119). The amount of *peshkash* as also the military contingents furnished for imperial service, even if might have borne some relationship with the zamindars' economy, were equally a denominator of the degree of imperial control.

3. If we go by the aggregate *mansabs*, whether proposed or actually awarded, the troops commanded and furnished, the *Jamadami*, position of trade (ports and pearl fishery) and Abul Fazl's remark that there are "many towns and the agricultural area is extensive" in Navanagar, the above impression would be reinforced. *Ain*, II, p.119.

the surrounding areas.[1] The most important trade for Bhuj, as well as Navanagar, was in Kutchi horses which were held 'equal to Arab horses'.[2] Bhuj also exported cotton to Thatta and the zamindar of Navanagar probably had some connections with the trade in pearls which during the seventeenth century were taken out of sea under the supervision of the imperial officials.[3]

It is thus evident from the preceeding discussion that the strength, as also the sources of their power, varied considerably from each zamindar to another. Apart from the zamindars' capacity of resistance, the geographical position of the zamindaris on the imperial map, its productivity and manageability went a long way in determining the relationship of the Mughal empire with each zamindar. The possessions of all the six zamindars are invariably described as *peshkashi*.[4] But it does not mean that the payment of *peshkash*, which will be discussed a little later, was the only obligation of these zamindars. They were also required

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1. Fifteen of the fifty *mahals* of Bhuj consisted of ports. *Account*, ff. 111a-2 a, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 227-8.

2. *Account*, ff. 111 ab, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 13-4, S.Gopal *Commerce and Craft in Gujarat*, p.126.

3. Kazim, *op. cit.* p. 770; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p,285, *Ibid*, *Supplement* p. 250; S. Gopal, *Op.cit.*, p. 130.

4. *Account*. ff.105 b, 106b, 126 b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.p.25; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 188, 224-25.

to render military service with specified contingents under the *Nazim-i Subah*.

In continuation of the pre-Mughal practice *b' dastur-i salatin-i Gujaratia* the zamindars of the six *sarkars* were placed, from the time of the conquest of the *subah*, under the obligation of serving the *Nazim* with specified contingents which they were required to maintain in accordance with the army regulations *mawajiq-i zabta-i fauj*.[1] According to the arrangements made during Akbar's reign the zamindars of Ramnagar had to maintain 1000 horse-men and those of Dungarpur, Banswara and Sirohi 2000 each.[2] The zamindar of

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp '224-5, *Account* ff. 106b, 110, 126b-27a.

2. *Account*, ff. 106 b, 109b, 126 b-27a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 134,136, *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 226-8; *Rasmala* p.299; Sheikh Ghulam Mohammed, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, Bombay, 1919, p.135. A.R. Khan's understading of the text (*op.cit.* p. 217) "*The Sarkar* of Sirohi was assigned as *jagir* to the *Nazim* of *Subah* Gujarat on condition of maintaining two thousand *sawars* for imperial service" is incorrect. The text says: From Raja Todarmal the zamindar *yek zanjir-i feel yaft w sarkar* Sirohi *b'shart-i khidmat ba jamia't du hazar sawar ba naziman-i subah jagir muqarrar shud*. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 226 The *sarkar*, thus, was assigned to the zamindar by way of *jagir* in return for service to be rendered with 2000 troops to the Governors of the *Subah*, *the Mirat-i Ahmadi* (I p.134) puts it more clreaaly: *zamindar* Sriohi... Raja *ra deed*... Raja *khila't*... *b' zamindar dade; muqarrar farmud ke ba jamia't du hazar sawar hamrah subedar* Gujarat *nawkari namude bashad*. Likewise the *Account* (f.110a) states that *zamindar mazkur... mulazmat... namude... muqarrar farmudand ke b' jamia't du hazar sawar dar subah nawkri namayad*. The zamindar, it may be pointed out, was not a *mansabdar*. So the *sarkar* was not granted to the zamindar as '*jagir*' against the *tankhwah* in strict

Kutch was exempted from military service during Akbar's reign[1] but in the subsequent years (1609-13) he is noticed to have served with 2500 horse-men under the *Nazim's* command.[2] Details regarding the service obligations of the zamindar of Sunt are not specified; he is, however, mentioned among the six zamindars who were required to serve.[3] Needless to say that it was not merely a theoretical obligation but on occasions they are reported to have actually

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...Continued...

technical sense of the term. Rather, the zamindar was to enjoy revenues of his zamindari as a *mansabdar-jagirdar* would have done otherwise, on condition of maintainig the troops. To assign the revenue in *jagir* without granting a *mansab* seems to be a legacy of the pre-Mughal Gujarat; see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.pp173-4; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 224-5; *Account* ff. 106 b, 110, 126b, 127a.

1. Rao Khangar, the first ruler of Bhuj to submit, had obtained the *pargana* of Morbi at the time of his submission (*Akbarnamah*, III, p 530). Though the service obligation of the zamindar is not specified, the ruler being a *du-hazari mansabdar* (*Tabqat, II* p,443) must have been under the obligation of serving the empire. His son and successor, Rao Bharamal, was duly exempted from service obligation as a reward for getting the last of the Gujarati Sultlan arrested at the time (1592-93) of his final submission. He also got *pargana* Morbi (*sarkar* Pattan) which in the meantime seems to have been confiscated. The text (*Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 226) says that the zamindar: *darkhwast-i pargana* Morbi *w muafi-i nawkri kard...* Khan-i Azam *pazeeraft*. The *Account* (f.110b) also states that : *pargana* Morbi *b'jama deh lac mehmudi b'mujib farmudand... taklif-i nawkri mua'f dashtand*. *Akbarnamah*, III, pp 472,524,530,593, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I.p 180.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 180. The Bhuj contigent was led by the son of the zamindar.

3. *Account*, ff. 106 b, 110, 126b, 127 a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 224-5.

served the Mughal government during the seventeenth century whenever called upon to do so.[1] Besides, troops of some of them were permanently stationed at the provincial capital where they remained till the close of the seventeenth century.[2]

Rendering military service to the state was not invariably conditional upon holding a *mansab*.[3] There is evidence to show that these zamindars served even when they were not recipients of *mansabs*. Under emperor Akbar, no zamindar excepting that of Bhuj was actually[4] granted a *mansab*, however, everyone of them was required to serve, a fact which has already been noted. None of these zamindars is, similarly, noted among the recipients of a *mansab* under Jahangir; they are, however, noted as serving the Mughals (1609--13) during his reign.[5] Likewise the zamindar of

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p 189 (1609-13); *Ibid*, I, p 224 (1650); *Ibid*, I. p. 256 (1663-64); *Account*, ff. 76a, 79b,

2. *Account* ff. 76 a, 79b,

3. S.Nurul-Hasan, "Zamindars under the Mughals", pp 19-20.

4. According to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Raja Todarmal had proposed the award of *mansab* to the zamindars of Dungarpur and Banswara of 2500/2500 each, to the zamindar of Ramnagar of 1500/1000 and to the zamindar of Kutch 2000/2000 and to the zamindars of Navanagar of 4000/4000. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp-134,136 Amongst them the zamindar of Bhuj alone seems to have been awarded the *mansab*.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 189.

Dungarpur served the Mughals in the year 1663-64 though he lost the *manasab* in 1658 and could regain it after 1679-80 only.[1]

The zamindars of the *peshkashi sarkars* endeavoured to abstain from serving the empire from the time of emperor Shah Jahan. The observation of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* that these zamindars no longer rendered military assistance since the year of Aurangzeb's death[2] stands contradicted by the evidence available in the same and other works, pointing to a much earlier cessation of the tie. The zamindar of Sirohi, for the last time came to see the *Nazim* in the year 1648.[3] Subsequently, (1657-58) prince Dara issued a number of *nishans* asking the zamindar to reach the imperial court and a few months later to serve under Raja Jaswant Singh. But the zamindar did not show up.[4] From the year 1648 "no zamin-

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1. *Ibid*, I, p. 256; for the award of *mansab* please see the discussion below.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 174; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 224-5. The *Account* without sepcifying the date also notes that these zamindars stopped rendering military service, *Ibid*, ff. 76a, 79b, 106b.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 224.

4. Kaviraj Shyamaldas in his documented work, *Vir Vinod* (1888), reproduces the prince's *nishans* (Vol. III, pp 1105-11). M. Athar Ali (*The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*) does not find the zamindar of the place among the participants in the war of succession. The author of *History of Sirohi* (pp 202-5) says that the zamindar sided with Dara and fought under Raja Jaswant Sing's command. He does not however substantiate his observation.

dar of Sirohi came to see any *Nazim*".[1] much less to serve. The zamindar of Ramnagar had ceased serving the empire from 1652-55 and perhaps even earlier and turned *peshkashi* for good.[2] The zamindar of Sunt likewise, turned *peshkashi* sometime during Shah Jahan's reign.[3] The zamindar of Dungarpur being a *mansabdar* (1000/1000 of which 800 were *du aspah sih aspah*) and his troops having been posted at the provincial capital continued to serve the empire till the close of the seventeenth century.[4] Though Tamachi, zamindar of Bhuj, had evaded Prince Murad's call to serve under him, he seems to have served a little later (1659-61) in his capacity as *mansabdar* for some time.[5] Evidently, the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* who had all been rendering service showed an inclination towards turning *peshkashi* and in their attempts

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 224.

2. As early as 1637-38 Azam Khan the *subedar*, had to lead an expedition for realizing *peshkash* from him. The zamindar seems to have, then, ceased to serve. *Account*, f. 110b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p 234; for the *Peshkash* being finally fixed sometime in 1652-55, Bakhtawar Khan *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam*, MS No. 2401, Jama Masjid Bombay collection, ff. 279-80; *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, ff. 2-4.

3. *Account* ff. 106 a, 109 b.

4. *Ibid*, ff. 76a, 79b, 10ba 126b.

5. (Emperor) Murad's *farman* (20 December, 1658), Sarad Palace, Bhuj read with prince Dara's *nishan* (17 Jan. 1659) of the same collection; *Account* ff. 110b-11a. Later on the zamindar assisted the imperial rebels instead. For reference, please see the discussion below.

to do so they had met with success by the onset of the eighteenth century.

No evidence suggesting any actual attempt by the provincial authorities to enforce the military obligation on these zamindars is available in the pages of contemporary, near contemporary or later works. Instead, the provincial authorities resorted to the collection of *peshkash*.

It would appear from the foregoing discussion that there was a lack of uniformity in the relationship between the Mughal empire and the Chiefs. In the ultimate analysis, this relationship was determined by the respective strengths of the the two, although to be sure, this ws done within the general framework of exaction of tribute and military service. It is also evident that the Mughal state was pragmatic enough to accept and continue the specific relatioship with individual chiefs earlier established by provincial kingdom which was subsequently absorbed within the Mughal empire.[1] The Mughals, it seems, had also endeavoured to exercise greater control as and when possible. In this, they met with considerable degree of success but gradually the zamindars succeeded in reversing the trend in their favour.

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1. A.R. Khan, (*op. cit*) has taken particular note of this fact.

That the imperial government laid claim to a share in the revenue of the zamindaris, which, regardless of its mode of exaction, is an established fact. The zamindars of the *peshkashi-sarkars*, on the whole, were under the obligation of paying "*peshkash-i harsala*" (annual tribute) which consisted of the *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* (the claim of the Emperor) and *peshkash-i nizamat* (the tribute for the Governor). It was in addition to the offering made by them on special occasions as will be examined below.

The six *sarkars* were not, it seems, subject to the payment of *mal-i wajib* as pointed out above. In addition to being termed *sarkarat -i peshkashi* the six *sarkars* are also described as "*peshkashi kharij az jama*" i.e., not being subject to assessment and payment of *mal-i wajib*.[1] The entire amount of revenues actually extorted from the six

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1. *Account*. ff. 105 b. 106b, 107b-11b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 25. The zamindari of Navanagar which had undergone a change in its position clarifies this point furhter. Before its annexation in 1662 the *sarkar* was also *peshkashi* (*peshkashi bud*). With its annexation it turned *kharaji* (*kharaji gashte*) it was then subject to detailed assessment under the direct administration, revenue collected came to be termed *mal-i wajib*' as distinct from *peshkash* of the pre-annexation period. *Account*. f. 105 b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 284-6; *Ibid Supplement*, pp 219-21, *Yad-dasht pargana haveli* Islamnagar *Waghaira*, in the possession of present researcher (hereafter *P.C*) No. P 3, P39-40 and ff. 55-6.

zamindars is invariably described as *peshkash*.[1]

The *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* which was exacted from these *sarkars* by way of *peshkash* seems to have been calculated on the basis of the *jama*.[2] While placed in the *khalsa*,

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1. *Yad-dasht: Haqiqat-i hasil-o peshkash, Farsi-daftar*, Pune Archives, Pune, Roomal No. 70 (hereafter R.No. Only). Unindexed. The document shows (1658) both *mal-i wajib* and *peshkash* as having been collected from a number of *parganas* of *kharaji-sarkars*. But against the three of the specified *peshkashi-sarkars* only the term *peshkash* is entered; also see, *nuskha-i peshkashi* in the *Account*, ff. 105 b, 106b, 109 b-11a.

2. The zamindari of Dungarpur with its entire *jama* (1,60,00,000) was held in *jagir* by a member of the house of Chittor during Aurangzeb's reign. The *jagir* reverted to the *paibaqi* for a brief period of roughly four months before it was assinged in the *jagir* of Rawal Jaswant Singh (zamindar of Dungarpur) and after the recall of the former *jagirdar* during the 22nd regnal year (R.Y). Since the zamindar had not paid the *mehsul* for the intervening period, the emperor ordered the *diwan-i subah* to realise 'the amount of *mehsul* of the intervening period which came to Rs. 66,690 and 8 *annas*.' *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 305. The recovery made in the 26th. R.Y. is recorded as '*peskahsi-i sarkar-i wala* (the tribute for the emperor) in the document entitled '*Yad-dasht: Matalba-i sarkar-i wala, sarkar* Dungarpur, dated (against the amount) 22nd R.Y. and 26th R.Y. (on the bottom), Pune, R.No. 70. Very clearly the amount was calculated against the *jama*, it is however, difficult to precisely asertain the relationship between the actual claim (*matalba*) and the *jama*. The recovery was made for a period of one-third of the year, the entire claim for the whole year comes to around Rs. two lakhs (66,690/8x3=200071/8). It is just about half the amount represented by the *jama* (1,60,00,000/40 = Rs. 400,000). Was the principality on six month ratio? Was it merely half of the amount of *jama* that was claimed as *peshkash*? Were the instalaments of *peshkash* equally spread over the whole of year? The region. it may be mentioned, mainly yielded *kharif* crops.

   Likewise the amount of *matalba* which the zamindar of Banswara had paid and the balance which stood in arrear is recorded just below the *jama* in the *Account* (f. 109 b). Unfortunately, the work doesnot specify the exact period of claim.

or *paibagi*, the *matalba* (claim) was realised by the *diwan-i subah* and remitted to the imperial treasury.[1] It could also be assigned in the *tankhawah jagir*.[2] The *peshkash-i nizamat* (the tribute for the *nazim*) on the other hand, was to be appropriated by the *nazims* of the *Subah* who were responsible for its collection also.[3] It was extorted in lieu of military service i.e. the zamindars either served the empire with specified contingents, or else they were required to offer *peshkash-i nizamat*. Besides, it seems to have stood independently of and over and above the *jama*.[4]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.p 305; *Account*, f. 109 b.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 305; *Account* ff. 106a, 110ab, for further references please see the the discussion in the following lines.

3. *Account*, ff. 14a, 20a, 74b; 106b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 25.

4. Thus, for example, *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* was collected from Banswara by the *diwan* of *subah* of Gujarat, whereas the zamindars was required to serve under *nazims* of the *subah* Malwa; since the zamindar of Dungarpur served the state with specified contigents during the course of the seventeenth century, he was exempt from paying it. During the year 1663-64 the zamindar served the state with 1000 contingents whereas the entire *jama* of the principality at this point of time was held in *jagir* by a member of the house of Chittor; the zamindar of Ramnagar enjoyed exemption, as pointed out above, from paying *peshkash-i nizamat* in view of his rendering military service. But when he stopped serving the empire, he was required to pay '*peshkash-i nizamat*'. For the same and similar references, *Account*, ff. 106 b, 109b., *Ibid*, f. 109 b, read with *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*, p 225; also *Account*, ff. 118b, 126 b, read with *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 305, *Account with Mirat-i Ahmadi* ff. 106, 127a, read with, *Supplement*, p 234; emperor Aurangzeb's *farman* repro-

Some idea of the assessment of '*matalba-i sarkar-i wala* which was calculated against the *jama* may be had by examining the *jamadami* figures which are fortunately available for some of the *sarkart-i peskhashi*. The *jama* for the principality of Banswara and Sirohi stood at the same figures from the close of the sixteenth century to the close of our period of study.[1] However, the *jama* for Dungarpur had doubled sometime during the post-Jahangir and pre-1658 period.[2] Evidently, the element of reassessing the *jama* and co-ordinating it with the actual paying capacity of the zamindar seems to have been generally lacking.[3]

Likewise the *peshkash-i nizamat* due from the zamindars of the *sarkarat-i peshkashi* besides being an annual (*har*

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duced in the *Vir Vinod* 425-8 read with *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 224-25, 305.

1. *Ain*, II, pp 132-3; *farmans* of Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb specifying the *jama*, *Vir Vinod*, pp 425-8, 1104; *Account*, ff. 106 a, 109b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p 225. The *jamadami* of Sirohi stood at 1,20,00,000 *dam* during the *Ain's* period. (*Ain*, II p 132). Later on (1615) this is put at 100,00,000 *dam* (emperor Jahangir's *farman*, dated 1615, AD, reproduced in *Vir Vinod*, II, 239-49). The reduction (20,00,000 *dam*) may perhaps be attributed to the fact that twelve of the villages of Sirohi had been, in the meantime, included in *sarkar* Pattan, *Account*, f. 109b.

2. *Ain*, II, p 133; Jahangir's *farman*, (May, 1615) reproduced in *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 239-49, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 305. During the post - 1615 period, the *jama* stood at the same figure.

3. Also see, *Account*, ff. 109a-10b.

sala) claim was also subject to reassessment though not necessarily. Referring to *peshkash* offered by the zamindar of Sirohi (1585-86), the *Tabqat* says that he paid 'the total amount of *peshkash* (*mubligh kulli peshkash kard*).[1] More particularly, the zamindar of Ramnagar paid different amounts Rs. 12000/- (1577-78), Rs. 9,000/- (1636) and Rs. 10,000 (1650-51) on three different occassions.[2] Apparently, the amount of *peshkash* was reassessed during the intervening period.[3]

But the amount was not reassessed invariably. During the post-1652 period, the zamindar of Ramnagar was required to pay the same sum (Rs. 10,000), that he paid in that year.[4] Likewise the amount paid by the zamindar of Navanagar seems to have remained fixed from 1577-78 to the closing years of the sixth decade of the seventeenth century.[5]

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1. *Tabqat-i Akbari*, II, p 382. See also Kazim, *op.cit* p 411, *Account*, (f. 106 b) describes it as *peshkash muqarrar-i harsala*.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 134, *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 228, 234; *Account*, f. 110b; *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam*, f.280.

3. Also see *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam*, ff. 279-80.

4. *Ibid*, f 80, the text runs as follows: *muqarrari sakhtand k' harsal deh hazar rupia b' tariq-i peshkash midade bashad*) also see *Account*, f. 110a.

5. On the three different points of time --- 1577-78, 1636-42, and 1656-57, the zamindar is noted to have offered the same amount and the same number of Kutchi horses. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 213, 285, *Yad-dasht: peshkash-i zamindaran*, (dt. 1067 AH), Navanagar, Pune, R.No. 37.

As regard the obligation of paying *peshkash-i nizamat* and *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* position of the zamindars under review was at variance from each other. The zamindar of Bhuj enjoyed exemption from paying both the claims.[1] The zamindars of Dungarpur and Banswara enjoyed exemption from paying the *peshkash-i nizamat* in view of their rendering military service but both of them were under the obligation of paying the *matalba-i sarkar-i wala*[2], as and when they were not recepient of *mansabs*. The zamindars of Banswara successfully evaded the payment of *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* during the reign of Aurangzeb.[3] The zamindar of Ramnagar ceased to be service-rendering (1636), the exemption from paying the *peskash-i nazamat* was withdrawn and he was instead forced to pay *peshkash* during the later period.[4] The zamindar of

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1. Excepting for a brief interval when he served under Jahangir as noted above, and during the period the zamindar enjoyed *mansab* under Akbar and Aurangzeb as mentioned above, the zamindars of the place do not seem to have served the empire, *Account* ff. 110 b-11a; the zamindar, however, was obliged to pay the *peshkash* in the year 1659 on account of his rebellious act of sheltering Dara during the war of succession. *Ibid* ff. 110 b-11a; 122a.

2. *Account*, ff.109b, 110a, 114, 118b, 126b, and *Ibid*, *Mirat-i Ahamdi*, I p 303.

3. *Account* f. 109b; it may be recalled that the *Matalba-i sarkar-i wala* was demanded if and when the *jama* stood unassigned in *jagir*.

4. *Ibid*, ff. 110b, 127a, *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam*, ff. 279-80.

Sirohi was exempt from paying the *peshkash-i nizamat* as late as 1650-51 in view of his rendering military service. Since that date he did not come to serve the *nazims*. In future he seems to have been required to pay the *peshkash* in lieu thereof.[1] The zamindar of Sunt was also required to pay '*matalba-i sarkar-i wala*.[2]

The zamindars of the *peskashi sarkars* seem to have by and large remitted *peshkash* directly to the treasury or through the *faujdars* of the *sarkar* in the immediate vicinity of their respective possessions.[3] It was perhaps under exceptional circumstances that the *subedar* himself was obliged to lead military expedition for exacting the tribute.[4] Before the close of the seventeenth century, the zamindar of Ramanagar was placed under the authority of the *mutasaddi* of Surat, who, therefore extorted tribute.[5]

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1. *Account*, ff. 110a, 119b, 126b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I. p 224.

2. *Account*, f. 109 b.

3. Kazim, *op. cit* pp. 768-70, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement* pp 224-5 where he says that at the time the work was being written the *nazim-i subah* had to lead military expedition for the purpose, presumably it was not done in former days.

4. Kazim, *op. cit.* pp. 768-70, *Account*, f. 110b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 213, *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p. 227.

5. *Account* ff. 110b, 127a, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp- 228, 234. The latter work does not specify the time.

Besides, these zamindars were also required to make occasional offerings. One among such, the occasion of doing homage, appears to be more important necessiating the presence of the zamindar.[1] Excepting the zamindar of Sunt all other zamindars under review are stated to have done homage to the Mughal emperor Akbar or to his envoy Raja Todarmal or to emperor Jahangir and Shahjan.[2] The zamindar of Bhuj did homage to emperor Jhangir for the first, and perhaps the last time, when he was forced to do so.[3] The zamindars of Sirohi, Dungarpur and Banswara did homage, perhaps for the last time in the years 1650 and 1700, re-

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1. The *Account* (f.85 b) specifies the birth and accession anniversaries of the emperor when the zamindars were required to congrtatualte the emperor and send *peshkash*. Besides, they had to offer *peshkash* alongwith the requests (*ara'iz*) made to the court. The zamindar of Bhuj had sent *peshkash* while requesting 'emperror' Murad to forgive his fault of sheltering an imperial rebel, 'Emperor Murad's *farman* dated 20th Dec., 1658 and prince Murad's *Hasb-ul hukm* dated May, 1657, private collection of Sarad palace, Bhuj MaharaoLakhpat of Bhuj also made a similar offering as late as 1756 to the imperial court when he sought to obtain the title of '*Mirza Raja*' and the *subedari* of Thatta. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p 545.

2. *Akbarnamah,* III, pp 189-90, 195-6, 210, *Tuzuk*, I. p 443; *Ibid*, II, p 19; Mohd. Saleh Kamboh Lahori, Asiatic Soc. Calcutta 1927. *Amal-i Saleh,* II pp 205, 213, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 134, 136, 285. *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 226, 228.

3. *Tuzuk*, I. p 19, Emperor Jahangir's *farman*, dated 19th urde-Bahisht 12th Ilahi year Sarad palace, Bhuj. See also the *Account* , ff. 110a-11b, suggestting that no zamindar of Bhuj came to do homage. It is in spite of the fact that the zamindar enjoyed exemption even from offering *peshkash*.

spectively.[1]

On the occasions of doing homage each of the above mentioned zamindars made offerings which appear to be different from, though at times inclusive of[2] the regular claim of *peshkash* made on an annual basis. During Jahangir's visit to the *subah*, the zamindars of Navanagar had presented one hundred *mohurs*, one thousand rupees and fifty horses at the time of doing homage.[3] Elsewhere, it is noted that the zamindar was under the obligations of offering three lakhs *mehmudis* and one hundred horses as *peshkash*.[4] On the other hand, the zamindar of Bhuj offered precisely double of what the Jam of Nanavanagar had already offered.[5] Since the zamindar of Bhuj reportedly[6] enjoyed a special status supe-

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1. *Account*, ff. 106a, 126 b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p 224; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p 226, For the zamindars being summonned, prince Dara's *Nishans*, *Vir Vinod*, III. pp 1101-11 Emperor Murad's *Farman*, dated 20th December, 1658, *op. cit.* Prince Azam's call, *Account*, ff. 106 a, 126 b.

2. For refernce please see note on the preceeding page and A.R. Khan, *op. cit.* pp 211-12.

3. *Tuzuk*, I. p. 443.

4. For reference see discussion in the preceeding pages.

5. *Tuzuk*, II, p 19.

6. *Ain*, II, p 119; *Akbarnamah*, III, p 472; *Tuzuk*, I, p. 443; *Ibid*, II, 19; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 194; see also Jahangir's *farman* 'granting' permission to the ruler of Bhuj for kissing the imperial threshold, assuring him of a befitting imperial treatment vis a vis Navanagar. *op. cit.*

rior to that of Navanagar, the offerings made by these zamindars may, therefore, be regarded as a denominator of their respective social status, though it is difficult to be definitive about this.

As regards the position of these zamindars within their zamindaris, they appear to have been left alone to manage on their own. Their possessions on account of being *mulk-i zamindari'* were exempt from survey, and, likewise, no imperial revenue officials were appointed in their territories.[1] Though the zamindars had accepted the circulation of imperial currency, the ones of Bhuj and Navanagar maintained their own mints and struck coins, called *kori*, *jami* and *mehmudi* there.[2] The zamindar of Navanagar was forced

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1. *Account*, ff. 20 b, 24a-25b, 28a-30b, 105b, 106b, 109b-112b. The *Ain* also doesnot furnish area statistics. Since the *jama* for Bhuj, Ramnagar and Sunt is not recorded in any of the available works, it may therefore, be argued that even the *jama* was not necessarily calculated for all the zamindaris. In its exhaustive list of the *Makan-i faujdari* and *thanabandi* of the entire *subah* for 1658 to C.1725, the *Account* (ff393b-404b cf, *Ibid*, ff. 96a, 100a) doesnot mention one in these *sarkars*; also see, *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp 224-8 which likewise does not mention the *makan* of *faujdar* in the possessions whereas in the *kharaji sarkars* the work specifies the same. Besides, the *Mirat* in its general description of the appointment of these officials from time to time, does not speak of such appointments in these territories. Therefore, it appears that *faujdars* were not maintained in their territories.

2. Even after the extinction of the sultanate, the zamindars of Bhuj retained their coins alongwith their own names written in Deonagari, the name of Muzaffar III of Gujarat, and the year 978(AH) both in Persian character, G.P. Taylor, "Coins of the Gujarat Sultans" *J.B.B.R.A.S.*, 1903, pp31-5; M.S Commissariat, *A History*

(1640-41) to cease coining money, though minting appears to have been revived subsequently as is suggested by the stationing of an imperial official (1660) there.[1]

But it does not mean that the imperial administration observed complete indifference towards all the internal affairs of these zamindaris. The state maintained a *waqa'-i nigar* at Dungarpur, presumably to live in touch with the internal developments.[2] Besides, the *Jams* of Navanagar were not free to work the pearl-fisheries which were placed under the control of imperial officials.[3] Moreover, the emperor could also make land grants out of *sarkar-i peshkashi*, one such grant in the *sarkar* of Sirohi even survived the Mughal

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of Gujarat, I p, 26 and n; for the permission given by the sultan, MS commissariat, *op. cit*, I. p 500 *Ibid*, II, p.26 n, The privelige of coining *mehmudis* had been granted to the ruler of Navanagar by sultan Muzaffar - III. *Ibid*, II. p 121 n; for the actual circulation of the coins during the Mughal period. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 214-15; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 228-39.

1. Mohammad Saleh Kamboh, *Amal-i Saleh*, II, Bid. Ind. Calcutta, 1927, pp 339-40. Kazim, *op. cit*, p. 770, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 214, Sarabhai Mehta, *Haqiqat-i naziman-i Gujarat* M.S. No,. 146, Apparao Bholanath collection, Ahmadabad, f. 44. The zamindar of Bhuj seems to have revived the practice sometime during the last decade of the seventeenth century. G.P Taylor, *op. cit*. pp 31-5. M.S. Commissariat, *op. cit* I, P 500; *Ibid*, II, pp 26, 121 n These coins are preserved at the Bhuj district Museum, Bhuj and are also available in the palace of Jamnagar.

2. *Account*, f. 85b.

3. Kazim, *op. cit*, p. 770, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 285.

rule in the Subah.[1]

In its concern for ensuring smooth flow of trade and commerce, the Mughal state, it seems, forced the zamindars to provide protection to travelers and traders through their lands.[2] Prince Murad (Oct. 1656), and a few months later emperor Shah Jahan ordered Rao Akheraj, the zamindar of Sirohi, to book the robbers who had plundered the goods of a traveller while passing through Danta, the zamindari territory which the Rao was granted with the express condition of preventing the occurence of such events.[3] From a *hasb-ul hukm* (May, 1657) it appears that consequent upon his plundering the Dutch traders one Akheraj (?) had been evicted out of his fort, and he took shelter in the territory of Bhuj with the suspected connivance of the zamindar of the place. The zamindar was, therefore, ordered to assist the imperial force chasing Akheraj, or else face similar conse-

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1. See, Aurangzeb's *farman* granting Mt. Abu and other places out of *sarkar* Sirohi, MS, Commissariat, *Studies in the History of Gujarat*, Bombay, 1935 pp 74-5.

2. S. Nuurul Hasan '*Zamindars Under Mughals*', p. 23.

3. See texts of the *nishan* and the *farman*, *Vir Vinod*, III pp 1102-4, while refereing to the place (Danta) of occurance the *farman* notes that *ma badawlat zamindari anja ra b' oo barai een inayat farmude' eem k' een qism umoor dar anja waqi shawad.*

quences, i.e. expulsion from his possession.[1]

Sometime the eruption of dispute over the succession to the *gaddi* also invited imperial intervention.

The imperial authority asserted its right to recognize the successor of a zamindar of *peshakshi sarkar*, though normally it gave recognition to the zamindar's nominee to succeed him.[2] Only two instances of imperial intervention in the succession to these principalities are traceable in the available sources for the entire period of Mughal rule in Gujarat. In the first instance, emperor Akbar placed for a short period, the principality of Banswara under direct administration (1603-4) on account of the trouble which had arisen over the succession between Agar Sen and Man Singh.[3] The second incident which relates to Navanagar during Aurangzeb's reign deserves to be examined in some detail.

Chhatrasal, the duly nominated successor, "succeeded

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1. Prince Murad's *hasb-ul hukm*, dt. May 1657, Sarad palace, Bhuj.

   No clue to identify Akheraj of the *hasbul-hukm* is provided in the text. There were two zamindars of the same name during the period -- Akheraj of Sirohi and one of Sehore (*Rasmala*), pp. 352-3.

2. *Kazim*, *op. cit.* pp., 768-9; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p 254; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System* p. 184 and n; S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindar Under the Mughals" pp.20-1.

3. *Akbaranamah*, III, p 821. The chief of Banswara, Agrasen, was expelled and the principality was captured. Subsequently, Man Singh is noitced calling upon the emperor having, in the meantime been confirmed in the seat of power. A. R. Khan, *op. cit*, p 108.

his father in accordance with royal mandate and customary practice of zamindar".[1] His uncle, Rai Singh, who was actively supported by his Jadeja clansmen of Navanagar and backed by the zamindar of Bhuj belonging to the same clan, occupied the *gaddi* (1660-61), imprisoned Chhatrasal, and expelled the imperial officials from the mint and the pearl fisheries.[2] In his turn, Rai Singh was killed by the imperial forces that came to occupy the principality (1662) which was renamed Islamnagar and placed under the direct imperial administration. Chhatrasal was only nominally restored to the *gaddi* and allowed to retain only three *parganas* out of the whole *sarkar* which lost its former status of the *peshkashi* one and was declared *kharaji.*[3]

Rai Singh's eldest son, Tamachi escaped to Okha Mandal where he led the life of an outlaw (*wahur wattia*).[4] With the active support of the zamindar of Bhuj and the Jadejas of Navanagar, he attacked the villages of Halar (*sarkar* Navana-

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1. Kazim, *op. cit.* pp 768-9, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p 254, Ranmal had remained "stead fast on the path of loyalty and submission", his request for nominating his, son, though a minor, was accepted. Kazim, *op. cit.*

2. Kazim, *op.cit*, pp.771-4.

3. Kazim, *op. cit*, pp 770-72, 775;; Saqi, *op. cit.* pp 21, 42; Khafi Khan, *op. cit*, p 197; *Account*, ff. 28a 123; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 244-45, *Ibid* , *Supplement* pp-219-21.

4. M.S. Commissiriat, *A History of Gujarat*, II, P 168.

gar) and *sarkar* Soreth.[1] Under the mounting pressure, Tamachi (of Navanagar) was offered a *mansab* which he seems to have refused.[2]

Perhaps tired of the long time spent (1663-72) in outlawry, Tamachi approached Maharaja Jaswant Singh, then *subedar* of Gujarat (1670-72). Obviously on the *subedar's* recommendation and evidently because of the inability of imperial officials to deal with an influential caste - leader. "the pen of forgiveness was crossed over the books of Tamachi's misdeeds" in 1672.[3] Tamachi, his brother Phul, Lakha, his eldest son and Varamal, the younger son were ennobled with *mansabs* of 1000/700, 300/150, 200/60 and 200/60 respectively, and, as per his request, he with his sons and brother was exempted from *dagh* and muster. Besides, 25 villages of the region which were the native places of Jadeja Rajputs who had accompanied him during his period of exile were, on his request, granted as *ina'm* to them. Tamachi was required to assist the *nazim* with a force

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1. Kazim *op. cit*, pp 771--3, 775; GH. Khare, *op. cit* Letter No. 62, dated 2nd June, 1667. Because of his acts of plundering and depradations he was given the cognomen of *tagad*, the robber, M.S. Commissariat, *A Hisotry of Gujarat*. II. p 168.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p. 281.

3. *Ibid*, I. p. 284.

of 1000 *sawars* and infantry of the same strength.[1]

But the *Jam suffered* a substantial loss both in his possessions and position. The *sarkar* of Navanagar was not given the position of *peshkashi* and it remained a *kharaji sarkar*. The *Jam* was given only a portion of the *sarkar*, the remaining part including *mahal haveli* and city of Navanagar remained under the direct administration of the imperial government. The zamindari was put under the jurisdiction of the local *faujdar* instead of the *Nazim* of the *subah*. The single *makan-i zamindari* as it was treated previously, was split up into twenty two *makans* with reduced status.[2]

Thus, out of necessity all the three -- Chhatarsal, Tamachi and the emperor -- had to make room for each other. Political expediency and economic necessity thus forced the solution. With the adjustment of Tamachi's interests the territory, mainly plain and fertile, could be managed with relative case.

The territory of the zamindar of Ramnagar, was annexed apparently for strategic considerations and it seems to have

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1. *Ibid*, I, pp. 284-5; For the newly assigned area, see *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 219-21; *Account*, ff. 123a and b, also see. *P. C.* Nos. p 39-40, pp 55-56. K. R. Kamdar, "Conquest of Jamnagar", *Proc. Indian, Hsitory Congress*, (IHC), 1957, p 217.

2. *Account* ff. 105b, 123a and b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 217 219-20, 225. *P.C.* (*Peshkash* document), Nos. 39, 40, 55.

been restored, subsequently, on economic grounds. In his bid to occupy important strategic points between Gujarat and the Deccan Prince Aurangzeb captured Baglana and annexed Ramnagar. Since the time of its annexation the administration seems to have found it difficult to meet the administrative expenses out of the revenues of the territory.[1] Consequently the zamindari was restored to its zamindar with provision that he would pay a sum of rupees ten thousand as *peshkash* every year.[2]

These zamindars do not appear to have much inclination for participating in the imperial politics as is evident from their moves during the war of succession between the sons of Shah Jahan. On the eve of the war, Prince Dara endeavoured to persuade Rao Akheraj of Sirohi to reach the imperial court.[3] As he did not show up, the prince asked him to join Maharaja Jaswant Singh along with the other zamindars of the surrounding parts.[4] But the Rao does not

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1. *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam*, ff. 279-80; the text says that *Wilayat* Ramnagar.. *maftuh gasht.... az anja kharj az dakhlash afzun bud*. But the empire seems to have retained the fort of Ramnagar, even after the restoration.

2. *Ibid*; *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f 4.

3. Dara's *nishans* dated 12 Oct. 16 Oct. and 3rd November, 1657, reproduced in the *Vir Vinod*, III, pp 1105-1108.

4. Dara's *Nishan* dt. 31 March, 1658, *Ibid*, III, pp. 1109-11.

seem to have participated in the war.[1] Rao Tamachi of Bhuj had also welcomed the prince who passed through his territory before the battle of Deora. Also, the zamindar "had engaged his daughter to Sipihr Shukoh in the hope of his own and Dara Shukhoh's future and prosperity.[2] " Dara's devastating defeat at Deora, followed by Qutubuddin Khan Kheweshgi's[3] retaliatory inroads into the zamindari and a timely imperial warning seem to have forced Rao Tamachi to change his stand.[4] Instead of supporting Dara on his way back, the zamindar regarded him "with complete indifference"[5], and a little later welcomed the imperial commander into his territory, surrendered prince's precious articles and offered

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1. M. Athar Ali in his *Nobility Under Aurangzeb* does not find the Rao among the participants in the war. However, the author of the *History of Sirohi* (pp 202-5) claims that he had joined Dara's side. The author of the latter work does not cite any evidence in support of his contention.

2. Khafi Khan *op, cit.*, pp 123, 137; Md. Kazim, *op. cit* p 296; Saqi, *op. cit* I, p 18; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 242-43.

3. A *mansabdar* from Gujarat, he had joined (emperor) Murad's ranks and followed him to the imperial capital. Subsequent to Murad's imprisionment he became Aurangzeb's partisan who favoured him with a rise in *mansab* and *faujdari* of Pattan, a territory adjacent to Kutch. At the time Dara arrived in the *subah*, the Khan, instead of joining his ranks, carried raids into Bhuj.

4. Dara's *nishan* (dt. 17 January, 1659, Bhuj collection) records Khweshgi's inroads and instructs the zamindar's relatives to support him against the invading forces. For the imperial warning, J.N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, New Delhi, n.d, Vol I. pp 326-7.

5. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, p 137; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 245.

peshkash from which he otherwise, enjoyed exemption.[1] A little later, the zamindar was favoured with a *khilat*, an elephant and a *mansab*.[2]

The zamindar of Bhuj was also summoned by 'emperor' Murad to join his standard before he left for the imperial capital.[3] But the zamindar does not appear to have joined him, for a little later, he is noted to have welcomed prince Dara as pointed out above.[4]

It is evident from the preceding discussion that the zamindars of the *peshkashi sarkars* ruled over their inherited territories on a hereditary basis with full autonomy under the paramountcy of Mughal emperors. Their subordina-

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1. Account, *f. 110 b;* Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement, *p 227.*

2. *Account*, f. 110b; The date of awarding the *mansab* is not recorded. However, Tamachi had held the zamindari from 1654 to 1662 (MS Commissiariat, A *History of Gujarat*, II, p 152) and the *mansab* was certainly awarded during Aurangzeb's reign. (M. Athar Ali, *op. cit*, p 208) From 1661 onward, Rao Tamachi had become a partisan of the rebel zamindar of Navanagar and opposed the emperor. It seems therefore, logical to assume that the *mansab* might have been granted between 1659 and 1661 presumably as reward for the coolness he had shown to Dara and the favoruable attitide towards the imperial commander.

3. Murad's *farman* dated 20th December, 1658, Bhuj collection, Prince Murad who was *subedar* of Gujarat on the eve of the war of succession, proclaimed himself emperor on December 5, 1658 MS Commissariat. *History of Gujarat*, II, pp 133-6.

4. Murad's '*farman*', *op. cit.* read with Prince Dara's *Nishan* to the ruler of Bhuj, *op. cit.*

tion to the empire implied rendering of military service, the offering of *peshkash* and accepting the circulation of Mughal coinage within their domains. Moreover the zamindars were to ensure safe passage to the travellers and traders passing through their lands. Besides, the boundaries of their respective *makans*, defined as they were, could not be changed of their free will by the zamindars, though they did endeavour to change and extend the sphere of their influence.[1] The empire, in its turn, seems to have extended the protection from external threats though some time the zamindar had to face it on its own.[2] The disputes over the *gaddi* could also invite imperial interference, though under normal circumstances the Mughals granted *gaddi* presumably to the

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1. *Akbarnamah,* III pp 524,530, *Tabqat-i Akbari,* II, pp 386-9; *Account*, ff 110 b-11a. Thus, for instance, the zamindar of Bhuj had also tried to oppose the imperial nominee and support a rebel, presumably the man of his choice for the *gaddi* of Navanagar as mentioned earlier. The zamindar of the place had expelled the Baghela and Jadeja zamindars of Santalpur and the surrounding areas (*sarkar Pattan*) and killed the zamindar of Halwad (1577-78) during Akbar's reign. Though the zamindar was forced to vacate these lands he, however, succeeded in acquiring *pargana* Morbi in exchange for surrendering the last of Gujarati Sultans to imperail forces.

2. The Marathas attacked Ramnagar twice in the year 1672. On the first occasion the imperial forces came to relieve the zamindar of the pressure. On the second occasion, the Marathas captured the capital town which the zamindar is reported to have reoccupied on his own after a lapse of ten years. J.N. Sarkar, *Shiva ji and his times*, p 186; GS Sardesai, *New History* of *Marathas (1600-1707)*, pp 193, 208, 226, 229; *History of Administration of Dharampur*, pp 17-8; G.N. Sharma *Mewar And the Mughal Empire*, Agra 1962 pp. 130-1.

zamindar's nominee at the time of each succession and recognized him as successor and granted lands in return for required obligations.[1] These zamindars, it also seems, showed an inclination for exchanging tribute for military service and by the onset of the eighteenth century a majority of them had turned exclusively *peshkashi* which indicates decline in the over-all imperial control.

B :*ZAMINDARAN-I-ISMI*: 15 *makans*

Next to the six *makans* of the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi*, the *Account* lists '*mahalat-i ismi*' constituting fifteen *makan-i zamindari* which formed the possessions of the zamindars called *ismi* (*zamindaran-i ismi*).[2] The literal meaning of the term '*ismi*' (renowned, nominal) does not help us to draw any comprehensive inferences except to distinguish them from the '*zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* discussed above. According to N.A. Siddiqi, "the zamindars who held a number of villages or an entire *pargana* and paid *peshkash* were known as *ismi* zamindars".[3] He has further observed that the possessions of *ismi* zamindars were '*ghair*

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1. This inference is based on the fact that the empire is reported to have intervened only twice, once each in Dungarpur and Navanagar where disputes had arisen on the question of succession.

2. *Account*, ff. 107a, 112b-13ab.

3. N.A. Sidiqi, *op. cit*, p.23.

amli'[1] and conditional upon the payment of fixed amount as *peshkash* or rendering military service in lieu thereof.[2] But in view of the explanation given below Siddiqi's view of the *ismi* zamindars may need to be qualified. Besides, the available evidence may also be utilized to ascertain the relative position of the *ismis* in terms of time and space within the category of the Superior zamindars.

In its exhaustive list of the *zamindaran-i ismi* the *Account* specifies fifteen *makans* in the entire *subah* which existed and continued to exist during the first and the second quarters of the eighteenth century.[3] Against a *makan-i zamindari* the name of its zamindar is also specified suggesting that one *makan* was held by one zamindar ancestor of each, according to the same work, were confirmed in their

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1. The *ghair amli* possessions were exempt from detailed revenue assessment and were held and administered by the zamindars themselves. For details see *ibid*, p.25.

2. *ibid*,. p. 147.

3. *Account*, f 112b. The *Mirat* (*Supplement*, p.225) mentions Navanagar as one of the *ismis*' territory which, however, is not listed by the *Account*. It may be recalled that Navanagar before the year 1662 was one of the *peshkashi sarkars* which was declared *kharaji* in the said year when it was annexed. Its *zamindar* was however, allowed to retain a portion of the *sarkar* and came to be counted as *ismi* until he reoccupied the entire lands sometime during post - Aurangzeb period and regained his lost status of the pre-1662 period. References will be cited at the relevent place in the following pages.

respective possessions during Akbar's reign.[1]

By virtue of their location, the possessions of the *ismi* zamindars enjoyed a position of some significance. Their lands were, by and large, situated on the outskirts of the *kharaji sarkars* adjoining the territories of the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* and other Superior zamindars holding lands in the former *sarkars*.[2] Besides, the territories of the *ismi* zamindars of Ali-Mohan, Haft-Polia (Pol), Danta, Rajpipla, Lunawada, Atlesar-Cheharmandvi, and Bansda were situated in hilly regions and infested with thick jungles, wild animals and, in some cases, surrounded by thick forests.[3] Besides, the route to Porbandar and Chhaiyan was infested with thickets of acacious trees which rendered riding through it quite difficult.[4] These zamindars moreover, strengthened their position further by maintaining fortresses which the empire had allowed them to retain at

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1. *Account*, f. 112b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 229, 233.

2. These zamindaris were situated along the boundaries of the zamindari lands of Sirohi, Dungarpur, Banswara, Ramnagar and Jagat. *Account*, ff. 15a, 112b;, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Suplement*, pp 206, 209, 214, 233; *Rasmala*, pp 444-6, 463-4; Hamilton Walter, *op. cit.*, I, pp 684-6; MS Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, I, p.326 n, *Bombay Gazetteer*, V. pp 413, 432-3, Raghubir Singh, *Malwa in Transition (1678-1765)*, Bombay, 1936, I, p. 78.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 89, 98-9. Please see also the preceding note.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 98-9.

the time of conquest. But unlike the zamindars of the *pesh-kashi sarkars* all the noticeable *ismis* had to surrender one of their fortresses which were held by imperial officials whereas the other was retained by the *zamindar* himself.[1]

The possessions of some of the *ismis* apparently commanded positions which were strategically very important. The territories of Rajpipla and Danta were of particular significance for the routes to the Deccan and the North passed respectively through the two zamindaris.[2] Likewise the Malwa-Gujarat link-route passed through the zamindari of Jhabua.[3] *Pargana* Nadot, one of the zamindari *mahals* of Rajpipla seems to have attracted traders for trading activities details of which are not known.[4] Moreover, Rajpipla was enriched with correlian mines situated at Ratanpur. The stones were taken to Limbodra where these were processed before carrying to Cambay, an imperial trade centre, by the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p 288; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p.218; *Account*, f. 215a.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. p. 89, Murad's *hasb-ul hukm* addressed to the ruler of Bhuj, *op. cit.*

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p.346.

4. *Dastak* dt. 9th Ziqa'd, I. R Y Muhammad Shah, Baroda Archives, Persian Documents, No. 91 (Hereatfter *Baroda*).

merchants.[1] The geographical position exposed the possessions of Porbandar to sea-trade. There were in all three ports--Porbandar, Chhaiyan and Ranavao -- which were situated within the zamindari of Porbandar.[2]

Some information regarding the caste of the *zamindaran-i ismi* some of whom may be identified as the direct descendants of the ex-ruling families[3] is also available. Rajpipla and Ali-Mohan were held by Gohels whereas the Bheels and Kolis formed a major part of their soldiery. Pol was possessed by Rathods; Lunawada by a Solanki; Barea by Chauhan; Probandar by Jethwas and Kesod and Jhabua were also held by the Rajput Chiefs.[4] It seems that the Rajputs were

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1. Mr. John Copland's letter (1814) cited in M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, I, pp 268-9; Barbosa, *The Book of Durate Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and their inhabitants* II, London, 1918 p 143, S Gopal, *op. cit* (for the trade in) pp 146, 187-8.

2. *Ain*, II, p. 117: *Account*, ff. 107a, 124b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 214.

3. James Tod, *Travels in Western India*, pp. 409, 417-8; W.H. Wilberforce, *History of Kathiawad*, pp. 47-8, 121-3; MS. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, I, pp 49n 82, 84,124-25,171,196-7,268-70,326n, *Ibid*, II, pp 28, 424-28,433n, 449n.

4. *Ain*, II. pp 115-9; *Account*, f, 113a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 225; *Rasmala*, pp. 340, 563; C.U. Aitchison (ed.) *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries, Bombay Presidency* Calcutta 1932 (hereafter Treaties) VII, p. 140, 145,147,153; MS Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, I, pp 196-7; *Ibid*, II, p.171. Raghubir Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 78; The *Account* (f 214b) states that the Rajput zamindar of Lunawara-Birpur was son of a Koli mother.

the dominant, if not the exclusive, holders of these zamindaris. Moreover, the same families continued in their possession throughout the period of the Mughal rule in Gujarat.[1]

The possessions of each of the *ismi* zamindars exclusively situated within the *kharaji sarkars* consisted of a *mahal*, but less than a *sarkar*, in no case less than a *mahal*.[2] As such the *ismis* enjoyed a secondary position vis a vis the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* each of whom held not less than a *sarkar*, an administrative unit over and above a *paragana* and a *mahal*. Thirdly, the *ismis* were not allowed to administer their entire holdings with full autonomy as part of their zamindari was placed under direct administration[3], unlike the zamindars of the *peshkashi*

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1. No Information regarding other zamindars' caste is availale.

2. *Account* (ff 106b -7a, 112b) enumerates these zamindaris under the heading '*mahalat-i Ismi* and *Mahal-hai sarkar-taalluqat-i zamindaran-i ismi*. Each possession is recorded as '*mahal* of such and such place (i.e. *mahal* Lunawara) and *mahal-i zamindar* so and so. *Account*, ff 24b, 27a, 106b -7a, 112b, 113ab and *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 205-6. 209-10, 214, 218. It may here be pointed out that *mahal* Kesoj was situated within the *pargana* of Mangrole (*sarkar* Soreth) which consisted of two *mahals*. (*Ibid.*, p. 218). As such an *ismis*' possession couldnot, necessarily, constitute an entire *pargana*. The possessions of Lunawada, on the other, cosisted of two *mahals* each of which formed a separate *pargana*. *Ibid.*, pp 205-6; *Account* ff. 107a, 113b).

3. For references and details please see the discussion in the follwoing lines.

sarkars who administered it on their own. Finally, the *zamindaran-i ismi* appear to have been the leading members of such former ruling families as had not been able to preserve unity of the family and its possessions. Thus the zamindari of Navanagar which formed a single *makan-i zamindari* before its annexation (1662) was split up into 22 *makans* at the time (1672) the chief claimant was restored to the *gaddi*. The leading member came to be designated as the *ismi* whereas the remaining 21 members of the family were termed as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* each holding his own possession independently of others.[1] Similarly, the Rajput chiefs of Idar, Lunawada, Porbandar, Cheharmandvi and Rajpipla who were the leading descendants of their respective families enjoyed the position of *ismis* wheres the dependent members and vassals of the families were classified as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* and they had direct dealings with the state.[2]

Like the zamindars of the *peshkashi sarkar* the *ismis* were also required by emperor Akbar, as under the Gujarati

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp. 284-5, *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 224-25 *Account* ff. 123ab *peshkash* documents. *P.C* Nos. 39 to 40. For the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* see the following section.

2. *Account* ff. 112b-3 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.pp. 189, 256 Ibid. *Supplement*, pp. 224-5, 228-36. read with *Rasmala*, pp 443-4. Therefore, it seems that the leading member of a divided family of a chief, emerged as the *ismi* whereas the leading dependents of the family as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*.

sultans, to render military services and/or pay tribute.[1] Excepting the zamindar of Rajpipla who was enjoined to furnish 1000 horse-men for service under the *nazim*, the details of contingents which the other *ismis* were likewise required to furnish are, however, not recorded in our sources.[2] In the subsequent years, the zamindars of Ali-Mohan along with Rajpipla (1609-13) and Lunawada (1661-2) are noted to have served the *nazim* with 650, 2000 and 500 horse-men respectively.[3] Besides, the zamindar of Porbandar is noted in imperial service in 1670-71 from sometime past.[4] The troops of Rajpipla remained posted at Ahmadabad till the close of the seventeenth century.[5] The zamindar of Navanagar when installed (1672) in his new position of an *ismi* was directed 'to be active in rendering military service' under the *nazim* with 1000 horse and infantry of the same strength.[6] Whether all the *ismis* continued to serve the

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1. *Accountt* ff, 105b, 106b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 225, 233. None of these zamindars is noted to have been awarded a mansab during the Mughal rule.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.233.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 189,256.

4. *Ibid* I, p. 257.

5. *Account*, ff. 76a, 79b.

6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 284. It may be recalled that the *ismi* zamindar of the place and three of his brothers and sons were awarded *mansabs*.

empire till the anset of the eighteenth century is not specifically known.[1]

Unlike the *peshkashi-sarkars*, the *ismis'* possessions were subject to the assessment and payment of *mal-i wajib* in addition to the *peshkash-i nizamat*

If and when an *ismi,* like the zamindars of *peshkashi sarkars*, was not required, or else could not be forced to render military service, he was obliged to offer tribute, called *peshkash-i nizamat*. The tribute, the amount of which could remain fixed (*muqarrari*) at the same figure for a number of years, was levied apparently whenever due on an annual (*harsala*) basis.[2] Accordingly, the zamindar of Rajpipla was under the obligation of paying 35,556 rupees sometime during Akbar's reign.[3] During Jahangir's closing years the amount was reassessed and fixed at 9,077 rupees. Thereafter, it was not reassessed during the course of the

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1. *The Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Supplement*, p. 229) and the *Account* (ff 76a-79b) however, suggest the continuity in the rendering of the service till the year of Aurangzeb's death.

2. *Account* ff, 107a; 112a-3b;. For a detailed view of the *peshkash-i muqarrari* please see Chapter I. (2) below.

3. *Account* f, 106b read with *ibid*, f.112b; *Vir Vinod,* II, p. 89 *Treaties and Engagements*, II, p. 41, During the same emperor's reign a sum of Rs. 100,000 was extorted. It was however the result of zamindar's rebellious act and not a part of regular payment. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement* p. 233.

seventeenth century.[1] The zamindar of Jhabua's recorded offering during the seventeenth century consisting of 15,000 rupees and two horses dates back to prince Murad's period of *subedari*.[2] The *peshkash* on the zamindari *parganas* of Ali and Mohan was assessed at 100,000 and 52,000 *Mehmudis* respectively sometime between 1668 and 1670. The amount was not reassessed during the later years of the century.[3] The *peshkash* due from the zamindari *parganas* of Atlesar and Cheharmandvi came to be assigned, sometime during the post-1662 period, in the salary of the *mutasaddi* of Surat, or a strong military Commander (*Sahib-i quwat-o fauj*) who could enforce the assessment and collection by leading military expeditions into the territory.[4] The other *ismis* were also required to offer *peshkash-i nizamat* though the amounts and exact time of their offerings are not specified for the seventeenth century.[5] It may, however, be submitted that

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1. *Peshkash*, Docs, .*PC* No. 28. The document was prepared during Mohd. Shah's reign. Having reflected the amount mentioned in the text, the document carries the expression: *ba'd azin aml niyamde*.

2. *Account* f. 126b.

3. *Ibid.*, ff. 112b, 127a, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p 233.

4. *Account* f. 127a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 205-6 The possession turned *ghair-amli* (immune from assessment) and its possessor, a *zortalab*.

5. *Account* ff 107a, 112b-3b, 118a-9b, 121b, 126b-7a *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; *Supplement* p. 231.

though the *peskhash-i nizamat* was a regular annual claim, it was by and large, collected only now-and-then because the zamindars rendered military service in lieu thereof.

Even these zamindars, like those discussed in the previous pages seem to have shown a tendency of becoming *peshkashi*.

Unlike the *peshkashi-sarkars*, the *ismis'* possessions were subject to the assessment and payment of *mal-i wajib* in addition to the *peshkash-i Nizamat* which has been discussed above.[1] The part of the possession which was subject to the payment of *mal-i wajib* appears to have been marked, and so far as our knowledge goes, was placed under direct administration. Thus, *pargana* Birpur, forming part of the possessions of the zamindars of Lunawada and port of Porbandar Chhaiyan respectively were accordingly marked and placed under the direct administration from the time of conquest.[2]

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1. *Account* ff. 112b, 113a, 214b-16b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 288; *Ibid, Supplement*, pp. 191-2, 209-10, 214,231; *Yad-dasht haqiqat-i Sarkar-i Soreth*, *PC*, No. 21, 27, *Haqi-qat-i Nazar-i peshkash-o Khichri Waghaira, Subah Gujarat*, *PC* No.28.

2. *Account*, ff. 27ab, 112b, 114b-6b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.p. 288; *Ibid. Supplement*, pp. 191-3, 209-10, 214, 231; *Yad dasht haqiqat-i Sarkar* Soreth, *op. cit.* Though the *Ain* does not specify the administrative position, it however, furnishes area statistics for a number of *parganas*, as will be seen below, held by the *ismis*. It is not known whether the zamindari lands thus furnished with area statistics were entirely administered by the zamindars themselve or by the imperial officials.
It may be seen that the *mahals* of other *ismis* formed part of one or the other *parganas* which are furnished

The zamindars of the places, however, continued to enjoy their share amounting to a fourth of the revenues which were collected by the imperial officials.[1] The share could also be given by setting aside a duly marked part of the otherwise directly administered lands.[2]

Out of the revenues which they appropriated from the *mal-i wajib* paying lands, the zamindars were required to pay *peshkash* in addition to what they paid on the *peskashi* territory.[3]

Reasonably adequate information reflecting the empire's attempt at ascertaining the paying capacity of the zamindars under review is also available. The *Ain-i Akbari* records the area statistics for the zamindari *parganas* of Cheharmandvi-Atlesar, Barea and of all *mahals* of *Sarkar* Nadot (excluding *mahal* Rajpipla), thus probably including the ones constitut-

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...Continued...

with *jama*, and sometimes with area figures. Seemingly, they were also required to pay *mal-i wajib*. Anyway all the *ismis*, as also the entire lands of them all, may not be categorised as exclusively '*peshkashi*' contrary to N.A. Siddiqi's contenton, *op.cit*; see also *PC* No. p 3 p 39a, p 40a, for Navanagar.

1. *Account*, ff.112b, 214b-6b - *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I,p. 288; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p. 233.

2. *Account*, ff. 214b-15a, 216b.

3. *Haqiqat-i Nazar-i peshkash-i zamindaran*, *op.cit*.

ing possession of the zamindar of Rajpipla.[1] The *jama* figures as recorded in the *Ain* for these zamindaris being in odd numbers also suggest some exercise having been made in calculation.[2] When we appreciate the availability of area statistics and the nature of *jama* figures in the context of the *desais*' appointment[3] to the zamindaris of Rajpipla and Atlesar the success of the imperial attempt at ascertaining the paying capacity of the *ismis* during Akbar's reign may appear more meaningful.

The imperial endeavor to ascertain the zamindars' paying capacity during the post-*Ain* period is, on the other hand suggested by the fact that the *Ain* and the later works record different amount of *jama* for the same lands.[4] The *jama* of the eleven *mahals* (*sarkar* Nadot) forming the zamindari of Rajpipla registered a rise of 5.6 percent from the

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1. *Ain*, II, pp 120-4; The aera recorded for the zamindari *parganas* is too meagre to suggest the entire lands were covered by the land survey. Was a part of land that during later years was held and administered by the zamindar himself, left unsurveyed?

2. *Ibid*, II. pp 120-4. The work doesnot mention any amount of revenue under *suyurqhal*. Therefore Shireen Moosvi's view that when we subtract the *suyrghal* figure from the *jama* figure we obtain round *jama* figures, is not-applicable. Shireen Moosvi, *Suyurghal* Statistics in the *Ain-i Akbari* -- An Analysis", *Proc, IHC*, 1975.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 233 and letter of Sharif Khan Bharauchi (January 1586) to Gangadas Nagar of Ahmadabad, Pune, R. No. 47,

4. *Ain.*, II, pp. 120-4; *Jama*: *Subah* Gujarat (1670), Pune, R.No. 70, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.205-6, 209-10

period of the *Ain* (67,36,228 *dam*) to the later half of the seventeenth century (71,12,870 *dam*). The increase appears to be meagre compared to the rise of 148 percent in the *jama* of Bisrai, a directly administered *paragana* of the same *sarkar*.[1] On the other hand, the zamindari *parganas* of Cheharmandvi and Atlesar registered a rise of 148 percent during the same period. It may, however, be pointed out that during the post-1672 period, Atlesar came to be categorized as *ghair-amli* and the *zamindar* of Cheharmandvi as *zortalab*. The former characterization indicates the termination of assessment and the latter necessitated the actual use or show of force for collecting revenues.[2]

Besides, the zamindars of Rajpipla and Cheharmandvi-Atlesar successfully changed the nature of revenues which they paid to the State. Since the zamindar of Rajpipla did not pay revenues, the *Subedar* led a military expedition

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1. *Ain*, II. pp.121-2; *Jama*, *Subah* Gujarat, (1670), *op. cit*; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 205-6, 209-10. We have reached the above mentioned total by deducting the *jama* for Bisrai, the twelth *pargana*, out of the total *jama* for all the *parganas* as given in the *Ain*. The course has to be adopted for the two remaining sources put the *jama* for the eleven *parganas* together whereas the same has been separately specified for the twelfth *pargana*.

2. (Anonymous), *Mirat-ul Hind*: *dar mahasil-i Subajat*, MS No. 58, Cama Oriental Institute, Bombay, ff 17-8; *Jama-o hasil Subah Gujarat*, Pune, R. No.37, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplment*, pp. 205-6.

(1627), extorted *khichri* [1] fixed the same amount as *peshkash* to be paid by the zamindar in future.[2] The other zamindar ceased to pay *mal-i wajib* from the year 167.2 He could be obliged to pay *peshkash* instead, by a strong military commander.[3] Thus, some of the *ismis* showed the tendency of turning exclusively *peshkashi* during the course of the seventeenth, century.[4]

But, then, the Mughals were neither able to exercise control in equal degree on all the *ismis* nor on the entire possession of each zamindar even during the period of the *Ain*, for neither of them finds the same treatment in the *Ain*. Thus, Rajpipla and Ali-Mohan are mentioned in the general description and not included in the statistical

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1. *Khichri* was the amount of money which the authorities could collect directly from the *riaya* occupying the lands that were otherwise subject to the payment of *mal-i wajib* and had passed under a zamindar's control who could not be forced to pay the revenue by way of *mal-i wajib*. It could also be levied as an additional impost over and above the *mal-i wajib*. For details, see the discussion in Chapters V and VI.

2. *Nazar-i peshkash-o Khichri waghaira, Subah* Gujarat; *taraf Batrak-o Mahikantha PC* No. 28.

3. *Mirat-ul Hind, op. cit.* ff.17-8. *Jama-o hasil Subah Gujarat, op. cit; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp. 205, 206.

4. Also see *Account*, f.27a, read with *Ain*, II pp.121-2 Before the dawn of the eighteenth century the recalcitrance of the zamindar of Cheharmandvi-Atlesar had come to be regarded as an accepted reality though he had been subjugated during Akbar's reign.

account, though the remaining *parganas* of the former zamindari, as referred to above, are furnished with area statistics.[1] Besides, none of the *mahals* of the other *ismis* excluding *pargana* Barea and Birpur of (the *zamindari pargana*) Lunawada and Atlesar-Cheharmandvi is even noticed in the *Ain*.[2]

The imperial interference, particularly in revenue matters was distasteful to the zamindars. Alongwith the *desai*, a *qazi* and a *waqai nigar* were also appointed in the territory of Rajpipla during Akbar's reign. The zamindar resenting the appointment of the *desai*, killed him.[3] Likewise, the zamindar of Cheharmandvi had also killed the imperial *desai* during the same reign.[4] The zamindar of Porbandar also attacked the imperial officials holding the fort and the port of the place.[5]

The zamindars of Rajpipla and Atlesar-Cheharmandvi successfully consolidated their hold over their respective

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1. *Ain*, II, pp. 120-2.
2. *Ibid*, II, pp. 115-24.
3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.233.
4. Sharif Khan Bharauchi's letter *op. cit.*
5. Photocopy of Aurangzeb's *farman*, dated April, 1683, *Settled (Barakhali)* case No. 1159; District Record office, Junagadh (hereafter *Junagadh*) recollects the said incident which took place at an unspecifried time in the past but surely during the reign of the same emperor.

possessions sometime before 1627 and 1673, respectively.[1] There is another set of evidence reflecting further the undoing of the imperial achievement of the *Ain*'s times during later period. The *Ain*, as noted above, furnishes area statistics for a number of zamindari *parganas*. Recording the position as existed around the year 1681-82 which persisted during the later period also, the *Account*, on the other hand, specifies the territories of the *ismis* as *ghair-paimooda*.[2] More important is the fact that these lands came to be regarded as exempt from survey and immune from furnishing accounts of the villages on the specific ground of being *mulk-i zamindari*.[3] It indicates the termination of Mughal hold on revenue matters and highlights the increasing hold of the *ismis* over their respective territory before the close of the seventeenth century.

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1. *PC* No. 28 and 38 For further references, please see discussion in the following lines.

2. *Account*, ff. 24b, 25a, 27ab. The work specifies the lands in the context of Aurangzeb's *farman* enquiring into the subsisting position of land survey in the *subah*, see *Ibid.* f.24a.

3. Instead of the area-figures, the following expression is suffixed against the territories: *bina bar mulk-i zamindari raqba dar paimaish niyamde* or *bina bar mulk-i zamindari Sarishta-i dehat b'daftar niyamde* or *bina bar mulk-i zamindari sarishta-i dehbandi b'daftar nami ayed Ibid* ff. 24b, 25a, 27ab, also see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement* pp.209-10.

But all the *ismis* were not able to regain their hold entirely and similarly consolidate their position. The zamindari areas of Porbandar (Port) and Birpur continued to be administered by the imperial officials throughout the seventeenth century.[1] There were, then, certain sources of revenue which were yet controlled by the state. Within the territory of Rajpipla (*Sarkar* Nadot) taxes on merchandise were levied and collected by the imperial officials as late as 1719.[2] Tax levied on the pilgrims visiting Amba Bhavani in the territory of Danta were also collected by the State officials before its abolition in 1662.[3] The *jama* for the zamindari *pargana* Ali-Mohan and *Pargana* (as different from port) Porbandar were, for the firs time, recorded during the post-*Ain* period only, suggesting that the government had acquired some control over these lands.[4]

This discussion leads us to the inference that though the magnitude of overall imperial control over the *ismis* had declined long before the onset of the eighteenth century, in comparison to the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* the

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1. *Account*, ff. 214b-6b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.288, *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp.191-2.

2. *Dastak*, dt 9th Ziqa'd, I.RY Muhammad Shah, *Baroda*, 91.

3. *Account*, f.101a.

4. *Ibid*, f.26b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.214.

former were placed under the greater degree of subjugation. As pointed out above, *qazis* were appointed in the territory of Rajpipla and Cheharmandvi. Similar appointments were made in the territory of Porbandar and Jhabua, while at the latter place a *muhtasib* was also maintained during Aurangzeb's reign.[1] We may infer that the Mughal system of judiciary was also enforced. The *mahals* held by a few of them moreover, lay within the jurisdiction of the imperial *faujdars* and thus would be subject to his supervision and control.[2] How far did the presence of *faujdars* affect the zamindar's position internally? In the absence of detailed evidence it may not be possible to answer the question categorically. As regards the military command of the *ismis* when posted outside their zamindris, they served directly under the *nazim-i Subah*, a privelege enjoyed by them all.[3]

The *zamindaran-i ismi* had only unwillingly accepted imperial control which they tried to throw away as and when possible. The zamindar of Cheharmandvi-Atlesar had established his position as *zortalab* before the dawn of the eighteenth century. But the zamindari of Rajpipla, during

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1. *Account*, ff.99b, 100a.

2. See, thus, Nadot (excluding Rajpipla), Mohan Kesoj fell within the jurisdiction of the *faujdars* of Baroda, Mohan and Mangrole. *Ibid*. ff. 427b-8b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp. 209-18.

3. *Account*, ff. 27,-76b. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.189, 286.

emperor Akbar's reign, was annexed in immediate response to the zamindar's rebellious act of killing the imperial *desai*. Having thus been fully subdued, the zamindar had no way out but to offer *peshkash* as the token of submission for the restoration of his lost possession.[1] Rai Naraindas, the Rathor zamindar of Idar (predecessor of the *ismi* zamindar of Pol) had shown his solidarity with Rana Pratap of Udaipur by rising in rebellion while the latter was hard pressed by Akbar. The imperial administration annexed the territory in retaliation for a while.[2] The zamindar of the place again rose in rebellion during Rajput wars (1679-80) which led to the loss of Idar, the stronghold, and large tract of territory for good.[3] It suggests that the imperial authority was quick, as far as possible, in retaliating the acts of rebelliousness, though the response and nature of action would not have been invariably the same.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*, p.233.

2. *Akbarnamah*, III, pp.47-8, 64-7, 190-1, 198-200, 267-8; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 122, 133. Rao Narain of Idar was father-in-law of Rana Pratap. Kunwar Rafaqat Ali Khan, *op. cit*. pp. 29-33, 35.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.294-5. The Rathors finally retired to Pol which they continued to hold till recently, MS Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, II, 449n. However, ex-vassals of the house of Rathor seem to have been allowed in their possessions as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*. *Account*. ff. 117ab.

During the course of the seventeenth century, some of the *makan-i zamindari* of the *ismis* lost their unity, though the specific cause of their breaking up is not known. The *Ain* mentions Ali-Mohan as the zamindari held by a Chauhan zamindar, later on it was broken into two; Mohan (one *makan*) remained in the *subah* Gujarat while Ali (one *makan*) was transferred to Khandesh.[1]

Similarly, Porbandar which had been treated as one *makan* as late as 1640, came to be split up into four *makans*.[2] Atlessar and Cheharmandvi were likewise divided into two *makans* sometime during the post-1663 period.[3]

To sum up, the zamindar who held an entire *mahal*, or more than a *mahal* or group of *mahals* but less than a *sarkar* paid *peshkash-i nizamat* or rendered military service and were subject to the payment of *mal-i wajib*, whose zamindaris lay (though not invariably) within the jurisdiction of *fauj-*

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1. *Ain*, II, p. 120 *Account*, ff.107a, 112b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*, pp.209, 233.

2. *Nazar-i Peshkash* Documents, Pune, RNo. 43, *Account*, f. 124b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.214. The remaining three *makans* -- Ranavao, Chhaiyyan and Navibandar -- were categorised as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*, i.e. inferior to the *ismis* in general and to Porbandar in particular. Besides, the Rana of Porbandar is said to have been regarded as the head of the four *makans*. Wilberforce. *History of Kathiawad*, p. 123; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IX, pt. I, p. 126; *Ibid*. VIII. pp 109-10, 301,

3. *Nazar-i Peshkash*, Docs, *op.cit.*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.233-4, *Account*, f.118a

dars and were subject to some degree of control by the imperial authority, were called *ismi* zamindars. Though the *ismis* and the zamindars of the *peshkashi-sarkars* enjoyed a position which was identical in more than one respect, a line of demarcation may possibly be drawn between the two:

First, the zamindars of the *peskhashi-sarkars* were allowed to retain their entire possessions intact whereas the *Ismis* were deprived of a part of their ancestral land at the time of conquest of the *subah*. Secondly, the possessions of the zamindars of the *peshkashi sarkars* consisting of not less than entire *sarkars* constituting the highest administrative unit within the province, while those of the *ismis* comprised, invariably, less than a *sarkar* which as an administrative unit, was comparable to a *pargana* level administration. Thirdly, the zamindars of the *peskhashi sarkar* were directly subordinate to the *nazims* while some of the *ismis* fell within the jurisdiction of *faujdars* of *sarkars*, or an equivalent authority, though they served directly under the *Nazim*. Fourthly, the zamindars of the *peshkash-i sarkar* enjoyed full autonomy in the administrative sphere of their entire zamindari but the *ismis* were deprived of part of the possessions which was placed under direct administration. Moreover, they were subject to greater control particularly in matters concerning revenues and judiciary. As such

the *ismis* enjoyed only a semi-autonomous position within a part of their possessions while those of the *peshkashi sarkars* enjoyed autonomy in the true sense of the term. Fifthly, the zamindars of the *peshkashi sarkars* paid only *peshkash* while the *ismis* were also required to pay *mal-i wajib*. The territories of the latter therefore, were not entirely *peshkashi*. With the passage of time, it is also evident from the preceeding discussion that the demarcating features were getting blurred. There had emerged signs of differentiation among members of the stratum of *ismis* as some of them had risen higher and moved closer to the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi*. In some spheres like rendering of military service, assigning of *jagirs*, offering *peshkash-i nizamat*, circulation of Mughal currency etc. no qualitative difference appears to have existed between them. Finally, the zamindars belonging to both the categories followed the rule of primogeniture in the matter of succession which, at least technically, was subject to imperial approval.[1]

Thus there existed definite signs of differentiation between the two strata of the category of zamindars, signs

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1. See, for imperial interference in the succession of Navanagar in the year 1695 when the zamindar enjoyed the position of a *ismi*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 330-1.

of intra-stratum differentiation had emerged and inter-strata distinguishing features were, though only gradually, getting blurred.

CHAPTER I (2)

THE SUPERIOR ZAMINDARS

On the eve of the eighteenth century

C : *ZAMINDARAN-I MAHIN O KAHIN*:

In its description of the *zamindaran-i Subah* the *Account* specifies the last set of *'zamindars'*, called *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*. They held 518 *makanat-i zamindari* during the first quarter of the eighteenth century. These *makans* like those of the *ismis* were exclusively situated within the *'kharaji-sarkars'*, outside the *makans* of the zamindars discussed in the preceding pages.[1] According to the description given in the *Account* the *mahin-o kahin* (lit. big and small) were, along with the other zamindars, confirmed in their possessions during emperor Akbar's reign.[2]

The appellation (*mahin-o kahin*) apparently indicated the size of the *makan* -- big and small, which by itself does not serve as a denominator to distinguish this stratum of the zamindars from the rest. However, a study of the size of their possessions makes an interesting reading. This appears to be worth examining for highlighting one of the visible sign of differentiation amongst them. Thus we come

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1. *Account*, ff. 105b, 107a - 11b.
2. *Ibid*, f.105b

across zamindars like Malik of *mawza* Kadi (*pargana* Kadi, *sarkar* Ahmadabad) and many others whose '*makan*' consisted of a fraction of cultivable land confined to a single village.[1] There were also other *zamindars* like Bhagwant Singh of *mawza* Kalol whose zamindari possession spread over as many as 42 villages, still confined to portions of cultivable area forming each of the villages under him.[2] There was, then, another section of zamindars each of whose zamindaris consisted of a little less than a *pargana* and sometime even

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1. Out of an entire area (6000 *bighas*) constituting *mawza* Kadi *khurd* the Maliks, *zamindaran-i mawza* held 1075 *bighas* out of the cultivable area (4000 *bigha*). The remaining cultivable area (3225 *bigha*) is mentioned as *raiyati* and the rest (2000 *bigha*) is categorised as *raqba kharij az zira't*. For similar examples see, Brahman, (*zinnardar*) zamindar of *mawza* Asland; Koli zamindar of Morwali and Rajput, zamindar of village Dewrah as representative cases. The document entitled "*Yad-dasht: dehat pargana-i Kadi*" (*PC* No. 3to 7) lists all "*zamindaran*" and zamindari villages in the *pargana*. The *Account* specifies zamindars, their *watan* possession and the area statistics of each of the '*paimooda-mawza*' forming the *pargana*. For the examples refered to above see, *P.C.* No.3,4 and 5 read with *Account* ff. 312b, 325a, 329a for other examples of similar nature, *P.C.*No. 1 to 6 read with *Account*, ff. 318b, 320b, 323a, 324b, 327b, 330b, 331b. It will not be out of place to mention here that in the present cases we come across also expressions like Koliyan, Rajputan, Moselmanan, *zinnardaran* (more than one person belonging to the caste held the possession) etc, each holding a fraction of cultivable portion of land; see, *P.C.*No.3 read with *Account* ff. 309ab, 322ab. In such and similar possessions share of member-zamindar must not have extended more than a few *bighas* of land. Also see following pages.

2. *P.C* NO. 3b-4b, read with *Account*. ff. 310a, 312a-4b, 322b-3a, 324a, 325b, 326b-7a, 329b.

more, thus considerable in size.[1]

As regards the location of the possessions of the *zamindaran-i mahin o kahin* it is evident that these were situated in almost every *pargana* of each of the *kharaji sarkars;* they thus covered plains, the rugged and mountaineous regions.[2] The geographical position of the zamindari and its distance from the seat of provincial power seem to have had some bearing on the size and extent of the zamindari as well as on the position of the zamindar within his possession.

The large sized possessions were mainly situated far off the provincial seat of power within favourable geographical surroundings. Thus the zamindari *parganas* comprising one *makan* and more than one *makan-i zamindari* were situated on the sea-coast of the peninsula Gujarat, i.e. *Sarkar* Soreth.[3] Similarly, zamindari *parganas* of Dantiwara, Aklesar, Tarkesar, Bundeli, Manzal, Nimdah etc. fell on the

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1. Thus, the zamindari *parganas* of Talaja, Mhowa, Sehore, Palitana Mandvi, Gariadhar etc. were respectively held by Partap Singh, father of Bhao Singh, Jemla, Dewdas, Pirthwiraj at the opening of the 18th century. *Account* ff. 125b, 126a read with *peshkash* Documents, *P.C.* No. p.17, p.19, p34, p36.

2. *Account* . ff 106b-9a, 114a-27a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement* pp.228-39 read with *Ibid*, pp.246-9;.

3. For example, see Mangrole, Mandvi, Chorwar, Jagat, Talaja, Amreli, Ghoga etc. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp.212, 214-5, 217-8; *Account*, ff. 108b, 109a; *Ain*, II, pp.117-19.

outskirts of the *subah* adjoining the possessions of *zaminda-ran-i ismi* and those of *sarkarat-i peshkashi*. [1] Still other like Lolyana, Morwara, Gohana, Duda, Baxra, Palitana, Sehore, Gondal, Gariadhar, Morvi etc. were located in he hilly regions and soemtime surrounded by forests and relatively in distant corners. [2] But no *paragana* level zamindari was situated around the seat of provincial power.

How far the distance from the seat of power and geographical surroundings could prove favourable to zamindar *viz a viz* the imperial government? It may be viewed from the position of the zamindar of *pargana* Tarkesar who, on account of distance (*dur-i dast*) and geographical surroundings (*dar kohistan waqi'shud*) could not be retained under the administrative control so much so that a *faujdar* too could not be

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1. *Account* ff, 107b-9a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.201-3, 205-6, 210-1. It may be pointed out that large size possessions of zamindars, which were situated on the mainland, fell on the Northern and Eastern side of the *Subah*. The part was, by and large, devoid of plains and infested with hill ranges and forest. Hamilton Walter, *op.cit* I, pp. 605,608,680, 683-5, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.210-1 also.

2. For distance, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.212-5, 217-9 for geographical conditions, *Ibid.*, pp.246-7; Sujan Rai Bhandari *Khulasat-ut tawarikh*, Delhi 1918 p.57 James Tod, *Travels into Western India*, p.19 Wilberforce, *op.cit*, pp 37-9

maintained there.[1] Similarly the zamindaris situated on the sea coast had come to enjoy immunity from the routine administrative controlm.[2]

On the other hand none of the *parganas* constituting the *sarkar* of Ahmadabad and Baroda was entirely held by zamindars.[3] These *sarkars* stretched over and contained mainly the plains constituting the *subah*. Within the *sarkar* Ahmadabad there were, however, relatively big zamindars holding vast tracts of land in the *pargana* of Viramgaon (Jhalawar), noted for its jungles and the recalcitrant Jhala Rajputs.[4]

As distinct from the *makan-i zamindari* of the zamindars discussed in the preceeding pages [Chapter I(1)] the *makan* of each zamindar of the present section was not invariably held by one zamindar. Thus *mawza* Bhadarya formed the zamindari of Rajputs (*Rajputan*) who held 982 *bigha* 10 *biswa* of cultivable area in the village.[5] Similarly there were

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1. Thus the text says: *pargana* Tarkesar- *az* Ahmadabad *yek sad -o panj kuroh taraf junub muttasil* Rajpipla ... *chun dur -i dast dar kohistan waqa' shude dast-i nazim -o jagirdar namirasid. Mirat-i Ahmadi: Supplement*, p.206.

3. *Account* (f 15a) states that *dur mulk bena bar sahil darya -i shor k' bar ba'zi jahast-o kharij az taqsim ast.* cf *Ain* II, p.124, for further references see the following discussion.

3. *Accounts*, ff 114a-27a.

4. Hamilton Walter, *op.cit*, I, pp.605, 608, 636, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.190, 192-3.

5. P.C.(Kadi), No.3 read with *Account* ff 9b, 322ab.

Syeds, Maliks and Khans etc respectively the zamindars of the village(s) Shali, Jarkal, and Badan, Ankhar--each (group) helding one *makan-i zamindari*.[1] It is equally true of some of the zamindaris that consisted of entire *parganas*.[2] It may, therefore, be contended that in the case of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* a zamindari *makan* would be held by one zamindar as also it could form collective-holding held together by more than one member who might have belonged to the same family.[3]

A study of the caste composition of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* brings a few important points to light. In addition to various clans of Rajputs, the Ahirs, Brahmans, Kolis, Bhats, Charans, Jats, Kathis, Syeds, Afghans, Maliks and other Muslims are also mentioned as being in possession of zamindaris in the *subah*.[4] Among the Rajputs some clans such as Jhalas, Panwars, Bhodias, Babarias, Makwanas, Gohels

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1. *Account* ff. 304a, 320b, 321b, 325a, 327b, 329a, 330b also see ff. 114b, 116b, 19a, 309a for additional informations.

2. *Ibid*, ff 122a, 123a, 124b, 125b.

3. As will be seen below there were also the *makan-i zamindari* which could he held simultaneously by the members of different caste and communities.

4. *Ain*, II, pp. 115-23, *Account*, ff. 105b, 114b, 115b-7b, 119a-25b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 190, 192, 201-3, 212-3, 215-7, 225; *P.C.* (Kadi) Nos. 3-7. *Rasmala*, pp. 222- 3, 253, 301.

etc. who did not possess the zamindaris described in the preceeding Chapter, are mentioned as holders of *makan-i zamindari* in the group under discussion.[1] It may, therefore, be submitted that from the point of view of caste and community this section had a relatively wider social base though mainly confined to high castes.

It has been observed that there were well marked blocks of territory each consisting of a single *pargana* or a group of *parganas* under the zamindari members of the same caste.[2] The observation being based on the information contained in the *Ain* may be substantiated further with the help of other sets of information, particularly for the Mughal *Subah* of Gujarat. Some of the territorial blocks like *Kathiawar, Jhalawar, Gohelwar, Babariawar, Jethwar* etc. were named after the castes, viz; Kathis, Jhalas, Gohels, Babaria Jethwa zamindars holding zamindaris in the regions named

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1. *Ain* II, pp.115-23, *Account*, ff.114a-27a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p.225 & passim; *Vir Vinod*; pp.91-6, Wilberforce, *op.cit*, pp.111-113, 115-6; 119-20; Tod, *Travels into Western India*: pp.256, 264, 306, 405, 411.

2. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p.161; B.R. Grover "Nature of *dehat-i taaluqa* (zamindari villages) and the evolution of the *taaluqdari* system during the Mughal Age", pp.166-67, 259-88.

respectively against their castes.[1] However, caste-blocks of territory need not be regarded as the exclusive holdings of the said caste. Thus Koli zamindars possessed zamindari village (Othania), in Jhalawad.[2] The Kolis are also mentioned as being in possession of zamindari lands in the vicinity of Bankaner (Wankaner), one of the constituencies of Jhalwad.[3] One of the four divisions into which Jhalawad was divided, was in the possession of Koli zamindars.[4] Similarly the town of Maliya (*pargana* Maliya) formed part of the *Jadejas*' zamindari in Jhalawar itself.[5] Therefore, the zamindars after whose caste the territory was thus identified, as is evident in the context of Jhalawar, were not the exclusive holders, they might better be described as the dominant possessors of the zamindari lands.

There were, then, as pointed out above, the *parganas* which were entirely held by zamindars. Vis-a-vis caste and clans of zamindars, such *parganas* as were exclusively za-

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1. *Ain*-II, pp.115-6, 251-5; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.178; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p.192; *Account*, ff. 120b, 122b-26a; Hamilton Walter, *op.cit*, I, p.636; *Rasmala*, pp.347-8, 404-5, 413; Wilberforce, *op.cit*. pp.1-2, 54, 66, 68, 111-6, 244-8, 256.

2. *Tabqat-i Akbari*, II, p.390.

3. *Ibid*.

4. *Account*, ff. 120b, 230a, 238ab; for the divisions of Jhalawar, *Ain*, II, pp.115- 6.

5. *Account* ff. 123b.

mindari holdings may be categorised into two: first, *parganas* forming zamindaris held by members of the same caste and clan. In this group the zamindari *parganas* like Sehore (Gohel), Navibandar (Jethwa), Palitana (Kathi) etc. each of which formed one *makan-i zamindari* may be mentioned .[1] There were still other *parganas* which contained more than one *makan-i zamindari*, were, however held by members of the same caste. Thus *pargana* Jagat comprised seven independent *makans* and was held by Baghera(Baghela) Rajputs. [2] *Pargana* Bhadarwa is mentioned as the zamindari of Rajputs (Rajputan) .[3] *Parganas* comprising Kathiawar (Four) consisted of 16 *makan-i zamindari* each of which was held by a Kathi zamindar. Among the sixteen Kathis, nine are identified as the descendents of one Khoman Kathi alone.[4] Similarly the *parganas* of Porbandar [5], Navibandar, Ranavao and Chhaiyan (two *mahals*, in all) were grouped into three *makans* which

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1. *Ibid.* ff. 124b, 125b, 126a; *Peshkash Docs*, *P.C.* Nos. 17,19,34, such *parganas* are noted as, for example: *pargana* Palitana-*yek makan b'ism* Jhala *zamindar pargana mazkur*.

2. *Account.* f.123a; *peshkash Docs*; *P.C.* No. p.20; p.38.

3. *Account*, f.125a;

4. *Account*, f. 124a read with *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. 1,5,19, 29, 32, 34.

5. *Mahal* Porbandar is counted as the possession of *ismi* zamindar mentioned already.

were held by Jethwa Rajputs. [1] Evidently the possession of a family, much less of a caste and clan, had come to be divided into separate *makan-i zamindari* presumably due to the working of the rule of succession and determined imperial bid to split up zamindaris into smaller units. [2]

But the sub-divisioning of zamindaris among members of a family, caste or clan of Rajput and Kolis (i.e. the original possessore of land) does not explain the existence of the second category i.e. non-Koli-Rajput zamindari *parganas* in particular or the multi-caste zamindari *parganas* in general. Thus, for example, *pargana* Tilakwara, an exclusive zamindari *pargana*, contained six *makans* which were held by Gohar, Hafiz, Murad Khan, Partap Singh, Bhanji and two more zamindars not named in the work. [3] Similarly, the *makan-i zamindari* in the *pargana* of Sarnal were held by Malik, Syed Miyan, Khan and Rajput zamindars. [4] There were, similarly, many other independent *makan-i zamindari* held by persons who belonged to different castes and communities in one and the

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1. *Account* f. 124b; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* No. p18b, p19a.

2. For references please see discussion in the following pages.

3. *Account* f. 127a; *yad-dasht-i peshkash-i zamindaran* (hereafter *Peshkash* Docs.) R.No. 17 Pune *P.C.* *Peshkash* Doc. No.p.15

4. *Account* ff. 114b-5a; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. p.12.

same *parganas*. [1] No precise information regarding the emergence of non-Rajput Koli zamindar during the Mughal age is available. [2]

Some changes in the caste composition of this category of zamindars appear to have taken place during the post-*Ain* period. [3] In addition to the castes of zamindars which are mentioned in the *Ain*, the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century documents mention Qureshis, Brahmans, Syeds, Afghans also. [4] Members of such castes as are not mentioned in the *Ain* may be noted for the *parganas* of Sanwas (Khans), Sonkhera (Rajputs) Nadiad (Muslims), Kadi (Solankis, Brahmans, Bhats, Maliks, Syeds, Kolis) etc. [5] In yet another *pargana* (Sarnal) the *Ain* enters '*girasia*' in the caste column of zamindars. [6] During the opening years of

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1. *Account* ff. 114b, 115b, 117b, 120a, 122a, 213b, 223a, 304a, 366a, *Peshkash*, Docs. *P.C.*No. 2,12,25,29.

2. For the period of Sultans of Gujarat, See S.C. Misra, ***Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat***, pp.204-6, 208.

3. The inference may hold good only if the information contained in the *Ain* is regarded as complete.

4. *Account*, ff. 213b, 223a, 304a; *Peshkash* Docs., *P.C.* Nos. 2,12,25,29; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.225; *P.C.*(Kadi) No.3,4,5; cf. *Ain*, II, pp.115-24.

5. *Account*, ff. 115b-6a; 121a, 223a; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos 6,27,; cf. *Ain*, II, pp. 115-23.

6. *Ain*, II, pp.120-1; It may be pointed out that the *Ain* mistook *girasia* for a caste. The *girasias* were also among the possessors of superior rights in land, See Chapter V below.

the eighteenth century we come across Maliks, Syeds, Miyan and Khan zamindars holding 12 out of 14 *makan-i zamindari* in the same *pargana*. [1]

No further information regarding the emergence of zamindars belonging to the castes mentioned above is available. Another set of evidence related to some other zamindaris however suggests the replacement of zamindars belonging to one caste by those belonging to another. In the *Ain*, Bajana, Wasara, Maliya and Ranpur are specified as parts of Jhalawar, zamindaris of which were held by Rajputs of Jhala clan. [2] During the last decades of the seventeenth century and first decades of the eighteenth Malik Bahadur Khan is mentioned as zamindar of Bajana which formed one *makan-i zamindari* in this region. [3] Likewise, Bahadur Khan is mentioned as the zamindar of (*qasbah*) Ranpur (one *makan*) Sahab Khan as the holder of zamindari *makan* of Wasara, and Maliya is specified as one *makan-i zamindari* held by a Jadeja Rajput. [4] Similarly, Sankhudar (Beit) is shown as the possession of Badhela Rajputs in the *Ain* while in the records

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1. *Account*, ff.114b, 115a, 304a; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. 12.

2. *Ain*, II, pp.116-21.

3. *Account*, ff. 122b, 230b, 237b; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. 29.

4. *Account*, ff.122b, 123b, 230b, 237b; *Peshkash* Doc. R.No. 38, Pune,

mentioned above the place is specified as the zamindari of one Bheema Rathor. [1]

It will also be worthwhile tracing the causes of the division of caste-family possessions. But, then, no precise information regarding the process and causes of dividing of the caste-family possessions is available. Still from stray pieces of information some idea of it may be formed.

It has already been noted that the zamindari of *sarkar* Navanagar was treated as one *makan* before it was annexed in 1662. Subsequent to its restoration there we hear of 22 *makan-i zamindari* held by the Jadeja descendents and dependents of the ex-zamindar belonging to the same clan. [2] Similarly the Rathors' zamindari of (*pargana*) Idar formed one *makan* before it was finally annexed in 1680. During the post-annexation period the Rathor vassals and descendents of the ex-chief (a Rathor), in all, held 15 *makans*. [3] Excluding the zamindar of *mahal* Haft-Polia (Pol) each one of them came to be categorised as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*. [4]

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1. *Ain*, II, p.117; *Account*, f.123a.
2. *Account*, ff.123ab; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.254-5, 284 *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. 3, 39.
3. *Account*, ff. 119ab; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. 4,10,11.
4. *Account* ff. 119ab; 123ab; *Peshkash* Doc. *P.C.* Nos. 3,4,10,11, 39.

The rule of succession clearly played its role.[1] Besides, we may take into account the chiefs' responsibility for providing sources of livelihood to the junior members of their families and their respective supporters by making land grants and the latters' willingness for and the empire's policy of entering into direct relationship with these smaller units.[2] At the time the Jadeja chief of Navanagar was restored to his *gaddi*, each of his family member who had approached the emperor was granted a status independent of their chief. The chief had particularly requested for the grant of 25 villages to those Jadejas who had stood by him during his days in exile.[3] It was these Jadejas who held the divided principality of Navanagar in the form of independent *makans* as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*.[4]

A glimpse of the division of zamindaris may be had by highlighting the position of some zamindars holding their

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1. See above the division of Jhalas and Kolis' principalities. Also C.U. Aitchison, *Treaties*, VI, pp.33, 270, *Appendix*, VI, pp.XX-XXIV; Baden Powell, *Land System of British India*, London, 1899, I, p.107.

2. *Rasmala* pp.567, 569, 570; Diwan Ranchondji Amarji, *Tarikh-i Soreth*, ed. J. Bargess, Tr. E. Rehatsek, London 1882, p.99; *Treaties*, VI, pp.9-10; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p.115; Himilton *op.cit*, I, pp.638-45; S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars Under Mughals", p.21.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.284-85.

4. *Account* ff. 123ab; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. p.39a-40b.

lands in *pargana* Kadi. In the *pargana*, Hathi Singh, (8 villages) and Bhagwant Singh (42 villages) held one *makan-i zamindari* each. In addition to that, the brother-hood (*brathri*) of Bhagwant Singh held 15 villages as '*zamindars*' independent of chief in the same *pargana*. Likewise Amar Singh, zamindar of (*watan*) Harsola and Pirthvi Raj, zamindar of (*watan*) Mansa held 34 and 16 villages respectively forming two *makans*. Their kinsimen (lit. brothers) held 33 villages independently of the head of their respective families. [1] The zamindaris were split up though the caste-family identity still survived. [2]

Like the *zamindaran-i ismi*, the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*, were also required to render military service. All of them were enjoined upon to perform the duty of "watch and ward" (*chowki-o pehra*) within the villages of their respective zamindaris. [3] For ensuring the proper performance of assigned duties, the adminsitration took an undertaking (*muchalka*), established *thanas* and *faujdari* stations within

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1. *P.C.* (Kadi) Nos. 3,4,5,6,7; also *Account*, ff. 307b-32a. They held these villages in their capacity as '*girasias*', i.e. primary zamindars.

2. It appears that the brotherhood was provided means of subsistence by its chief. In due course of time the dependent brotherhood entered into direct relationship with the imperial administration.

3. *Account*, f.106b.

their zamindaris, and sometime at the *watan* village (or town) itself.[1] In addition to policing their zamindaris, they were also required to furnish troops for imperial service whenever called upon to do so.[2] It may be pointed out that the duty of 'watch and ward' was an essential obligation of all of them whereas the specified contingents for performing duties outside their respective zamindaris were to be furnished as and when required (*ind-ul talab*) otherwise they were required to pay *peshkash-i nizamat* in lieu of service.[3]

Like the other constituent sections of the category of Superior zamindars, the tendency to exchange *peshkash* for service is discernable in the case of the present section also. By the year 1682, a section of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* had succeeded in exchanging *peshkash* for service.[4] There were the zamindars like those of Tarkesar, Santalpur and other places who are characterised as *zortalab* and

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1. *Ibid*, f. 93a; for details of *thanas Ibid*, ff. 163a-4b; 168b-9a; 211b-2a, 227a-30b and *passim*; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.190-238.

2. *Account*, f. 106b. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.256. for the military service actually rendered by some of them during the reigns of Akbar and Aurangzeb see *Akbarnamah*, III, pp.66-7, 593; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.175, 189, 256.

3. *Account*, ff.93a, 106b. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.230, *Yad-dasht zamindaran-i subah*, R.No. 63 Pune.

4. *Account*, f.106b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; *Supplement*, pp.121-2.

could be forced to pay *peshkash* only. [1] Also the zamindars whose possessions were located far off the seat of privincial power and in the coastal areas of peninsular Gujarat enjoyed virtual exemption from service. [2] Moreover, some of them, like that of Bargir had, for unknown reasons, been directly allowed to go *peshkashi*. [3]

A similar view of the declining imperial control may in more definite terms be formed by having an insight into the state's economic claims in the produce of the zamindaris.

Like those of the *ismis'*, possessions of this section of zamindars were from the beginning of the Mughal rule subject to the payment of tribute and *mal-i wajib* which were respectively called '*peshkash-i nizamat*' and '*matalba-i sarkar-i wala*.'[4] The imperial administration strove, as far as possible, to ascertain the actual paying capacity of

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1. *Account*, ff. 27b, 74b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi; Supplement*, pp.192-203, 205, 206, 214, cf. *Ain*, (II, pp.121-22) which furnishes area figures alongwith the *jama* for these zamindaris.

2. *Account*, ff. 15a, 27b, cf. *Ain*, II, p.124

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi; Supplement*, p.230. The work describes the position of the zamindar of Bargir as *zamindar anja b jamia't du sad sawar taqdim-i khidmat-i nazim hazir mishud.... man ba'd peshkash bar oo qarar yaft.*

4. Unlike *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* who paid *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* by way of *peshkash* other zamindars with few exception paid it in the form of '*mal-i wajib*'. *Yad-dasht' zamindaran-i subah, op.cit.*

zamindars and to curtail powers otherwise enjoyed by them. In this attempt the empire had met with appreciable success and placed the zamindars under a greater degree of subjugation in comparision with the ones discussed in Chapter I(1). But during the course of the sventeenth century, particularly during its latter half, some of the zamindars who, among others happened to be richer in resources and stronger as to their resisting capacity, successfully reversed the ongoing process of acquiring greater control in their favour.

The imperial administration extended land survey to cover possessions of '*zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*'. It appears the practice had been initiated under the Mughals during Akbar's reign.[1]

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1. Excepting seven *parganas* of *Sarkar* Ahmadabad and Pattan and the entire *sarkar* Soreth, the *Ain* furnishes land area statistics for all the *parganas* of the *subah* in the statistical account. Since the zamindars' possessions were located within these *parganas*, these lands too might have been covered by land survey. But the information in the *Ain* appears to be incomplete for it does not speak of the survey of the entire lands situated within the surveyed *parganas*. Our suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the works of later date giving the same information for the later period (c. 1682) show a rise in the land area for the same *parganas* over and above the ones given in the *Ain*. For example, *Account* ff. 278a, 279a-98b; 303b; 304b-7a; 351b-3a. Thus :

Pargana	*Area Statistics (in bighas)* *c. 1595*	*c. 1682*
A. Dholqa	8,34,606	13,68,467
B. Sarnal	80,646	1,37,102
C. Mehmudabad	45,590	53,818

The evidence contained in the *Account* establishes it beyond doubt that the zamindars' possessions were covered by land survey and the practice was kept up even during the subsequent period. Excepting 4 out of 282 villages which formed *pargana* Kadi, all others were surveyed by Raja Todarmal.[1] Another document specifies that 252 out of 282 villages of *pargana* Kadi contained zamindars' lands all of which had been surveyed.[2] To be more precise, zamindar Hathi Singh whose possession in the same *pargana* extended

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...Continued...

The latter work records the number of villages constituting the *pargana* and land area of each village separately, thus indicating that entire lands had been covered by land survey by the later date. However, the possibility of restructuring of *parganas* during the post-*Ain* period may not be ruled out as the *Mirat-i Ahmadi (Supplement*, p.190) suggests the creation of some new *parganas*. (*Ibid.* p.190 cf. *Ain* II, pp.120-1). The following evidence substantiates it further:

Pargana	*Area Statistics* *c. 1595*	*(in bighas)* *c. 1682*
A. Piplod	39,930	21,358
B. Kadi	9,36,837	6,32,438
C. Masumabad	2,13,805	1,14,970

Fall in the land area was definitely the outcome of taking out of some villages from these *parganas*, for the later work records area of each village (excepting 7 out of 340 villages which, according to the work, were not covered by Raja Todarmal's survey) constituting the three *parganas*, leaving no possibility of turning the once surveyed area into *ghair paimooda*.

1. *Account*, ff. 319a, 321b, 326a, 330a.

2. *Ibid*, ff. 307b-32a read with *P.C.* (Kadi) No. 3to 7.

over eight villages possessed *mawza* Pethapur by way of *watan*.[1] The account furnishes detailed area statistics for Pethapur the same way as it does for the '*raiyati*' villages.[2]

The *Account* furnishes village-wise information regarding all the 28 *parganas* which constituted *sarkar* Ahmadabad. Describing the position that existed around 1682, the *Account* mentions 10 *parganas* as *ghair paimooda* while the rest (18) are furnished with area-figures. All the *parganas* which are described as '*paimooda*' contained 63 *makans* held by

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1. *Account*, ff. 309a; *P.C.* (Kadi) No.3.

2. *P.C.* (Kadi), No.3; *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* No.6,7; The *Account* records area in the following way:

Mawza: Pethapur

raqba (total)	3900 - 10 *biswas*
(a) *adadani waghaira*	1550 - 10 *biswas*
i) *abadani*	100-0
ii) *Kondra*	175-0
iii) *rah*	345-0
iv) *goristan*	7-0
v) *zamin-i shor*	30-0
vi) *hawz*	10-0
vii) *jungle*	501-0
viii) *lab-i ab*	380-0
ix) *devasthan*	2-10
(b) *Laiq-i zira't*	2350 *bigha*

To cite yet another example, *mawza* Badasma, a *watan* village finds the description in the same way:

raqba	1000 bigha
abadani etc...	300 bigha

Laiq-e zira't 700 bigha. *Account*, ff. 309b, 314a.

zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin. The *watan* portions of their possessions are also specified in the documents.[1] The *Account* in its village-wise description records the area of all the villages, including the *watans*, which were situated within the *parganas* declared as '*paimoodah*'.[2] It establishes beyond doubt that the imperial land survey was extended to cover even the *watan* possessions of *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*.

Instead of citing evidence in exhaustive detail it may, in brief, be submitted that around the year 1682, when the last land survey was undertaken, possessions of *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* which happened to be situated within the *parganas* of *paimoodah* lands, were also in equal degree, subject to the land survey. The survey covered all the zamindari villages including *watan*. Analogically it may be argued that possessions of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*

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1. For the village wise description, *Account*, ff.163a-427b. For the identification of *watans*, *Ibid*, ff. 114a-22b and 164b, 173ab, 174b-5a, 183b-4a, 203b and passim. *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.*No. p1to 2, p4a, p5-27, p29-40 also *yaddasht haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash*, *zamindaran-i subah*, Gujarat, R.No. 37, Pune; *P.C.*(Kadi) Nos. 3 to 7.

2. See, for example, *Account*, ff 307b-32b, 362b-9b. the document entitled '*Yad-dasht: Dehat-i pargana* Kadi [(P.C. (Kadi) No.3to7)] specifies zamindar, *watans* and the rest of villages forming the entire zamindari of each zamindar holding lands in *pargana* Kadi. On the other hand the *Account*, as mentioned above, records area statistics for each of the villages constituting zamindari possessions. Evidently, land survey was extended to cover the entire lands of zamindari and no exception was made in these cases.

were not exempt from land survey and it might have been extended to cover their lands in the rest of *subah* also.[1] The administration had an inclination for surveying all lands, including zamindars' possession, though the policy had met only with partial success.[2]

The policy of surveying all lands including those of zamindars, which was initiated under emperor Akbar was not only kept up,[3] but also enforced further to cover new *parganas*. The evident increase in the area statistics for the same *parganas* from the date of the *Ain* to the year 1682

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1. The *Account* gives exhaustive details of villages and *parganas* forming *sarkar* Ahmadabad. As regards the other *sarkars* it does not record details below the *pargana* level. *Ain*, II, pp.120-4.

2. In the year 1682, emperor Aurangzeb had ordered the survey of lands of the *parganas* that had remained unsurveyed by that year. He had ordered that assistance of "*zamindaran*" was to be taken for that purpose. *Account*, ff.23a, 24a.

   In the aforesaid year, entire *sarkars* of Soreth and Godhra and 49 *mahals* situated in the remaining eight *kharaji sarkars* are characterized as "*ghair paimooda*", *Account*, ff.23a-31a. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.25. For further details see the following discussion.

3. See for example, *parganas* of Dholqa, Sarnal, Kadi, Mehmudabad, Masudabad, Nadiad, *haveli* Ahmadabad, Arhar-matar, Bheel, Piplod, Prantij etc. are furnished with area statistics in the *Ain* (II, pp.120-1) as well as *Account* (ff.23ab, 25a; 163ab, 174a-5a, 202ab, 218a-9a, 278ab, 302b-3a, 307b-8a, etc.).

may serve as a reliable indicator.[1] Besides, the *Ain* doesnot furnish area statistics for the *parganas* of Petlad, Thamna, Mandva, Hyderabad and Kaparbanj.[2] But the *Account* furnishes detailed area statistics for all these *parganas*.[3]

A reverse trend is also noticeable. All the *parganas* of *sarkar* Godhra are furnished with area-statistics in the *Ain*.[4] Subsequently the entire *sarkar* turned *qhair paimooda* .[5] Similarly, nine *parganas* of *sarkar* Ahmadabad which had been surveyed during the *Ain*- period, are described as '*ghair-paimooda*' during Aurangzeb's reign.[6] So is the picture of one *pargana* of *sarkar* Baroda, five of Bharuch, six of *sarkar* Champaner and eleven *mahals* of *sarkar* Godhra which had been surveyed during the sixteenth century, but came to be categorised as '*ghair-paimooda*' by the ninth

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1. An increase in the recorded area is noticeable in the *parganas* of Arharmatar, Bheel, Prantij, Petlad, Thamna, Dholqa, Sarnal, Kapadbanj, Mehmudabad, Nadiad, *haveli* Ahmadabad etc. *Ain*, II, pp.120-1 cf. *Account*, ff. 23ab; 25a.

2. *Ain*, II, pp.120-1.

3. *Account*, ff. 183a, 218a, 277a, 332b, 337b. It may also be seen that all the *parganas* of *Sarkar* Soreth and *pragana* Idar (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) remained '*ghair-paimooda*' throughout the period. *Ain*, II pp. 120-5; *Account*, ff.28a, 168b.

4. *Ain*, II, p.123.

5. *Account*, ff.27ab

6. *Ain*, II, pp.120-1 cf *Account*, ff.23b, 24a, 25a-6a.

decade of the seventeenth century.[1] In brief five new *parganas* came to be covered by land survey during the post-*Ain* period, while 48 *parganas* and one entire *sarkar*(Godhra) lost their position of surveyed areas during the same period[2]. Inferentially, the possessions of more zamindars stood *ghair paimooda* during the post-*Ain* period than at the time of the *Ain*. However, the zamindaris that were situated around the seat of provincial power and which could be managed with relative ease, felt more weight of the administrative control. It appears from the fact that the *parganas* which came to be covered by land survey during the later period were located in close proximity to the seat of provincial power while the others which turned *ghair-paimooda* were located in more distant places, generally touching the zamindari possessions of *ismi* zamindars.[3] Apparently imperial control on the zamindars of distant regions was on the decline. This may be established further with the help of another but similar set of evidence.

Excluding a few *mahals* in the *sarkar* Pattan and *sarkar* Ahmadabad and the whole of *sarkar* Soreth all other *mahals* of

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1. *Ain*, pp.122-3 cf. *Account*, ff. 23a-7b.
2. *Ain*, pp.120-4 cf. *Account*, ff. 23a-7b.
3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, (pp.188-222) specifies the distance of *parganas* and direction from the city of Ahmadabad.

the *subah* were covered by land survey during Akbar's reign .[1] By the year 1682, the exclusively zamindari *parganas* came to enjoy immunity from land survey as well as from furnishing details of villages and revenue-returns to the *Diwan-i Subah*. Thus, for example, *Account* states 'on account of being *mulk-i zamindari* (*bina bar mulk-i zamindari*)' details of villages of the seven *mahals* of *sarkar* Godhra were not received in the *Diwan's* office. [2] Thus, the zamindars who held entire *parganas* and *mahals* and whose possessions were situated in relatively distant parts came to enjoy immunity from land survey and some of them even from furnishing accounts of villages as a matter of administrative norm during the post-*Ain* period. These zamindars had evidently extended their administrative sway over the lands which had been surveyed and presumably placed under direct administrative control during the period of the *Ain*.

However, all the zamindars who came to hold entire *parganas* were not necessarily exempt from furnishing accounts of villages to the privincial *diwan* even though their lands being located in the *ghair paimooda sarkar* of Soreth

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1. *Ain*, II, pp.120-21, 124.

2. *Account*, ff.17a, 26b, 27a, For similar position also see Ibid. ff. 26b, 27a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Supplement*, pp.205, 210-11) describes these *parganas* as held *bila qaid dehat* hence the number of villages too is not specified cf. *Ain*, II, p.123.

were not covered by land survey.[1] Territories of a large number of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* lay within the jurisdiction of *desais* who acted as watchdogs of imperial interest in revenue matter.[2]

The imperial administration also maintained *jama* (the assessed revenue) figures for the territories of zamindars. It was maintained regardless of the position concerning land survey and the furnishing of accounts of villages.[3] A study of the *jama* figures of the zamindars who turned autonomous makes an interesting reading.[4]

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1. *Account*, ff. 25a, 26a-8b.

2. No exemption seems to have been granted in regard to the appointment of the *desais*. However, the strong ones appear to have extorted the concession in the course of the seventeenth century. For details and references, please see '*desai*' Chapter III below.

3. *Account*, ff. 23a-31a read with *Ibid*, ff. 114a-27a. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.p.205-6, 210, 211. *Jama* for some of the *ghair-amli* lands held by a few zamindars however, were not maintained.

4. *Ain*, II, pp.120,124, Doc. *Yad dasht*, *Jamadami Subah* Gujarat 1682-83 (partly torn), R.No.33. Pune; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.211-1; *Account*, ff. 18a-20a. These *parganas* are not among the ones which lay within *desais*' jurisdiction at least during Augangzeb's reign. Please see *desai* Chap. III. below.

Zamindars' Parganas (*Sarkar* Soreth)	*JAMA - DAMI* *C. 1595*	*C. 1682-83*	*C1719 and on*
1. Amreli	17,84,160	16,72,050	16,72,050
2. Palitana	2,40,592	50,000	50,000
3. Dharai	6,24,270	50,000	50,000
4. Lathi	2,96,152	1,46,000	1,46,000
5. Mandvi	1,27,440	50,000	50,000
6. Dhatrod	2,52,048	1,00,000	1,00,000
7. Malikpur	9,95,048	2,50,000	2,50,000
8. Dungar	7,60,400	7,72,000	7,72,000
9. Gariadhar	6,23,042	6,26,042	6,26,042
10. Jagat	8,03,200	8,40,000	8,40,000

It is evident that these *parganas* were assessed even during the post-*Ain* period, the *jama* figures for the different points of time (1595, 1682-83 and 1719) are not the same. Secondly, the *jama* in the case of first seven of the ten *parganas* cited above records a fall in the assessed revenue demand of the state. A rise indicated in the *jama* of the last three *parganas* being too meagre does not fall in line with the general trend shown in the *jama* for the *subah* as well as the empire. Thirdly, the *jama* figures for the years 1682-83 and 1719 onward having remained the same suggest that the *jama* in respect of these zamindaris was not reassessed during post-1682-83 period, though an upward revision is evident from the *jama* for the non-zamindari areas as well as areas of relatively petty zamindars. Thus a recorded fall in the *jama* (serial Nos. 1 to 7), or a negligible rise in the amount of *jama* of a few (serial Nos.

8 to 10) and finally the non-revision of the same during post- 1682-83 period is suggestive of an over all decline in the imperial control over the economy of the same and similar zamindars.[1]

The *parganas* referred to above had come to be held and administered by the zamindars themselves.[2] There were also the zamindars whose *makans*, either entirely or partly fell within the *parganas* which continued to be under the direct imperial administration.[3] The entire lands including the non-zamindari ones, forming these *pargana* are also described as '*ghair paimooda*'. However, the *diwan's* office maintained detailed account of each village, including the *watan* part of zamindars in the same way as it does for the non-zamindari villages.[4] No discrimination seems to have been made in

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1. It has been suggested that *jama* approximated to the *hasil* during the last years of emperor Akbar's reign. The gap between the two widened particularly during Shah Jahan's reign and the trend was not reversed during the subsequent period; see M. Athar Ali, *Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, pp.46-50. The negiligible rise and more clearly the fall in the *jama* appreciated in the context of widening gap between the assessed sum and the actual collections go to suggest that the zamindars were able to pocket major part of their revenues. For some of the other zamindars' territories showing the same and similar trend, *Ain*, II, pp.123-4, read with *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp.210-8.

2. *Account*, ff. 123a-5b, 168b-9a; 213a-4b; 274b-7a.

3. *Ibid*, ff. 345b-55a. *Ibid*, ff. 227a-37b; 300a-32b; 370a-71b.

4. *Ibid*.

the appointment of authorities responsible for assessing and collecting the revenues during the heyday of Mughal rule.[1]

Among the territorial possessions of zamindars part of which was held by them while the other portion remained under the imperial officials, may be mentioned the Gohel's possessions. The zamindar administered *pargana* Sehore while Ghoga, a port town and a constituent of the zamindari was placed under the imperial officials.[2] The zamindar obtained his share in the revenues of the port from the provincial treasury.[3]

Instead of retaining parts or entire *makans* of zamindars under its direct administration, it appears that the imperial government, in some cases, remained contended with direct control over one of their sources of revenue. Thus, for instance, taxes on pilgrims visiting Amba Bhavani in the territory of Danta, a self-administered *makan*, were collected by the imperial officials before their abolition in 1662 .[4] Likewise, taxes on traders in the region of Sehore

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1. *Ibid.*

2. *Account*, ff. 126a; also *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p.194.

3. Doc. entitled, "*Yad-dasht : bandar* Ghoga, R.No.39, Pune, For similar position in Jhalwad and Idar see; *Account*, ff. 230b-7b.

4. *Account*, f.101.

etc. (*sarkar* Godhra) were levied and collected by imperial officials, though the terriroty had come to be held by autonomous zamindars.[1] Moreover, the villages of Mandal, Dekawara and Hadala (Viramgaon) were held and administered by the zamindars themselves.[2] However, the *dastur-ul amals* laying down rates of taxes and levies to be extorted at the *nakas* (entry-exit point) of the aforesaid villages housing *mandis*, were maintained in the *diwan's* office.[3]

Not much information is available regarding the position and role of zamindars in the process of assessment and collection of *mal-i wajib* from the peasantry of *ghair-paimooda* zamindari lands which had been placed under direct control. However, the revenues for the *peshkashi* territory were collected and paid by the zamindars as will be seen below.

As distinct from the *makanat-i zamindari* referred to above, all the *makans* which happened to be situated within the continuously surveyed parts of the *Subah*, were placed under direct administration from the times of the *Ain* to the

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1. Baroda Archives Farsi Daftar, (hereafter, *Baroda*) dated 1718. Doc. No. 91 of 1718.

2. *Account*, ff. 230b-6b.

3. *Ibid*, (ff.227b-8b) specifies each item of trade, rates of levy, place of levying taxes and other instructions to imperial officials regarding the coins etc. For similar references also see *Ibid* ff. 228b-9b.

opening of the eighteenth century. The available evidence for these zamindaris casts light on the sway of rights and position of zamindars within their possessions during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.[1] The available information is of particular significance for it casts light on the inter-relationship between zamindars' lands and the *raiyati* lands from a different angle.

Even if a zamindar held merely a portion, he was indeed identified with all the villages or *parganas* as the case might be.[2] The identification appears to be a mere conventional form of description rather than an indicator of the sway of the zamindar's right.[3] The available evidence

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1. The last of the reported land surveys was ordered in 1682. The pre-1682 position of lands which continued to be surveyed till that year was, according to the document, based on Raja Todarmal's survey as revised by Nawab Shihabuddin Khan during Akbar's reign.

2. For such identification, see Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp.155-7. The *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* were also identified the same way. The documents describe the zamindars as : so and so zamindar of *mawza/ pargana* such and such, or zamindar(s) so and so of *mawza /pragana* such and such.

3. Irfan Habib (*Agrarian System*, pp.141,143) and following him, B.R. Grover ("*dehat-i taaluga*" *op.cit* p.166) conceive of the *raiyati* and the zamindari villages as exclusive of each other. According to them, the *raiyati* could not form part of a 'zamindari' village and vice versa. N.A. Siddiqui (*op.cit*, pp.146-7) also follows the same line of argument. These scholars, rule out possibility of the existence of *raiyati* lands in the *taaluqa* (zamindari) of a zamindar. Their understanding of the *raiyati* and zamindari rights as being other than and different from each other is quite correct. But in view of the evidence cited below their view on the existence of the *raiyati* lands within the

suggests that the zamindar's right could be confined to a definite portion and the rest could be the *raiyati* land, even if the village was reckoned as '*taalluqa-i zamindar*'.

It has been pointed out above that the possessions of the Rajputs and Kolis were divided into two parts, namely; the *talpad*, revenues from which were attached to the government, and the *bantha* which was retained by its original possessors. It is yet to be seen whether the division implied the sub-division of revenues, of the land constituting the village, or of the villages themselves. Secondly, what does *bantha* denote--*watan*, share of zamindar comparable to *malikana*, or *nankar*, or else the entire zamindari out of which the zamindar was entitled to a share.[1]

To beginwith, *taaluqa* of (Superior) zamindar was divided into the *watan* possession and the rest of the zamindari. To cite a representative example, zamindar Pirthi Singh's zamindari consisted of eight villages of which *mawza* Petha-

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taalluqa needs to be modified in the present context.

1. Equating *bantha* with *watan-jagir*, B.R. Grover holds that Rajputs etc. "were given one fourth of the territory known as *bantha* as *watan* villages." He argues that revenues from *talpad* were paid as *peshkash* to the state. "Nature of land rights", *op.cit*, p.24. Irfan Habib equates *bantha* of Gujarat with the *malikana* of North India and treats it as the share of zamindar. *Agrarian System*, pp.149-50. S. Nurul Hasan regards *bantha* as the renumeration given to the intermediary zamindars. *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations* p.35.

pur formed his *watan*-possession.[1] The area of each of the villages constituting his zamindari is recorded as under:.[2]

Mawza Pethapur

(Total area constituting the village) =3901 *bigha*

A. (Area under) habitation etc, excluded

(*minha adabadi waghaira*) =1550 *bigha*, 10 *biswa*

B. Cultivable area (*raqba laiq-i zira't*) =2350 *bigha*, 10 *biswa*

a. *raiyati* 1763 *bigha* 10 *biswa*

b. *giras* 587 *bigha*

Evidently the division into *bantha* and *talpad*[3] implied dividing of land as different from the categorisation of villages.[4] Instead of citing evidence which is available

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1. *P.C.* (Kadi) No.3, 7 and R6 *Account* ff. 121a, 309b. For the composition of zamindari villages including identification of the *watan* villages of the zamindaris of Jai Singh, Roop Singh, Partap Singh, Kishandas, Abhairaj and many others, *P.C.*(Kadi), Nos. 3-7, p7, R.6; *Account*, ff. 309a-32a; *Ibid*, ff. 311a, 312b, 315a, 318a, 324b etc.

2. *Account*, ff. 311a, 312b, 315a; 318a, 324b, for other similar examples, *Ibid*, ff. 309a-32a.

3. Here *raiyati* stands for *talpad* and the *giras* for *bantha*. For a detailed view please see discussion in the following lines and Chapter V below.

4. The possibility of categorisation of villafges on the same lines may not be rejected out right. But, simultaneously it can't be regarded as the standard mode of division. In its description of all the villages constituting 28 *parganas* of *sarkar* Ahmadabad the *Account* specifies only one village held entirely by way of

for hundreds of the zamindari villages it may be submitted in brief that every zamindari village, (situated within the surveyed parts) including the *watan* of the Superior zamindar is likewise divided into *talpad* and the *bantha*.[1] Since the land of every one of the village constituting the *makan-i zamindari* could be divided into the *talpad-bantha*, the division may not be considered as the one into the *watan* and non-*watan* portions for, as pointed out above, the lands of *watan* possession too were divided the same way.[2]

A further view of the fact that the lands were physically divided and that the division implied something more than mere categorisation into *talpad* and the *batha*, may be formed from another piece of information[3] which reflects the area under actual cultivation in *mawza* Lekhawara (*pargana* Bheel, *sarkar* Ahmadabad), the *watan* possession of Amar Singh

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bantha. *Ibid* f. 249a.

1. *Account*, ff. 174b-5a, 218b, 241a, 309a read with *Ibid*, ff. 175b-81b, 219a-20b, 241b-49b, 309b-32a. It may be pointed out here that the *bantha-lalpad* system of dividing lands did not cover the entire *subah*. The system was confined to the areas which had been covered by land survey. For details, pleae see chapter V below.

2. cf. B.R. Grover, "Nature of Land Rights", *op.cit*, p.24.

3. The document is entitled *khasra mazruat mawza* Lekhawara *pargana* Bheel, *fast-i-kharif*.....1098 *fasli*(R.No. 37, Pune; hereafter *mazruat* Lekhawara). It furnishes details of the cultivators muzaria'n each cropped field, providing identity and area of the same.

zamindar.[1] Thus specifying the cropped area under the following heads and sub-heads, the document notes:

1. (Total cropped area) 4523 *bigha*

A. *Talpad* 3560 *bigha*

a. *Raiyai* 3130 *bigha*

i). *kameja* 1460 *bigha*
ii). *paikashta* 1670 *bigha*

b. *pusaita* 211 *bigha*

c. *Wazifa* 219 *bigha*

i). *khudkashta* 93 *bigha*
ii)? (*muzarian kashta* 126 *bigha*

B. *bantha-giras* 963 *bigha*

i. *zamindar kashta* 115 *bigha*
ii. (*muzarian kashta*) 848 *bigha*

It may thus be seen that the entire cropped area (4523 *bigha*) consisted of the *talpad* (3560 *bigha*) and the *bantha* (963 *bigha*) which represents 2.129/- of the cropped area. But the entire *bantha* lands (1537 *bigha*) constitute 24.99% of the entire cultivable area (6150 *bigha*) constituting the village. Secondly, 62.65% of the total *bantha* area was

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1. Area statistics of entire lands forming the village are as under (*Account* f. 174b.).

Total area of the village - 12150 *bigha*
A. Habitations etc. - 6000 *bigha*
B. Cultivable area - 6150 *bigha*

i. *raiyati* - 4613 *bigha*
ii. *bantha-giras* - 1537 *bigha*

cropped whereas 77.17% of the *talpad* land was brought under cultivation during the crop season. The proportion of the cultivable and the actually cultivated area for one and the same category of land thus being different strongly suggests the existence of the two categories of physically divided lands in the village. A closer scruting of the plots (identity of which has been furnished in the document) and the duly named cultivators (*muzaria'n*) further reveals that neither the plots nor the cultivators were common under the two sets of land. It indicates categorisation of the cultivators, or land holders also.[1]

Since the *talpad* and the *raiyati* are used to denote the same portion of land in the two documents, it would therefore, appear that the two denoted the same non-zamindari possessions. However, the difference between the two may not be lost sight of. The *talpad* lands (3560 *bigha*) consisted of the *raiyati* (3130 *bigha*) and the *wazifa* (219 *bigha*) and *pusaita* (211 *bigha*) lands. It suggests that the *raiyati* was exclusive of lands which had been set aside by way of revenue grants (conditional upon or free of service

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1. The similar categorisation of the cultivators is also noticeable amongst the ones cultivating *bantha* possession of the Primary zamindars (Chapter V *below*). Even though it may not be pressed too far, its significance may however not be lost sight of.

obligation) whereas the *talpad* was inclusive of them. So far as the sway of the zamindar's right is concerned *talpad* and the *raiyati* were identical to each other. Still the one cannot be equated all the time with the other. The *raiyati* could be less than, as in the present case, and presumably even equal to the *talpad*.[1] Finally, the *raiyati*, and for that matter, the *talpad*, could exist though not necessarily even within the *taalluqa* of a zamindar the sway of whose rights thus would cover only a portion of the village otherwise identified as a zamindari village.[2]

Though the available evidence does not suggest it conclusively however the zamindar (i.e. holder of the *bantha*) doesnot seem to be the sole-owner of the *bantha* lands. As is evident from the *mazruat* Lekhawara document, the cultivators (*muzaria'n*, enjoying unspecified rights) cultivated *bantha* lands which were subject to direct assessment by the government, a fact which will be discussed a little later. Presumably the *muzarian* of the *bantha* enjoyed some kind of rights in the land that is why they are specified in

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1. For further details, Chapter V below.

2. cf. B.R. Grover, "*dehat taalluqa - i zamindar*" *op.cit.* Also cf. Irfan Habib's observation that '*raiyati* land was different from *talpad* and was not even originally under the possession of the Kolis and others.' *Agrarian System.* pp.142-3; Also cf. NA Siddiqui's opinion that *talpad* was situated outside the *taalluqa* of zamindar and the *raiyati* lands were situated outside the villages which contained *bantha* lands. *op.cit*, pp.146-7.

their own right. Another document mentions the *zamindaran-i kameja* implying that the zamindar's right was not necessarily identical to the (proprietory) rights enjoyed by the *kamejas*.[1] Ragardless of the nature of rights enjoyed by others, the zamindar doesnot seem to be the absolute owner of the entire *bantha* lands, particularly the ones other than his *khudkashta* lands and held by the assessees.

Even though the *talpad* could be found in the zamindari village but it seems to have come to fall outside the sway of the zamindar's right. According to the *Mirat*, *talpad* "was attached to the government".[2] The *Account* terms the revenues from *talpad* "*mal-i padshahi*".[3] The *talpad*, moreover, was identical to the *raiyati* as distinct from the *bantha* i.e. the zamindari lands. It is therefore maintainable that the *talpad* didnot entail (Superior and Primary) zamindar's rights.[4]

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1. Doc. *Yad-dasht dehat* pargana Kadi *P.C.* No. 3b, *mazruat* Mahej, *P.C.* NO. 209a. For a detailed view of the rights of various persons holding *bantha* land under the Primary zamindars, please see discussion in Chapter V, below.

2. *Mirat-i Ahamadi* I, p.174, *Ibid*, *Supplement*, *p 229*.

3. *Account* f. 106b, *zamin sih hissa dar har deh talpad mal-i padshahi qarar yaft*.

4. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 142-3.

Secondly, the revenues assessed on *talpad* were collected as *mal-i wajib* and the receipts shown as *hasil* in contra distination to the revenue receipts from the *bantha* of (Superior) *zamindars* which were termed *peshkash*".[1] The two amounts stood exclusive of each other. The collection made as *hasil* (against *jama*) and the *peshkash* from the following villages which contained *bantha* lands[2] would clarify the point:

villages	*Peshkash-i zamindaran* (in rupees)	*hasil* (in rupees)
1. Akhaliyaghara	151/-	202/-
2. Asjol	502/-	101/-
3. Adol	701/-	2716/8 *annas*

Thus the amount levied as *peshkash* being less (Sl. No.1 & 3) as well as more (Sl. No. 2) than that of the *hasil* the one did not form part of the other.

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1. Neither all the revenues collected from the *bantha* were termed *peshkash* nor even all the amounts called *peshkash* were extorted from the *bantha*. For details please see discussion in the following lines and Chapter V, below.

2. *Account*, f. 174b, read with *ibid.*, f. 178b; *ibid*, f,309a read with *ibid*, f. 311b, It may further be added that there was no *makan-i zamindari* in *pargana* Azamabad. No collection is therefore recorded as *peshkash*. The realised amount is reflected as *hasil*.

The state demanded a share in the produce of the *bantha* of *zamindar* and it was called *peshkash*. The origin of government claim in the *bantha* - revenues is traced back to the days of Sultan Muzaffar Gujarati who introduced the *bantha-talpad* system. Since then the *peshkash* came to be extorted from the *bantha* of the *zamindaran* (and *salami* from the *bantha* of the *girasias*) and the practice was kept up during the Mughal age.[1] Under the Mughals the claimed share in the *bantha* revenues of the *zamindaran* was levied as *peshkash-i nizamat*.[2]

The *peshkash-i nizamat* was determined on the basis of detailed assessment. It has been submitted above that detailed information regarding the area actually cropped by individual plot-holders of the *bantha* of Superior zamindar were maintained in the office of *diwan*, the same way as for the *talpad*. Likewise the office maintained the *dastur-ul amal* specifying the propotionate share of the *riaya*, the state and the Superior zamindar. Thus the produce of (*barani*, unirrigated) *polaj* of the *bantha* was divided into four parts (*chahar hissa*) of which two parts (*du hissa* i.e.

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1. *Ibid*, f. 106b.

2. *Account*, ff, 106b-9a, 339a, 340a, 409a. But entire extortions made as *peshkash-i nizamat* were not levied on the *bantha*.

half of the produce) were left with the *riaya*; a fourth (*chaharum hissa*) was apportioned as government's share (*hissa-i sarkar*) and the remaining quarter (*hissa-i chaharum*) as the *hissa-i banthadar*.[1] Similarly produce of the irrigated (*chahi*) *polaj* was divided into six equal parts. The state and the *bantha-dar* each, were entitled to a sixth part whereas the rest (four parts of two-third) was marked as the *raiyat's* share.[2] In a nutshell, the *dastur-ul amal* and *amal-i dastur* which are available for the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb suggest it without exception that the part of the produce which was extorted from the peasantry of the *bantha* was equally divided between the state and the zamindar.[3] According to the available *dasturs* the state share could be assessed, though only exceptionally, on lump sum basis (amal-i *bitmuqte*).[4] The *peshkash-i nizamat* was demanded and collected as an annual claim (*harsalah*) from every *makan-i zamindari* as government's share in the

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1. *Account*, ff. 339a, 340a, 409a; *dastur-ul amal*, *P.C.*Nos. 22, 25-6, 33, 41, 45-7. The earliest available *dastur-ul amal* dates back to the period of *subedari* of Isa Tarkhan (Shahjahan's reign) who introduced the *bhagwatai* as the mode of assessment and collection; last of the *dasturs* were framed during Aurangzeb's reign and were, at least officially, not revised subsequently.

2. *Account*, f. 339a.

3. *Account*, ff. 339a, 340a, 409a; *dastur-ul amal P.C.* Nos.22,25-6, 33, 41, 45-7.

4. *Account*, f.339a

produce of the *bantha* provided the (Superior) zamindar was not called upon to render military service.[1]

It may be added here that from the view point of *riaya* no difference existed between the *bantha* and the *talpad* in terms of revenue demand. The above quoted *dasturs* specify the *riaya*'s share which remains the same regardless of the category of land. The difference lies in the fact that revenue from the *bantha* were shared between state and *banthadar* whereas the one from the *talpad* were to be expropriated by the state at the exclusion of the *banthadar*.

From the preceding discussion it would appear that the '*zamindar*' was neither the absolute owner not the only claimant in the produce of the *bantha* lands. Since the state claimed a well defined share in the *bantha* revenue on regular basis in addition to extorting revenues due from *talpad* at the exclusion of the zamindar, it is difficult to equate *bantha* with the *malikana* which was expropriated by the (primary) zamindar alone.[2]

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1. *Ibid*, ff. 114a-26b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 229-39, B.R. Grover ("Nature of land rights", *op.cit*, p24.) mistook the amount of *peshkash* as specified in the latter work as the one paid by the zamindars due from *talpad*, See also *Account*, ff, 174b, 181b, 309b-32a; *Mawazna fis-sinwsat Subah* Gujarat *sarkar* Ahmadabad *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *P.C.* No. 105, cf. N.A. Siddiqi, *op.cit*, p.147.

2. cf. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp.149-50.

Thus the sway of the zamindar's right had been curtailed and confined to the *bantha*, revenues from which portion were, under the rules governing assessment, shared by the zamindar and the state on equal basis. The *bantha*, as such, may be described as 'reduced zamindari' as distinct from the 'share of zamindar'.[1]

The *peshkash-i nizamat* which was a regular claim, in the present context, on the *bantha* of zamindar does not seem to have borne any relationship to the *jamadami* which represented the *talpad* portion of land.[2]

It is an established fact that the *hasil* denoted the revenues actually collected as against the *jama* which signified the 'revenues assessed. Since the *hasil*, stood exclusive of the *peshkash-i nizamat* as noted above it may be argued that the latter was neither included in nor signi-

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1. For further details, please see discussion in Chapter V.

2. Though Irfan Habib does not appear to have come across the expressions '*peshkash-i nizamat*' and *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* but his observation that the *peshkash* (i.e. in its presrnt form) was different from the *jama*, the two being indicators of two distinct imperial claims, levied separately, holds good. *Agrarian System*, pp.184-5; cf. M.A. Nayeem who notes the prevailence of two distinct claims but erroneously tries to calculate proportionate relationship between the *jama* and the *peshkash -i nizamat* without paying attention to the fact whether the former signified and represented the latter at all M.A. Nayeem, "Mughal documents Relating to the *peshkash* of zamindars of South India, 1694-1752", *IESHR*, Vol. XII, No.4, Oct-Dec 1975, pp.425-33.

fied by the *jama*.[1]

The preceding discussion pertaining to the assessment of *peshkash-i nizamat* relates exclusively to the zamindaris of *paimooda* areas which were divided on *bantha-talpad* lines. But most of the zamindari *makans* were located in the regions lands of which were not surveyed. In these areas the imperial attempt at correlating the amount of the tribute with the actual yield seems to have been at variance from zamindari to zamindari as will be discussed below.

The *peshkash-i nizamat* from a section of zamindars holding lands in *ghair-paimooda* areas seem to have been determined after making some exercise in calculation. The office of *diwan* maintained details of the zamindari villages.[2] Secondly, nature of figures of the amount actually extorted also goes to suggest to the same effect.[3] But then, there were the zamindars whose offering are invariably

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1. For further evidence, *Account,* ff, 167a, 174b-75a, 183b-4a, 275a, Since the evidenc relates to the areas which followed *banath talpad* system, the inference therefore, may hold good for the same parts.

2. *Account*, f 28a. The*Mirat-i Ahmadi* (*Supplement*, pp 211-19) refers to such zamindari which did not furnish details of villages, (or *sarihta-i dehat*) implying that other zamindars furnished it.

3. See, for example the amounts of *peshkash* i.e. 2378/-, 568/8annas, 1025/- 1312/8 etc. paid by the zamindars of *sarkar* Soreth etc. during the first few years of the eighteenth century. *Peshkash* documents , *P.C* Nos. 2,9, 14a, 17a- 9b;

recorded in round figures which hardly suggests any exercise in calculation.[1] There were still other zamindars like those of Jagat, Dhatrod (*Sarkar* Soreth), Dantiwara, Santalpur, Kakrej etc (*Sarkar* Pattan) who, sometime during the post-*Ain* period, ceased to furnish account of villages under them and turned *zortalab*.[2] Located in favourable geographical position far off the seat of provincial power zamindars of these places were strong enough to resist imperial interference because of their strong caste bastions also.[3] Similarly *ghair-amli* portions of the zamindaris were immune from assessment and subject to the minimum of imperial control.[4]

As such no uniform standard of assessment was applicable to entire lands of all the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*. The variations ranged between wide limits; on the one hand there were the zamindari lands which had been placed under

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1. Thus a Koli zamindar of Chunwal paid 15000 *jami* during the *subedari* of prince Murad and Bahadur Khan. Khoman etc. zamindars of Jhalawar paid the same amount during price Dara's period of *subedari*, for the same and similar instances *Peshkash* documents, *PC*, Nos, 1,2,19,20 and *haqiqat-i sarkar* Soreth -*PC*, Nos. 22a, 23b.

2. *ibid.*, 22b-9a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 203,205-10,212-6,218.

3. These lands are described as *miskin-i Jattan*, *miskin-i Kolyan or miskin-i Kathiyan* etc. The reason of non-furnishing the details of villages is also ascribed to the recalctrance of the zamindars. *Account*, ff. 22b-9a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 202-3,214-6.

4. *Account*, ff 26b-7b; N.A. Siddiqi, *op.cit* p.25.

direct administration, thus minimizing the difference between *peshkash* and *mal-i wajib*; on the other there were the lands which at the onset of the eighteenth century[1] were not assessed at all.

It is worth submitting that *peshkash-i nizamat* was also described as "*peshkash-i mugarrari* [2] which expression implies that the amount was fixed (regardless of the mode of assessment), but was 'liable to be revised after a reasonablespan of time'.[3] The available evidence for the latter half of the seventeenth century also suggests that the amount could remain fixed for as little as three years to as many as ten years.[4] It was equally true for the offerings made by the zamindars regardless of the mode of assessment and collection.[5] As such, in spite of surveying cultivable lands and maintaining details of the actually cropped area

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1. It has already been mentioned that more of the zamindaris turned "*ghair paimooda*" and a number of zamindars passed out of administrative control.

2. *Account*, f.106b; *Peskash* documents, *PC* Nos.28-34, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p, 324.

3. B.R.Grover,Elements of continuty and change in Land ownership and rights from the Mughal Age to the early British Period 'Presidential Address, Med. Sec IHC Calicut, 1976 pp 20-2

4. *Peshkash* Documents, *PC* Nos, 1-2,5, 8-12, 14-5, 28-35, 38, 43; *Account*, ff 122b-3a, 124b-6a, 166-7a, 303b-4a, *Yad-dasht fis-sinwat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *peshkash zamindaran, mawza* Anwarsaj *wghaira. PC,* No. 105.

5. *Yad-dashl* , *P.C.*No.105. *op. cit.*

and the *destur-ul amals*, the *peshkash*, for all practical purposes, was not fixed on yearly basis. Since the zamindar paid the same amount of money for a number of years the crop-season-wise assessment might not have direct and consistent bearing on the amount thus actually paid. The crop-season wise assessed paying capacity of the zamindar not being taken into account every time it would allow the zamindar some degree of freedom in revenue matters even within those zamindari lands which otherwise were placed under direct administration. Also the zamindar's income would be determined not only by his proportionate share but also by the difference in the amounts paid (*peshkash*) and actually collected.

In addition to appropriating land revenue a number of *zamindarn-i mahin-o kahin* enjoyed income from other sources also. Some of them enjoyed revenues of the ports which were situated on the coastal line of Gujarat peninsula and were obvious centers of trading activities.[1] The zamindars of Halwad and Jia Koli were allowed a share of Rs. 7/8 *annas* and Rs. 20/- respectively out of every Rs. 75/- from the imposts levied on merchandise at the *mandis* of Viramgaon, *nakas* (exit-entry points) of Hadala, Patri (Patdi). Wasara,

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1. *Ain.*, II,pp 116-9 read with *ibid* II,p 264; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement* pp 212, 214-5, *Account*, ff 17b.

Janbo, Mandal, Weekawara etc. (*pargana* Viramgaon, *sarkar* Ahamdabad).[1] Likewise the zamindar of Patdi of the same *pargana* enjoyed a share in the revenues collected by the officials from the *namaksar* (salt-pans) located in the zamindari.[2] Some of the zamindars held lands and villages by way of *ina'm*, exacted fines, levied prohibited taxes (*abwab-i mamnua'*) and resorted to plundering activities both on land routes and the high seas.[3]

In the light of this discussion it may summarily be submitted that:

Despite the fact that the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* were more numerous, holding vast tracts of land all through the *kharaji sarkars* and enjoying wider social base, they were assiqned a position secondary to those of the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* and the *zamindaran-i ismi*. Aconsiderably large number of them had been the junior members and vassals of the leading chiefs of the region whose prin-

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1. *Dastur-ul amal-i mandvi qasbah* Viramgaon, reproduced in the *Account* 227a-8b; *ibid*, f228b. The taxes were gathered by the state officials and the zamindars collected their share from the treasury. *ibid.*

2. *Account* ff.229-30b; for the location of the salt pans, *Ain*, II, pp 148-9; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 192.

3. *Account*, ff. 101a and b; 170a, -72a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 232-4, 324-5; *Hasb-ul Hukm*, dt. May 1657, *op.cit*, *Yad-dasht dehat tappa* Chunwal *amla pargana* Jhalawar, *PC* No. K1; Surinder Gopal, *Commerce, and Craft in Gujarat*, pp. 168, 175.

cipalities had broken up as a result of ongoing political process.

This stratum was placed under greater degree of administrative control. Zamindars' geographical position on imperial map, caste-clan bastions, productivity, manageability and the capacity to resist went a long way in determining the state-zamindar relationship. Since these factors lacked uniformity and varied from place to place, the position of the *zamindaran-i mahin-okahin* was also at variance from one another.

Moreover, the intra-strata differences were further sharpened particularly during the second half of the seventeenth century, during which period a process suggesting qualitative change in the state-zamindar relationship is discernable. During the period two simultaneous processes viz; of acquiring a qreater hold over a group and secondly conceding autonomy in qreater degree to the other are noticeable. Consequently we come across a section of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* who, by the close of the seventeenth century, had been thoroughly subjugated so much so that most of the shades of distinction subsisting between them and the Primary zamindars had been eroded. The other section that in major part had earlier been subjugated, emerged as truly autonomous, under only a nominal imperial

control. Likewise the zamindars who had been autonomous only partially, also emerged as fully autonomous. Moreover, some of them ceased to be service rendering and still others stopped paying *mal-i wajib* and turned exclusively *peshkashi*. As such the intra-stratum signs of differentiation became more prominent where a strata of them approximated in its position'to the *zamindaran-i sarkart-i peshkashi* and the *zamindaran-i ismi*. Thus the process of blurring the inter-strata-distinguishing features also gained currency. It may particularly be mentioned that the zamindars who had consolidated their position by repelling imperial administrative pressure, were the ones who were relatively richer in resources and in command of considenable power in men and material. But the zamindars whose position was relatively more vulnerable, were exposed to bear the maximum of imperial administrative pressure. It is also worth appreaciating that the imperial policy of promoting disunity among the caste-family members by entering into direct relationship with them and making inroads into the main source of their power could be pursued within its logical limits and on a limited scale. Therefore, the zamindars' caste bastions could not be eroded to an appreciable extent for the greator benefit of the empire.

So far we have discussed features and tried to ascertain distinguishing characteristics of the constituent - sections of the (Superior) '*zamindaran*' as they find description in the contemporary works, particularly the regional documents. On the basis of this discussion [Chapter -I(1) and (2)] and some other evidence it may be submitted that:

Forms of holding zamindaris and the provisions made for sharing revenues were of varying nature. Though the Mughal had adopted an overall structure of the pattern of relationship established under the Sultans of Gujarat, it had consistently made efforts for acquiring greater hold over the zamindars. In this attempt the Mughals adopted reasonably flexible attitude, presumably keeping in view the sources of their strength and power and the capacity for acquiring and retaining control over them. The pattern of relation thus established, lacked uniformity and, consequently there emerged zamindaris having definite signs of differentation.

Beside the manageability considerations which, by and large, were governed by the geo-social compulsions, the economy factor appears to have been a strong motivating force behind the imperial attempts at acquiring control over

the zamindaris on the one hand and the zamindars' own capacity to resist and repel it on the other.

The empire pursued a definite but cautious policy towards the 'symbols and sources' of zamindars' power.[1] Attempts were made to dislodge them from forts and fortresses and convert them into instruments of administrative control;raze the strongholds of some recalcitrant ones to ground, deny them freedom of raising new ones and, in their stead, raise its own fortresses at commanding points.[2] But the policy, presumably as it could be, was pursued to its logical limits and a number of zamindars, particularly the stronger ones, continued in possession of their respective strongholds.[3]

Caste-clan affiliations and family bonds seem to have constituted the main source of the Superior zamindars' strength in Gujarat also.[4] Though the members of other

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1. For a general view of the zamindars' symbols and sources of power, Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp.160-9.

2. *Ain.*, II, pp 121-24; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 121, 143-4, 174, 211, 213, 225-6, 262,274,285-6,326-7,369-70; *Ibid*, *Suplement*, pp 217-9, *Account* ff. 15a 18a, 70a.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I, pp. 372-3;*Ibid*, *Supplement* pp, 205,207,209, 213-4, 218,233; *Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam*, ff. 2-4; Hamilton Walter, *op. cit*, p.685.

4. For some details, please see, Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 159-64.

castes and community too made inroads into the category presumably through state channel, Rajputs and Kolis continued to be in the domineering position which the state could hardly erode, even though some efforts to that effect were made.[1] The well established practice of providing suitable means of subsistence, called *jiwaee, shasun or giras* to the leading caste-members and junior members of the family following the rule of primoqeniture in matters of succession, might have helped the zamindars in preserving unity of the inherittance from within and resisting pressure exerted from without.[2] But where and when found feasible the empire

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1. For such inroads through state channel during the period of Sultans of Gujarat, S.C. Misra, *Rise of Muslim power in Gujarat* pp. 204-6, during Mughal age, *Junagadh*, S.C. No, 1159 (*mahal*, Kutiyana).

2. Rule of primoqeniture applied to the larger principalities, though not invariably. (For exceptional instance, *Account*, f 109b); For the grants made by head of family, Hamilton Walter, *op. cit*, I, p.618; For the chiefs' concern for providing suitable means and respectable social status for his leading clansmen, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.284-5.

   The sons of petty zamindars divided, though not equally, the patrimony among themselves _ the 'younger brothers shared alike assigning a larger share (*Motabhag*) to the eldest who was designated *motabhagia* and held the seal of zamindari (*Rasmala*, pp 567,569-70); *Treaties* VI, pp. 9-10). In such cases the inheritance was not physically divided, generally, it was held jointly (*Treaties*, VI, pp. 33,70; Appendix No, VI, pp xx -xxiv, Baden Powell, *Land System of British India*, London, 1889. I. p.107). The expressions such as brotherhood (*brathri* or fraternity), brothers (*brathran*) children or descendents (awlad), Rajputs (Rajputan), Kolis (Koliyan) etc. used to denote holder (s) of one and the same *makan*, as pointed out earlier, testify to the existence of collective holdings. But

established direct relationship with the vassals and dependents of leading zamindars, either by eradicating or alongwith the head of family for dismembering the otherwise united. *makan-i zamindari.*[1]

The imperial authority seems to have, though only exceptionally, intervened in matters concerning succession in larger principalities, the small zamindars appear to have decided the matter among themselves although they too had to procure confirmatory orders from the provincial authorities.[2]

The Mughal state had allowed the Superior zamindars to continue in their possessions on condition of rendering military service to and sharing revenues with the empire The service obligation, with some exceptions, was an essential obligation for all of them, and the zamindars had to serve, as they did, regardless of the award of *mansab*.

...Continued...

the *bhayads*, according to British works, were not averse, under given cricumstances, to their coming into direct contact with the state.

1. Please, see for example the instances of Idar, Porbandar, Kadi and Navanagar referred to in the preceding discussion.

2. Only two instances one each relating to Dungarpur, Sirohi and Banswara during Akbar's reign and the last relating to Navanagar during Aurangzeb's reign are noticeable in our sources; see also, *Rasmala*, pp 312, 319-20; 340-2, *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 96-7; *Treaties*, VI, pp. 2,4,20,77,89; Hamilton Walter, *op. cit* i. p 640.

The State's share in the revenues was met under two major heads, viz; *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* (claim of Emperor) and the *peshkash-i nizamat* (tribute for the Governor). The former was denoted by *jama* and levied as *peshkash* from the zamindars of *peshkashi sarkars*, and, as *mal-i wajib* from the rest of them. The *peshkash-i nizamat* was demanded on an annual basis, if and when a zamindar was not required to serve. The state made elaborate arrangements for assessing their paying capacity and endeavoured to enter, as far as possible, into direct dealing with the *riaya*. In this attempt the state met with appreciable success. But, as a matter of fact, it could neither acquire hold in equal degree over all of them neither retain the acquired hold consistently. Therefore, the Superior zamindar's position vis-a-vis the empire and the *riaya* was at variance from one another and, consequently, they bore definite signs of differentiation amongst themselves, thus giving rise to the three distinct sections who could mainly be distinguished on the basis of extent and degree of autonomy which they enjoyed within their respective possession. The pattern of relationship established initially witnessed some significant changes before the onset of the eighteenth century.

The state, on the one hand, successfully subjugated (by and large relatively petty) Superior zamindar thoroughly

and, slimultaneourly conceding autonomy in greater degree to the other zamindars who, in the beginning had been placed under greater degree of administrative control. The seventeenth century witnessed a dual process of acquiring and repelling the imperial hold. In this game of see-saw a number of the Superior zamindars emerged stronger. The development led to blurring the inter-strata distinguishing features on the one hand and widening and intensification of intra-stratum differentiation.

Secondly, the Superior zamindars also tended to, and a number of them also succeeded in exchanging service for *peshkash-i nizamat*, Thirdly, some of them successfully transformed the nature of imperial claim from *mal-i wajib* to *peshkash* which did not necessarily bear relationship with the zamindar's paying capacity[1].

Alongwith the element of continuity in the attitude of imperial authorities towards the 'erring' zamindars, element of qualitative change is also discernable.

With regard to the acquisition of military service and exaction of tribute, the Mughal state was quite insistent.

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1. For further references, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 189, 256-7; *ibid Supplement*, p 190, = 192,203,205-6,224-7,234,290-1; *Jama dami Subah* Gujarat, R.No. 47, Pune; *Yaddasht haqiqat-i Peshkash-o hasil sarkar* Soreth *PC.* Nos, 21-4; *Rasmala*, pp 253-4; *Treaties*, VII, pp 191-2. Hamilton Walter, *op. cit* I, p 645.

The zamindars, at times, displayed reluctance in performing the enjoined duties. The garrison placed at various places throughout the *subah* under the superintendence of the Governors and over all watch kept by the centre, to an appreciable extent, ensured enforcement of the assigned obligations.[1]

As regards the collection of *peshkash* it was Governor's responsibility to ensure its remittance, *faujdars* of *sarkars* and *parganas* were in direct charge. The Governor was, however, required to undertake military expeditions for re-inforcing the local administration.[2] But the *nazims*, or else some strong commander had to directly ensure its collection from the leading recalcitrants who could not be managed by the *faujdars* [3] Likewise the leading recalcitrants of Surat

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1. For details of administrative arrangements, *Account*, ff 74b, 93a&b; For a general view, Q Ahmad, "*Faujdars* of *parganas* and *sarkars*", *Proc, IHC,* 1958, pp.352-4;and Milieu of study under Inbroduction to the present studys above.

2. *Account*, f. 105b; *Alamgirnamah*, pp. 769-70. For expeditionary pruposes the *subah* was divided nto 30 units (*zila*) each of which consisted of specified *makan-i zamindari* number of which ranged from one to 42. Necessarily not corresponding to the boundries of any of the administrative unit a *zile* could be equal to or more than a *pargana* and a *sarkar*. The *zila* seems to be a geo-administrtive unit, comprising specified *makan-i zamindari* along the routes adopted by the expeditionary forces. *Accound* ff. 106 b-9a.

2. *Account* (f.74b) for the expeditions actually led against leading recalcitrants, *Mirat-i Ahmad*, I, pp. 192, 213-4, 216,239,254, 326-30.

region had to be dealt by the port officer, or else by a strong commander (*Sahib-i quwwat-o fauj*)[1]

Occasionally one or the other zamindar evaded payment of *peshkash*, abstained from performing enjoined dnties, defied command, plundered villagers, travellers and traders, rose in open rebellion and harbuored imperial rebels.[2] All such reported acts of rebelliousness invited administrative action which resulted in various kinds of punishment, such as imprisionment of zamindar, enhancement' in the amount of *peshkash*, imposition of economic penalty and transfer or attachment of zamindari for a while.[3] Simultaneously, incompetent Governors were replaced by more powerful and competent ones, strong military contingents were sent from the centre for meeting emergency and more administrative pressure was brought by establishing new *thanas*, or else the strength of the existing one was raised in the ares of

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1. *Account*, ff. 105b, 109b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement* pp. 206-8.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 188, 210-17, 223-4,230,232: *Vir Vinod*, III,pp. 1105-11 Prince Murad's *nishan* dt., December, 1655. *op. cit* Emperor Shahjahan's *Farman* addressed to the zamindar of Sirohi, *op. cit* *hasb-ul hukm*, addressed to the zamindar of Bhuj, dt. May, 1657, *op. cit*.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 188, 210-6, 223,-4, 230, 232, *Hasb-ul hukm*, dt. May, 1657, *op. cit*.

turmoil.[1]

Incidents of zamindars' rebelliousness are reported, more frequently, during Aurangzab's reign, presumably suggesting an increase in the acts of defiance.[2] Increased recalcitrance seems to have infuriated the emperor who, in desperation, ordered the Governor, to kill the 'mischievious, rebellious and confirmed offenders.'[3] Harshness in the attitude of administration is equally evident from the actions reportedly taken against the defiants, particularly the smaller zamindars.[4] Non-compromising approach is also reflected in the acts of annexation of zamindaris, a consid-

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 188, 210,223-4, 255-6, *Hasb-ul hukm*, dt, May, 1657, *op. cit.*

2. For example, please see, the rebellious activites of the Kolis, Rajputs and those of the zamindars of Bhuj, Idar, Ahmadnagar, Hyderabad, Kathiawar, Khanbali, Thhan Dantiwara, Nandot, Baroda region, Therad, Jagat, Kakrej, Mahumdabad, Jhalawar etc. Kazim, *op. cit* pp 296, 771-5; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 242-5, 253-6, 284-85 288-91, 294-5, 325,331, 336--7, 344-5, 370, 372-3; *Junagadh* Sc No, 115. (*Mahal Kutiyana*); G.H. Khare, *Aetihasik Farsi Sahitya*, VI, Letter No. 62 Dt. 2nd June, 1667, Ishwardas Nagar, *Futuhat-i Alamgiri*, Delhi, 1978, pp. 130-1; Myse, *History of Dharangdhara State*, 1921, pp. 96-9 *History of Kathiawar*, p. 119-20.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I, p 279; for a moderate attitude as adopted under the preceeding emperors. *ibid.* I, pp. 165-6; A.R. Khan *op. cit* pp.78-90

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* i, pp. 244, 255-6. But the stronger ones evaded such punishment; Kazim, *op. cit* pp. 296, 411; *Account* f. 110b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I, pp 242-43.

erable number of which was extinguished during his reign.[1]

The evidence cited above must, however, not lead us to infer that the administration under Aurangzeb dealt with all the defiant zamindars with equal sternness, or that the pressure once exerted was kept up all through his reign. On the contrary the emperor was obliged twice to restore Raja Chandrasen Jhala to the *gaddi* of Halwad in 1680 and again in 1706 under mounting pressures. The zamindar was also able to extort the privelege of exemption from paying *peshkash* (1680) and the *Thanedari* of Mhodasa (1706).[2] Likewise the emperor compromiosed his position with the *de facto* chief of Navanagar as mentioned earlier. Besides, the zamindars of Jagat, Nadot, Kolis and the Bhils of many places rose in rebellion and seem to have evaded punishment during the closing years of his reigh.[3] During the same emperor's reign the zamindars of Santalpur, Chunwal, Kakrej, Chehermandvi, Atlesar, Tarkesar, Jhalwar and Kalthiawar

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1. During the reign zamindaris of Navanagar, Halwad, Idar, Deesa, Thhan, Khanbali, one each in *pargana* Ahmadnager and Hyderabad were annexed. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I, pp. 254-5, 284-85, 291, 294, 325, 372, *Ibid Supplement* p. 202; H.K. Kamdar, "Conquest of Navanagar", *op. cit* pp. 217-8; *Account* ff. 123ab, C.Mayse. *op. cit* pp 96-9.

2. Emperor Aurangzeb's *farman*, dt, 29 Oct, 1680, Dharangdhara palace collection, unindexied; C. Mayse, *op.cit* pp 97-99; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.372-73; *ibid Supplement* p.218; *History of Kathiawad,* pp 119-20.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I.p. 370

successfully turned exclusively *peshkashi zortalab* zamindars.[1] As such the empire if and when feasible, endeavoured to acquire greater controlling position and react effectively. But where and when such a position was difficult to attain and retain, or else react effectively, it contented itself with the exaction of tribute and retrieve its steps rather than prosecute doubtful contest. By the onset of the eighteenth century rigidity seems to have given way to compromising approach and some laxity. The process found its way into the eighteenth century when it seems to have acquired further momentum and unprecedented dimensions.

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1. *Ibid*, *Supplement* pp.192,196,203,205-7, 212-3 216; *yad-dasht: haqiqat-i peshkash-o hasil sarkar* Soreth, *PC* Nos, 21-4; *Account*, ff.23a-7b.

CHAPTER - II

The Superior Zamindars
(1700 - 50)

In the preceding discussion we noticed the zamindars of various descriptions, having many features in common as also definite signs of differentiation, within the broad category of Superior zamindars. It has also been observed that the empire made elaborate arrangements for adjusting, preserving and maintaining the often discordant interests of the zamindars and its own through various devices but mainly by maintaining constant vigil and continual pressure, the degree of which varied from place to place. It is further noticed that during the course of the seventeenth century some of the zamindars successfully repelled the imperial pressure and effected a favourable change in their position leading to gradual erosion of the inter - strata distinguishing features and the emergence of intra - stratum variations. Having been in nascent stage and confined to select zamindaris, the process found its way into the eighteenth century and, within a few years of its opening, gained momentum and went on unabated, acquiring unmanageable dimensions. Gradually the zamindars greatly disturbed the entire system of balancing interests. There was a progressive decline in the degree of imperial control. Much before the Mughal rule had physically become extinct from Ahmadabad(1753) the Moghul authority ceased to exert any pressure on them. A drastic change in the conditions of holding zamindaris and the imperial attitude towards the zamindars becomes manifest. Without losing their positions, the various sections of Superior zamindars mingled with each other

and formed a single bloc. These zamindars were locked in contest with the empire, even though they fought among themselves and remained disunited. Under the emerging pattern of relationship, exacting *peshkash* by force survived as the only point of contact between them and the Mughul state. In this Chapter an attempt is made to discuss the elements of continuity and change in the position and role of the Superior zamindars in their relationship particularly to the Mughul state and in relationship with their own. In view of the emergence of almost uniform conditions of holding zamindaris resulting from the prevalence of similar circumstances, these processes are studied at one and the same place since they relate to all sections of the Superior zamindars.

Following the example of the relatively stronger and the more privileged of them, the rest of the Superior zamindars too ceased to serve the empire. To beginwith, the *mansabdar*-zamindar of Dungarpur withdrew his troops (1701) from the provincial capital in the wake of *subedar* Shuja't Khan's death (1701) in office.[1] With the withdrawal of his troops the last of the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* who had continued to furnish

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1. *Account* ff. 76a, 79ab, 105b, 126 b *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 225.

specified contingents ceased to serve the empire for good.[1] Thus, with the turn of the century even a *mansabdar*-zamindar could not be forced to serve in contrast to the situation during the seventeenth century when the same and the other zamindars regardless of the award of *mansab*, had rendered service obediently.

The *zamindaran-i ismi* followed the example set by the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peskhashi*. Of the *ismis* those who were still in imperial service withdrew their troops(1701)which were stationed at Ahmadabad.[2] With this, all the *ismis* ceased to serve the empire for good.[3]

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1. Subsequent upon his withdrawal of troops Prince Mohd. Azam, the next *subedar* summonned the zamindar. But he did not show up. Later on *subedar* Firozjang and Shahamat khan led expedition into the territory. The zamindar, however, refused to call on the *subedars Account* ff. 79ab, 126b, please see also Ibid, f. 105 b and *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement* p.225.

2. *Account* ff. 79b, 112a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement* p.229. Similar inference may be drawn from the detailed description of contemporary events given in our sources. During the course of the seventeenth century the *Mirat*, on a number of occassions as noted earlier, specifies the zamindars who served the *nazims*. In subsequent years (1702-50) such references in regard to the above mentioned zamindars disappear altogether. But the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, at another place (Ibid, I pp 173-4; Ibid, Supplement, pp. 224-5, 228-9 (and following him the other works of later date trace the development to the year of Aurangazeb's death (1707). See, for example, *Treaties*, VI, pp. 93, 98, 203, 210, 229; *Rasmala*, pp. 556-67. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II pp. 119, 213, 219. From the evidence cited in the previous and the present Chapter, it would appear that the process was a gradual one and didnot emerge and develop all of a sudden in 1707.

3. *Account* ff 79b, 112a

The tendency to abstain from rendering military service is likewise well evident in the case of *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* also, a number of whom had already ceased to serve, as noted in the preceding Chapter. But unlike the above mentioned zamindars this stratum continued to serve for a little longer and withdrew only gradually. Leading ones among them withdrew their troops from the place of postings along with the zamindars of the other sections.[1] But some of them whose zamindaris were located in the areas adjoining the provincial seat of power, responded to the *subedar*'s call (1707) and furnished troops to fight the invading Maratha forces soon after emperor Aurangazeb's death.[2] A little later (1714) one Jassa zamindar is noticed in the company of *subedar* Daood Khan, informing him of the high handedness of the zamindar of Navanagar.[3] Later on (1724-25), *subedar* Mubariz-ul mulk is reported to have summoned the zamindars to join his standards for pushing the Marthas out of the *subah*.[4] Momin Khan the *subedar* (1737-43) had also asked Jatta, zamindar of Antrasma and the Kolis of Mandwa to present themselves for defending the ford and passage of Kholwad.[5] It was apparently a call for duty but no zamindar is mentioned as having responded to it.

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1. *Account* f. 112a.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. P.377.
3. *Akhbarat*, 2489, 7th Shoban, 3rd R.Y. of Farrukhsiyar.
4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* , II. p. 86.
5. *Ibid*, II, p.258.

No evidence suggesting any actual attempt by the provincial authorities to enforce the military obligation is available in the pages of contemporary, near - contemporary and later works. Instead, the provincial authorities resorted to the collection of *peshkash* through expeditionary forces specifically led for that purpose. Such expeditions were led by the *Nazims*, or sometimes by an equally strong commander.[1] Gradually it became a norm. As a corollary to the development which indicates a definite change in the zamindars' attitude[2], the nature of economic claim, mode and method of its assessment and collection, as would be examined below, underwent a drastic change.

It seems worthwhile to examine the observation of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* that "whenever the *Nazim-i subah* leads an expedition"[3] the zamindars pay *peshkash*. Presumably no tributs was paid without this coercion and this point itself indicates the process and pattern of the emerging mode of Mughal-zamindar relationship in the context of time and space.

Collection of *peshkash* through expeditionary forces led by the *Nazims* as a matter of routine is in direct contrast to the ways and means of collecting it during the seventeenth century when such a course of action was adopted under extraordinary

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1. *Ibid*, I. pp1.73-4; *Ibid, Supplement*, pp. 224-5, 229; *Account* ff. 15a, 74b, 107a. For the expeditions actually led for the purposes *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II. pp. 10-11, 20-4, 27, 40-1, 43-5, 50-1, 53, 57, 93, 233, 257, 260, 271, 303, 324-8, 330, 341, 344, 394, 396, 398 etc.

2. That was why, it seems that all the *zamindari makans* came to be designated *mehwas*. *Account*, ff. 74b, 107a, 112b-13b.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I, pp 173-4' *Ibid, Supplement*, pp. 224-5, 229.

circumstances and against the strong recalcitrants in particular.[1] As the situation, according to the *Mirat* necessitated the presence of *nazims* in "each *pargana*"[2] at the head of a strong force, it emphatically reveals the defunct state of *pargana* and *sarkar* level administration with regard to its dealing with the Superior zamindars who had turned bold and strong enough to successfully defy the *faujdars* and other local officials.[3] The continued necessity of leading expeditions each year for the collection of *peshkash* is also indicative of the absence of a permanent solution at the local level.[4]

Some information which casts light on the changing attitude of the Superior zamindars and, by implication, on the ineffectiveness of the routine administration, is also available.

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1. Beside the expeditions mentioned in the text, the *Nazims* were also required to undertake such expeditions for reinforcing local administration *Account*, ff. 106 b-7a.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 229.

3. According to a regional work (*Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 150, 156) the *faujdars* and the *thanedars* waited for the arrival of *watangiri* forces in the areas of their respective jurisdiction. At the arrival of such forces they merely assisted the *Nazim*. The work also reports that from the fourth decade of the eighteenth century active support of the locally influential nobles had become a necessity for the *nazims* for collecting *peshkash* from the zamindars of *sarkar* Soreth. The Mirat also indicates that the local nobles accompanied these force and mediated between them and the zamindars. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II. pp. 93-4, 244.

4. Combining more than one official positions into one hand (i.e. executive and revenue) may, in the present context, be seen as an attempt apparently made for strengthening officials' hand who, on their part, might have clamoured for acquiring such a privileged status. The attempted solution instead of providing a respite to the administration, proved harmful for the state as well as the *riaya*. For references, please see Political Milieu under Introduction to this workand Chapter VII below.

The situation necessitating the leading of expeditions seems to have partly arisen as early as the period of the *subedari* of Prince Mohd. Azam(1701-1704) and subsequently it came to stay for the rest of the period. The Prince had been able to ensure remittances of *peshkash*, presumably through routine administrative channel from two of the *zamindaran-i ismi* and a number of *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*, even though expeditions are not reported to have been led during his period of administration.[1] But the fact that all the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* (100%), 13 of the *zamindaran-i ismi* (87%) and a considerably large number of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* (74%) evaded payment, speaks of the emerging ineffectiveness areas of the routine administrative channel, demanding intervention of the higher authority. Hence the *Nazims* had to step in.[2]

During the period of administration of Prince Bedar Bakht, the next (interim) *subedar* "no expedition - no peshkash".

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp. 346-57. The prince had only reluctantly accepted the *subedari* of Gujarat and shown his unwillingness to continue there, for he had found the *subah* "not congenial" for himself. *Ibid*. Also, the prince had to deny the Marathas an entry into South Gujarat, in which parts they roamed all through his period of *subedari*. *Ibid* For the remittance of *peshkash*, please see *Account*, ff. 126b, 127a; *Haqiqat-i naziman-i Gujarat*, pp. 53-4; *Peshkash* docs, *P.C.* Nos. p8-p19, p25-26, p37.

2. The *peshkash* documents contain detailed information about *peshkash* for the years 1701-24 concerning 160 *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*. Taking the giure (160) as 100 for calculation purposes, it would appear that of them only 42 zamindars i.e. 26% remitted the *peshkash*. Ibid, *P.C.* Nos. p8-p19, p25-26, p37; *Account*, ff. 126b-27a.

situation comprehending almost all the Superior zamindars seems to have emerged, and, come to stay. The *Peshkash* documents and other works of the period donot mention any amount of *peshkash* having been exacted from any of the zamindars of *peshkhashi sarkars*, the *ismis* and 160 of the 518 *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* details of whose offering are available for the period covering the *subedaris* of Prince Bedar Bakht and his successor, Ibrahim Khan (1707).[1] The *Mirat* too doesnot mention any *watangiri* expedition as having been led during their days of administration.[2] It may be pointed out in brief that any amount of *peshkash* exacted from the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* and the *zamindaran-i ismi* is invariably associated with the *watangiri* expeditions led

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1. *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* op.*cit*.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I, pp. 367-74, 374-81, To reinforce the argument it may further be pointed out that the zamindars of Soreth-region are not recorded to have offered *peshkash* during the periods of *subedari* of Ghaziud-din Khan (1708-10), Asad Khan (1712), Dawood Khan (1713-15), Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-21 i.e. second tenure) and Nizam-ul mulk (1723-24) who are also not mentioned to have led expeditions into the region. *Peshkash* docs, *P.C.* Nos. p 9, p 14, p 20, p 30, p 39, read with *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 382-400, 401-13 *Ibid* II. pp 21-38 47-54, and 58-82; But Ghazi-ud dinKhan, Shahamat Khan (1713), the Maharaja (2nd tenure) are mentioned to have led expeditions into Ahmadnagar and Jhalawar (*sarkar* Ahmadabad); Daood Khan into *sarkar* Pattan and Nizam-ul Mulk's *naib* Hamid Khan into Jhalawar, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I. pp 382-89, 398-400, *Ibid* II, pp 21-38, 58-82. The zamindars of the same areas are accordingly reflected to have paid *peshkash* to the same *subedars Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p 8, p10, p12, p25-6, p28, p31.

into their respective terriotiries for the purpose.[1] Likewise the *peshkash* documents reflect the *peshkash* as having been exacted only from those *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* whose areas had been visited by the *watangiri* forces.[2] As such it may be maintained that a no expedition - no *peshkash*' situation had, by and large, emerged from the period of Prince Bedar Bakht's *subedari*.[3]

The *peshkash-i nizamat*, an annual claim (*peshkash-i harsala*) came to be collected irregularly. A careful examination of the recorded expeditions led in prevailing circumstances of no expedition-no *peshkash* reveals that the expeditionary forces lacked comprehension of the time and space. To beginwith, the

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1. *Account* ff. 105 b, 110 b, 110 a-11b, 118b, 122a, 126b, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 9, 11, 20-7, 41, 45-6, 112-3,; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp. 226, 232, 234, 238, 261. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*; ff. 60-61.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 9-11, 20, 27, 41, 43-6, read with *Peshkash* Documents, *P.C.* Nos. p2, p5, p8, p20, p25, p38, p39b, p40, to mention few.

   But the point in case of *zamindaran-i mhain-o kahin* may not be pressed too far. Some of them, particularly the ones whose possessions being situated in the area adjoining Ahmadabad were within easy reach, remitted the *peshkash* regularly, as late as, if not later than 1721-22 without having been forced by the expeditionary forces. *Mawazna-i dehsala, dehat pangana haveli* Ahmadabad 1127 to 1139 *fasli*, *P.C.*

3. An identical situation though on a limited scale, as seen earlier, had started emerging during Prince Mohd Azam's period of *subedari*.

expeditionary forces could not be led each year[1] to realise the *peshkash* which, otherwise, was to be exacted every year. For instance, Prince Mohd. Bedar Bakht and Ibrahim Khan are neither reported to have led any *watangiri* expeditions nor shown to have levied *peshkash* during the periods (1705-8) of their *subedaris*.[2] Among the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* the zamindar of Dungarpur faced the expeditionary forces thrice in 1709, 1711 and 1722; that of Bhuj only twice in 1720-21 and 1730-31; and the zamindars of Sirohi, Banswara, Ramnagar and Sunt each faced it only once sometime before 1721-22 during the course of 48 years (1702-50).[3] They did not pay any amount during the rest

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1. Thus during the times of uncertainties at the imperial centre, wars of succession, internal strifes, transfer and forcible eviction of *subedars* from the office, mounting Maratha pressure, other internal engagements such expeditions were not led. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp. 365-77; *Ibid*, II pp. 13-20, 23-4, 27-8, 37-9, 42, 103-6, 155-8, 164, 177-80 etc. Please see particularly, *Ibid*, II pp. 51-3, 58-64, 195-238, 269, 275-6, 397-8, when the expeditions could not be led due to the reasons stated above. The striking capacity of the *watangiri* expeditions might have been conditioned by the resistance put up by the zamindars and the presence and activities of the Marathas in and around the *subah*. The Marathas who had been making inroads into the *subah* since 1701, had become quite active, particularly in Southern Gujarat from 1715 onward. Excepting Shahamat Khan, Mubariz-ul mulk and Maharaja Abhay Singh no other *subedar* could lead expeditions into these parts of the *subah*.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 346-82.

3. *Ibid*, II, pp. 41, 112-3; *Account* ff. 105b,- 11b, 126b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement* pp. 226, 232, 234, 238, 266. Though the *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* in regards to Dungarpur and Banswada was assigned (1717) in the *tankhwah gagir* of a member of the house of Udaipur, but the *peshkash-i Nizamat* stood due and could not be realized. Later on, Sarbuland Khan (1722-23) forced the zamindar of Dungarpur to accept the payment of the *peshkash*. But in view of the intervention of Rana of Udaipur the zamindar was absolved of the responsibility. The exemption thus granted in the Rana's favour, was never revoked. *Account*, ff. 110a, 118b; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*. ff. 60-61; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp. 45-6.

of the period when expeditions were not led into their lands. As such the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* ceased to be an effective part of the empire before the close of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, particularly so far as the sharing of their revenues is concerned.[1]

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1. Thus zamindar of Dungarpur paid *peshkash* for the last time in 1711. Subsequently the zamindar was forced in 1722 but, as pointed out in the preceding note, the amount was not realized. Sirohi paid it for the last time sometime between the years 1713 and 1716. Ramnagar, Sunt and Banswara made their last offerings sometime before 1721-22. *Account.* ff. 105b, 110b, 122a, 126b-7a.

   The zamindar of Bhuj made his last offering in 1720-21. In the year 1730-31, the territory was invaded again and the zamindar had also agreed to pay 10,00,000 *mehmudis*. But the *nazim* demanded more. After a long battle the *subedar* was forced to beat the treat empty handed. It happened to be the last attempt for realizing *peshkash*. Later he enjoyed virtual exemption.

   It seems to be worth pointing out that the zamindar of Bhuj did not break off his relation with and continued to accept the suzerainty of Mughal empire. The zamindar of Bhuj is reported to have submitted *arz-i ali* alongwith 100 *asharfis* sometime between 1730-1733 during the *subedari* of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-1737). Raja Lakhpat, the next zamindar sent offerings which consisted of local specialities. He was favoured with the grant of a *farman*, a *khilat* and the title of *Mirza-Raja*. He had also hoped to get the *subedari* of Thatta which he was not favoured with. *Account* 1056, 11a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p.245. The said zamindar and his successors retained the title even during the British days as is evident from the documents carrying the epithet *Mirza Raja Maharao* Shri..... available in the personal archives of the present descendent of the house. Please see also Sorabji Jahangir, *Representative Men of India, London.* 1887, p 29; For the similar offerings made on earlier occasion Murad's *hasb-ul Hukm,* May, 1657 *op cit*; Emperor Murad's *farman*, 20 Dec, 1658 *Op cit*; for the occassions when such offerings were to be made, *Account*, f. 856.

In the same way the *watangiri* expeditions could not be led into the territories of the *zamindaran-i ismi* on regular basis and, therefore, the *peshkash* could not be realized annually. Thus our sources do not mention any such expedition to have been led into their lands during the periods of *subedari* from Prince Mohd. Azam to that of Asad Khan (1702-12) and later on during the tenures of Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-21, 2nd tenure), Nizam-ul mulk (1723-24), Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) and during the post-Monin Khan period (1743-50)[1]. The other *subedars* who had actually led expeditions, could not manage it on a regular (annual) basis.[2] Also, the *watangiri* forces, as and when led, could not march into the territory of each of the *ismis*.[3] Putting the information zamindar-wise it would be seen.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I. pp. 374-81, 382-89, 390-98; *Ibid*, II. pp 3-11, 47-87, 277-362, 366-98; *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p 4b, p16, p19, p22, p28, p33, p39.

2. For example, please see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I pp. 382-89, 401-13, *Ibid*, II pp 39-47; and particularly *Ibid*. II pp. 13-20, 27-8, 37-9, 275-76.

3. For instance, Shahamat Khan (1713) could cover Nadot; Dawood Khan could visit Navanagar; Maharaj Ajit Singh (1715-17) could reach Navanagar, Porbandar, Kesoj and Pharkar and Momin Khan could lay hands on Navanagar only. *Ibid*. I. pp. 382-9, 401-13, *Ibid*. II pp 4-11, 39-47, 275-76; *Account* ff. 112a-13b, *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p16, p22, p28, p33, p39.

that the zamindar of Navanagar faced the *watangiri* expeditions on six occasions, that of Rajpipla on four occasions and the ones of Porbandar, Kesoj and Pharkar faced them twice each during the year 1702-50[1]. There were still others who seem to have escaped attention of the *watangiri* forces all through the period.[2]

The *ismis* seem to have ceased to share their revenues with the empire from 1725-26, excepting Navanagar who made its last offering to the *watangiri* forces in 1742.[3] In this way they happened to be next only to the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi*.

The position of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* with regard to the offering of *peshkash-i nizamat* was not much different from the above discussed constituents of the Superior zamindars. An analysis of the information concerning the *watangiri* expeditions undertaken by the provincial authorities available in the pages of the *Mirat-i Aḥmadi* and the details of zamindar wise *peshkash* exacted by *subedars* from the times of prince Mohd.Azam (1701-4) to those of Nizam-ul Mulk (1723-24) reflected in the *peshkash* papers strongly suggests that the tribute was collected only irregularly. Thus, for instance, the zamindars of Sabarkantha region (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) are shown not to have paid

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 348, 409; *Ibid* II. pp 11, 44, 94, 98-9, 276; *Ibid, Supplement* pp. 228-38; *Account*, ff. 46b, 112a-13b, 126b-27a; *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p3, p4, p16-p17, p19, p22, p25, p28, p33, p39, p47.

2. The zamindars of Fatehpur, Pol and Kukramunda are shown to have paid no *peshkash* during the period. *Account*. f. 113b.

3. For details please see the preceeding and the following discussion.

peshkash during the periods of administration of Sarbuland khan (1712), Daood Khan (1713-15) and Maharaja Ajit Singh (1715-17) in the *peshkash* papers[1]. Likewise these *subedars* are not mentioned to have led *watangiri* expeditions into the region.[2] Similarly the zamindars of Pattandeo (*sarkar* Soreth) did not pay *peshkash* to Ghazi-ud din Khan (1708-10), Shahamat Khan (1711) Sarbuland Khan (1713) and Maharaja Ajit Singh's *naib* Mehar Ali Khan (1719-20, second tenure).[3] The *Mirat* too does not mention any expedition to have been led into the area held by them.[4] To put the information briefly, it may be seen that none of the *subedars* from Prince Mohd. Azam to Nizam-ul mulk (1701-24) could exact *peshkash-i nizamat* from all of the 160 *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* details of whose offerings are available.[5]

Statistical analysis of the *subedar*-zamindar-wise information contained in the *peshkash* papers further clarifies the point under review. None of the 160 zamindars (taken as 100) paid *peshkash* to Prince Bedar Bakht, Ibrahim Khan and Asaf-ud dawla; whereas Shahamat Khan, Dawood Khan, Maharaja Ajit Singh, Khan-i dawran, Maharaja Ajit Singh (Second tenure),

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1. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p8, p25, p26.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp. 396-97, 401-13; *Ibid* II pp 1-14.

3. *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. p9, p37.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I, pp. 382-9, 396-7, 398-400, 401-13, *Ibid* II. pp 21-38.

5. *Ibid* I. pp. 267-74, 374-81, 382-90, 396-400, 401-13, *Ibid*. II. pp 2-14, 16-8, 21-38, 39-46, 48-83 read with *Peshkash* Docs. *P.C.* Nos. Op. *cit*.

Muizuddawla and Nizam-ul mulk could exact it respectively from 11 (7%), 5 (3%), 18 (11%), 91 (57%), 75 (47%), 3 (2%), 102 (64%) and 2 (less than 2 %) of the 160 *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin.*[1]

Moreover the *subedars* as pointed out earlier, could not lead expeditions every year and cover the whole of the *subah* even during the entire duration of their respective tenures.[2]

The *watangiri* forces, as and when led, did not cover the entire *subah* and, as mentioned earlier, all the zamindars could not be forced to offer *peshkash* on every occasion. According to the information contained in the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* Ghaziuddin Khan led expedition into Sabar Kantha and some other parts of *sarkar* Ahmadabad; *naib-subedar* Sarbuland Khan and his *naib* could cover Chunwal, Sagwara, and Chorasi areas; Dawood Khan visited Sabarkantha, Kathiawar, Halar, and parts of Pattan; Maharaja Ajit Singh covered the zamindaris situated in some parts of *sarkar* Ahmadabad, Sabarkantha region, Soreth and Halar areas; Khan-i Dawran's naib could not go beyond Baroda, Sabarkantha and

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1. *Peshkash* Docs, *PC Op. cit.*

2. For more information about the areas covered by the expeditionary forces please see discussion in the following pages.

parts of Soreth.[1] As such all the areas thus covered by expeditionary forces put together, any of the Nazim could not cover whole of *subah* even during his entire tenure, much less every year.

From the evidence cited above it must, not however, be concluded that the *watangiri* forces would have succeeded in exacting *peshkash* from each zamindar of the parts of *subah* thus visited by them. For instance, Maharaja Ajit Singh led expeditions into Soreth region. But he could not levy *peshksh* on the zamindars of Dharai, Dhak and Junagadh *parganas* of the*sarkar*.[2] Similarly, Khan-i Dawran's *naib* visited the same *sarkar* for collecting *peshkash*. But he failed to capture it from the zamindars of *pargana* Amreli, Bhimrad, Rajkot etc situated within the same *sarkar*.[3] Likewise Muizuddawla had not been able to exact *peshkash* from the zamindars of *pargana* Ghoga, Baxra, Medra etc. situated within the region visited by him.[4] Also the *watangiri* forces could not necessarily exact *peshkash* from all zamindars of a *pargana*, much less of a *sarkar*, actually visited by them. For

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp. 382-89, 396-97, 401-13; *Ibid* II. pp 2-11, 12-20.

2. *Peshkash* Docs; *P.C.* Nos. p 31-6 read with *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, pp 2-11.

3. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p 34, p 35, p 38 read with *Mirat-iAhmadi*, II. pp. 12-20.

4. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p 19, p 33, p 35 read with *Mirat-iAhmadi*; II. pp. 38-47.

instance, out of 14 zamindars of *pargana* Banswara (*sarkar* Soreth) Maharaja Ajit Singh and Khan-i Dawran exacted *peshkash* from seven zamindars each but Muizuddawla could succeed in capturing it from six only.[1]

Out of the eleven zamindars of *pargana* Ranpur (*sarkar* *Soreth*) the above mentioned three *subedars* could levy *peshkash* from three, two and nine zamindars respectively.[2] Likewise out of the 15 zamindars of *pargana* Pattan, Dawood Khan, the Maharaja, khan-i Dawran *naib* and Muizuddawla could exact *peshkash* respectively from 11, 13, 12 and 6 zamindars.[3] Evidently coverage of *watangiri* forces was neither comprehensive and nor even intensive, a situation which must have provided the zamindars an opportunity to evade payment of otherwise a regular claim of Mugal State.

Instances of evading payment of *peshkash* and offering it only irregularly may further be highlighted by citing a few examples of representative nature for the years 1701-24. Holders of relatively large sized zamindaris in favourable geo-social setting far off the provincial seat of power, like those of Bhimrad, Palitana, Jagat and others (*sarkar* Soreth) could be forced to pay *peshkash* only once.[4] Similarly the zamindars of Sonkhera and Sankhani holding lands in the hilly tract on the outskirts of

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1. *Peshkash* Docs; *P.C.* Nos. p5, p7, p32-33.
2. *Ibid*, *P.C.* No. p19.
3. *Ibid*, *P.C.* No p25.
4. *Ibid* *P.C.* Nos p17- p20. Please see also the zamindars of *pargana* Laathi, Morwada, Santalpur, Chorwar *bandar* etc. for the same type of instances. *Account*. ff. 120b, 123a, 124a.

sarkar Champaner could be oblized to pay it only once during the period.[1] But the zamindars of *mawza* Limbda of pagana Chhad (*sarkar Soreth*) holding a small sized zamindari though in a far off area, was forced to surrender tribute four times during the same period.[2] On the other hand, the zamindar of Lakhtar who held his lands in Jhalawad (*pargana* Viramgaon) in close proximity to Ahmadabad but noted for its recalcitrant Jhala Rajputs, surrendered *peshkash* only once.[3] But the zamindars who held their zamindaris in *pargana* Ahmadnagar, an area by and large plain and relatively within easy reach from Ahmadabad, paid it from there to five times.[4] More particularly mention may be made of the petty zamindars of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad who offered *peshkash* regularly as late as 1723-24, subsequently surrendering it only irregularly under the pressure of arms.[5] It was, evidently, not merely the element of irregularity in leading military expedition that counted but also, and quite prominently the zamindars' own resourcefulness that went a long way in deciding the chances of evading payment of *peshkash*.

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1. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p 27.
2. *Ibid*, *P.C.* No. p14.
3. *Ibid P.C.* Nos. p29.
4. For instance see Bhimji and Ajab Singh, the zamindars of *mawza* Kaher; Dayal and Ajab Singh of *mawza* Karaadi; Jassa and Jiwaji etc. holding zamindaris in the *pargana*. *P.C.* No. p8.
5. For example, the zamindar of *mawza* Anwarsej and that of Muzaffarpur paid it the same way. *Mawazna-i dehsala dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1127 to 1139 *fasli*, *P.C.*

It may, therefore, be concluded that the collection of *peshkash* depended on leading military expeditions and the zamindars' capacity to resist and evade its imposition. The expeditions, moreover, were led only irregularly. Consequently, the *peshkash* could be exacted only irregularly. It follows that long before the Marathas' emergence as a serious contestant for power on the provincial political scene from 1722-23, the *peshkash-i nizamat* (or, *peshkash-i harsala* as it was termed) which had been a duly established 'annual claim' of empire, acquired the form of a 'casual claim'.

During the post-Muizuddawla period, or for that matter after the Marathas' appearance as serious contender for power (1723-50), the capacity of administration for effecting assessment and collection of *peshkash* deteriorated further. Thus from the table given below it would appear that

period of *subedari*	*Watangiri* expeditions led into the parts of		Number of the expeditions led during the tenure
Nizam-ul mulk[1] (1723-24)	Jhalawar	(*sarkar* Ahmadabad)	one
Sarbuland Khan[2] (1724-30)	*Sarkar*	Ahmadabad	six
	Sarkar	Bharauch	three
	Sarkar	Soreth	three
	Sarkar	Pattan	two
	Sarkar	Baroda	one
Maharaja Abhay Singh[3] (1730-37)	*Sarkar*	Ahmadabad	one
	Sarkar	Baroda	one
Momin Khan[4] (1737-43)	*Sarkar*	Ahmadabad	five
	Sarkar	Pattan	two
	Sarkar	Bharauch	two
	Sarkar	Soreth	one
Muftakhar Khan[5] (1743)	*Pargana haveli*	Ahmadabad	one
	Pargana haveli	Bharauch	one
Jawanmard Khan[6] (1743-53)	*Sarkar*	Ahmadabad	four
	Sarkar	Pattan	two
	Sarkar	Soreth	one

1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 81-2.

2. *Ibid*, II. pp 50-1, 55-6, 92-5, 97-9, 102-3, 106-7, 110-2, *Peshkash* Docs *P.C.* No. p30.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 143-4, 183, 192-93. Even these expeditions were led to chastise the Marathas and a rebellious noble. The *Subedar* failed miserably against the Marathas and withdrew from the *subah*, leaving the affairs in the hands of his *naib*. During this period the task of collecting *peshkash* was assigned to leading nobles on *ijara*. They too could not make a headway. For references, please see discussion in Chapter IV below.

4. *Ibid*, II. pp 242-8, 257-8, 262-6, 275-6.

5. *Ibid*. II pp 285-6, 298-9.

6. *Ibid* II 351, 353, 375, 390, 397-8, 411-2.

The *watangiri* forces could cover much less parts of the areas thus visited by them. Also the *watangiri* expeditions could be led much less frequently during the period (1723-50) as compared to the earlier period (1701-22), presumably due to the internal strifes, activities and presence of Maratha forces that kept the Mughals on a tight rope and the increasing resistance put up by the zamindars.

As compared to the other two constituents of the category of the Superior zamindars, the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* continued to surrender *peshkash* more often and even after the others had ceased doing it. But more resourceful amongst them could not be forced after the close of the third decade of the century. Withdrawal of this section from the imperial net was a bit slow and gradual.

That the capacity of the provincial authorities to effect collection of *peshkash* from the Superior zamindars had considerably eroded even before the appearance of Marathas as a worth reckoning political power in the *subah* may further be highlighted by examining another piece of information --- zamindar wise amount of *peshkash* which was actually paid. A study of the amount may possibly clarify whether the irregularly levied exactions were inclusive of the dues of the period when the collection had not been effected. It may also be of some use for ascertaining the pattern of ongoing change concerning the magnitude of state demand on zamindars.

On the basis of statistics available for the zamindaris of Durgarpur and Kutch it may be inferred that the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* paid the *peshkash* which, in comparison to the others happens to be minimal. The zamindar of Dungarpur who had not paid *matalba-i sarkar-i wala* calculated against the*jama* (1,60,00,000 *dam*) at least during the years 1702-17, paid a total of Rs.200,000 as *peshkash-i nizamat* during 1702-50 i.e. for a period of 48 years. The annual average (200,000/48) comes to Rs.4166/- as against the required minimum of Rs1.00,000/- per annum i.e. he paid 4.02% of what he was under the obligation to pay.[1] The zamindar of Bhuj surrendered 600,000 *jami* (1702-50) which comes to 12500 *jami* per annum as against the required minimum of 6,79,440 *jami* per annum, he thus paid less than 2% of the what was due.[2]

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1. *Account*, ff. 79b, 105b, 126b; *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. 8, 10-12, 14, 16, 10-9, 20,25, 33-4, 37; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 45-6, *Ibid, Supplement* pp 226, 234, 238, 266. Even if we donot take into account the period (1722 onward) when (1722) the claim was written off in favour of Rana of Chittor, the zamindar paid Rs. 2 lacs for a period of 20 years i.e. @ Rs1.0,000/- per annum which comes to 10 % i.e., less by 90% of the amount due for the period.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II 112-13; *Account* ff. 110b-11a.

Collectively both the zamindars paid 800,000 i.e. @ 1607 (21.13%) as against the required sum of 7,77,440 per annum, paid 21.3% of what was due.

A similar position emerges in regard to the *zamindaran-i ismi* also. Of the 15 *ismis* of whom detailed data are available for five[1] thus:

Zamindari	*Peshkash muqarriri-harsala*	Amount paid (1701-50)	Average per annum payment	Percent
Navanagar	1,50,000	6,77,000	13540	9
Pol	2,500	7,500	150	6
Lunawara	80,000	1,67,000	3540	4.4
Kesoj	30,000	13,400	268	0.9
Pharkar	15,000	2,000	40	0.26
Grand Total	2,77,800	8,66,900/50	17336	6 %

As compared to the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi* who paid 21.3%, the *ismis* paid 6 % Though both the sections paid much

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1. *Account* ff. 113a-15b; *Peshkash* Docs 16, 23, 25, 33; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 409, *Ibid* II pp 11, 44, 94, 98, 276.

   It must be kept in mind that Navanagar and Lunawara had also captured *mal-i wajib* paying lands (references follow), and the lands of Pol were located not far off the provincial seat of power.

less than they were under the obligation to pay, the *ismis* bore a little more burden in comparison to the zamindars of *peshkashi sarkars*.

From the data of *peshkash* which is available for 160 out of 518 *zamindaran-i mhain-o kahin*[1] it would appear that they too bore much less burden during the years 1704-22 as compared to the first few years (1701-4) of the century. But they bore a greater burden as compared to the other two sections of the category of Superior zamindars.

Area	ZAMINDARI	Prince M. Azam 1701-4 @ per annum	Firoz Jang 1708-10	Shaha-mat Khan 1713	Dawood Khan 1713-5	Maharaj Ajit Singh 1715-7	Khan-i Dawran 1717-9	Maharaja Ajit Singh (II) 1719-21	Muiz-ul Dawla 1721-2	Total Amount exacted 1705-22 (18 years)	Average per annum exaction (1705-22) Total/18
Sarkar	+										
	Base =100										
Ahmadabad											
Pargana											
Ahmadnagar	1. Denwal	+ 900	x	x	x	x	x	500	2000	3500	(194.4
								(167%)	(222%)		(21.6%
	2. Kaloli	+ 4500	x	x	6000	x	x	9,500	12000	27500	(1528
					(133 %)			(211 %)	(267 %)		(34 %
Sarnal	3. Jarkal	+ 500	500	x	450	x	x	x	2800	3750	(208.3
					(90 %)				(560 %)		(42 %
	4. Bansa	+ 500	500	x	400	x	900	x	x	2800	(156
					(80 %)		(180 %)				(31 %

1. It may be pointed out in particular that among the representative cases cited in the text we have included only those zamindars who, on their own voilition, had remitted *peshkash* during 1701-4. Such zamindars who did not pay *peshkash* either during 1701-4, or else during 1708-10 are not included, as this period is taken as the one when *peshkash* was fixed in accordance with the set procedure. Secondly the zamindars who didnot pay at all during 1701-22 are also not included. Explaination follows.

Area	ZAMINDARI	Prince M. Azam 1701-4 @ per annum	Firoz Jang 1708-10	Shahamat Khan 1713	Dawood Khan 1713-5	Maharaj Ajit Singh 1715-7	Khan-i Dawran 1717-9	Maharaja Ajit Singh (II) 1719-21	Muiz-ul Dawla 1721-2	Total Amount exacted 1705-22 (18 years)	Average per annum exaction (1705-22) Total/18
Sarkar Bharuch	5. Maqbulabad	-	+ 6990	7000	26000 (372 %)	x	x	36000 (515 %)	45000 (644 %)	120990	(6722 (96 %
Pargana Bharuch	6. Gorai	-	+ 7000	10000 (143 %)	x	x	x	x	17000 (243 %)	34000	(1899 (27 %
Sarkar Pattan	7. Kakoli	+ 230	230	x	270 (117 %)	500 (217 %	x	x	682 (296 %)	1682	(93.4 (40 %
Pargana Pattan	8. Raner	+ 490	490	x	490	x	x	x	1000 (204 %)	1980	(110 (22 %
Sarkar Champanar	9. Mehlol	+ 2978	3000	x	x	x	x	3000 (100.7 %)	3000 (100.7 %	9000	(500 (17 %
Pargana Chorasi	10. ?	-	+ 6000	x	x	x	x	x	6000	12000	(667 (11 %
		30088/18								217202/18 (40 %)	12067 (40 %)

Sarkar											
Soreth											
Pargana (s)											
Chhad	11. Chhad	+ 5620	x	x	x	562-8	562-8	x	562-8	1687-8	94 17 %
Sultanpur	12. Sultanpur	+3000	x	x	x	3000	3000	x	x	6000	333 11 %
Ranpur	13. Ranpur	+ 937	x	x	x	1000 106 %	1000 106 %	x	650 69 %	2650	147 16 %
Hastni Chowk	14. Hastni Chowk	+ 938	x	x	x	1000 106 %	1500 159 %	x	1600 170 %	4100	228 24 %
Mangrole	15. Mahyari	x	x	x	x	540-9	700 129 %	x	800 148 %	2040-9	113 21 %
	16. Sangrasai	560	x	x	x	560	1000 178 %	x	1000 178 %	2560	142 25 %
Ghoga	17. Ghoga	1875	x	x	x	1875	2000 107 %	x	10100 539 %	13975	776 41 %
Total in (Rs.)		8413	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33012/18 21.8%	1833 21.8 %
	Grand Total	38501									13,900 36 %

Above are tabulated representative instances of *peshkash* exacted during 1701-22 from the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* whose possessions were located in central (*sarkar* Ahmadabad), northern (*sarkar* Pattan), southern (*sarkar* Bharuch), eastern (*sarkar* Champaner) and western Gujarat (*sarkar* Soreth).[1] From the data tabulated above it may be inferred that :-

Prince Mohd. Azam and Firuzjung apparently exacted the same amount[2] as *peshkash.* , but in reality the latter's exactions constituted only a fifth of the former's, for the *peshkash* was not exacted during 1705-7 and, therefore, under Firozjung the exaction was to be levied for a period of five years (1705-7 and 1708-10). Also Firozjung could exact *peshkash* from a much lesser number (eight) of the zamindars in comparision to the number (13) of them under the prince.

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1. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. 8, 10-12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 25-6, 32-4.

2. It must be clarified here that the prince had managed exaction on annual basis whereas under Firozjang and his successors the exactions by and large happened to be a one time affair regardless of the duration of tenure of a given *subedar*.

Secondly, it would also appear that after Firozjung almost every *subedar*, barring a few exceptions realized more amount than their immediate predecessors. As compared to the first recorded (as also the duly fixed) exaction of the century, the hike in subsequent years ranged between 0.7 and 544 percent. Amongst the different *subedars* Muizuddawla whose tenure extended to almost a year, exacted the maximum of amount, viz. 0.7 % to 544% more (serial no.5)[1].

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1. As compared to the first exaction, Muizuddawla levied more from 12 (serial Nos. 1-3, 5-9, 14-17), less from one (serial no. 13) and equal from two (serial no. 10-11) of the zamindars. Though some of his predecessors also exacted more than what had been exacted earlier, the hike under Muizuddawla in the context of duration of his tenure, was much more than under others. Also, Muizuddawla exacted *peshkash* relatively from a larger number of zamindars than any of his predecessors. The *Mirat* also speaks of the stiff atitude with which Muizuddawla had dealt with the zamindars. (*Ibid* II pp 43-5), the hike in the amount appears to denominate the same. Muizuddawla's tenure was followed by large scale Maratha penetration into the *subah* having paralysing effects on the wroking of the provincial administration. These developments, to a great extent explain the cause for accelaration in the recalcitrance and the armed resistance put up by the zamindars during the post-Muizuddawla period which witnessed withdrawal of imperial control from rural Gujarat. For references see discussion in the following pages.

But the hike noted above is more deceptive than real. A closer view of the evidence suggests that the net burden of *peshkash* on the zamindars had rather declined during 1705-22. A comparision of the amount of *peshkash* for the period 1701-4 (column no1.) with the average per annum amount (column no1.0) paid during 1705-22 clearly suggests that each of the zamindar paid less during the later years. Thus the zamindars of Maqbulabad (serial no.5) and Ghoga (Serial no1.7) proportionately paid the largest sums.[1] But these zamindars too paid less, Maqbulabad paid less by 4 % and Ghoga paid less by 59% i.e. they respectively paid 96% and 41% during 1705-22 of what they had paid earlier (1701-4). The rest of the zamindars paid much less, viz., 11% to 58% of the amount paid earlier.

A *sarkar*-wise analysis of the *peshkash* figures suggests that the highest amount was exacted from *sarkar* Bharuch (63.6%) followed by *sarkar* of Ahmadabad (32.6%) Pattan (28.25%), Soreth (21.8%) and Champaner (13%). But if we exclude the *peshkash* exacted from the highly vulnerable towns of Maqbulabad and Ghoga, then Ahmadabad (32.6%) replaces Bharuch as the highest paying *sarkar* and Soreth takes the position of the lowest paying.[2] In other words, the nearer the area to Ahmadabad, the higher the amount of *peshkash*, and the further off the area, the less this amount.

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1. Maqbulabad, a town and trading centre was located in plain area and had no fortification. It was within easy reach from Ahmadabad. Ghoga happened to be a port town, situated in a highly vulnerable position.

2. Thus zamindars of Bharauch *sarkar* paid only 27% and those of Soreth 9.3% if the *peshkash* levied from the towns is excluded.

A comparison of the amount levied from the zamindars of *sarkar* Soreth (21.8%) a difficult region, with the one levied from the zamindars of mainland (40%) also suggests that the zamindars of the former region paid less by 78.2% and those of the latter by 60%. Elements of proximity to the provincial seat of power and accessibility of the area presumably constitute the reason for the difference[1].

On the whole the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* could be forced to pay 36% during 1705-22 which is less by 64% in comparison to the preceding years of the century. Thus this section of the Superior zamindars paid more than the *zamindaran -i sarkarat-i peshkashi* and the *zamindaran-i ismi*. The burden of *peshkash* came to be associated in reverse order--higher the status and more the resources of a zamindar the lighter the burden of *peshkash* actually borne and vice versa. True, the data on which this genral statement is based pertains only to about a third of the total strength of the class of Superior zamindars, one might yet tentatively, and perhaps speculatively, extend it to the entire class.

Some idea of the way the amount of *peshkash* came to be determined, may also be formed from the available information. During the closing years of Mughal rule the amount came to be

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1. Please also see the zamindars of *sarkar* Champaner paying only 13%. Reason is not far to seek - it was difficult from the point of view of access and located in a distant part, holding a position identical to that of Soreth in this regard.

fixed in accordance with the exigency of time and the *nazim*'s own strength (*b'mutaqaza-i waqt w quwwat-i nazim*) as different from the *zamindar's* capacity.[1] For instance, the zamindar of Bhuj who was required to pay 6,79,440 *jami* annually, agreed to pay only 600,000 *jami* when pressed in 1720-21.[2] Later on (1730-31) the zamindar agreed to surrender 10,00,000 *jami*, if the *subedar* was agreeable not to march on Bhuj. But the *subedar* demanded more. The zamindar, then, resisted the very imposition of any amount, successfully forcing the *subedar* to return empty handed.[3]

From amongst the *ismi* zamindars Dawood Khan could persuade the Jam of Navangar (1714) to offer a meagre sum of Rs.77,000/- as against Rs1.,50,000 which had been fixed during former days.[4] The zamindar fought Maharaja Ajit Singh (1717) for several days with guns and cannons "due to the demand of a large sum of money", finally agreeing to pay Rs.90,000/- only.[5] Five year later (1722) the amount was fixed

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1. *Account.* ff. 15a, 74b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I.p 174, *ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 225, 229; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f 69

2. *Account* ff 110b-11a

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II,pp 112-3. According to a local legend which is still current in the region, the Bhuj Army captured the *mahi-o maratib* and the *Nazim's* drum during the fight. These are preserved at district musuem Bhuj. Similarly the zamindars of Ramnagar and Sunt paid a reduced amount which was settled on the spot. *Account*, ff 110a,127a.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I,pp 409-10; *Akhbarat*. No. 2489, 7th Shoban, 3rd R.Y Farrukhsiyar *Ibid*. No. 2519, 5th Shawwal, 3rd R.Y. Farrukhsiyar. The *Subedar* had also helped the zamindar against a family member contesting for the *gaddi*.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p 11; *Account*, f. 105b; *Peshkash* Docs *P.C.*, No. 39 b.

at Rs.60,000/- which the *subedar* collected peacefully.[1] Later in the year 1724 the Jam who could reoccupy *gaddi* with the help of *subedar* volunteered Rs.300,000/-, the highest sum ever paid by the zamindar during 1700-50.[2] During the year, it may be seen, the *subedar* commanded a large army which was specially financed by the imperial centre, and therefore could collect *peshkash* to his " heart's content".[3] The following year (1725) the same *subedar* who had, in the meantime, suffered considerably in strength could exact Rs1.00,000 from the same Jam.[4] On the last occasion (1742) the zamindar resisted impositions of *peshkash* and after giving a battle for 20 days agreed to surrender Rs.50,000/- only which amount the *subedar* willingly accepted due to "exigency of time".[5]

Some information on the ways of determining the *peshkash* exacted from the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* is also available. From the extant evidence it would appear that the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 44; *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* No. 39 b.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 94.
3. *Ibid*, II pp. 54, 79-80, 94.
4. *Ibid*, II p. 98.
5. *Ibid* II p. 276. Likewise, the *Subedars* had to be contented with a meagre of Rs. 500(1716) and Rs. 1500/=(1721) which the zamindar of Phakar agreed to pay as against the previously assesed amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Also, the Zamindar of Porbandar who had captured *mal-i wajib* paying lands paid, on different occasions @ Rs. 2,500/- *mehumudis* which amount he was required to pay in addition to rendering military service. The position in regards to other *ismis* was almost the same. *Account*, f 113a; *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* 16, p 19, p 25, p 33; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 248; *Ibid*, II pp. 11, 98-9.

assessment of tribute involved hardly any calculation based on the paying capacity of the zamindars; the amount in their case also, was often the outcome of the *Nazim's* and the zamindars' evaluation of each other's strength.

During the first few years of the century, necessary exercise in calculation seems to have been undertaken for determining the amount of *peshkash*. The zamindars had remitted the duly assessed amount through routine administrative channel during prince Mohd. Azam's period of *subedari* (1701-4). Khan Firozjang, the next *subedar* (1708-10) to levy exactions, collected almost the same amount which was fixed under the prince[1]. Also, there are a few instances showing some of the succeeding *subedars* as collecting the amount which had been fixed during the preceding years[2]. The observation of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* that the *nazims* extorted "befitting" and "suitable" *peshkash* in 'accordance with the capacity of each (zamindari) unit (*farakhor halat-i har makan*)[3] presumably relates to the seventeenth and the early years of the eighteenth century.

But the position concerning the mode and method of assessment gradually showed signs of deterioration. Dawood Khan's laxity allowed the rebels to go unpunished, and the zamin-

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1. Please see serial no. 3-4 and 7-9 in the table above, and *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* no. p8, p10, p12.

2. For instance, please see serial no 8-13 and 17 in the table above beside *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p9-p10, p12, p14-p16, p18-p19.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I, p 174, *Ibid Supplement*, p 229.

dars to pay less than they had volunteered under the preceding *nazims.*[1] Under the Khan and his successors the amount came to be increasingly fixed and realized in round figures.[2] Muizuddawla (1721-22) who had earned the reputation of a tough man during his tenure as *diwan-i subah* (1715-17) and *naib-subedar* (1717-19) fixed and collected *peshkash*, particularly on the mainland, with a stiff attitude. He seems to have applied the sword and fire recklessly, if and when a zamindar ventured to resist.[3] It was under him that the administration, as noted earlier, fixed and exacted the largest amounts which are, by and large in round figures.[4] But the amount fixed as *peshkash-i muqarrari-i harsala* (i.e. *peshkash-i nizamat*) under him, could not be realized under his immediate successor and when it was realized it was much less.[5] Sarbuland Khan the next *subedar*, settled and realized *peshkash* "according to his heart's content" during the first two

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1. *Ibid* I pp 412-3; for a comparative position of the amount, please see table above and the references concerning Navanagar cited in the preceding discussion. See also *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p12 and p30.

2. See the table above and for further references, *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p10-p12, p15, p18, p28-9 etc.

3. For instance, see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 9(Palitana), 10(Munjpur), 17(Antrasma), 41(Pethapur), 43-9(Dabhali), 51 (Petlad and Dhawan) etc.

4. See the table above and the discussion based on it in the preceding pages. For more references, please see also *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos. p8-10, p12, p14, p20, p25-38.

5. *Ibid P.C.* no p30.

years (1724-6) of his administration.[1] But later (1726-30) the *subedar* had to face stiff opposition put up by the zamindars.[2] During the *subedari* of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) rebellious elements could gather enough courage to attack *sebedar's* army, and sneak into the provincial capital.[3] During his administration the state officials who had contracted *peshkash* on *ijara* failed to effect assessment and collection of *peshkash* and consequently suffered losses.[4] Momin Khan, the next *subedar* (1737-43) had to lean heavily on the support of the Marathas and some locally

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1. Some idea as to how the *subedar* dealt with a defiant zamindar(1725) for settling the amount may be formed from the incident of Wadhawan (*sarkar* Ahmadabad). Zamindar of the place put up armed resistance with the help of his tribesmen and the Kolis. Having not been able to dissuade the determined *Nazim*, he negotiated peace. The *Nazim* decided to charge not less than rupees three lakhs as penalty for he had stood on the trench for three days. The zamindar helpless as he stood, agreed to surrender the dictated sum in addition to the unspecified amount of *peshkash*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*. II, pp. 93-4. The author of *Mirat-i Mustafabad* (p. 151) adds that the zamindar had already expelled *thanedar* and occupied the *thana* for himself. It may here be clarified that the authorities were empowered to collect "whatever booty may be collected from the recalcitrant zamindars". Q. Ahmed, "dastur-ul amal-i salatin", *Proc. I.H.C*, XXI, p. 353. Despite his efforts to exact more from the zamindars, and encraochments upon the *paibaqi khalsa* and *jagir* lands, the *subedar* could hardly collect sufficient funds. He found it hard to pay salaries to his soldiers, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II, p. 113.

2. For instance, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 93-4, 96, 102-4, 108.

3. *Ibid*, II, pp. 143, 162, 164-5, 183.

4. *Ibid*, II, pp 172-73; the *subedar* continued to retain the *Khalsa*, *paibagi* and *jagir* lands which had already been encroached upon.. Still he complained of sharp decline in the income of the *subah* B N Reu, "Some more *farmans* of Maharaja Abhay singh of Marwar regarding his Gujarat campaign," *Proc, I.H.C*, 1948, p1.12. The *Mirat-iAhmadi* also states (1737) that most of the *parganas* had truned *zortalab*, *Ibid*, II. p1.64.

influential nobles for effecting assessment and collection of *peshkash*. The zamindars appeared to be all the more determined to fight before agreeing to pay.[1] The *subedar*, therefore, could assess *peshkash* "according to exigency of time" and collect only "more or less" (*kam-o besh*) amount.[2] Then, during the *subedari* of the last Mughal Governor, Jawanmard Khan Babi (1743-53), in particular and the post-Muizuddawla period (1723-50) in general exactions were commonly determined and levied in accordance with the " exigency of time", "exigency of situation" and the "Nazim's own strength" as distinct from the zamindar's capacity to pay.[3]

As such the *peshkash* was more a matter of bargain than one of conformity with the established rules. The mode of collecting it is remincent of the one adopted for *zortalab* zamindars. Also the line of distinction based on service and *peshkash*, the basis and mode of its calculation and collection that had existed during the heyday of Mughal rule, had almost become extinct. The shade of distinction based, particularly, on the varying degree of autonomy seems to have vanished.[4] Moreover, the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.240-1, 243-4, 248-9, 257-8, 262-3, 265-6, 275-6.

2. *Ibid*, II, p. 258. In the year 1742 the same work (*Ibid*, II, p. 253) describes all the *mahals* "incomeless" see also, *Ibid*, II, p.261;*Rasmala*, p.360.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 173-74, *Ibid*, II, pp 397-8; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp. 229.

4. Later, the British found that the (superior) zamindars enjoyed complete autonomy, independent of outside interference and the posessions were subject to the payment of a nominal quit rent.

zamindars, whether *ismis* or the *mahin-o kahin*, endeavoured to transform the nature of imperial claim from *mal-i wajib* to *peshkash*, for a considerably large number of them surrendered a single amount which was reflected as *peshkash*.[1] As such the *ismis* and many *mahin-o kahin* zamindars acquired the status which otherwise was enjoyed by the zamindars of *peshkashi sarkars*.

The next step of the Superior zamindars was to seek to destory the symbols of Mughal administrative machinery; the *thanas*, the head quarters of the *faujdars* and the check-points. As these symbols of imperial control were gradually erased, the zamindars felt ever more free to choose their path of action.

The zamindars of *peshkashi sarkars* were spared even this effort for no *faujdar* was maintained in these zamindaris.[2]

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1. The exacted amount from all the *ismis* is reflected either as *peshkash* and penalty, or simply *peshkash* in direct contrast to the earlier practice of reflecting the same as *hasil* and *peshkash*. Similarly the levies exacted from the *mahin-o kahin* zamindars in considerably a large number of cases, are shown as *peshkash* only, or else *peshkash* and *khichri* i.e., amount levied from the *raiyati* portions which were otherwise subject to the payment of *hasil* but had been encroached upon by the zamindars. *Account*, ff. 109a-11b; 126b, 127b; 241a, 275a, 277a, 300a, 304a, 367a; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*. ff. 60-1, 69-80; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 41, 45-6, 98-9, 112-13, 258 *Ibid*, *Supplement* pp 205-6, 227, 230-33; *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* Nos.p 28-30, p33, p36, As such the distinction based on *mal-i wajib* and the *peshkash* got blurred and in a number of cases vanished completly.

2. The empire made an unsuccessful attempt to appoint a *qiledar* at Ramnagar *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.41. The *waqai-nigar* could not be maintained at Dungarpur after 1701. *Account*, f 26a. But the land revenue grants made in favour of a Jain trader at Mt. Abu (*sarkar* Sirohi) by Aurangazeb survived the fall of Mughal empire. For references, please see Revenue Grantees, Chapter V below.

Their refusal to render military service followed by their successful endeavour to evade payment put them on an almost equal footing with the provincial authorities. No reference is available to suggest any effective link between them and the provincial authorities during the second quarter of the eighteenth century, except an unsuccessful attempt to levy *peshkash* from the zamindar of Kutch in 1730-1.

The *Zamindaran-i Ismi* also appear to have endeavoured to overthrow the symbols of imperial control. The zamindar of Navanagar sought to retrieve to his earlier status of a *peshkashi sarkar*. Soon after the death of Aurangzeb the zamindar reoccupied Navanagar, the headquarter of *faujdar* and, formerly, the seat of *gaddi* and raised strong fortifications around it. He is reported to have expelled the *faujdar*, *Qazi*, *muhtasib*, *amil*, *amin* and other officils like *tehsildar*, *darogha* of mandis; the officials posted at the mint and the pearl fisheries.[1] Sometime after 1716-17 the zamindar encroached upon *jagir* lands of imperial *mansabdars* and the *paibaqi* lands situated within the *sarkar*.[2] But the zamindar did not deem it either necessary or

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1. *Ibid*, I, p. 285; *Ibid Supplement* , pp. 219-20; *Account*. ff. 17, 46a.

2. The document entitled *yad dasht: Jama pargana haveli* Islamnagar *waghaira*, *fasl-i kharif*, 1128 *fasli*(*P.C.* Nos. p3 and 39a) specifies the *mehsul* from the *paibaqi* and the *jagir* lands for the year 1128 fasli/1716-17 AD. Therefore the observation of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*that the Jam occupied the lands soon after Aurangzeb's death may not be taken literally. *Ibid*, I, p. 285; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p220.

possible to overthrow all symbols of subordination. According to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* " what is left of the former regulations is this : that a permit of goods despatched to Islamnagar (Navanagar) is accepted in its *mandis*. The traders are not molested for taxes".[1] The *Nazims* who led *watangiri* expeditions into Navanagar donot seem to have pressed for his eviction from his unauthorised acquisitions. Similarly the *ismi* zamindars of Rajpipla, Mohan, Lunawara, Atlesar and other places explelled the *faujdars* and either occupied the *faujdari* head-quarters or razed them to the ground.[2] Also the zamindar of Porbandar expelled Mughal officials from the port and the fort and occupied them for himself sometime before 1724-25.[3] The zamindar of the place (Rana of Porbandar) also acquired the *thanas* of Ranavao, Adwana, Miani, Navi (a port), Gariadhar and Madhopur.[4] Rana

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.286; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p.220. Moreover the zamindar doesnot appear to have succeeded in re-establishing his cantrol over all the members of his family who in thier capacity as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* paid *peshkash* directly to the *watangiri* forces as late as, if not later than 1721-22 *Haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash waghaira, zamindaran-i subah* Gujarat, *P.C.* Nos. 39-40.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. pp 45-6, 98-9, 103, 116, 121-2, 136, 138; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 191-2, 214-5, 232-3. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 52, 86, 252; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 152; *Vir Vinod*, III. pp. 98-9.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp. 98-9 read with *Ibid* , I. P.288 *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p 214; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p 52, ; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 152.

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 52, 86, 252; Wilberforce, *History of Kathiawad*, p .152.

Vikramjit who succeeded to the *gaddi* of Porbandar after his father's death in 1728, conquered the isolated *thanas* of Kutiyana and annexed to his principality.[1]

Like the *ismis*, the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin also sought to destory the symbols of Mughal administrative machinery. Attributing the cause of this development to the weakness of *nazims* and want of military discipline the *Mirat* observes that the zamindars gradually demolished the *thana*-fortresses, or else they captured the places and settled down as residents there.[2] According to the detailed information available in the same work zamindars of Prantij, Bhel, Harsol, Aseelnagar, Palitana and some other places destroyed *thanas* and strongholds of *faujdars.*[3] The *thanas* of Pethapur, Piplapur and Sadra were occupied and converted into shops by the zamindars.[4] The zamindars of Kathiawad, Jhalawad, Ahmadnagar, Jagat, Talaja, Chorwarbandar (Port), Tarkeshar, etc. pulled down, or else occupied the administrative fortresses located within their respective zamindaris.[5] On the

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1. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p. 86; *Mirat-i Mustfabad*, pp 298-9; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII. pp. 302. For a general view of the zamindars' acquisition of forts etc. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 173-74.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.174.

3. *Ibid*, *Supplement*; pp. 168-9, 191, 197-8; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p.97.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 170-72, 196-97, 200-201, 214-15.

5. *Ibid*, pp. 191-92, 198-99, 213-15, 217.

other hand, the zamindars of Gariadhar, Chhad, Talaja (a port) and Oplota instead raised fortifications.[1] The zamindar of Sehore founded (1717) and developed a new fortified port town, Bhaonagar, occupied Loliyana - the most important Mughal outpost of the region, called doorway of Soreth.[2] Some of the *faujdars* and *thanedars* are also reported to have left the places, other failed to reach the place of their charge and some of them were bullied down by the zamindars and still other assumed independence.[3] As a result most of the *thana* - fortresses passed into the zamindars' hands.[4]

Some of the zamindars raised fortresses and fortified their *watan* towns and villages on the pretence of defence

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1. *Ibid*, pp. 212, 214-15, 217.

1. *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p. 218; *Account*, ff 124b, 126a; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, pp 296, 301.

3. *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p 302. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 152-58. The latter work notes that Asad Ali Khan (d. 1726), *faujdar* of Soreth, had lost control over the outlying *thanas* - Mangrole, Kutiyana, Una, Deluda, Solapara and Samna. They had become independent. The more distant *thanas* of Mahua, Doretha, and some others in the central peninsula had long been independent of the *faujdar*. The work further remarks that the *thanedars* not merely disobeyed the *faujdars* but also opposed them and even fought against them.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.174; *Account*, ff. 14b-15a *Haqiqat-i Naziman-i Gujarat*, f. 28.

against the Marathas.[1] Still others enterenched themselves behind strong fortifications even without such a pretence.[2] Bahadur Khan (d1.728), *faujdar* of Soreth is reported to have permitted the Kathis to build a fortress at Jaitpur.[3] Evidently the imperial policy of demolishing and occupying the zamindars' forts and fortresses and instead raising its own strongholds to keep them within bounds, was virtually reversed and its achievements were accordingly undone.

Besides, the empire seems to have been wanting in providing necessary security to the zamindars.[4] Simultaneously it

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1. Khawfi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, IV, pp. 194-5; Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai *Syar-ul Mutakhirin*, II (tr) Yunus Ahmad, Karachi, 1962, pp 203, 293; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 154.

2. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 154; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 214-15, 217.

3. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p. 82.

4. The principality of Ramnagar was attacked twice in the year 1672 by the Marathas who succeeded in capturing it in the second attempt. Ramdeo II, the son and successor of the exiled zamindar Raja Somdeo (also known as Somshah), managed its recovery with the Kolis' help in 1679-80, after he had failed to seek help from the Mughals. J. N. Sarkar, *Shivaji and his times*, pp. 186, 219; G.S. Sardesai, *New History of Marathas (1600-1707)*, I, 2nd print, 1957, pp '103, 208, 226, 229. Occupation of Ramnagar by Marathas gave Shivaji a safe and easy route from Kalian to Surat and laid that part helplessly open to invasions from the South. Please see also, *History of Administration of Dharampur State (prant Dharampur)*, From 1262 to 1937, pp. 15-17. Sometime before the year 1745 the zamindari was again occupied by the Marathas and only its part was restored to the zamindar in 1758-59. R. Bahadur Ganesh, Chimanji Vaid, (ed.) *Selection from the Satara Raja and the Peshwa Diaries, III, Balaji Baji Rao Peshwa,* Vol. I, Bombay, 1907, Doc. No. 99 of 1758-59, p. 73. Similarly, Marathas attacked Dungarpur and Banswara in 1728-

couldnot effectively govern inter-zamindar relationship and apply a restraining hand. Therefore, the extent of sway of zamindars' rights came to depend on the ability of the zamindar himself.

A change in the ways and means of acquiring and extending sway of rights thus becomes increasingly evident during the first quarter of the eighteenth century. With no effective power to keep them within bounds the zamindars turned against their brethern. Consequently the zamindaris of some of them were eliminated and some of them came to acquire a sub-ordinate position thus giving rise to sub-infeudation. But before analysing the process of relegation of some of the zamindars to a sub-ordinate position in a free for all situation it seems worthwhile to ascertain its existence during the days of relative stability.

Evidence suggests the presence of a zamindar as an independent holder of *makan-i zamindari* and of a dependent zamindar belonging to another caste within the same *makan* even during the opening years of the eighteenth century. The *zamindari-makan* of Roopram of *mawza* Amod (*pargana* Kadi) consisted of

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29 forcing them to pay Rs. 113000 and 50,000 respectively. RBG. Chimanji Ved, & DB ' Paranvis (ed.) *Selection from the Satara Raja And the Peshwa Diaries I, Shahu Chhatrapati,* Poona; 1907, Doc No. 219 (1728-29), pp. 101-2. The zamindar of Banswara was again humbled to surrender *khandni* (security money) in 1748. *Selection from the Peshwa Raja and the Peshwa Diaries-III op. cit,* p. 26. For further references see discussion in the following pages.

six villages which are specified in the document.[1] One Akraji (Koli) held *mawza* Santhanl in the same *makan*.[2] However, Roopram was treated as the zamindar of the *makan* while Akraji held only a dependent position within the *zamindari*, presumably under the *zamindar*.[3] Similarly, one *mawza* Lakhpat out of 34 villages forming one *makan-i zamindari* of Amar Singh *zamindar*, was held by Abdul Khan the same way as described above.[4] The *mawza* Kel too is shown as the *talluqa-i Musalmanan* within the zamindari of Ajab Singh.[5] The three subordinate holders of the villages within the zamindari *makans* (also called *ta'lluqa-i zamindar*) held by "*zamindars*" were not recognized as *zamindaran-i mhin-o*

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1. *P.C.* (Kadi) No.4.

2. *Ibid.* The entry is made as under:
   Taalluqa-i Roopram *Mawza* Amod
   6 villages
   Amod, Palaj, Kankodan, Mankaj, Sathal, Manknos, Akraji.

3. The document entitled *yad-dasht: Peshkash-zamindaran* (R. No.66, Pune) dated 1705-6 records the remittance of *peshkash* in the following way: *Roopram, zamindar mawza* Amod, Six villages : Rs. 2750/=. *-az mawza* Santhal Rs. 390/-. Apparently, Roopam remitted the total sum of *peshkash*(2750/-) due from his zamindari. He paid Rs. 2360/- on (6-1) 5 of his villages while the rest (Rs. 390/-) was contributed by dependent Koli, holding the 6th village.

4. *P.C.* (Kadi) No. 6.

5. *Ibid.*

kahin nor their possessions counted as separate *makans.*[1]

How and when did the above mentioned developments take place? Our sources are completely silent on the matter. However, from prince Murad's *Nishan* and emperor Shah Jahan's *farman* concerning the zamindari of Dantiwara it would appear that the imperial government could place the zamindar of one *makan* under the zamindar of the other. The zamindari of Dantiwara (one *makan*) was granted to the zamindar of Sirohi on condition of ensuring safety of passengers and traders passing through the former territory.[2] Likewise, emporor Aurangzeb had granted 12 zamindari villages of *pargana* Kutyana (*sarkar* Soreth) as " *ina'm b' tariq-i zamindari*" to the brother of one Sheikh Md. Hafiz for suppressing a rebel (*mutamarrid...mufsid*) perhaps the rebellious zamindar, and maintaining specified contingents to serve the *faujdar-i sarkar.*[3]

Some of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* could be placed under some noble favoured with the position of *watandari* (?). Masum Quli Khan, *naib-faujdar* of *pargana* Rajkot was granted *watandari*

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1. *Ibid.* Nos. 1 to 7; *Account* ff 121a, 309b. The two sources do not count the holdings of sub-ordinate zamindars as seperate *makans*, particularly the latter work which lists all the *makans* of *pargana* Kadi, does not mention the these sub-zamindars at all.

2. See texts of the *Nishan* and *farman* in *Vir Vinod* III pp. 1102-4.

3. *Junagadh* S.C.No.1159 Ex.No. F/2 (Majmal Kutyana). The family remained in possession of zamindari till as late as, if not later than, 1890. *Ibid.* F/3, F/4, F/9.

of the same *pargana* in recognition of his appreciable act of eliminating the leading zamindar of the place during emperor Shahjahan's regin.[1] Likewise, Jawanmard Khan Babi (senior) was granted *watandari* of (*pargana*) Radhanpur during Eemperor Farrukhs Siyar's reign.[2] Later on Jawanmard Khan Babi, (the Junior) was favoured (1731) with the *watandari* of *pargana* Badnagar by maharaja Abhay Singh, the *subedar* designate, for assisting him against Mubariz-ul mulk, the dismissed defiant Governor.[3] What kind of rights did the *watandar* enjoy is not known. However they seem to have been placed over and above the zamindars of the concerned area, and were themselves required to pay *peshkash*.[4]

But the mode of extending the area of influence and acquring additional rights is distinct during the eighteenth from that of the seventeenth century. Thus the zamindar of Bhuj encroached upon the Waghela's possessions in the adjoining *sarkar* Pattan, occupying *pargana* Tharad, some villages in *parganas* of

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p.216.
2. *Ibid*, pp. 202-3.
3. *Ibid*, II, Pp 213.
4. At the time the Babi chief was granted *watandari* of Radhanpur some reduction(*tatkfif*)was made in the *jama* of the pargana, presumably to adjust the *watandars* rights. *Ibid, Supplement*. Pp. 202-3. The Babis continued to hold the *watandari* possesions for the rest of the period. For the *watandar* paying *peshkash*, *Ibid*, II, P. 144.

Santalpur and Morwara beside the lands in the adjoining *subah* Thatta sometime before 1720-21. The *subedar* who visited the zamindari (1720-21) at the head of a strong *watangiri* force, didnot bother the zamindar to vacate the un-authorised posessions which he continued to hold.[1] Similarly the zamindar of Sirohi continued to hold 60 villages in *pargana* Deesa which he had occupied in a likewise manner around the year 1717.[2] On the other, the zamindar lost part of his lands to the house of Jodhpur.[3] In the same way zamindar of Sunt lost his valueable possessions i.e. plains to the *ismi* zamindar of Cheharmandvi. The teritory of Sunt shrank to the immediate surroundings of the capital city.[4]

Likewise the *ismi* zamindars of Lunawara that of Porbandar extended their area of control. The Rana of Porbandar took Kutiyana from the Qasbati zamindars of the place.[5] He bribed the *desai* of Mangrole and took hold of Madhopur and its depend-

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1. *Account*, ff. 110a, 111a ; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp 226-7; For a similar act on the part of zamindar but followed by quick action leading to his eviction from the unauthorised occupations during Akbar's reign, please see *Akbarnamah*, III, pp. 524, 530; *Tabqat-i Akbari*, II, pp. 386-7; *Account* f 110b.

2. *Account*, f 110a.

3. *Vir Vinod*, III, Pp. 844-46.

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 26-7, 52, 82; Hamilton Walter, op. *cit*, I, pp. 684-85.

5. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, P. 86.

ent villages in 1725.[1] The Rana is reported to have acquired all the villages between Madhopur, Chhaiyan and Porbandar.[2] The zamindar of Rajpipla expelled the imperial officials from Nadot (1729) and brought the area under his control.[3]

The strongar onces among the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* too didnot lag behind in the ongoing process. Some stray pieces of information suggesting, though indirectly, the existence of a zamindar holding sub-ordinate positions under others, are available for the third decade of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the usual practice of reflecting a zamindar zamindari-wise amount of *peshkash*, the *Account* sometimes brackets a number of *zamindari makans* together as having been assessed on all the zamindaris thus bracketted together, but collected from a duly specified zamindar.[4] The *peshkash* document, in a likewise manner, brackets eight *makan-i zamindari* together alongwith the *peshkash* noted separately against each of the *makans* but, then, the sum total of the *peshkash* is reflected against zamindar Dayal

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1. *Ibid*, pp. 84-86; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 151-2.

2. *Tarikh-i-Soreth*, Pp. 52, 92; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, pp. 115. Between the year 1723-33 the Jethwas, tribesman of the zamindàr of Porbandar, are reported to have acquired territories adjacent to these zamindaris. *Ibid*, VIII, p. 298.

3. *Vir Vinod*, III, pp. 90-94. The *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, (*Ibid*, I, pp 369-70) simply speaks of rebellious activity of the zamindar during the year 1704-5.

4. *Account*, ff 11b, 117b, 366a, 368a -69b.

and other who held zamindaris amongst them.[1] According to another document the zamindar of Wadhawan, Arjun Singh, paid *peshkash* to Dawood Khan (1713-15) on his duly specified zamindari, i.e. Wadhawan. But during Muizauddawla's period' the *peshkash* from the zamindaris of Karanpur (Rs.75/-) and Bans (Rs.225/-) alongwith from Wadhawan (Rs.9700/-) was collected through (*ma'rfat*) Arjun Singh only.[2] It suggests that the zamindars who paid *peshkash* on behalf of other zamindars also, had acquired some authority over them and this seems to have carried the state's approval.

Some specific information showing the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* turning against each other is available in the works of a little later date.[3] Bhao Singh, the zamindar of Bhaonagar, is reported to have encroached upon the territory of *parganas* of Ghoga, Dholqa and Dhandoqa, forced the zamindars of the places to pay him tribute (1739) and, finally expelled them from their respective possessions.[4] Some of the zamindars of

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1. *Peshkash*, Doc; *P.C.* No. p. 19.

2. *Ibid*, Nos. pp. 29-30.

3. The *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, a contemporary work, does not specify particular zamindars involved in the acts of encroachments. But the work does mention the zamindars in general making illegal exactions and extending sway of their rights. *Ibid*, I, p. 174.

4. *Rasmala*, pp. 146, 416; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, P. 96; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p. 143; Wilberforce, *Op.cit* pp. 128-30.

Ghoga became tributory to the Kathi zamindars of Kathiawad.[1] The Ahirs, Kolis and Bareas of Kathiawad are reported to have enlarged their possessions at the expense of their neighbouring zamindars during Farrukhsiyar's reign.[2] The zamindar of Bhaonagar didnot spare even his own *bhayads* and occupied Tarpat, holder of which had been in direct relationship with the state.[3] He also took away zamindaris in *pargana* Santalpur from their Koli zamindars and harassed the zamindars of Laathi.[4] Likewise a brother of the zamindar of Halwad established his authority over the Khanwad (Kathi) zamindars of Saela. Subsequently he established himself at the place as a *raja*, independent of Halwad. Sometime during the fifth decade of the century he sucussfully brought his brother Gaj Singh of Halwad under his control.[5] During the same decade Nagar Brahmans of Mangrole were deprived of their possessions by Maliks and Rajputs; the Waghelas also

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1. *Rasmala*, p. 146; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p. 82.

2. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p. 82, Hamilton Walter(*op.cit*, I, pp. 644-5) states that they acquired Dhandopur, Sudama, Chhotola, Mawar, Bewar, Channora and Arunpur.

3. *Tarikh-i Soreth*,, pp. 96-7;*Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p. 143; *Ibid*, VIII, p. 298.

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p. 96; *Imperial Gazetteer*(Bhavnagar), p. 119.

5. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 98-9; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 251. Jawanmard Khan Babi (Junior), the last Mughal Governor and founder of the *Nawabi* of Rahanpur, reportedly helped Gaj Singh regain Dharangdhara.

lost their zamindaris to the Kahtis around the same period.[1] Bhagat Singh Waghela lost Kalor in 1728. In his turn he captured Lambodra from Arjun Singh, a Koli and occupied the place for himself.[2]

Some idea of the process and causes of the passing of the weaker zamindars under the stronger ones may be formed with the help of contemporary and near-contemporary evidence.

The process of passing of Dungarpur and Banswada into the tutelage of the house of Chittor suggests that even the imperial authority could itself be instrumental in letting the stronger zamindar establish his sway over the weaker one. Pursuing a carrot and stick policy towards the house of Udaipur during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the empire had used Dungarpur and Banswara as pawns for regulating Agra-Udaipur relationship.[3] But with the assigning of the two principalities

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1. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 26-7, 52, 82; Hamilton Walter, *op.cit*, I, pp. 684-5.

2. *Rasmala*, p. 266; *Treaties*, VI, p. 24.

3. Zamindars of Dungarpur, Banswada and Sirohi had, before their acceptance of the Mughal suzerainty, owed their allegiance to the house of Chittor, the relationship being based mainly on political affiliations and matrimony. Even after their submission to empre, their position was considerably influenced by the state of relationship subsisting between the Mughals and the house of Chittor. Thus in his apparent attempt at isolating Udaipur from its allies, Emperor Akbar singled out the three chiefs for doing homage. (1576-77) and married the daughter of the zamindar of Dungarpur, the strongest of the three. (*Akbarnamah*, III, pp. 181-90, 195-96; Kr R. A. Khan, *op. cit*, pp. 32-6). Moreover, Rana pratap's brother Jagmal who had entered into imperial service was assigned *jagir* in the zamindari of Sirohi, a step

in the *tankhwah jagir* of a cadet of Chittor in 1717 and subsequently (1730-31) the writing off *peshkash-i nizamat* in favour of the Rana, the two principalities could never return to the imperial fold.[1] Likewise the zamindari of Sirohi which was assigned in the *tankhwah jagir* of the zamindar of Jodhpur by emperior Farrukhsiyar, passed out of the Mughal state for good.[2]

...Continued...

seemingly pregnent with significan implications. (*Tabqat-i-Akbari*, II, p. 370; *Akbarnamah*, III, p. 413). Once Rana Amar Singh submitted, emperor Jahangir assigned(1615) Dungarpur and Banswada in the *tankhwah Jagir* of Kunwar Karan Singh. (Text of Jahangir's *farman*, dt. May 11, 1615, *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 239-49). But when a rift cropped up during Shah Jehan's reign, the emperor deprived the Kunwar of *jagir* of two principalities which, instead, were assigned in the *tankwah jagir* of the respective zamindaris of the principalities who were ennobled with *mansabs*. The two zamindars along with the one of Sirohi were obliged to do homage; and one of them, the zamindar of Dungarpur also favoured with the *thanedari* of Azamabad(*Sarkar* Ahmadabad). Rawal punja of Dungarpur and Rawal Samsi of Banswada were respectively awarded *mansabs* of 1500/1500 and 1000/1000. Being thus encouraged by the emperor the zamindars 'began to throw off Chittor's 'yoke'. *Amal-i Saleh*, III, pp. 205-213; Abdul Hamid Lahori, *Badshahnamah*, Asiatic Society, 1867, II pp, 304, 307; *Vir Vinod*, III, pp. 319, 369, 425-8, 430; p.Saran, *op. cit*, pp. 128-30. presumably in recognition of the neutrality observed by the Rana of Chittor during war of succession, emperor Aurangazeb restored the two principalities in the *tankhwah jagir* of Kunwar Jai Singh, terminating the *mansab* of the Rawals of Dungarpur and Banswara. (Text of Aurangazen *farman* of 1068 AH, *Vir Vinod*, III, pp. 425-28; as also *Ibid*, p. 430). During the Rajput wars (1679-80) the Mughal- Chittor amity again suffered a set back and, consequently, the two principalities were again taken away and the zamindar of Dungarpur, as under Shah Jehan, was granted *mansab*. The zamindari of Banswarah was retored to *khalsa*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 305; *Account*, ff 108a-9b; *Vir Vinod*, III, p. 754.

1. *Account*, ff. 105b, 110b, 111b, 126b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp. 226, 234, 238.

2. *Account*, ff.111a, 126b.

This development may be attributed to the declining grip of the imperial centre which virtually helped a stronger zamindar-*jagirdar* to absorb zamindari-*jagir*. The *Mirat*, moreover, speaks of the use of force by the zamindars in their endeavours for extending the sway of their rights[1]. The zamindar of Navanagar regained part of his possession under imperial control by applying force; the Rana of Porbandar made encroachments and re-occupied the directly administred portion of his zamindari while the *faujdar* had gone to southern Gujarat to resist Maratha pressure.[2] The Rana bullied the local *thanedars* into vacating *thanas* in his favour.[3] Also he bribed the *desai* of Mangrole so as to get the latter's consent for the occupation of Madhopur, a dependency of Mangrole.[4]

Connivance of local nobles seems to have played its role. The zamindar of Sehore (and later Bhaonagar) had provided shelter to Sohrab Khan during the days of hardship.[5] The Khan's

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.174-75.

2. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p. 256; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 158.

3. *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p. 301. The zamindar is also reported to have intrigued with the local officials.

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f.54; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p.152; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p. 302; Wilberforce, *op. cit* p.152.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 155-6. The author of *Bombay Gazetteer* (*Ibid*, p.303) incorrectly mentions Sohrab Khan instead of Behram Khan, who, according to the *Mirat* was the person so sheltered by the zamindar and later on appointed by the state.

appointment as *amin-amil-faujdar* of Ghoga and surrounding areas in the vicinity of Sehore might have come as a boon for the zamindar. During his tenure the zamindar is also reported to have entered into a secret treaty with the Abyssinean commander, in- charge of Mughal fleet, who helped him encourage the traders to use the newly founded port of Bhaonagar.[1] The possibilities of the Abyssinea's connivance with the zamindar in the acquisition of lands under the port of Ghoga may not be ruled out. The zamindar of Cheharmandvi took part in the internal strife at Surat by siding with Teg Beg Khan, the port officer, against the merchant prince (*umdat-ut tujjar*). In the strife the former emerged victorious. The obliged *mutasaddi* presumably turned a cool eye towards the zamindar who absorbed the surrounding *thanas* and the lands of *sarkar* Sunt.[2]

Some of the zamindars made direct use of the Mughal-Maratha struggle. Some of them acted as mediators between them and were rewarded by both.[3] The zamindar of Rajpipla took advantage of his treaty of friendship with the Marathas. The Maratha pressure in this part kept the Mughals at bay and the zamindar fell upon

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1. *Gazetteer of Bhaonagar*, pp.434, 477; For similar instances of the zamindars extending support to defiant Mughal nobles, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II, pp 17, 170-1.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 16-7, 148-57.

3. *Ibid*, II, p.317.

Mughals' land, and the *thanas*.[1] Besides, the overall prevailing political condition must have generated the requisite atmosphere conducive to such acts of self aggrandisement on the part of the zamindars.

As regards the specific causes other than the ones which are implied in the preceding discussion of the passing of the weaker zamindars under the stronger ones, contemporary works are almost silent[2]. However the works of later date cast some light on the point. It is suggested that the adventurers and the 'stronger' zamindars harassed their neighbours and compelled them to purchase their protection and forebearance at the price of surrendering a part of their share.[3] The *qirasias* and the free booters

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1. The *Mirat-i Ahmadi* doesnot explicitly report about the treaty. It, however, specifies that the Marathas when pressed hard by *subedar* Sarbuland khan took shelter in Rajpipla. *Ibid*, II, pp.60-5, 143-4, 108-10; *Rasmala*, p.iii.

2. From the observations of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, (*Ibid*, I, pp.174-5) however it would appear that the helplessness of the weaker ones (i.e. inability to defend themselves in a situation when the Governors had themselves were too weak to extend protective hand) was the main cause.

3. For the stronger zamindars attacking and harassing the weaker ones, *Akhbarat*, 2489, 7th Shoban, 3rd R.Y. of Farrukhsiyar; *Ibid* 2505, 3rd Ramadhan, 3rd R Y of Farrukhsiyar; *Ibid*, 1442, 5th Shawwal, 4th R Y Farrukhsiyar, *Ibid*, 1448, 14th Shawwal, 4th R Y of the same emperor.

   According to the *Bombay Gazetteer*, (IV, pp.147) failure of the provincial authrorities to shelter middle zamindars' from the raids of free booters and exactions of strong neighbourers drove the "Owners", of many villages to seek protection of local 'chiefs'; the protection was sought in lieu of cession which was either in perpetuity (*aghat*) or for a number of years (*avad*). In almost all cases only a share of the produce and a subsistence was reserved for the original possessor.

reportedly caused havoc. Harassed by them the zamindars sought protection of those stronger than themselves.[1]

There were, then, some Superior zamindars who could not maintain the unity of their zamindaris, particularly due to the challanges that came from within.[2] The *bhayads* in particular appear to have been restive under the control of the head of the family.[3] Thus brothers of zamindar Arjun Singh who held *mawza* Barod within his zamindari *makan*, broke off their relationship

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1. During 1770-90 the British noted that the villages in peninsular Gujarat were generally fortified. There they also noted the high towers which were used to notice the arrival of kathis and their ilk and warn the inhabitants. Hamilton Walter, *op cit.* I, p.653. The *Mirat* also speaks of particular arrangements made for controlling the Kathis and their ilk who used to create disturbance if they noticed a slight slackness' in the administrative control *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 174-5, 211. The gradual decline of garrisons in the interior and on the important points might have encouraged such element to go about their job with impunity. For the presence of such element in the *subah*, please see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 173-75; *Ibid*, II, pp. 244, 247, 249, 259, 266, 276, 500; B N Reu, " Some Imperial *farmans* addressed to the rulers of Jodhpur, " *Proc. I.H.C.*; 1952, p.353.

2. It may be recalled that the empire had sought to dismember and weaken some of the stronger zamindari, like the one of Navanagar, by entering into direct relationship with the vassals and the junior members of the family of ruling zamindars. Later (1721) *subedar* Muizuddawla also entered into direct dealing with the *bhayads* and other vassals of the Chief of Bhuj. But the two zamindars, strong as they were, succeded in putting their respective houses in order again. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 11, 98, 110-3; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, p 258; *Account* ff. 110a-11a, 122a. Obviously even the qains of the policy which was pursued within its logical limits, could not be preserved, if and when the zamindar happened to be strong enough.

3. It is worth pointing out that on the death of a junior member of the family, the grant reverted back ot the head of the family who, according to the rule of inheritance, was the sole successor to such lands.

with the head of the family by paying *peshkash* to the *subedar* (1721) directly.[1] Likewise one Gangadas broke off his relations with the head of his family by entering into direct transactions with *subedar* Ghazi-ud din Khan (1709) and, later on with Muizud-dawla (1721).[2] Moreover, sons of Veroji and Vesoji (Mahikantha) are reported to have enlarged their posessions at the expense of the head of family from whom they had broken off their relationship.[3] Some of the *Bhayads* in northern and peninsular Gujarat who had severed their links with their families and assumed independence were later on found in possession of a few villages; one of the *bhayads* who held village Barkoora, had assumed the title of *raja*.[4] Works of a later date observe that the *bhayads* pressed hard by the Kathi free booters, *girasias* and sometimes even by the heads of respective families sought protection of a stronger zamindar, of the one other than their immediate head.[5] Some of them surrendered the main part of their possessions to

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1. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* No. 30 read with *Account*, f.116b.

2. *Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* No. 10 read with *Account*, f. 115b.

3. *Rasmala*, pp. 348-50; *Treaties*, VI, p 4; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, pp 115-6. The *bhayad* belonged to Gohel clan of Rajputs.

4. *Treaties*, VI, pp. 9-10; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p.115.

5. *Treaties*, IV, p.59.

the protector and retained only a share as *jiwaee.*[1] The process might have created a new section of zamindars out of the existing zamindaris and enhanced the position of those who could extend protection by virtue of possession of a striking force.

It would appear, then, that some zamindaris changed hands and some new hands came to acquire the status of Superior zamindars whereas some of them lost their independent status. A drastic change in the caste composition of the category of Superior zamindars is not discernable. But the relative exclusiveness of the caste-blocks as noted in the preceding Chapter, might have been further affected, though only marginally, by the entry of a new group of people, viz; Mughal officials and *jagirdars* who could transform their official positions into hereditary ones.[2] Still the Rajputs and the Kolis seem to have continued to hold leading position, with their caste-bastions constituting as before, the main source of their power.[3]

It would appear from the preceding discussion that the

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1. *Ibid*, VI. pp. 9-10, 116; *Bombay Gazetteer*, pp 115-6; *Ibid*, IV, p. 147.

2. For a detailed view of the representative cases transforming official psotions into hereditary *nawabi*, please see Chapter VII. below.

3. Later on the British also noted the same castes as holding, numerically, the dominant position among the Superior zamindars with a hold at the grass roots level. *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, pp. 115, 117, 160, 162, *Ibid*, IX, pt. I, pp. 123-5; *Ibid*, (Kaira), pp. 37, 80-1, 217; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 10-8, 100-08.

Mughal - zamindar relationship underwent a drastic change during the period. A qualitative change in the Mughal attitude which is indicated in the preceeding discussion may be summarised as under:-

Although in theory the very act of abstaining from service on the part of zamindars amounted to rebellion, the Mughals however made no serious attempt to enforce this rule. No action is reported to have been taken against any of the zamindars abstaining from service.

The virtual alternative to military service as we have noted above, came in the form of extorting *peshkash*. As the collection of *peshkash* also required actual use or show of force, it is evident that the tribute was not offered willingly and regularly. On many an occasion the zamindars put up resistance and refused to pay even under the presure of arms. As per the available evidence only two of the defiant zamindars, viz; Dantiwara and Halwad were confiscated for a while.[1] No other example of confiscation is traceable in our sources, though in a few cases the authorities resorted to the extreme acts of massacring the zamindars' supporters, putting fire to their possessions and

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 371; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p 203 ;*Peshkash* Docs, *P.C.* No. 29.

exacting heavy amounts by way of penalty.[1] Nomerous incidents of withholding payments and putting up armed resistance are spread all through the pages of available sources.[2] But in all other incidents of the sort the zamindars either paid the tribute, offered securities or hostages, or agreed to pay the amount at the very arrival of *watangiri* forces; or they (particularly the more resourceful ones) resisted the imposition, put up armed opposition but agreed to pay the bargained amount before the final result of military action. More and more instances of military resistance are reported from the period of Dawood Khan's *subedari* (1713-15) , though the tendency to evade payment considerably had emerged much earlier.[3] Gradually rebelliousness came

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.396; *Ibid*, II, pp.10, 41, 43-4, 51, 102. Such immoderate actions were taken against reltively smaller and more vulnerable zamindars.

2. For instence, *Ibid*, I, p. 392-4, 396; *Ibid*, Ii pp. 9-11, 41, 43, 51, 89, 93-4, 107, 212, 244, 247, 257-8, 262-6, 276 etc. In all the struggles one common feature emerges, that in the end the amount of *peshkash* was bargained and settled. Zamindari of none of these zamindars where resistance has found mention, was confiscated. It makes clear that the zamindar first refused to accept any claim and when they saw that resistance was unawailing they purchased forebearance. See also Hamilton Walter, *op cit*. I, 642. But the zamindar of Bhuj, as noted earlier, had been able to resist its imposition successfully. Also a number of them evaded payments all through the period.

3. For instance, please see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.211, 337, 370-71, 374, 377, 381, 392-94, 396, 412; *Ibid*, II, pp 9-10, 17, 27, 41, 51, 89, 102, 106-7, 257-8, 263-6. For the instances of rebelliousness reaching the environs of the provincial capital, *Ibid*, II, pp. 133, 162, 164-5, 247, 249, 258, 263-64, 265-6; M S No. 15, ff. 379, *Akhbarat*, 2751, 19 Zilhaj, 4th R Y Farrukhsiyar.

to be accepted as a *fait accompli* and all the zamindaris came to be designated as *mehwas* (refractory) and the zamindars as seditious (*mufsidan*) and leading ones among them as *Mehwas-i umda*[1] i.e. the recalcitrant and the excessively recalcitrant zamindaris. The blanket treatment thus given to them all and their categorisation based on the degree of recalcitrance not only speaks of the wholly changed attitude of the zamindars but also indicates the helplessness of the Mughal State which couldnot even react effectively, much less to take the initiative which had virtually been seized by the zamindars.

It would, therefore, appear that Mughals didnot care much for the acquisition of military service, or were unable to do so. In case the zamindars paid *peshkash* peacefully to the *watangiri* expeditions they were not disturbed in their possessions.[2] Some

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1. *Account*, ff. 14b, 15a, 74b, 107a, 108a.

2. The Mughal's attitude in this regard becomes clear from the incident of Porbandar. On the arrival of the *subedar* near Porbandar, the zamindar abandoned the forcibly occupied fort and port and fled, obviously to avoid payment of tribute which had been due for a long time.. The *subedar* captured the fort. In order to press the zamindar to come back and offer *peshkash*, the *Nazim* ordered the demolition of the fort. The action could not bring the desired results. In the end the *subedar* ordered repairing of the demolished parts of the fort and declared his intention of appointing a *faujdar* and retain the fort i.e. to restore status quo ante. The news brought the zamindar back to the place of action. As the zamindar paid *peshkash* and penalty, the order of appointing the *faujdar* was withdrawn and the zamindar was left in possession even of his unanthorised acquisition. The Nazim's action totally legitamatised the zamindar's action. *Mirat-I Ahmadi*, II, pp 98-9; *Tarikh-i Soreth* pp 84, 86; *Mirat-i-Mustafabad*, p.152.

of them who put up resistance were in some cases not so much opposed to the imposition of *peshkash* as to the amount dictated. However some of them first opposed the very imposition of *peshkash* and when they saw the futility of resistance they agreed to pay the dictated or the bargained amount. More commonly the resistance proved to be a tactic meant to put the zamindar in a bargaining position. Neither the Mughals nor the zamindars brought the matter to an extreme for, it seems, the latter were basically interested in retaining their possessions while the former's interest was mainly in obtaining the *peshkash* quickly and, preferably, peacefully. Under the circumstance the administration adopted a compromising attitude leading to a sharp fall in the amount collected and gradually in the very capacity to effect collections. The administration could not come out of the vicious circle.

It is possible that the negligence on the part of Mughal officials was due to their pre-occupation with safeguarding their interests *vis a vis* one another and the Marathas which also affected the efficiency and strength of the empire. The Mughals, for whatsoever reason, virtually had lost control over the Superior zamindars and punishing the rebels as they had done during the heyday of the empire. The Mughals had adopted virtually a non-punitive attitude towards the rebels. Hardly any of

the zamindars was forced to vacate his unauthorised acquisition of *faujdari*-strongholds, the *thanas*, the *raiyati* and the other zamindars' lands.[1] Exacting *peshkash* on irregular basis survived as the only interest as also the point of contact of the Mughals with the Superior zamindars. Moreover *peshkash* which was a well established claim, duly calculated on the basis of paying capacity, came to denominate not so much the zamindars' subordination as much the price of forebearance determined on the basis of evaluation of each other's strength and surrendered only casually.

A change in the attitude of provincial authorities towards the matter of succession is evident from the evidence coming for Navanagar. Hardolji had killed his elder brother, Jam Rai Singh and usurped the *qaddi*. Son of Rai Singh left for his aunt, the *Rani* of Kutch - sister of Rao Pratap Singh of Halwad. The *Rani* is reported to have requested her brother to manage installation of the legitimate successor on the *qaddi* of Navanagar. The zamindar of Halwad entered into matrimonial alliance

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1. *Subedar* Dawood Khan is, however, reported to have forced the Kolis of Baroda region to vacate the villages which they had captured by force and the fortress which they had raised was also pulled down. *Akhbarat*, 2505, 3rd Shoban, Farrukhsiyar's 3rd R.Y. For the *Nazims* not seeking eviction of zamindars from their unauthorised acqusitions, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 11, 41-2, 45-6, 57, 93, 96, 98, 99; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp 84-6; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp 152, 154; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, pp. 296, 301. Also there is a solitary instance showing the *subedar* re-establishing a *thana*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p. 266.

with Sarbuland Khan, then *subedar* and Salbat Mohammed Khan, an influential Babi chief. The *subedar* along with the Rao of Halwad and the Babi chief attaked Navanagar, expelled Hardolji and restored the *gaddi* to Jam Rai Singh's son. The new Jam offered *peshkash* and three villages which the two Mughal officials sold to another zamindar. In order to finance the project, the Jam had taken loan from the zamindar of Kutch by mortgaging the *mahals* of Balambha and Amrah. At Balambha, the zamindar of Kutch built a fort (1736) and subsequently annexed the two *mahals*.[1] Again, the Jam was killed (1734) by the zamindar of Wadhawan, Karan Singh Jhala. But our sources are silent as to what happened subsequently. However members of the same ruling family continued to rule the zamindari.[2] It, thus, becomes clear that the intervention in the matter of succession does not appear to have been considered a matter of established state policy. It was rather a matter of personal interest of the provincial authorities if it suited their purpose. It may, thus, be seen that

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1. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 99, 256, 258; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 151. The latter work specifies the villages of Chirgadhi, Terakunda and Dobha which the Babi chief got. *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, P. 302. The *Mirat-i-Ahmedi* (*Ibid*, II, Pp.94, 98-9) merely speaks of the *watangiri* expedition led into Navanagar and the *subedar's* marriage with the daughter of the zamindar of Halwad.

2. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, pp. 256, 258; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 151. L.F. Pushbrook William (*Jamnagar*, Sketch of its rulers And its administration P.4) notes that struggle for succession was a 'rule' in the house of Navanagar until nineteenth century.

the Superior zamindars had succesfully replaced the Mughal authority with the one of their own, emerged stronger out of the strife - ridden phase (1700-50) in the history of the region.

CHAPTER III

INTERMEDIARY ZAMINDARS

(On the eve of the eighteenth century)

Like other parts of Mughal Empire the intermediary zamindars held a significant position in the revenue administration as well as agrarian society of Mughal Gujarat. Though the intermediary position was not exclusive of the rights enjoyed by Superior and the Primary zamindars, it was, however, distinctly different from them.[1] Modern scholars have identified and discussed various holders of intermediary positions in different parts of the Empire.[2] Of them the *desai*, *patel* (*muqaddam*) and the *ijaradars* who find description in the contemporary sources, may be discussed as intermediary zamindars of Mughal Gujarat.

A - *THE DESAI* :

The *desai* who held a position identical to the *chaud-*

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1. S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars under the Mughals". *op.cit.* pp. 24-7.

2. *Ibid*, p.25 ; *Thoughts on Agrarian relations in Mughal India*; pp 31-2; B R Grover," The position of *desai* in *pargana* administration of *subah* Gujarat" *Proc. IHC*, 1961, pp 150-3, Dilbagh Singhm; " Position of *patel* in eastern Rajasthan", *Proc IHC*, 1970, pp 360-66; For a view of them without having been categorised as such, Irfan Hahib, *Agrarian System*, pp 126, 128-32, 141, 231, 233, 292-3; N A Siddiqi, *Land Revenue Administration*, pp 11, 19, 24, 52.

hari[1] of North India, finds frequent description in the official documents and other sources of information of the period. During the reign of Emperor Akbar the *desais*, according to the *Mirat*, were appointed in all the *mahals* of the *subah* by Raja Todarmal who is reported to have introduced them in the Mughal revenue administration.[2] During the course of the seventeenth and the opening years of the eighteenth century *desais* are noticed in all the *kharaji*

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1. For the position of *chaudhari*, S. Nurul Hasan, *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations*, p. 32; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 231, 235, 252-5, 291-4; N A Siddiqi, *op.cit*, pp 17, 41, 90-1; Irfan Habib (*op.cit*, p 291) without citing any evidence in support of his contention, identifies *desais* with the *chaudharis*. But B.R. Grover opines that the *desai* can't be identified with the *chaudharis* as both of them find references in the contemporary sources. It may be clarified here that emperor Jahangir issued a *farman* (dt. 14th Mehrmah, Ilahi year, *Baroda*, 14, unindexed; Hereafter *Baroda farman*), appointing Trangdas and Kishandas as the *chaudharis* of *pargana haveli* Baroda. The *Mirat* too (I, pp 262, 287, 292) refers to the *chaudharis*. But on a closer view of the available evidence it would appear that each available reference to the *chaudhari* is found in the documents which were prepared at the imperial centre. The references in the *Mirat* appear only when its author cites imperial orders. On the other none of the available document which was prepared in the *subah* refers to the *chaudharis*, much less in addition to or alongwith the *desais*. Further, the Baroda *farman's chaudharis* Tarangdas and Kishan das - are listed as *desais* in the document entitled *fahrist mawaze' taraf-daren desaiyan pargara haveli*, Baroda, R No. 49, Pune. It seems the North Indian terminology penetrated, surreptitiously, into the drafting of the documents at the imperial court.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*; p 228.

sarkars of the *subah*.[1] The imperial administration maintained, or else endeavoured to maintain *desais* in the *zamindari makans* of the *ismis* and the *mahin-o kahin* zamindars[2], evidently to keep a watch on their revenues.

The *desai* was an intermediary zamindar of *pargana* level.[3] In the available documents they are described as the *desai* of *pargana* unlike the *muqaddam* who is identified with a village.[4] In other cases the *desai* could be identified with a *taraf* i.e. portion of a *pargana* comprising a group of specified villages.[5]

However the sway of a single *desai's* right did not necessarily extend to cover the entire *pargana*, for more than one persons could hold the *desaigiri* in one and the same *pargana*[6]. Thus emperor Akbar had appointed Jewraj,

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1. *Account*, ff 17a, 173a, 174b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp 228-39, *Yad-dasht haveli* Islamnagar *waghira, fasl-i Kharif-o rabi* 1128 *fasli*, *PC* No. 31; *Yad-dasht dastur desaiyan parganat-i subah* Gujarat, *PC* No.90; for their presence in pre-Mughal Gujarat, JW Watson, " Historical Sketch of the town of Ghoga, " *The Indian Antiquary*, III,Vol.V, 1874, pp 283-85.

2. Please see also, *Rasmala*, pp 302, 340, 345-6, 353, 447, 456 and references in the following discussion.

3. B.R. Grover, "The position of *desais* in *pargana* administration", *op.cit*, p.150.

4. *Account*, ff. 173a, 174b -5a, 183b, 213a, 230b.

5. *Ibid*.

6. Cf B.R. Grover, " The position of *desai* in *paragana* administration", *op. cit*, p.150-1.

Kishandas and Kalyan as the *desais* of *pargana* Mangrole (*sarkar Soreth*) in 1603.[1] It is seen above that emperor Jahangir had also appointed more than one persons as the *desais* (*chaudharis* of the *farman*) in *pargana haveli* Baroda. There are references available for the entire seventeenth and the opening years of the eighteenth century specifying more than one *desais* for one and the same *pargana*.[2].

It will be however wrong to assume that the jurisdictional authority of every single *desai*, or for that matter every *desai*-family, was invariably confined to the limits of a single *paragana*. According to a *parwana* (1687) Govardhan Das, Bethidas, Dhanwi Rai and Raghoji held *desaigiri* in 34 *parganas* of *sarkar* Soreth, each of them enjoying a share of fourth in the rights consequential upon the position.[3] It

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1. *Parwana* dt. 15 Rabi II,1012 AH containing reference to the imperial *farman* dt. 21 Rabi I, 1012 AH, *Junagadh*, S C No.1025 and 1170 (*mahal* Balagam).

2. *Junagadh*, SC No.688 Ex. Nos. 8/3, 8/4, and 8/5 (*mahal Junagadh*); *Ibid*, SC No. 104 (*mahal* Sutrapara); *Account*, ff 163a, 167a, 169b, 173a, 174b, 183b, 203b, 210b, 213a, 214b, 218b, 223a, 230b, 241a. There was no *pargana* in the entire *sarkar* Ahmadabad having less than two *desais*. Moreover, the *desaigiri* so held jointly was generally shared by the members of the same family.

3. The document (dt. 1099 AH) specifies the *parganas* as under; *Pargana haveli* Junagadha, *parganas* of Batwa, Medra, Oplota, Dehrawal, Ranpur, Baxra, Belkha, Jetpur, Lathi, Jhao, Gariadhar, Terwa, Bhimrad, Daulatabad, Rajkot, Dhak, Gondal, Sultanpur, Deoli, Kutiyana, Babra (i.e. Babaria), Mandvi, Palitana, Hastnichowk, Dharai, Porbandar, Navibandar, Dhatrod, Raigaon, Artacha, Mahokheda (?), Jagat and one more *parguna* name of which

would, thus, appear that the territorial jurisdiction of *desai* ranged between wide limits and, likewise, their social status and economic position too would be at variance from one another.

Since more than one persons could enjoy *desaigiri* in one and the same *pargana*, or group of *parganas*, at the same time, it necessitated divisioning of income, or else, the source of income itself. In some cases the territory under joint jurisdiction was held collectively and share of each of the *desai* in the benefits consequential upon the position was defined proportionately.[1] In other cases the territory was physically delineated, each such division (*taraf*) represented, though not necessarily, proportionate share of each *desai* who, in such case, was termed *tarafdar* i.e. holder of

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...Continued...

could not be deciphered. *Junagadh* S C No.389 Ex.No.2 (*mahal* Junagadh).

1. *Ibid*. The share was expressed as 'a fourth, a fifth, a sixth (*hissa-i chaharum, hissa-i panjum, hissa-i shashum*) etc. The jointly held undivided territory is termed *majmua-i desaiyan* and in this capacity the *desai* was designated *majmueadar*. In the available mortgage deeds which are bilingual documents, the *desaigiri* of the Persian text is termed *majmueadari* in its Gujarati version. S H Desai's Private collection, Junagadh document dt. 14th Zilhaj 1110 AH No. 14 (6)/14; *Ibid*, dt. ? Ramadhan. AH; *Samwat* era 1771, (1714AD) No. 14(6)/19.

a *taraf*.[1]

Desai's position was by and large hereditary.[2] But the succession necessitated, every time, imperial approval.[3] It has been suggested that the *desai's* succession was confirmed, as also the fresh appointment was made by the provincial authorities who issued necessary *parwana* to that effect.[4] But the available evidence does not subscribe to B.R. Grover's view. Jeewraj, Kishandas and Kalyan were confirmed in the position of *desai* on usual basis (*b'dastur-i sabiq*) by virtue of an imperial *farman* issued by Emperor Akbar.[5] Likewise Emperor Jahangir confirmed Kantha, son of Harjiwan *desai* in the *desaigiri* of *pargana* Uplota etc. and Tarangdas and other in the *desaigiri* (*chaudhrai*) of *pargana*

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1. *Account*, f .82a. The villages of *pargana haveli*. Ahmadabad, sometime during Aurangzeb's reign were divided into seven *tarafs* in the following way : *taraf* Bethaldas (consisting 34 specified villages), *taraf* Mukandas (33 villages), *taraf* Gopidas (15 villages) and so on. Village Patri Kochrab which was held jointly is described as ' *majmua -i desaiyan'; Fahrist mawazi taraf-dar desaiyan, pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, R No 42, Pune.

2. B R Grover, "The position of desai". *op.cit*, p.150.

3. *Ibid*.

4. *Ibid*.

5. *Junugadh*, S C Nos. 1025 and 1170 (*mahal* Balagam), *op.cit*.

haveli Baroda by issuing *farmans*.[1]

Likewise the *parwana* (1687) confirming Govardhandas and other in the *desaigiri* of 34 *parganas* as mentioned above, was issued in accordance with the imperial *farman* (*b' mujib-i farman-i a'lishan*).[2] It may, therefore, be seen that the *desais* were appointed and confirmed by the imperial centre. The provincial authorities issued *parwanas* as a matter of follow up action. The revenue department of the *subah* maintained *pargana* - *taraf-majmua'* - wise details specifying area of jurisdiction of each *desai* for official purposes.[3]

On every succession the incumbent had to offer tribute(*peshkash*) to the Emperor. The offering being a stipulated sum of money and described as *peshkash-i sarkar-i wala* was to be recovered on installment basis.[4] In some cases exemption from paying the required *peshkash-i sarkar-i wala* could be granted by the Emperor.[5] It may be pointed

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1. The *Baroda farman* reads: *chaudrai pargana* Baroda *b'aba-o ajdad mutalliq ast b'dastur sabiq b'Tarangdas w awlad-i oo mugarrar o mufawwaz ba'shad.*,, *Junagadh*, SC No. 389 Ex. No.2 (*Mahal Junagadh*).

2. *Junagadh*, S.C. No. 389, Ex. No.2 (*mahal* Junagadh).

3. *Account*, ff. 17a, 82a.

4. *Ibid* ff. 80b, 163a, 164a, 167a, 168ab; Emperor Jahangiri's *farman*, dt 13th mah Tir Ilahi 13, (5th Jamadi, I, 1027 A H *Junagadh*, S.C. No. 88 (*mahal* Junagadh).

5. Jahangir's *Baroda farman*, (*op.cit.*) grants the exemption; see also *Account*, 352a.

out here that the amount of *peshkash* thus offered differed from *desai* to *desai* and ranged between wide limits. Thus, for example, the *desais* of Viramgaon sometime during the opening years of the eighteenth century were to pay Rs.68386/9 *annas* and those of Piplod only Rs.550/-.[1] Taken as a denominator, the amount of *peshkash* suggests vast variations in the socio-economic positions of *desais* within their own group.[2]

The *desaigiri* was most commonly held by the Nagar and Andrawala Brahmans who are reported to have "followed the professions in which penmanship" was required.[3] Some of the *desais* also belonged to the Mehta and Khatiri castes.[4] Members of these castes are found amongst the persons who went for higher education and were well versed in Persian during Mughal age.[5]

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1. *Account*, ff. 218b, 230b.

2. Please see also *Ibid* ff. 173a, 174b, 183b, 213a, 214b, 241a.

3. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f. 23, SH Desai's private collection Nos. 14 (6)/14 of 1110 AH; *Junagadh*, SC No.780, Ex. No.4/3 (*mahal* Sutrapara); *Rasmala*, p 57.

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f.23; *Rasmala*, p 57; The collector of Surat to Revenue Commissioner No.54, dt. 13th November, 1846; *Report* from NA Peddar, C.S., President of the Gujarat *Watan* Commission, No. 18/143, dt.19th April 1865.

5. M A Qureshi, *Muslim Education and Learning in Gujarat (1277-1758)*, Baroda, 1972, pp 231-9, 253-6.

The *desais* occupied a leading position in the administrative set up of revenue machinery. The *desai* was basically responsible for effecting assessment and for fixation of *jama* in accordance with the rules and regulations.[1] They were required to be well versed in the rules and regulation concerning revenues, the *destur-ul amals* and their application.[2] The advice of *desai* was to be given due weightage in the affairs concerning revenues and allied matters.[3] Assisted by the state officials and the *muqaddams* the *desai* had to visit every cultivated plot for the settlement of revenues.[4] Services of *desai* were required in the settlement of revenues in such areas also as followed the system of *ghalla bakhshi*, known also as *bhagwatai*.[5]

The *desais* also supervised collection of revenues which at the village level was effected by the *muqaddams* and state officials. Emperor Akbar had ordered the *diwan-i subah* to

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1. *Account*, f. 17b.

2. *Ibid*, ff. 17ab.

3. Jahangir's, *Baroda farman*, *op.cit*.

4. Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs*, II, p 419; *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, p 201; *Bombay Revenue Selection*, p 210.

5. For example, the *desais* as pointed out earlier, were there in *sarkar* Soreth. From the period of Isa Tar Khan's period, the *sarkar* was put under the system of *bhagwatai*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 217-8; *Corpus Inscriptionum Bhavnagri*, New Delhi; 1971, pp 47-9.

"collect revenues through the *desais* and ***muqaddams***" both in *khalsa* and *jagir* lands.[1] Likewise Emperor Jahangir had directed that the assessment and collection of revenues be effected with the approbation (*b'istaswab*) of the *desais*.[2] The *desais* along with the *muqaddams* were to sign *tamassuk* undertaking the responsibility of collecting and remitting the assessed revenues.[3] Moreover the *desais* had also to explain the cause of difference, if any, between the amount assessed and actually collected.[4]

Functions of the *desais* were not confined to the sphere of assessment and collection of revenues alone. The *desais* had to maintain accounts also. According to the *Baroda farman* the *desai* was to maintain year to year detailed account of *jama-o kharj* of the area and furnish the same to the imperial centre(*b'daftar-i khana - i* ***humayun***).[5] The imperial court used to depute mace bearers to collect such

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* ; I, p. 173.

2. Jahangir's *Baroda farman*, op.*cit.*

3. *Naql tamassuk* for the period of Mukarramat Khan *PC* No. 63. Later on the British also noted that the *desais* were appointed to 'superinted the collection of revenues.' Mr. Asst. Collector Pyner's *Representation on Balasinor*, 1827; *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, pp 214-5.

4. ***Naql*** *tamassuk*, *PC* No. 63 *op.cit.*

5. *Baroda farman*, *op.cit.*

detailed accounts from the *desais*.[1] The *desais* along with the *quanungos* were also required to approach the *Diwan-i Subah* for submitting the *awarjah*, details of *taqsim* and *mawazna-i dehsala*.[2] In this enormous task of account - keeping the *desais* were assisted by their respective *gumashtas* at village level.[3]

The *desais* were also responsible for the advancement of the *taqavi* (agricultural loans) to the deserving *raiyat* and its subsequent recovery in instalments in accordance with the established practice.[4] The *desais* were, moreover, supposed to enforce the state regulations for trade and commerce.[5] They were also required to make 'sternous' efforts in 'promoting' the prosperity and the flourishing condition' of the area and the 'welfare of the inhabitants'. They were also instructed to ensure that more and more land

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1. *Account*, f 17a, The *Mirat* (I p.327) notes that Sheikh Muhammad Fazil, the mace bearer, came to procure the details of *hal-i hasil*, of *parganas* and *mawazna-i dehsala* of the *Subah* sometime during Aurangzeb's reign. The *nazim* and the *diwan* had to make arrangements for reproducing *desais* because the *jagirdars* " practised indifference in producing the *desais*".

2. *Account*, ff 17ab, 180ab.

3. S H Desai's private collections, No.14 (6)/14 op.*cit*. The *gumashtas* were allowed a share out of the *desai's* income. *Ibid*; *chaknama*, dt. 10th Sho'ban 1111 AH, *PC* No.266.

4. B R Grover, "The position of *desai*" *op.cit*. p.152.

5. *Ibid*.

was brought under cultivation and the *jins-i kamil* (cash crop) was increasingly cultivated.[1]

There were, then, some other duties assigned to and still other performed by the *desais* on their own volition. Emperor Aurangzeb asked the *desais*, *sheths*, *quanongos* of every *chakla* in the city of Ahmadabad to point out ways for levying additional taxes assuring them a share in the income therefrom.[2] The *desais* were regarded as reliable witnesses by the zamindars for substantiating their plea before the State for regaining the zamindari lost to some miscreants.[3] The *desais* of *pargana* Dholqa helped the *muqaddams* and the *riaya* of Chatrasan and other villages (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) in settling inter-village boundary dispute arising out of the changing course of river Sabarmati during Aurangzeb's reign.[4] The *desais* of *sarkar* Soreth during closing years of Aurangzeb's reign reported to the *bakhshi* of the *subah* that the miscreants attacked and plundered villages finding the place without a *faujdar*. The *desais* were accordingly empowered to raise specified troops for meeting

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1. *Baroda farman, op.cit.*
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.260.
3. *Junagadh*, SC No.1159 Ex. No.F/2 (*mahal* Kutiyana).
4. *Tamassuk*, dt. 2nd Jamadi II, 1111 A H, PC No. 275; *Ibid*, dt. Samwat 1751, PC No. 276.

the challenge.[1] It was in addition to the customary staff of horse-men and foot-men which the *desais* were provided with for the proper discharge of the routine duties.[2]

SHARE

The *desais* were hereditary recipients of a share in the revenues actually collected from the *riaya*. The share was given in cash at a specified rate out of the collected revenues and in the form of land grants. The share in cash was called ' *dastur-i desai* , '*desaigiri*', *haq-i desai*' or *majmuaedari*'. The lands given were described as ' *pusaita*' or *pusaita-i desaiyan*.[3]

According to the author of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* Emperor Akbar determined the *desai's* share in 1590. Accordingly the *desais* were to get @ 2.5 % of the revenues collected from the *khalsa* and *jagir* lands.[4] During the reign of the same emperor half (1.25%) of the *dastur* was resumed by *Khan-i Azam* Mirza Aziz Kokaltash, then *subedar*. The same work notes that the *desais* were further deprived of the half (.625%) of the remaining half (1.25%) in favour of *diwani* and thus they were allowed @ .625 % of the collected -

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.307.
2. B R Grover, 'The position of desai ". *op.cit* p. 150.
3. For references please see discussion in the following lines.
4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p.173; *Ibid, Supplement*, p.228.

revenues by way of *desaigiri*.[1] Whether the same rate was applicable for the entire *subah* during Akbar's reign is not known. Emperor Jahangir's *farman* issued in favour of Kant-haji and other *desais* of *pargana* Junagadh (*sarkar* Soreth) allowed the *desaigiri* @ 5 % i.e; a rate much higher than the one granted by Emperor Akbar.[2] The *desaigiri* for the *desais* of *pargana* Viramgaon and Dholqa (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) was calculated @ 1.5 percent during the reign of Emperor Aurang-zeb and later also.[3] In the absence of detailed evidence it is difficult to ascertain if the rate of *desaigiri* was modified during post - Akbar period, or else different rates were simultaneously applicable in different parts of the *subah*.

Besides the *desais* were allowed to enjoy revenues of the *pusaita* lands which they held in addition to, and, over and above the *desaigiri* allowance discussed above.[4] The

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1. *Ibid*.

2. *Junagadh*, S C No. 880 (*mahal* Junagadh).

3. *Account*, ff 229b, 298a.

4. According to Emperor Jahangir's *farman* (*Junagadh*, SC No. 880, (*mahal Junagadh*) the *desais* were to enjoy the *desaigiri* @ 5 out of every 100 *mehmudi* and *arazi-i pusaita*: *desaigiri pargana mazkurha fisad ki panj mehmudi-o arazi pusaita* ; According to the *parwana* (1099 AH) issued to confirm Govardhandas etc. in the *desaigiri* cited above, the *desais* were to enjoy the *dastur*, the *pusaita* and *ina'm* possessions (*dastur-o pusaita - inam dehat*) as before (*b'dastur sabiq*) . Cf, B.R.Grover, "The position of *desai*..." *op.cit*.

pusaita grants were actually held by them on the mainland as well as on the peninsular Gujarat.[1] It is interesting to note that the *pusaita* lands were fragmented considerably in a large number of villages unlike the *madad-i mash* lands which were consolidated in specified areas. Emperor Jahangir's *farman* speaks of the *pusaita* lands of Kanthaji and other *desai* in every, (*dar har mawza*) if not each village of the concerned *parganas*.[2] According to a *parwana* (1723) the *pusaita* lands of Pragji, Jiwan, Ranchhod and other *desais* of *pargana* Junagadh were located, since some time past, in *qasbah* Delwara (60 *bighas*), villages of Mahta buzurg (55 *Bigha*), Amodra (45 *bigha*) Patri *buzurg* (15 *bigha*), Shekhwapur (30 *bigha*), Anjar *buzurg* (15 *bigha*), Dandi (15 *bigha*), Khajodra (25 *bigha*), Ver *buzurg* (15 *bigha*), Upodra (25 *bigha*), Sheikhji *buzurg* (15 *bigha*), Sonkhera *buzurg* (15 *bigha*), Belkhar (25 *bigha*), Bahrampur (10 *bigha*), Chakher (10 *bigha*), Gangasar (50 *bigha*), Hansoj (25 *bigha*) and Una (50 *bigha*), thus in all 500 *bighas* of land were spread over eighteen villages.[3]

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1. Jahangir's *Junagadh farman*, *op.cit*; *Junagadh*, SC Nos.517, 519, 1054 (*mahal* Derawal): *Account*, ff. 182a, 202b, 409a.

2. Jahangir's *Junagadh farman*, *op.cit*.

3. *Junagadh*, SC No.389, Ex. No.2 (*mahal* Junagadh).

In addition to their customary claims as discussed above the *desais* were also recepients of the *ina'm* and additional *pusaita* rights given as a special favour. Emperor Aurangzeb granted (1660) *mawza* Hanmethi (*pargana* Ranpur) to Dwarkadas *desai* by way of *ina'm.*[1] The same emperor granted (1688) villages of Ojwal, Tonki, Uchde and Reshala in addition to *mawza* Hanmethi to *desai*, son of Dwarkadas *desai* by way of *ina'm.*[2] The same *desai* also held the villages of Piparia (*pargana* Baxra), Tankatoda and Nehrwala (*pargana* Amreli) during the same period, however granted earlier by way of *muafi.*[3] The same emperor also granted (1703) a well (*chah*) alongwith the land associated with it, by way of *pusaita* out of kindness (*az rah-i-inayat*) to Ajit Rai *desai* of *pargana* Mangrole (*sarkar* Soreth)[4].

Besides, the *desais* were also given similar grants by the *jagirdars* and other state officials.[5] Prince Muhammad Azam Shah who held *sarkar* Soreth in *jagir*[6] granted (1700 AD) 50 *bighas* of *barani* and *chahi* lands in *mawza* Amodra by way

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1. *Ibid*, SC No.800, Ex. Nos.1,3, 7/5, (*mahal* Junagadh).
2. *Ibid*, Ex. Nos.7/6.
3. *Ibid*, Ex. Nos. 7/4.
4. *Ibid*, SC No.194 (*mahal* Seel).
5. *Account*, f. 14a.
6. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp.306-7.

of *inam-o pusaita* to Malji and other *desais* of *pargana* Una (*sarkar* Soreth).[1] The prince also granted them eight *anna* (*neem rupia*) as daily allowance (*rozina*) out of the revenues of the town of Delwara.[2] Later (1704) the prince granted 200 *bigha* of *chahi* (irrigated) and *barani* (un-irrigated) lands to Mohanji and Nana Raghunath, *desais* of *pargana* Una as an act of benevolence (*az rah-i inayat-o meherbani*).[3]

Though the *pusaita* lands were by and large held rent-free however in some part of the *subah the desais* had to share its revenues with the state. In a number of *parganas* of *sarkar* Ahmadabad the *desais* were not required to pay any part of the revenues accruing from *pusaita* lands to the state.[4] But the *desais* of *pargana* Mundah (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) were required to surrender a half of the revenues of the lands during the *kharif* season to the state whereas the other half of the revenues expropoeriated from the *raiyat* was retained by them.[5] The state made no such demand during the

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1. *Junagadh*, SC No. 688, Ex No. 8/3 (*mahal* Una).

2. *Ibid*, Ex No. 8/5.

3. *Ibid* Ex No. 8/4; *Ibid*, S C No.517 Ex No.2 (*mahal* Derawal).

4. *Dastur-ul amal* (Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and Muhammud Shah's reign), *PC* Nos. 22, 26, 51; *Account*, ff. 182a, 350a. These lands are declared as *muaf* (not assessed for paying revenues to the state).

5. *Account*, f. 339a.

rabi crop season.[1]

There is evidence to show that the *dastur* and *pusaita-i desaiyan* were subject to the payment of a cess, called *peshkash-i dastur-i pusaita* which was levied by the *Nazim-i subah*.[2] During the reign of emperor Aurangzeb (Mukhtar Khan's period of *subedari*) the cess on the *pusaita* was abolished and excluded of the *jama* also.[3]

But the *dastur-i desai* was not entirely expropriated by the *desais* who had to offer an unspecified portion of it to the *Nazim-i Subah* throughout the seventeenth and the opening years of the eighteenth century. The offering called *peshkash-i harsala*, *peshkash-i dastur-i desaiyan*, *peshkash-i nizamat* of *desais*, *peshkash-i desaigiri* or simply *dastur*, was paid annually to the Governor of the province.[4] Exemp-

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1. *Ibid.*

2. *Dastur-ul amal*, for the period of *subedari* of Isa Tar Khan and Prince Dara's *naib* Ghairat Khan, *PC* Nos. 35, 58.

3. *Ibid.* After his succession the Emperor abolished it along with the other prohibited cesses (*abwab-i-mamnua*) but it continued to from a part of the *jama*. Later, on the *desais'* request for its exclusion from the *jama* and stopping collections, was acceded.

4. *Account*, ff 173a, and Ibid, ff 164b, 167a, 169a, 175a, 203b, 213b, 216b, 218b, 223a; For its actual collection during the eighteenth century, *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp 236-9.

tion from its payment could also be granted.[1]

It would thus appear from this discussion that a considerable part of the *desais'* share which varied from place to place, was taken away by way of *peshkash-i sarkar-i wala* and then as *peshkash-i desaigiri*. Even then, the net income of the *desais* must have been substantially large. More so, the sources of their income were not confined to the *desaigiri* allowance, *pusaita* lands and *ina'm* and *mua'fi* possessions. They had other means, both legal and illegal, for enhancing their income.

At times with his (official) position the *desai* felt tempted to misuse their authority to coerce the *raiyat* and make money. The *desai* of *pargana* Supa (*sarkar* Surat) were reported not to have made proper assessment and contrary to the practice had done only summary assessment on the villages based on part records in 1594. The *desai* had also illegally realized the village expenses (*malba*) and arrested 22 persons. He had also omitted the assessment of his own cultivated lands.[2] According to another *parwana* (1678) the *desai* of *pargana* Bisrai forced the *raiyat* of some villages

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1. Emperor Jahangir's *Junagadh farman* provides that (*peshkash-i desaigiri ke sahib-i subah.....migirafte marfu-ul qalam daniste*).

2. MS. B.N. Paris, folios 170b, 71b, vide *parwana* 9th Muharram 1000 AH *cited* by B R Grover, "The Position of desai," *op.cit.* p.151 and n.

to cultivate his own lands for himself. The *muqaddam* of one of the villages who happened to be a member of the *desai's* caste (*birathri*), also lent him support. Then the *desai* evaded assessment of his own cultivated lands.[1] According to yet another *parwana* (1693) the *desai* of *pargana* Harsur (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) assessed the *pusaita-i muqaddaman* at full rates (*amal-i bilmanasta*) in violation of the *amal-i dastur* which provided for complete exemption of their *pusaita* lands from assessment.[2]

The *desais* seem to have had some kind of relationship with the *seths* and *mahajans* i.e. the men of capital and money lenders.[3] According to empoeror Aurangzeb's *farman* (eighth regnal year) the ' *seths* and *desais*' of many *parganas*' of the *subah* did not allow other persons to purchase fresh food grains on its arrival in the *mandis*. They purchased good quality of grain and allowed the merchants to buy 'rotten and wasteful corn.' Moreover, they forced the

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1. *Parwana*, dt. 19 Safar, 1089 AH, R No.36, Pune.

2. *Parwana*, dt. 14 Rabi I, 1110 A H, R.No.42, Pune.

3. Emperor Jahangir's *Baroda farman* asks the *mahajans* of Baroda t0 take note of the person appointed as *desai*. According to the *Mirat*, the *gumashta* of the *amin-i jizyah* had reported that the *zimmis* of *pargana* Mehmudabad did not pay *jizyah* for two years (1697-99) and they were bidding time for payment with the support of local *desai* and *seths*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 339.

merchants to pay the price of good stuff.[1] If the *desais* purchased lands, cattles and houses, the state granted them exemption from paying customary tax on such transactions.[2] The *desais* contracted *ijara* rights and thereby might have made money.[3] They are also reported to have collected prohibitted taxes from a certain section of the *riaya* during Aurangzeb's reign.[4] As such the *desaigiri* was quite a lucrative position and its possessors would have, naturally, enjoyed a respectable social position.

A few pieces of information casting light on some other activities of the *desais* and their relationship with other members of the ruling class are also available. Perceiving the rising strength of imperial power, Somji *desai* pursuaded the Gohel chief of Sehore to offer port of Ghoga by way of *nazrana* to Akbar when the Emperor conquered Gujarat.[5] For this, Somji ws rewarded by a grant of some villages and an increased allowance while the Gohel chief was allowed to retain his rights in all the harbours of Gohelwad.[6] Later

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 260- 1.

2. *Account*, f. 364a.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.292.

4. *Ibid*, I, pp 209, 304.

5. JW Watson, "Historical Sketch of the town of Ghoga," *The Indian Antiquary*, *op.cit*, p 283.

6. *Ibid*.

during Shah Jahan's reign the *desai* of *pargana* Idar acted as an intermediary for bringing about a rapproachment betwen the Rathor zamindar of the place and the provincial authorities.[1] Mehraji, an imperial *desai* at Lolyana (*sarkar* Soreth) made capital out of the strife ridden ruling family of Sehore sometime during Aurangzeb's reign. The *desai* succeeded in getting his son, Ranji Mehraji, appointed as a *pattawat* there.[2]

The relations between the *desais* and other zamindars were not necessarily cordial all the time. The zamindar of Rajpipla had killed the imperial *desai* during Akbar's reign but had spared the *qazi* and the news-writer.[3] Likewise the zamindar of Cheharmandvi killed the imperial *desai* during the reign of the same emperor.[4] It has been mentioned above that the *desai* of *pargana* Supa and Harsur had encroached upon the priveleges of the *muqaddams* by illegally realizing the village expenses and assessing the *pusaita* lands. The *patel* of Verawal (*pargana* Somnath-Pattan, *sarkar* Soreth)

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1. *Rasmala*, pp. 344-45.

2. *Ibid*, p 353. Ranji Mehraji's son, Damji, was also appointed in the same capacity there. He became very powerful and annoyed the then ruling chief, Bhao Singh who killed Damji. *Ibid*.

3. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi, Supplement* p. 233.

4. Sharif Khan Bharuchi's Letter, *op.cit*.

killed the *desai* for some unspecified reason sometime during Aurangzeb's reign. The deceased *desai's* son was thefore favoured with *pusaita* grant by the court and he continued to hold it during later years .[1]

But, then, the *desais* seem to have maintained satisfactory working relationship with the *jagirdars*. Any reference suggesting differences between them is conspicuous by its absence. On the other the *jagirdars* and other local officials are reported to have favoured them with *pusaita* grants and *ina'm* which they made out of their *jagir* revenues .[2] The *Mirat* has also reported that the *jagirdars* "practised indiferrence in producing the *desais* " of their respective areas before the imperial officials deputed from the centre to collect revenue-records from them. The provincial authorities had, therefore to make special arrangements for ensuring the availability of the *desais* before the deputed person.[3] It seems the *desais* had an inclination to

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1. SH Desai's collection, *parwanah* dt. 22 Jamadi I, 1122 AH/8 July, 1710, No.14(1)6.

2. *Account*, f.14a.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp 326-7, It may be pointed out here that the Mughal officials who established their independent principalies in the *subah* during the first half of the eighteenth century maintained the *desais*, assigning them high administrative positions under them. In their new capacity they were designated as ' *diwan or karbhari*', the incharge of affairs.

hold back the required information and were hand in gloves with the *jagirdars*.

The *desais* undertook some such activities which signify their socio-economic position and were meant to earn name and fame. Mahasom, the imperial *desai* at Ghoga, built a temple of Kalka-Mata in the year 1615.[1] Mathuradas and Samalji, *desais* of *pargana* Badnagar, built a stepwell for public use at the town of (*pargana*) Petlad (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) during the opening years of the eighteenth century.[2]

The *desaigiri* seems to have aquired the form of property before the close of the seventeenth century. It is not precisely known if the *desaigiri* could be sold and purchased. But it is certain that it could be martgaged. According to a mortgage deed (May 1699) Mahadji, Madanji and Anandji, the sons of Ganpat *desai* of *pargana* Somnath-Pattan (*sarkar* Soreth) mortgaged their share in the *majmue'dari* (*majmue'dari hissa khudha*) with Gangaram, Damodar and Bhimji, sons of Ram Krishna - a physician (*Tabib*) for 252 *mehmudis*. The mortgagors (*maraahoons*) as per the stipulated

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1. J.W. Watson, "Historical Sketch of the town of Ghoga", *op. cit.* pp 284-6. The temple carries a duly dated inscription.

2. M R Majumdar, "A Triangular inscription on a stepwell in Petlad," *Journal of the University of Bombay* V No. 10, pt. IV, May, 1937, pp. 147-8. The stepwell was constructed during the subedari(1701-4) of Prince Azam who is duly mentioned in the inscription.

conditions, got entitled to enjoy the consequential rights and perform the related duties.[1] Another document(Feb. 1700) records that a woman[2](*musammat*)named Kobra(?), wife of Gobindji(son of Sarangdhar) possessed a share in the *desigiri*[3] in *pargana* Somnath-Pattan (*sarkar* Soreth). The woman-*desai* mortgaged her share for 350 *mehmudis* with Damodar, the son of the same physician, Raikishan Nagar.[4]

It would appear from the preceding discussion that the *desaigiri* was by and large held by educated members belonging to upper castes, particularly the Nagar Brahmans. The *desais* appear to be wealthy people having links with the men of purse. That the *desais* enjoyed a position of power and significance in the revenue matters and the ruling hierarchy is well evident. Whether they had an equally strong social

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1. S H Desai's private collection, *rahn-namah* dt. 14th Zilhaj 1110 AH, No. 14(6)/14.

2. This is the only available reference to a woman holding *desaigiri*. Whether the right was purchased or inherited is not known.

3. The preceding and the present documents are bilingual one. The Gujarati version terms the rights thus being mortgaged as *deshaigiri* in both the documents. Whereas the Persian text in the first document calls it *majmue'dari* and in the following document names it the *desaigiri*. The two terms thus being used alternately as also interchangeably seem to have denoted the same rights. Both the deeds, it may be mentioned, were registered with the office of the *qazi*.

4. S H Desai's Private collection, *rahn namah*, dt. ? Ramadhan, 1111 A H, No.14 (6)/19. The *Tabib* was recepient of *madad-i* ma'sh lands also.

base is not borne out by the available evidence. In all probability the *desais* depended more on the administrative backing than on their social base which, in any case, does not appear to be as strong as that of the *muqaddams*.

B - ***MUQADDAM*** :

The *muqaddam*, also called *patel*[1] was an important intermediary zamindar of village level. A leading member of the village community he acted simultaneously as the representative of the village under him and watch dog of imperial interests in the village.[2] The position of *muqaddami* was hereditary and could also be bought and sold.[3] In the Mughal Gujarat emperor Akbar is reported to have confirmed the *muqaddams* in their positions and accordingly accepted their share in the revenues.[4]

The presence of *muqaddams* is noticeable in all the *kharaji sarkars* of the *subah* during the seventeenth century. From the

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1. *Baroda*, 27. The bilingual document describes the person named therein as *muqaddams* in its Persian text and *patel* in the Gujarati version. In another Perisan document (*Ibid*, 57 and 83) the named persons are called *patels* (*patelan*). Please see also, Irfan Habib, *Agrarian system*, p. 129n1.

2. For a detailed view Dilbagh Singh, " Position of Patel in the Eastern Rajasthan" pp 360-66.

3. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 128-29.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p 173; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p 228.

detailed list of the villages of *paragana* Kadi (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) it would appear that the *muqaddams* were there in both kinds of villages, the *raiyati* as well as the zamindari.[1] They were there in the villages lands of which were divided on *bantha-talpad* lines and also in the ones areas of which were not likewise divided.[2] Their presence is also noticeable in the zamindari *makans*, including the *watan* possessions of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin.*[3] discussed in a preceding chapter [I(2)].

But it cannot be taken to mean that the *muqaddam* was necessarily there in each of the villages. Of 282 villages in *pargana* Kadi the *muqaddams* were there in 211 villages i.e. 74.8 per cent of the villages had their own *muqaddams*. The remaining villages, 72 in number and forming 25.2 per cent of the *pargana* were without a *muqaddam* (*muqaddam nadard*).[4] As such the sway of *muqaddam's* right did not cover the entire country side.[5]

Like the class of cultivators that mainly consisted of

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1. *Account*, ff. 309a-38a.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Account*, ff 309a read with *Ibid* ff 311a, 314a, 315a and *dehat-i paragana* Kadi, *PC* No. 3 to 7.
4. *Account*, ff 309a -38a
5. Irfan Habib (*Agrarian System*, pp 128-31) also notes the villages without *muqaddams*.

the *kameja* (*khudkasht*) and the *paikashat*[1] (*uprawaria*), the available documents speak of two classes of *muqaddams* also, viz; *muqaddaman-i kameja* and *muqaddaman-i paikashata*. In a *dastur-ul amal* of emperor Aurangzeb's reign rates of assessment have separately been furnished for the *paikashta-muqaddaman* for the *pargana* Prati (Prantij), *sarkar* Ahmadabad.[2] The *paikashta muqaddams* are also refered to in the *dastur* of a newly founded (*naw abad*) village of the same *pargana*.[3] Another document specifying area statistics of the actually cropped lands in *mawza* Mahej (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) mentions the *muqaddaman-i kameja* amongst the various holders of land, however as a separate category of land holders.[4] The available evidence however does not help us to precisely ascertain if the *muqaddams* were themselves non-residents (*pais*) or there were separate *muqaddams* for the *paikashtas*, or both. It may also be mentioned that the

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1. The *kamejas* or the resident cultivators were the ones who held and cultivated the lands by themselves; the *pahi*, meant " the peasant (*raiyat*) in one *mauza* and is subordinate to one zamindari and carries on cultivation in the zamindari of another zamindar". For a detailed view, Satish Chandra " Some Aspects of Indian Village Society in Northern India during the 18th Century -(The position and Role of the *khudkasht and pahi kasht*" pp 245-56).

2. *Account*, f. 202b.

3. *Ibid*, f 202a.

4. *Mazruat mawza* Mahej *P C* No.209 a.

muqaddams were holders of lands in their own right, independent of the *muqaddami*. They could be the *khudkashtas* as also held lands which were cultivated by other cultivators (*muzarian*) of unspecified description.[1]

The *muqaddami* was, by and large, confined to the most important section of the village community and the *muqaddams* were the superior members of the populace.[2] But the the *muqaddami* doesnot, by and large, seem to have been enjoyed by a single individual in a village .[3] Excepting *mawza* Shahbari (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) we donot come across any village which had only one *muqaddam*.[4] From a document dated 1699 A D (1111 AH) it would appear that there were not less then Three *patels* in village Santhal of the same *pargana*.[5]

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1. The *muqaddams* held lands in *talpad* (*raiyati*) as well as in the *bantha* portion of a zamindar. *Mazruat-i-mawza* Khator, 26 R Y Aurangzeb, *P.C.* No.161; *Mazruat-i-mawza* Dhamanwan, 1140 *fasli*; *Mazruat-i-mawza* Mahej, 1146 *fasli*; *Mazrual-i-mawza* Majhol, 1151 fasli, *P.C.* Nos. 91,93; see also *P.C.* Nos 278-79 of 1709-10 A D.

2. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 128-9; Dilbagh Singh, *op cit.*, pp. 360-63; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, pp 71, 171.

3. In its description of the *muqaddams* of the villages of *pargana* Kadi the *Account* invariably suffixes the expression ' "and other" (*Waghaira*) after naming the *muqaddam* of a village. In case the work does not specify the name and simply puts the caste, it likewise puts them in plural - Rajputan, Baqqalan etc; see also Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p 129.

4. For more references, please see discussion below.

5. *Yad-dasht girasia waghaira mawza* Santhal *amla pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, R.No.37, Pune.

Another document (1702 AD) specifies as many as nine *muqaddams* in *mawza* Deoli, *pargana* Chorasi (*sarkar* Surat).[1] Evidently sway of each *muqaddam's* right would extend to a portion of the village, or else to a part in the revenues thereof. The situation, it may be postulated, would also lead to intensifying the *muqaddam's* hold over the *raiyat*.

As regard caste-composition of the *muqaddam* some valuable information is available in the pages of *Account* which furnishes detailed list of the *muqaddams*, their caste or community for the villages of *pargana* Kadi (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) for the first quarter of the eighteenth century.[2] As mentioned earlier 211 of the 282 villages had *muqaddams*. The caste wise composition of the specified 211 villages having *muqaddams* may be summarised as under:

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1. *Yad-dashat maqaddaman mawza,* Deoli *amla pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, R No. 37, Pune.

2. *Account*, ff. 309a-38a.

	CASTE/COMMUNITY-WISE BREAK UP						
	Kunbis	Rajputs	*Baqqals*	*Zannar-daran*	*Badfaro-shan*	Other non-muslims	Muslims
Number of *muqaddams*	148	22	9	1	1	25	5
per-centage ---> (211=100)	70	10.4	4.3	.48	.48	11.8	2.4

It is thus evident that the cultivating class (*kunbis*)[1] formed the majority (70%) of *muqaddams* in the *pargana*. The remaining positions were held by others, presumably the non-cultivating section of the society. Of them the Rajput-*muqaddams* enjoyed a predominant position. But their over all proportion (18.4 percent) in the *muqaddami* is significantly much less than their proportionate share in the

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1. According the *Lughat-i-Gujri* '*Kunbi*' was a Gujarati equivalent of *al-muzare*' i.e. the cultivator (p.229); The *Rasmala* (p. 542) also describes them as the most industrious cultivators of the region. This work don't specify their castes and they find description as cultivators regardless of their caste. It is also a well known fact that high caste Hindus did not cultivate lands directly with their own hands. Also see, Baden Powell *Land System of British India* III, Oxford, London, n.d, p.336.) who says that the *kunbi* is the most numerous land holding caste. They are "almost certainly a mixed race". But in the modern day Gujarat the 'Kunbi *patels*' are counted as Rajputs.

zamindari of the known villages in the same *pargana*.[1] More significant to note is the presence of *baqqals* i.e. pettly traders and money lenders, whose proportion which being 4.3 per cent is not very high. However it suggests the penetration of trading class into the ruling section of land magnets. The Charans & Bhats (*badfaroshan*), the Brahmans (*zannardaran*) and the Muslims had also made inroads but their over all proportion (3.33 %) was, significantly, not very high. It is however evident that the *muqaddami* was not necessarily monopolised by any single caste or community and it seems to have been enjoyed by, relatively, a wider section of the society. Finally the majority of the *muqaddami* position being held by the Kunbis the differentiation between the *muqaddams* and the cultivators was not much wider and moreover both of them had, in their common positions as cultivators, identity of interests also.

The contemporary evidence doesnot help us to precisely ascertain if the *muqaddami* belonged to the castes that enjoyed predominance numerically or in terms of area of lands or both. The British, later on, noted that in the

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1. Of 211 *muqaddami* villages we have definite information about the castes of zamindars of 154 villages. Of them (154) 140 (90.9%) were held by the Rajputs, five (3.5%) each by Muslims and the Bhats; one each (.65%) by Charans and Brahmans and two (1.3%) by the Kolis. *Yaddasht dehat pargana* Kadi PC Nos 3 to 7 read with *Account* ff 307b-8a.

villages of aboriginal tribes the *patels* belonged to one of the above tribes; in Koli villages a headman was usually a Koli. In other villages he was either a Kunbi, Rajput, Bhatela, Brahman, Malik, Muslim or a Saiyed.[1]

The present piece of information may also be utilised to ascertain relationship, if any, between the *muqaddami* and nature of the village i.e. *zortalbi* and the *raiyati* which is duly specified. Thus:

No. of villages	Total No. = 282		Villages with *muqaddam* = 211		Villges without *muqaddam* = 71	
	Raiyati	*Zortalab*	*Raiyati*	*Zortalab*	*Raiyati*	*Zortalab*
282	271	11	207	4	64	7
Percentage	96.1	3.9	98.1	1.9	90.14	9.86

The proprtion of *zortalab* villages in the *pargana* being 3.9 out of hundred doesnot seem to be very high. Of the *raiyati* villages, 98.1 percent were the ones having *muqaddams* whereas the percentage of the *zortalab* village having *muqaddams* being 1.9 percent was relatively less. It is evident that the proportion of the non-*muqaddami zortalab* villages (90.14 per cent) was relatively high in comparision to the proportion of the *zortalab* villages which had *muqad-*

1. *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p. 71; *Ibid*, II, pp 57, 70, 157, 227, 382.

dams (9.86 per cent). It is however difficult to suggest whether the presence of *muqaddams* influenced, or else was itself influnced by the feature of *zortalbi*. It is however evident that the *zortalbi* and the *muqaddami* were necessarily neither the corollary of and nor even consistent with each other.

As regard co-relationship, if any, subsisting between the caste of *muqaddams* and the *zortalb* it would appear that 75 per cent of the *zortalb* villages having *muqaddams*, were held by the *kunbi muqaddams*; remaining 25 percent were held by the Rajput *muqaddams*. It suggests that more *Kunbi*-held *muqaddami* villages were prone to the *zortalbi*. But when viewed in broader context, it would appear that:

Muqaddam's caste and the villages	Kunbi 148		Rajput 22	
Nature of villages	*raiyati*	*Zortalab*	*raiyati*	*Zortalab*
Number of villages	145	3	21	1
Percentage	97.08	2.02	95.45	4.45

: the proportion of the Kunbi held *muqaddami* villages (2.02 per cent) was comparatively less than the Rajput - *muqaddami* villages. It may however be pointed out that the *muqaddami* and zamindari of the single *zortalab* village was held by different persons but both of them happened to be Rajputs.

The available evidence may also be utilised to examine if the *muqaddam* " was usually chosen from among the Primary zamindars"[1] and, for that matter the Superior zamindars also. The *Account*, as mentioned above, specifies 211 villages which had *muqaddams*.[2] Of them 197 *muqaddams* have been duly named. The document entitled *yad-dasht dehat-i pargana* Kadi specifies *banthadaran* (Superior and Primary zamindars) holding zamindaris in these villages.[34] Besides, the *Account* also furnishes list of zamindars holding zamindaris in the same *pargana* during the same period of time.[5] A comparative study of these sets of information reveals that none of the person holding *muqaddami* find description among the zamindars. Another document, though not dated however coming for the first quarter of the eighteenth century, specifies both the *muqaddams* as well as the *girasias* (i.e. Primary zamindars) of *mawza* Santhal (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad). Again, the *qirasias* and the *muqaddams* appear to be

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1. S. Nurul Hasan, *Thoughts on Agraian relation*, p. 31.

2. It is evident that the villages without *muqaddams* had zamindari lands. (*Account*, ff. 311a, 312b, 313a, 314b, 315a, 317a, 318a, 319a etc.). In these villages the *muqaddami* was not held by the zamindars also though they were very much there.

3. *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Kadi, *op.cit.*

4. *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Kadi, *op cit.*

5. *Account*, ff 308a -8b.

different persons.[1] Similar information which is available for other parts also suggests that the zamindari and the *muqaddami* were held by different persons.[2] Nevertheless the possibility of *muqaddams* holding *makan-i zamindari* and *giras* rights may not be ruled out.[3] In the light of the evidence cited above it would however appear that the *muqaddami* and the zamindari (i.e. Primary and the Superior one) were generally held by different persons. However the conclusion may not be pressed too far.

The eavailable evidence though very limited in quantity and scope however suggests that the *muqaddami* and the *desaigiri* were generally, if not necessarily, held by different persons.[4] The *desaigiri* of *pargana* Kadi was held by the persons who donot find mention among the duly named *muqaddams* of the *pargana*.[5] Names of the *muqaddams* and the

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1. *Yad-dasht muqaddaman-o girasia waghaira mawza* Santhal *amla pargana haveli* Ahmadabad. R. No.37, Pune. The document names Detha, Rewa and Harkaran as the *muqaddams*; and Banji, Bheraji, Pethoji, Sahaji, Akraji and Jassaji as the *girasias* of the village.

2. *Rasmala*. pp 350-1, 431; SH Desai's Collection Nos. 14/1 (5); *Baroda*, 87 and 99.

3. Only two instances each showing the *muqaddams* as holder of a *zamindari makan* and *giras* lands are available. *Account*, f. 101b, *P.C.* No. 278.

4. *Account*, f. 17b.

5. *Ibid*, f 308a read with *Ibid*, ff 309a-38a.

desais also appear in the *chaknamas.*[1] They are also duly named in a case of dispute on the inter-village boundry.[2] In all these instances the two sets of persons were different people. But it may not be emphatically asserted that the *desais* and the *muqaddams* were invariably different persons for the documents sometimes add the suffix "and other" (*Wghaira*) after a duly named *muqaddams* and, or, *desais* or both.

The *muqaddam* in Gujarat, like else where, was required to perform various duties as an intermediary between the state and the village under him.

The *muqaddam*, to beginwith, was associated with both the stages of revenue collections, viz., assessment (*tashkhis*) and collection (*tehsil*). From Aurangzeb's *farman* addressed to the then *diwan-i subah* Gujarat it would appear that the *muqaddam* was to be associated with land survey, presumably to make it acceptable and preclude the possibili-

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1. See, for example, *PC* Nos. 40 of 1040 AH and 286/41G/Bha. of 31RY Aurangzeb's reign; *Baroda*, 57, 83.

2. The two available documents (*PC* Nos 88 and 271) mention Mathuradas as the *desai* of *pargana* Dholga. The *muqaddams* of specified villages of the *pargana* were Kashidas, Gangadas, Jeewa, Manohar, Keso, Banarsi, Bhaoji Lakha, Sobhji and Reewadas. Another document (*PC* No.277), likewise mentions both of them. They are again different persons.

ty of complaints as had happened in the past.[1] Detailed account of the surveyed lands was also to be prepared in co-operation with the *muqaddams*.[2]

The *dastur-ul amals* appear to have been enforced through the *muqaddams*. Isa Tar Khan (1642-4) who is appreciated for his acts of "conciliation of the *raiyat*"[3] is noticed to have furnished the detailed rates of assessment before the commencement of the sowing operation to the *riaya* through the *muqaddams*.[4] Alongwith the assessee - cultiva-

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1. Please see Aurangzeb's *farman* (text) dt. 25 Rabi I, 25 RY, *Account*, f 24a. The *Mirat* reports that during Akbar's reign Shahabuddin Ahmad khan had to 'survey the cultivable lands of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad and other *parganas* a second time' due to complaints of the *raiyat* against the results of the first survey which was undertaken by Raja Todarmal. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p.141.). The *Account* (f.23a) identifies the *muqaddams* as the complainants -*muqaddaman pargana mazkur......nalish namude ki raqba dehat dar zabt Raja Todarmal zyada amde ast)* . It seems *muqaddams* were not involved, at least effectively, when the first survey was undertaken.

2. *Account*, f.24a.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.217. Prior to Isa Tarkhan's act of concilliation which are not duly specified, Azam Kahan had successfully subdued the rebels. But he had paid "no heed to improve the condition of the *raiyat*" and, as a result the *raiyat* 'had taken refuge under zamindars (i.e. rebel ones) of distant places. (*Ibid*, I, pp. 215-6). Isa Tarkhan is reported to have introduced *bhagwatai (ghalla bakhsi)* as the mode of assessment and collection and put the affairs in right order. Whether the present act of issuing the *destur* and *ganwat* in the above mentioned way was an improvement on, or simply act of re-inforcing the established practice is not precisely known. *Ibid*, I, pp 215-7.

4. *Dastur-ul amal* (Isa Tar Khan's period of *subedari*), a *naql*, *PC* No.41-5.

tors (*muzarian*) the *muqaddams* gave, before hand, their acceptance of the rates whereas the latter also undertook the responsibility to assess and collect the revenues as per agreement (*ganwat*).[1] The *muqaddams* seem to have regarded the issuance of the *ganwat* through them as their privelege.[2] For the administration, it would be an expedient way out.[3]

Subsequent to their acceptance of the rates of assessment the *muqaddams*along the *desai* and revenue officials were involved in the fixation of *jama*.[4] Following it he undertook the responsibility to collect from every assessee, the revenues fixed in accordance with the *dastur-ul amal* (*mawafiq-i dastur-ul amal*) under the supervision of the *desai*.[5] The *muqaddam's* involvement in the process of collecting revenues was, under the Mughals, made during the reign of Emperor Akbar who had asked the *diwan-i subah* to collect

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1. *Ibid.*

2. *Wajib-ul arz-i fidwi* Metha, *muqaddam mawza* Faizabad *urf* Shahbari, *P C* No.38. It records :*ganwat-o qawl o qarar b riaya -o muzarian ma'rfat banda az sarkar marahmat shawad.*

3. The above quoted request is followed by the expression 'accepted'(*manzoor ast*). Another piece of information suggests that the work of assessment because of some disagreement on the rates of assessment, could not be carried on without active involvement of the *muqaddams*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p 104-5.

4. *Naql tamassuk-i Nawab* Mukarramat Khan, *fasl-i khari*) 1077 *fasli*/1669-70 AD, *P C* No.63.

5. *Ibid.*

revenvs 'with the consultation of *desais* and *muqaddams*.[1]

Emperor Jahangir had also directed the *muqaddams* of *pargana haveli* Baroda to collect revenues in consultation with the *desais* whose appointment was to be taken note of by them.[2] Isa Tarkhan's *ganwat* deed of Shah Jahan's reign specified *muqaddams*' acceplance for collecting revenues.[3] A *tamassuk* (1077 *fasli*/1669-70 AD) records that Rs.3,25,072/- was assessed as the revenues on *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad for the *kharif* season. The document reflects the *desais* and the *muqaddams* undertaking responsibility of collecting the revnues.[4] In the parts of the *subah* which followed the system of *bhagwatai* the *muqaddams* saw that the harvested crops were carried to the threshing-floor of the village and heaped there properly until the state had taken, or assessed its share.[5]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.173.

2. *Baroda farman*; *Junagadh*, SC No.880 (*mahal* Junagadh).

3. *P.C.* No. 41.

4. *Naql tamassauk-i Nawab* Mukarramat Khan, *op cit*. Beside being held responsible for explaining the cause in the fall in revenues, if any, the *muqaddams* were also requried to realize @ Rs.2/- per *bigha* of such lands which were tilled during the preceding year but left uncultivated during the year in question.

   See also *P C* No.63a *wajib-ul arz*, cited above.

5. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, p. 483; *Ibid*, VIII, p. 172.

Besides, the *muqaddams* were also required to extend area of cultivation and promote the cultivation of cash crops.[1] The *muqaddams* enjoyed the right for alloting the cultivable waste to such ones as wished to till .[2] Also he pursuaded the aggrieved cultivators (*kunbis*) to undertake cultivation at right time.[3] He was also to make arrangements for preventing migration of the *riaya* from his village.[4]

Muqaddam's jurisdiction over the village was not exclusively confined to revenue matters.[5] Though the state posted its own men- (*swara-o-piyadah*) in villages, the *muqaddams* could request for providing additional number of footmen to serve in the village under him.[6] The British

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1. Please see *tamassuk*, *ganwat* deed and the *wajib-ul arz* cited in the preceding notes.

2. Geleynssen observed that " anyone who wants to cultivate any land goes to the headman of the village and asks for as much as he wants at place which suits him. This is rarely refused but always granted". Geleynssen, *JIH*, IV, pp 78-9 *cited* in *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, p 215 and 16. The *chaks* of the lands granted as *madad-i ma'sh* were also marked in consultan of and agreement with the *muqaddams* (*b' razamandi* or *b' ittefaq*).

3. *Rasmala*, p 544; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV p. 147.

4. *Rasmala*, p. 544.

5. Ifran Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 132-3.

6. *Wajib-ul arz*, *op. cit.*

also found that *muqaddam* was held responsible for any crime committed within or near his village and he was answerable for the track of all thieves.[1]

In his capacity as the chief representative of the village community the *muqaddam* seems to have played the role of village-host. As per the contents of the *wajib-ul arz* referred to above the *muqaddam* had requested the state to grant him eight *bighas* of land by way of *pusaita* to meet expenses on the entertainment of respectable person (*mard -i abroo*) and travellers(*Kharj-i musafir*).[2] Moreover the *muqaddam* also represented the village for settling the inter village boundry disputes.[3]

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1. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II. PP. 215 227; *Ibid*, VIII, 171-3. Also see Mr. Asstt. Collector Pyane's *representation* (1827, on Balasinor) regarding *muqaddams*' position in the *Nawabi* territory of Balasinor. According to it, the *patel* "collected rent from different cultivators, saw that the land actually in the possession of each cultivator agreed with what he ought to hold and bore the crops stipulated in the engagement, helped the *tallati* (*patwari*) to make out the cultivator's agreement, encouraged fresh cultivators to resort to the village, brought its waste land under tillage and acted as an officer of the police.

2. *Wajib-ul arz, op.cit.* It was accordingly granted.

3. *PC* Nos. 88 and 271. Accordingly to the British officials the *patel* 'governed' the village, 'managed' the village affairs and settled disputes. In religious and social matters he took the lead. He had the privelege of dignity and precedence on ceremonial occasions. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, p 382; *Ibid*, (kaira), p. 91; Baden Powell, *Village community*, pp 10-1; *Land system*, I, p.153.

Share :

The *muqaddam* like *desai* was entitled to a share in the revenues taken from the *riaya* as state's cliam. Share of *muqaddams* was fixed at 2.5 per cent of the revenues collected from the *khalsa* and *jagir* lands during Emperor Akbar's reign.[1] Since no change is reported during the subsequent days it would therefore appear that the rate remained unchanged.[2] From the document reflecting actual revenue - returns and disbursement theirof, it would appear that the *muqaddam* was not given the share out of the salami or *peshkash* extorted from holders of the *bantha*. His share was calculated out of the revenue proceeds from the *talpad* portion only.[3] As such the *muqaddam's* interests were confined to the *talpad* i.e. his interests were not consistent with the *bantha-dar*.

Besides, the *muqaddams* also held *pusaita* lands which were assessed at concessional rates or were wholly exempt from paying revenues.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.173; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p.228.

2. See for the year 1692-93, *Jama-o Kharj pargana* Petlad, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif*... 1105 *fasli* R.No.29, Pune.

3. *Ibid*, If the portions of (*talpad*) lands were held as *madad-i ma'sh* the *muqaddams* enjoyed his share. *P C* No.60.

The *pusaita* possessions of *muqaddams* could be there in the *talpad*, the *bantha* as well as in the villages lands of which were not divided on *bantha-talpad* lines.[1]

Muqaddams' karindas nature of whose rights and obligation do not find description, are also noticed as holding *pusaita* lands beside *muqaddams*.[2] The *pusaita* lands were cultivated by cultivators(*muzarian*) of unspecified description. Since these cultivators are duly specified amongst the assessees[3] it would therefore appear that *muqaddams'* entitlement was qualified and he does not seem to be absolute owner of lands held as *pusaita*.

As regard the revenue proceeds from the *pusaita* lands the state claimed a share, proportion of which could vary from time to time and place to place. The earliest available *dastur-ul amal* specifying rates for the *pusaita* lands of *muqaddams* dates back to Isa Tarkhan's period of *subedari*(1642-4).[4] The *dastur* records the state's share as

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1. Please see *muzruat* documents, *PC* Nos. 161 (26th R.Y. Aurangzeb), 278-9(1113*fasli*, *kharif*), 93(*kharif* 1136 *fasli*) and the ones available in R. No. 37, Pune, particularly for the years 1117,1119, 1127, 1131, 1133, 1137 *fasli*.

2. *Mazruat* documents, *P.C.* Nos 161 for *mawza* Khatur of 26th RY *Aurangazeb*.

3. *Ibid.*, For *mawza* Mahej(1142 *fasli*). *P.C.* No 96.

4. *Dastur-ul amal pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *naql ganwat b'mohr nawab*. Isa Tarkhan, *P.C.* Nos. 41-48.

'less by one-third'(*Sayoom hissa kam*) i.e. two-third of the revenue was to be taken by the state and the remaining one-third was to be retained by the *muqaddam*. But later Prince Aurangazeb (1645-6) adopted harsh attitude, attaching whole of the revenues of the *pusaita* in favor of state.[1] Later Ghairat Khan (1648-50) reverted back to the rates which were

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1. *Destur-ul amal* of Shahzada Aurangzeb, *PC* No 51. As such the prince disallowed the *muqaddams* from enjoying any share in the *pusaita* lands. It may be added that the prince had, likewise, disallowed all the non-serving sections(i.e. Brahmans, Bhats, Charans, Kolis and others from enjoying any share in the *pusaita* lands. *Ibid*. His action which did hurt their interests must have annoyed the socially influential people.

    The *Mirat* notes that *subedar* Aurangzeb "had collected a large number of servants for establishment of order and chastisement of rebels". Who the rebels were ? It is observed that during his period of *subedari* "expenses were more than income" of the *Nazim* - (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 219-21). Apparently because he had to maintain larger establishment of soldiers than was usually required under normal circumstances.

    Aurangzeb stayed as *subedar* for less than two years (*Ibid*). Shaista Khan, the next incumbent "in spite of the *mansab* of 5000 *sawars*(2 X 3 h) and land revenue of an annual sum of 500,000 rupees for provision of 3000 *sehbandi sawars*... failed to chastise and punish the rebels and kolis of the *subah* in a manner he sought to have done." (*Ibid*, I, p 224)

    Shaista Khan was replaced by Prince Dara who governed the *subah* through his deputy, Ghairat Khan. The khan restored the *status quo ante* and followed the *desturs* which were enforced under Isa Tarkhan. The khan ran the administration smoothly. He was replaced by Shaista Khan again. This time Shaista khan managed the affairs well without facing difficulties similar to the ones he was confronted with earlier. Whether Aurangzeb and Shaista khan (first tenure) had faced the problems and rebellions because of their harsh attitude towards the *pusaita* holders, is the question worth investigating into.

applicable during Isa Tarkhan's period of administration.[1] The same rates were kept up in the *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad during the later period.[2] The *muqaddams' pusaita* in *pargana* Mundah were assessed on *bilmuqta*(lumpsum) basis.[3] *Muqaddams* of some villages in the same *pargana* paid the state an amount which ranged between one to two and a half *mehmudis* per *bigha* of the *pusaita* lands.[4] In some parts of *sarkar* Ahmadabad they paid it @ one rupee per *bigha*[5]. In *pargana* Bheel of the same *sarkar* the *muqaddams* enjoyed entire revenues of the *pusaita* lands.[6]

The *muqaddams*, moreover, contracted *ijara* rights during the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb.[7]

Beside enjoying a share in the revenues and part or whole of the revenues of the *pusaita* lands the *muqaddams* were recepients of some other concessions also. The *muqaddams* enjoyed exemtions from paying required taxes on pur-

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1. *Dastur-ulamal P.C.* Nos. 46-8.
2. *Ibid*, Nos 22-6, 28, 31, *Account* 409a.
3. *Account*, f. 339a
4. *Ibid.* f. 182a.
5. *Ibid* f 350a.
6. *Ibid.* f. 182a.
7. *Mirat-i Ahamadi*, I p 292.

chase of cattles and houses.[1] Also they enjoyed exemption from paying a cess levied on the occassion of Holi.[2] However, the *paikashta - muqaddams* were required to pay half a *mehmudi* per cow maintained by them.[3]

Information casting light on the relationship between the *muqaddams* and other zamindars is hardly available. From the available evidence it would however appear that *muqaddams* could come into clash with the *desais* as well as the two could join hands.[4] As regard their relationship with other zamindars two pieces of information indicating two different state of relationship are available. Thus Kanji, a Koli zamindar of Chunwal - a region noted for its recalcitrance killed the *muqaddams* of Detroj for he had refused to 'pay obeisance to Kanji', the Koli chief.[5] But the *Patel* of Gariadhar rendered valuable assistance to the zamindar of the place against his opponents.[6]

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1. *Account* ff 364a - 4b.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.* The *muqaddams* were also required to bear the two-third cost of the *qaba-i kotwal* to be offered every year. *Ibid.* f 364a.

4. For references and details please see discussion under '*desais*' in the preceeding part of the chapter.

5. *Rasmala*, pp 430-31.

6. *Ibid* p 350.

From the preceding discuss on it would appear that the *muqaddam* being a man of the village and member of its community, must have been quite strong a person, more so because he was vested with such administrative powers which brought him into active dealings with and further placed him over and above the villagers in general.[1] Though they enjoyed a position secondary to that of the *desais* but within the respective villages of their possessions the *muqaddams* might have been much stronger than the former.

C - ***IJARADARS*** :

Ijaradar was also an intermediary who collected revenues accruing from a specified source, generally the land. By virture of contracting *ijara*, the *ijaradar* was vested with the right of collecting revenues on behalf of the state, or its assignees for a fixed period of time. It was a time-bound non-hereditary contract-based position.[2] Important fact is that an *ijaradar* had to pay a " fixed amount in cash irrespective of the amount collected from the

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1. The ballad, called " The koonbee's Grief" which was a favourite song of the *kunbis'* (cultivator's) women in Gujarat, records the resentment of the cultivators against the zamindars who " plunder us of the produce of our cows." But it does not speak against the *patel* who also finds mention in the song. *Rasmala*, pp. 543-5.

2. N A Siddiqi, *op.cit*, p.93; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p. 233.

peasants."[1] The Mughal state did not regard *ijara* as a sound revenue arragement and, therefore, disapproved of it.[2] However the practice crept into both the *khalsa* and the *jagir* lands during the seventeenth century.[3] Consequently there emerged a new intermediary position.

As regard the seventeenth century Gujarat the available information is insufficient to form a tenable view. It however suggests that the *ijara* was practised during the second half of the century. According to the earliest available piece of information coming for the 30th R Y of Shah Jahan's reign one Satidas Sahu[4] held *mawza* Sankhesh-

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1. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 233-4. Very similar to them were the *muqtai* who paid on their own lands a fixed amount' 'periodically assessed' on the basis of 'a fixed rate of revenue per *bigha*'. The *bilmuqta* arrangement also signified a fixed revenue demand on the whole village', or a larger area. *Ibid*, p.233.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 234-5; N A Siddiqi, op *cit.*, p.93.

3. Irfan Habib finds it difficult to say how widespread the practice of *muqtai* and *ijara* was during the period. *Agrarian System*, p. 235. But N A Siddiqi opines that the *ijara* had become quite widespread in the course of the seventeenth century. But his view is not duly substantiated. N A Siddiqi, *op.cit*, p.93.

4. Satidas (Shantidas) was the principal representative of the wealthy and powerful Swetambor Jain community of Western India. He was also recepient of revenue grants from Shah Jahan and Aurangeab as will be seen in the following chapter. M S Commissariat, Imperial Mughal farmans in Gujarat" (Reprint), *Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic society*, Vol. IX, Pt-I, July 1940, pp 12-7.

war[1] (*pargana* Munjpur) in *ijara* on the basis of *sanads* of the imperial court (*asnadi-i* dargaati) and the former officials since sometime in past. The *sahu* paid Rs.1050/- inclusive of customary cesses, presumably on per annum basis to the *jagirdars*. The document further provides that the place be kept in *ijara* in Sahu's favour 'intact in accordance with the (previous) practice and make no change or alteration' therein.[2]

Another piece of information which is contained in the pages of the *Mirat*, is the *farman* of Emperor Aurangzeb (1676) dealing with specific situation in Gujarat. It appears that the practice of farming out lands to the *chaudharis* (*desais*) and *muqaddams* in the province was reported to the Emperor. It was pointed out that the practice led to the injustice and caused oppression of the *raiyat*. The emperor disapproved of the practice and issued an order to put a check upon it. It prohibitted the practice of *ijara* in *khalsa* and *jagir* lands. The *farman* makes it evident that

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1. ShanKheshwar, a village bordering Gulf of Kutch, had been for several centuries a *tirtha* for the Jains of Gujarat. There stood Jain temples belonging to the period of the document under reference. J. Burgess and H. Cousens, *Architectural Antiquities of Northern Gujarat*, London 1903 pp, 93-5.

2. MS Commissariat "Imperial Mughal *farmans*", *op cit*, Plate No. XIII.

ijara as a practice lay under official disapproval in general and in case the *ijaradar* happened to be intermediaries or the revenue officials it was disapproved strongly.[1] Evidently the practice had penetrated both into the *khalsa* and the *jagir* lands and the revenue officials as well as the intermediaries contracted *ijara* rights.

Practice of levying fixed sums of money for a given duration on a village would not really have been much different from the one of giving the revenues on *ijara*. In this and broader sense of the term, *ijara* was practised even after Aurangzeb's *farman* prohibitting the practice outright. From the *hasil* figures available for a number of villages[2] of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad it would appear that :---

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 292. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 234 & n, 235, N A Siddiqi, *op.cit.*, pp 94-6.

2. *Jama mawazi'*, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *PC* Nos.123-25; *mawazna pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, leaves Nos. 15, 19, 22, 44. The information for two or more consecutive years is available for 67 villages. No such fixed amount was realized from the remaining 52 villages for any number of years.

Village	Amount of *hasil* in rupees and years of receipt				
	1092 *fasli* (1684-85)	1093 *fasli* (1685-86)	1094 *fasli* (1686-87)	1095 *fasli* (1687-88)	1096 *fasli* (1688-89)
1. Churasma	3253/-	3253/-	3253/-	3253/-	3253/-
2. Darapur	1653/10	1653/10	1653/10	1653/10	1653/10
3. Lallapur	974/12	974/12	974/12	974/12	974/12
4. Andodra	167/14	167/14	167/14	167/14	167/14
5. Koba	1874/-	1874/-	1874/-	1770/-	1601/-
6. Kochrab	3749/-	3749/-	3749/-	3128/-	3220/-
7. Balhapur	471/-	471/-	471/-	496/-	506/-
8. Muzaffarpur	2461/4	2461/4	2461/15	2322/15	2300/-
9. Nawapura	2313/2	2313/2	2973/-	1453/-	?
10. Heerpur	189/11	189/11	150/-	150/-	125/-
11. Banodra	1562/8	1562/8	1787/8	1745/8	1150/-
12. Rahneb	190/-	1201/-	1351/-	1351/-	1351/-
13. Dhamanwan	6815/-	6990/-	7068/-	6825/-	6825/-
14. Dantali	1746/-	1771/-	1771/-	1572/-	1572/-
15. Budhathal	2510/-	2585/-	2585/-	2549/-	2285/-

: a fixed amount was realized from a number of villages, the duration of amount having remained fixed at the same figure, could range from two (sl.Nos.9-11, 13-15) to five years

(Sl.Nos.1 to 4). Secondly the amount could be refixed. In such cases the volume of fixed-amount could be more than the one realized during the immediately preceeding (Sl.Nos. 12, and 15) and the succeeding (Sl.Nos. 5, 6, 8, 10, 14 and 15) year. Likewise the amount so fixed, or refixed, could also be less than the ones realized during the immediately preceeding (Sl.No.13) as well the succeeding (Sl.Nos.7, 9, and 11) years. Also different amount could be fixed for the same village but for different sets of years (Sl.Nos. 10 and 14). Also the amount fixed for the next time (Sl.No. 10 for 1094, 1095 *fasli*, Sl. No.14 for 1095, 1096 *fasli*) could be less than the one fixed and realized earlier (Sl.No.10 for 1092 and 1093 *fasli*; Sl.No.14 for 1093, 1094 *fasli*). Finally, some exercise in calculations appears to have been made before fixing the amount which therefore doesnot seem to have been settled arbitrarily.

But the point remains as to who paid the amount so fixed? The practice of realizing fixed revenues existed there though it might not have prevailed every where: the information is available for 67 villages of which it is noticeable in the above mentioned 15 villages only.

From the preceding discussion it would appear that the jurisdictional authority of a *desai* extended to cover wider

areas as compared to that of *muqaddams*, sway of whose rights hardly extended beyond the boundries of a village. However, the *muqaddam* having deeper roots in the village community commanded more power within his limited area of operation in his own right than a *desai* whose power base lay in the patronage extended to him by the Mughals. The *desai* emerges more as a representative of the Mughals whereas the *muqaddam* looks more closely associated with the community. Also the *desais* who were in direct communication with the centre also, seem to have developed better working reala-tionship with the *jagirdars* as different from the *muqaddam* who emerge as espousing the cause of the revenue - payers. Similarly an *ijaradar*, an undesirable entrent imposed from above, seems to have had, in this capacity, no local power base.

CHAPTER IV

INTERMEDIARY ZAMINDARS

(1700 - 50)

The position and role of intermediary zamindars underwent a discernable change during the first half of the eighteenth century. The available evidence suggests that two stages of revenue arrangements, viz; assessment and the collection, by and large intermingled with each other. Accordingly the position of the intermediary zamindars who were associated with the process of assessment and collection of revenues affected and in turn was affected by the emerging pattern which is well reflected the way the state demand was fixed and realized. Though the emerging process and pattern of change is well marked, it does not seem to have been uniform all through the region as also for both the intermediaries - the *desai* and the *muqaddam*.

Before studying changes and highlighting the position it seems worthwhile to briefly outline the developments which relate to the process of assessment and collection of revenues, the main sphere of activity of intermediary zamindars.

Declining administrative control over the countryside coupled with increasing recalcitrance and accentuation

of the centripetal forces rendered the working of revenue machinery quite difficult.[1]

To allow its officials to combine powers, financial and executive, into one hand partly appears to be the imperial response to meet the challenge at local levels.[2] The attempt which seems to have met with some success initially does not appear to have proved a long lasting solution.[3] Particularly from the opening years of the fourth decade of the eighteenth century, these officials increasingly failed in the most basic task of effecting assessment and collection of revenues.[4]

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1. For increasing recalcitrance and activisation of the centripetal forces please see Chapter VII, Introduction to the present study & Chapters II and VI.

2. For details and references please see Introduction and Chapter II above; also see please *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II pp. 48, 94,103,105-7,117,145,147,165-6,188,192-3, 257, 264,284.

3. For the success please particularly see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II,pp. 94,165 and also *Ibid* II, p 6 read with *yad-dasht pargana* Dholqa, *op. cit*, *PC* nos 14-7. But such officials also resorted to exploitation of the *riaya*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi,* II, pp. 94,105.

4. These officials had to apply force for effecting assessment and collection (*Mirat-i Ahmadi* ,II pp. 50,165-6). It has been pointed out earlier that the strength commanded by them was increasingly found insufficient to meet the challenges faced by them. To cite few instances of their incapacity to perform the basic duties: Himmat Dil Khan, the patrolling *faujdar-amin* and *amil* of *pargana haveli*. Ahmedabad failed (1733-34) to effect assessment and collection of revenues; Jawanmard Khan Babi could not effect assessment (1732-33) in the *parganas* under his charge; Safdar Khan Babi (1732-33) too "was not able to assess" revenues in the *parganas* under his charge" *Ibid* II, pp. 105,107 172, 186;

Particularly from the fourth decade of the eighteenth century the very process of effecting assessment seems to have undergone a radical change. In the first place the expeditionary forces led by the Governor, or some other strong military commander came to effect assessment. Thought the expeditions were led even earlier [1], the *Mirat* speaks of the first such expedition which was led for the "assessment of *parganas*" in 1722 under the then *Nazims'* command.[2] The *Nazim* who moved around various parts of the *subah* reached Patan "for assessment and collection of revenues.[3] Later on (1727) Mubariz-ul mulk is also reported to have led military expedition for the assessment and collection of revenues, beside the tribute from zamindars.[4] During the subse-quent

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Also see please *Ibid* II pp 246-8; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad* MS. NO. 129 (By anonymous), Apparao Bhola Nath collection Ahmadabad, ff. 12-13; Rai Gobindas Kayath, MS No. 105 *op cit* ff 37, 43-4 47.

1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* specifies the expeditions which were generally led even earlies but for a different purpose-making administrative arrangements, establishing order, collecting *peshkash* from the noted recalcitrants and taking punitive actions and preventive steps. *Ibid*. I. pp. 324(1688) 325(1690),326(1691), 330(1694)381(1707) 383 (1708), 387 (1711), 394 (1712). 396 (1712-13), 397-98 (1713), 407 (1714), and passism.

2. *Ibid*, II p. 45; for a similar expedition led by *diwan-i subah* *Ibid* II . p 10.

3. *Ibid* II p 46

4. *Ibid* II p 93

years every *Nazim* had to lead expeditionary forces for the "assessment of *mal-i wajib* from "*malguzars*", beside collection of *peshkash* at the "time of harvesting season".[1] It thus shows that the local machinery of revenue administration had failed to carry out its duties, obviously in the face of opposition put up in the countryside. It may particularly be mentioned that the *Nazim* had to visit " every *pargana* " for assessment purposes.[2]

Secondly, the other zamindars, on a large scale, emerged as intermediaries between the villagers and the state.[3] The *banthadaran* as pointed out elsewhere[4] occupied *talpad* and *raiyati* lands. The *Mirat* states that "whenever the *Nazim* of the *subah* leads an army the *banthdaran* who utilize *talpad* present by way of *peshkash* worthy of that place[5] (i.e. *talpad* and *bantha*). As such the holders of *bantha* not only changed the nature of revenues from *mal-i wajib* to *peshkash* but also stepped into the shoes of the

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1. *Ibid*, II, pp 98-9 (1727), 110 (1729), 243-44 (1736), 246-47 (1737), 248(1738) 257 (1739), 259 (1739-40), 262 (1740-41), 265 (1741), 279.

2. *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p. 229.

3. For a detailed view please see discussion in the Chapters II and VI.

4. For details please see discussion in Chapters II and VI.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.p.174 *Ibid*, *Supplement* pp 228-9

intermediary zamindars.[1]

Thirdly, the basis of assessment (i.e capacity to pay) also appears to have been replaced by the capacity to extort. The *Mirat* observes that the *Nazims* led military expedition to capture revenues, the amount of which was determined " in accordance with his own strength and the exigency of the situation".[2] It may be appreciated with reference to the timings of leading expeditions (i.e. at the time of harvesting season) which would indicate that the earlier practice of calculating the state's share at the time or soon after the sowing season had, apparently been abandoned.

Thus the power of state to collect revenues increasingly deteriorated. It has been discussed in the Introduction that the productivity of the soil had not eroded but the volume of the revenue-receipts reaching provincial capital dwindled and each *Nazim* from the period of Sarbuland Khan onward was confronted with the difficulty of the paucity of funds. Further the revenues of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad

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1. But it was not invariably the case. There were villages in *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad where the *banthadaran* had not been able to bring whole area of the village under their control. Thus see for instance, *Mazruaat* documents for the villages bof Balad (1141 *fasli*) Palri kochrab (1142 *fasli*) *Taraf* Rakhyal *buzurg* (1143 *fasli*) *Taraf* Nazriat (1144 *fasli*) *Taraf* Daryapur (1144 *fasli*); R No 21 Pune Rakhiyal Khurd (1143 *fasli*), Runhasan (1137 *fasli*) Dantyal (1148 *fasli*) Dantiyali; (1149 *fasli*) Khoranj (1153 *fasli*) R Nos 22, Pune.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; *Supplement*, p 229 *Rasmala* p 394.

dropped to Rs. 2,34,734/- in 1727 and then to Rs. 49134/- in 1743 from Rs. 507134/- in the year 1714.[1]

Another set of information indicates a fall in the area actually cropped in *mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*, (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) between the years 1717-18 and 1742-43 for which the information is available.[2]

Years	Total cropped area (*Rabi* and *kharif*)	Total revenue receipt		Rise(+) and fall(-) in cropped area base year =1717-18	Rise (+) fall(-)in the reven. base year = 1717-18	Average amount/ *bigha*
	big-bis					
1717-8	673-10	4827	4	100	100	7.16
1718-19	630-7	4722	2	93.6 (-6.4)	97.9 (-2.1)	7.49
1721-22	703-18	2401	0	104.6 (+4.6)	49.8 (-50.6)	3.41
1729-30	411-0	2023	0	62.6 (-37.4)	41.9 (-57.1)	4.92
1742-43	359-0	668	0	53.3 (-46.7)	13.7 (-86.3)	1.81

1. *Mawazna subah* Gujarat *fis sinwat sarkar* Ahmadabad, *paragana haveli* 1122 *fasli* to 1135 *fasli*; *Yaddasht jamabandi dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1151 *fasli amal* Renkoji Pandit. The last document furnishes income of the villages under Marathas and other titled the same way furnishes details of income of the villages under Momin Khan, the Mughal *Subedar*. *P.C.*

2. *Mazruat mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*. *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad. *fasl-i kharif* 1126,1127,1130,1148 and 1151 *fasli*, *P.C.* Nos 110-29, 135; *Ibid* for *fasl-i rabi* for the same years R.No 37 Pune; *Mawazna subah* Gujarat *fis-sinwant sarkar* Ahmadabad, *pargana haveli* Ahmedabad 1122 to 1137 *fasli*; *Jamabandi dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif-o rabi* 1148 *fasli*; *yaddasht mal-i wajib*, Rakhyal *buzurg* 1151 *fasli P.C.*

Barring 1721-22 the area under actual cultivation fell every year so much so that it fell by 46.7 percent in 1742-43 as compared to the year 1717-8. But the fall in the cropped area may not be taken on its face value. It is because of the fact that the recorded information was furnished by the *muqaddam* for the last two years (1729-30 & 1742-3) and not by the *patwari* who furnished the same for the first three years.[1]

But, then, the volume of revenues actually received also fell by 86.3 percent in 1742-3 as compared to the year 1717-8. Also the per - *bigha* revenue collection which (calculated by dividing the amount by the area) comes to Rs. 7.16 per *bigha* (1717-8) fell to Rs. 1.81 per *bigha* only. Since no change in the crop pattern is noticeable, it may be taken to mean that the state's power to collect revenues even in the villages which were located in close proximity to the seat of provincial power, had deteriorated considerably i.e. the hold of the zamindars, and in the present and similar cases other intermediary zamindar, had considerably increased on the sources of revenue. The evidence in hand is too limited to indicate a general trend. However it suggests

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1. For a view of *muqaddam* stepping into the *patwari's* and *desai*'s shoes please see discussion under '*Patel*' in the following pages.

a sharper deterioration in the amount of revenues as compared to the noticed fall (even if the figures are taken on their face value) in the area under actual cultivation.

Not that the intermediary zamindars passed under the authority of the *banthadaran* who had forcibly occupied the *talpad* lands. The state itself superimposed over and above them another intermediary, the *ijarahdar*.

Ijarahdars:

It has been noted in the previous Chapter that the *ijarahdar* exercised contracted rights over a specified source of revenue for stipulated period of time. *Ijarahdar's* income depended on the difference between the amount actually collected and the amount paid, the latter i.e. the contracted sum, generally happened to be a fixed amount which was determined in advance.[1] During the period (1700-50) some significant changes are noticeable in the role and position of *ijarahdars*.

In spite of remaining distasteful to the reigning emperor, the practice of farming revenues did continue

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II pp. 56-7 103, 107, 135 145 165-6 172,186,248; N.A. Siddiqi, *op.cit.* pp 93-4.

during the period.[1] Though specific information about the practice for Mughal Gujarat is not available for the first two decades of the century, the *ijarahdari* however seems to have been practiced even during these years.[2] From the available information it would appear that *ijarah* came to be contracted on a larger scale, particularly during the third and the fourth decade of the century.

During the period new sources of revenues such as imposts on fords and passages, tax collection office of miscellaneous duties (city of Ahmadabad), offices of *zakat*, *faujdari* and *mahal paibaqi* in addition to land revenue (*khalsa* and *jagir*) inclusive of *peshkash* from zamindars came to be contracted by *ijarahdars*.[3]

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1. It is reported that strict rules and regulations for transacting business in all departments were disregarded since the reign of Jahandar Shah. Under his successor the entire administration was thrown into confusion. Continuation of *ijarah* on a much wider scale in the empire during the early years of Mohammad Shah's reign is attested by Nizam-ul mulk's proposal (1721) requesting the emperor to abolish the practice. But *Wazir*'s scheme could not materialize and the practice continued even during rest of period. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, pp. 378-80; *Sahih-ul Akhbar*, Elliot and Downson, VIII p. 315; Irvine, *Later Mughals*. p.375 NA Siddiqi *op.cit* pp. 93-8.

2. According to the author of *Mirat-i Mustafabad* "the places situated far off the head quarter (of *sarkar* Soreth i.e. Junagadh) were farmed out" even during this period. *Ibid* p. 379.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 50 56 103 106-7 117 135 141 145 165-7, 183-4, 192-3, 197 *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f 79; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp 262-3, 267-8, 272-4, 276-80

The *ijarah* was usually contracted for a specified duration but sometimes no such time limit was imposed.[1] In view of the nature of source of revenue the *ijarah* could be contracted on daily basis, for a crop season and a year which, if agreed to, could be renewed for another term.[2]

A significant development of the period is that the adherence to the terms and conditions came to be depended on the relative strength of the contracting parties. Maharaja Abhay Singh (1733) terminated the *ijarah* contract with Momin Khan before its expiry as the *ijarahdar* had invited his displeasure and, therefore, the rights were transferred to another *ijaradar* on similar terms and conditions.[3] The Maharaja's *naib* however failed to force another *ijarahdar* to surrender his rights which he continued to enjoy even after the expiry of the stipulated period.[4] Similarly Sher Khan

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1. The *faujdar* of Dholqa (*Sarkar* Ahmadabad) is reported to have given away villages on *ijara* to *girasias* in " perpetuity (*b'tariq-i istamrari)* as a result "fertile places went into their possessions which implied sale to them". (*qiryat-i jeed b'tasarruf an ha raft k' dar ma'ni farokhtan bud.*) *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 97.

2. Office of miscellaneous duties was farmed out on daily basis, Jawanmard Khan Babi held a few *parganas* only for a year. Some other *parganas* which were held by one noble in one year, were farmed out to another the following year,. For the same and similar references, please see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; II pp. 103, 106-7, 115, 141, 167, 183-4.

3. *Ibid* II pp 183-4.

4. *Ibid* II pp 192-93

Babi managed to retain the office of *Naib-faujdar* (*Sarkar*-Soreth) which he held by way of *ijarah* against the wishes of the *faujdar-ijarahdar* at imperial court.[1] One of the *ijarah-dars*, relatively a weaker person (*peshkar*), who failed to pay the contracted amount due to losses suffered by him, was imprisoned by the *Subedar*.[2] But Safdar Khan Babi, a strong noble of the region successfully disregarded (1734-35) the terms of contract. He did not pay the contracted sum and escaped any action against him.[3]

Territorial boundries of *ijarahdars* ranged between wide limits. Extending from a specific source of revenue of a given place, or a portion of village, it could cover an entire village, group of villages, a *pargana*, group of *parganas* and even an entire *sarkar*.[4]

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1. *Ibid* II p 102

2. *Ibid*I pp 107-8

3. *Ibid* II pp 167,172,186; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 83; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f. 13. Safdar Khan Babi had on his own volition withdrawn before the expiry of the term, thus terminating the contract on his own.

4. *Faujdar* of Dholga had given villages on *ijarah*; Jiwan Chughal, a *seth* & money lendar, had acquired *parganas* of Dholqa, Bharuch Jamusar and Maqbulabad on *ijarah*; Jawanmard Khan Babi, Momin khan and Safdar khan Babi contracted *ijarah* nights which extended from a single *pargana* to a group of *paraganas*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 56 97 107 135 145 167 172 183-4 186 192-3; Document entitled *mawaziat-i ijarah pargana haveli* Ahmadabad fasl-i kharif-o rabi R.No. 21 Pune; *Ibid* R No 31.

Excepting Jiwan Chughal, a *seth* who had contracted *ijarah* for four *parganas* (1725) the *ijara* rights over vast tracts seem to have been contracted by influential nobles of the region holding the offices of *Mutasaddi* of port (Port officer), *faujdar* and *naib- faujdars* and commanding power.[1] Initially the members of mercantile class like money lenders, businessmen, petty traders also contracted *ijarah* rights over the revenues accruing from the sources situated in and around Ahmadabad.[2] But the *girasias, patels* and some other zamindars appear to be more numerous among the *ijarahdars,* exercising the rights directly as *ijarahdar* or else, as *sub-ijarahdars.*[3]

The income of the *ijarahdars* depended on the difference between the amount contracted (or paid) and actually col-

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi,* II pp 50 103, 107, 116,135,145 167,172,183-4 186; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad,* f.13; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat,* f.83

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi,* II pp 56 97 141 145 *PC* No 279 *Rasmala* p 9; *Mirat-i Mustafabad,* p 136 *Yaddasht-pargana haveli* Ahmadabad *ijarahdaran* (1727) Pune R.No 37

3. *Yad-dasht : pargana* Petlad, R.No 57 Pune; *Yad-dasht - ijarahdaran, Sarkar* Ahmadabad R.No.67 Pune. On peninsular Gujarat the zamindars are reported to have acted as *sub-ijarahdars* ; Leading superior zamindars like the ones of Bhaonagar and Chhhaiyan contracted such rights, towards the south of Ahmadabad (on main land Gujarat) *desias* were found to be the main beneficiaries of the practice. *Rasmala* pp 402-4 *Mirat-i Mustafabad* pp 123 136 152 451; *Bombay Gazetteer* VII, pp 147 294 *Ibid* (Kaira) p 89 *Gazetteer of Bhavnagar* p 87; Baden Powell, Land System III pp 286-7.

lected.[1] The *ijarhdar* would therefore endeavour to maximise the collections and, or minimize the remittance for making profits within the logical limits. Since the available sources do not specify the amount it is hardly possible to form a tenable view. But the fact that the same person could contract *ijarah* rights repeatedly suggests that the *ijarahdar* must have made profits. According to the works of later date the *desais* who had contracted *ijarah* right in southern Gujarat were found in a state of opulence.[2] Some *patels* in the same region were found to have lost their positions to the *ijarahdar-desais* who had stepped into the shoes of village headman.[3] Some *desais* and the *patels* later on claimed ownership rights over the lands which they had continuously held on *ijarah*.[4] In *pargana* Dholqa *ijarahdars* seem to have virtually turned into land owners.[5] As regards the impact of the *ijarahdari* emperor Aurangzeb had observed that 'tyranny and oppressions are caused to *riaya* in various

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1. N.A. Siddiqi *op cit* pp 93-4
2. *Bombay Gazetteer*, pp. 57, 215-16.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid*, II 57, 215-16, 484, 486.
5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 97

ways".[1] But the nature, extent and magnitude of the oppressive acts are, however, not known.

But, then, the *ijarahdari* was not necessarily a profitable job for all the *ijarahdars* and for all the times. A *peshkar* of a Mughal noble retained the *ijarah* rights after his master's death. He "failed to pay the amount" and was consequently imprisoned.[2] Jawanmand Khan Babi also ran into deficit towards *Naib-Subedar* Bhandari's men. He too failed to pay the contracted amount. He was therefore obliged to undertake the responsibility of paying salary to the soldiers of the *naib-subedar's* establishment. The Babi chief tried to extort money from the Rathod zamindar of Idar for liberating himself of the burden but failed miserably and could not absolve himself of the responsibility.[3] Similarly Safdar Khan Babi "fearing and foreseeing heavy losses" withdrew his hands from the *parganas* he held on *ijara*. He too escaped any action.[4]

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1. *Ibid* II p 292. For a different view, see *The Risala-i Zira't* in Harbans Mukhia's *Perspectives on Medieval History*, Vikas, 1993, pp. 272,277-80

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 107-8

3. *Ibid*, II pp 167, 172; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f 83. *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f 13; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p 242.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, p 186, *Mirat-i Mustafabad* p 242

Causes of reported losses suffered by the leading *ijarahdars* may be tentatively suggested on the basis of available evidence. The *peshkar-ijarahdar* was not powerful enough to effect collections presumably due to his inability to force the revenue-paying sections of agrarian community to surrender the state's claim.[1] Jawanmard Khan Babi too had not been able to collect revenues, presumably due to his inability to subdue the concerned section of society for paying revenues under the prevailing situation.[2] Likewise Safdar Khan Babi failed even to assess the claim under the prevailing circumstances and particularly due to Maratha disturbances in and around the *parganas* held by him on *ijarah*.[3]

After the two leading nobles of the region had suffered losses (1734-35) any reference to the Mughal officials in regard to contracting *ijarah* rights is conspicuous by its absence in the available sources. Their inability might have served as an eye-opener for others also. Moreover, the failure of officials- turned-*ijarahdars*, the strong and obvious representative of Mughal administration, further

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 107
2. *Ibid* II pp 167, 172; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f, 83
3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 186

attest to the increasing inability of the administration in dealing with the zamindars and the revenue paying sections of the agrarian society.

From this discussion it would appear that the state along with its official-*ijarahrdas* was losing control over the sources of revenue. The administrative apparatus gradually lost its organizational cohesion and effectiveness which, for all practical purposes seem to have ceased to exist. As a corollary of these developments the established intermediary zamindars, the backbone of Mughal revenue machinery, came to assume different a position which came to be determined by their ability to survive the vicissitudes and manage their affairs in their own right. In the following pages an attempt is made to ascertain the emerging position of the established intermediary zamindars in the above discussed context which, to a great extent, speaks of general changes that had been taking place in their position.

The *desai*:

It has been discussed in the preceding Chapter that the *desai* was basically associated with the task of revenue assessment and also required to superintend the revenue-collection with the active assistance of *muqaddam* who commanded influence at the grass-root level. The *desais*, by

and large, were associated with the state and their main source of strength lay in the support the administration extended to them. Generally they belonged to the educated section of such upper castes which do not seem to have wielded arms.

The very fact that military expeditions had to be led for effecting assessment of revenues indicates that the *desais* position had been rendered ineffective. Since the revenues came to be determined 'in accordance with' the *Nazim's* 'strength' and 'exigency' of situation the position of *desai* would appear to have turned all the more meaningless. Besides, many Superior and the Primary zamindars had successfully captured *raiyati* and *talpad* lands and thus established their hold over the *raiyat* whose affairs otherwise, fell within the *desais* jurisdiction. In their attempts many a zamindars emerged as intermediaries thus replacing the *desai* by the authority of their own.[1] The available evidence suggests that a number of *desais* territorial jurisdiction shrank and even within the curtailed area of jurisdiction, their authority was rendered ineffective.

The available evidence suggests that some of the *desais* proved instrumental in the zamindar's endeavours to extend their sway. The Rana of Porbandar is reported to have

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1. For details please see discussion in Chapters II & VI.

'bribed' the *desai* of *pargana* Mangrole (*Sarkar* Soreth) so as to get the latter's consent for the occupation (1725) of Madhopur - a dependency of Mangrole.[1] The *desai* of Junagadh had also assisted one Kunwar Vibhaji of Gondal in his attempt at taking possession of Bhajarvada (*pargana* Junagadh) in the year 1735.[2] The *desais* of Idar had helped the Rathod brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh in their endeavour to establish their personal rule at Idar.[3] The *desai* of Bhaonagar assisted zamindar of the place in his moves for capturing Mughal lands around his possession.[4]

It may however be pointed out that the *desai* did not necessarily lose his position in such territories which passed into the control of the *zamindars*.[5] Possibly the *desai* of such territories might have come to enjoy a subordinate position under the occupant zamindars.

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1. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, f 97

2. *Ibid.*, f 103

3. For details and references please see 'Raja of Idar', Chapter VII below.

4. J.W. Watson. "Historical Sketch of the town of Ghoga" pp 284-5. The town of Mangrole was first captured by the Marathas who were later on expelled by the *qasbati* soldiers. Finally it was occupied by the *nawab* of Junagadh. The *desais* however continued to enjoy their share all through these years. *Tarikh-i Soreth*, ff 52-3.

5. *Tarikh-i Soreth*. ff 59-60; *Junagadh* SC No 1042, (*mahal* Seel).

But, then, all the *raiyati* areas were not occupied by the zamindars. The *mazruat* documents testify the continuity of the *raiyati* lands outside the sway of the *banthadaran*.[1] Later the Marathas as well as the British found *talpad* lands which had remained outside the control of the holders of *bantha* lands.[2]

But in the areas which continuously remained under the direct control of the provincial authorities the *desais* gave way to the *muqaddams*. According to the *Account*, services of the *desais* and the *amins* were dispensed with by the *muqaddams* who themselves, for all practical purposes, acted as the assessment authorities in their stead.[3] The *muqaddams*, moreover, disallowed the *desais* to prepare and maintain the accounts which were to be furnished to the office of *diwan-i subah* and the imperial centre.[4] Besides, the competent *desais* who were well versed in rules and regulations of the

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1. Please see, for instance *mazruat* documents for the villages of Khoranj (1123 *fasli*), Rakhyal *buzurg* (1121, 1126, 1127, 1130, 1148, 1151 *fasli*) Mahej (1146,1149 *fasli*), Nawagam (1147 *fasli*) Bajhol (1151 *fasli*). *PC* Nos 91,93, 101, 110-30, 137-51, 153-9, 162-64, 205-18.

2. For references and details please see Chapter VI below.

3. Account ff 17a-7b It states that *muqaddam-i parganat khudra amin qarar dade w anha ra dar salah kar-i tashkhis muattal karde and*. During the post 1735 period references to the *desais* in *ganwat* deeds disappear. *Naql ganwat az qarar*, dt.24 Jamadi I, 28 R.Y. (Muhammad Shah), *PC* No.64.

4. *Account*, f 17b

state died and *desaigiri* in many places came to be held by incompetent persons, presumably by some new entrants.[1] The *desais* failed to furnish accounts of revenues to the administration.[2] A number of them could not get the *desaigiri* allowance and therefore they failed to pay the *peshkash-inizamat* and *peashkash-i sarkar-i wala* which stood in arrears almost against each of the *desai* of *Sarkar* Ahmadabad during the third decade of the eighteenth century.[3] As such the *desais* appear to have lost their positions to the *muqaddams* at village level, particularly within the areas which could be retained by the *Nazims* under their direct control.

It may, however, be seen that the *desais* did not suffer similar set backs every where.[4] As per the evidence available for the *nawabi* territory of Junagadh the *desais* continuously enjoyed the *desaigiri*, *pusaita* lands and *ina'm* pos-

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1. *Ibid* f 17a.

2. *Ibid* f 17b Instead the information were furnished by the *muqaddams*. *Yadasht haqiqat mawza* Rakhyal *khurd bamujib Navisanide* Udai Karan *muqaddam PC* No 136

3. *Account.f.* 17a; for further details *Ibid* ff 174b 203b 213a,214b,218b,241a,274b 299b.

4. The *desai* of Viramgaon held the position of '*madar-i kar* (chief of affairs) and his wishes were honoured in making appointments in the *pargana*. According to the *Mirat* 'dis-affection existed between the *desai* and Jawanmard Khan, the *faujdar*. As the *desai* was *madar-i kar*, the administrative matters became chaotic. The *naib subedar*, therefore, appointed Sher Khan as *naib faujdar* because 'he was in concord with *desai*. '*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp 16, 166-7.

session which were granted to them from Akbar to Muhammad Shah and later on renewed by the *Nawabs* who also added extra favours.[1] Similarly works of later date speak of their continuity in the *nawabi* territories of Bharauch, Radhanpur Palanpur and Balasinor (Barasinwra).[2]

The available evidence also suggests that some of the *desais* not merely managed their survival out of the fluid state of affairs but also made fortunes.

Some *desais* contracted *ijarah* rights. Dayanat Ram *desai* (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) contracted the *desaigiri* and *pusaita* rights of another *desai* for a sum of Rs 41/ on annual basis for two *fasli* years 1138 and 1139 (1730-31 and 1731-32).[3] Some other *desais* of the same *pargana* held *mawza*

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1. Beside the references (Junagadh SC) cited in Chapter III under *desai* and in Chapter V under *ina'm* please also see *Junagadh* SC No 1042 (*mahal* Seel) SC NO 688 EX (8/8 *mahal* Una) SC NO 1195 ex 1 (*mahal* Babariawar) SC No 148 EX7 and 780 ex 4/3 (*mahal* Sutrapara) SC No 393 ex 12/4 and 389 (*mahal* Junagadh) SC No 1124 *mahal* Kutiyana.

2. Register (Jild) "*Karparbhari*" at *Nawab's* house Radhanpur. *Bombay Gazetteer* II pp 484-6 Mr. Asstt. Collector Pyne's *Representation* (1827) on Balasinor; *Indian Economist*, p.212; *Bombay Govt Revenue selection* III p 649 In the *nawabi* lands of Radhanpur and Palanpur the *desais* held the charge of revenue affairs and they were designated as *karparbhari* Gujarati version of Persian expression *madar-i kar*, the chief of affairs.

3. *P C* No 279

Tirwara and Faridabad (1729-31) in *ijarah.*[1]

The *desais* in *pargana* Viramgaon appeared to have withheld the revenues of the villages under them sometimes during the *Subedari* of Ghaziuddin Khan. The *Subedar* is therefore reflected to have collected *khichri* instead.[2] The *desais* in some parts of *sarkar* Surat (which later on constituted the *nawabi* of Surat) remitted revenues as and when forced to do so.[3] Later on the British also noted that the *desais* in (the *nawabi* territory of) Balasinor "exercised the functions of the *patel.*[4] Some of the *desais* of *pargana*

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1. *Yad-dasht haqiqat dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad *dehat-i ijarah* R No 37 Pune. Regarding the period 1760--1810 the Brithsh observed about south Gujarat that *desais* were more than a Government Servant" and were established as *ijarahdars* and had divided villages amongst themselves and all were called *desais* " *Bombay Gazetteer* II pp 57 215-16; The *desais* of *pargana* Idar and Viramgaon came into clash with the *qasbatis* of the place presumably because both of them acted as *ijarahdars. Rasmala.* pp 345-47. See also *English Documents*, p 8; *Tarikh-i Soreth*,.f.54; *Mirat-i Ahmadi.* II p 114.

2. *Nazar-i peshkash-o Khichri waghaira, PC* No p 29.

3. *English Documents* p 15 In this region the Marathas had acquired predominant position and the *desais* seem to have aligned themselves with them.

4. Mr Asst Collector Pyne's *Representation* (1827) on Balasinor. In Surat region many a *desais* had also grabbed *patelship.* According to the British findings the *desais* at times found the *patels* incapable of paying the arbitrarily enhanced government demand. Then the *desais* advanced credit (*manoti*) to the peasantry at exorbitant rates of interest and thus put aside the agency of *patel* between themselves and the peasantry. The *patels* were forced to sell out the *majmua* lands the symbol of their headship. *Bombay Rev Sel* III p 649; *Indian Economist*, p 212 It must however be kept in mind that the English disliked the *desais* from the very

haveli Junagadh (*Sarkar* Soreth) turned "*muqtai*" and paid a fixed amount to Maharaja Ajeet Singh, the *Subedar*.[1] The *desais* of *pargana* Mangrole (*Sarkar* Soreth) paid 75000 *mehmudis* presumably on the non-zamindari lands of the *pargana* under them during the *Subedari* of Muizuddawla.[2]

Some information regarding the *desai*'s relationship with other zamindars is also available. It has already been pointed out that the *desais* of Mangrole and Junagadh had helped the Rana of Porbandar and Vibhaji of Gondal against the imperial cause. But the *desai* of Viramgaon misrepresented the case of Arjun Singh, the zamindar of Wadhawan (*pargana* Viramgaon) before the *subedar*.[3] The *desais* of Idar had attempted to reinstall the ousted zamindar at the *gaddi* sometime during second decade of the eighteenth century.[4] The *desai* of Bhaonagar mediated between the (*nawab*) *mutasaddi* of Surat, *Subedar* of Gujarat, Marathas and *faujdar* of

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beginning of their rule in the region.

1. *Peshkash docs PC* No 31 cf *Ibid PC* No 13 Later on the British noted that *desais* in *pargana* Bharauch claimed the rights and position of '*zamindars*'. The investigations conducted by them revealed that *desais* had utilized their position as " man of capital and government servants to bring into their hands large areas of valuable lands". *Bombay Gazetteer* II, pp 484, 486.

2. *Peshkash* Docs, *PC* No. 33; cf. *Ibid*, *PC* No 16.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 93-4.

4. *Rasmala*, p 346

Junagadh and Rawal Bhao Singh. The *desai* also assisted the Rao of Sehore in the foundation of the town of Bhaonagar and managed to obtain a grant of certain rights in the port of Ghoga.[1]

There is evidence to show that the *desais* did not lend support to the Marathas, though it was not invariably the case. The *desais* of Baroda did not help the Marathas in the realization of revenues when ordered by a revel, *Naib-Subedar* Hamid Khan to do so.[2] Likewise the *desais* of Surat region (1735) were imprisoned by the Marathas on the ground of their non-coperation with them.[3] The *desai* of Viramgaon had first put up armed resistance against the Marathas on his own volition but when he lost trust in the Mughal *Subedar* he helped them capture the place.[4]

The *desais* appear to have made money by levying taxes and making encroachments. According to a complaint received by the Marathas (1753) the *desai* of *pargana* Bulsar (*Sarkar* Surat) expropriated revenues of the villages which Sadat

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1. J.W.Watson, " Historical sketch of the town of Ghoga" pp 284-85

2. *English Documents*, p 3

3. *Ibid* p 15

4. Later on he expelled the Maratha garrison from the town and occupied the place for himself. For references and details please see discussion below.

Khan, a Mughal *jagirdar*, held in his *jagir*.[1] The *desai* of *pargana* Baroda levied *salami* from the *madad-i ma'sh* possessions in the area.[2] It seems the *desais* tried to make use of their position if and when it was found feasible.

Some of the *desais* amassed considerable amounts of money. Rawal Bhao Singh of Bhaonagar plundered the wealth and confiscated property of the *desai* who had grown very wealthy.[3] Ratan Singh, *Naib-Subedar* under Maharaja Abhay Singh "since long had in view" Udai Karan *desai's* "wealth and riches". He is reported to have always waited for an opportunity to confiscate it.[4] Sunder Wagji *desai* of Bulsar (*Sarkar* Surat) possessed not less than 13 domestic slaves (*gharchi ghulam*), a few villages and certain *bighas* of lands.[5]

While the *desais* of some places protected and promoted their interests by rendering assistance to others, the *desai*

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1. *Selections From Satara Raja and Peshwa Diaries*, II Balaji Baji Rao Peshwa, II pp 118-19

2. *Historical Selections From Baroda State Records I (1724-68)* p 121

3. J W Watson *op cit* pp 284-5

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 166-7

5. *Selections From Satara Raja and Peshwa Diaries* II p 194

of Bairamgam (Viramgaon)[1] acting independently laid foundation of his dynastic rule as a Superior Zamindar. The *desai* cashed upon the disorderly situation created by Maratha presence in the *subah* and utilizing his own sources of strength turned from the *desai* of *pargana* Viramgaon into the Thakur of Patdi.

Bhao Singh, the *desai* of *pargana* Viramgaon, was a wealthy and influential person holding a key position in the affairs (*madar-i kaar*) of the *pargana*.[2] Ratan Singh Bhandari, deputy *Nazim* of the *subah*, with an eye on *desai*'s wealth, deputed a special *faujdar* to bring the latter to Ahmadabad. While coming to Ahmadabad he came to know of Bhandari's intentions and with the cooperation of the sure-

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1. Viramgaon was a *pargana* of *sarkar* Ahmadabad. It mainly consisted of the posessions of Jhala Rajputs and the Kolis. The town is situated in the north of Ahmadabad.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p. 116. Bhao Singh's family Kavda Kunbi by caste is said to have come from Champaner, settled at Viramgaon in the 16th century ,first as *patel* and afterwards under Aurangzeb as *desai* rose to the wealth and importance. Bombay Gazetteer, IV, pp 348, 354n. According to *Mirat-i Ahmadi*,(II,p.64) the populace of Viramgaon while Rengoji put armed pressure, arranged on the advice of Udai Karan, the *desai* that the place should buy off the enemy with a payment of Rs. 3,50,000. The *desai* had, however, with much foresight secured from the people a contribution over and above what was required for the *Khandni* (the security money) and with the help of that surplus a fortification was built around the town for its protection. Strangely enough, Marathas did not take possession of the place at that time.

ties (*bandharis*) he secured his release.[1] The next year (1733), Ratan Singh appointed a Marwari as the *faujdar* of Viramgaon in place of Sher Khan Babi. But Bhao Singh distrusting the Marwari, sent a secret message to Damaji Gaekwad at Dholka, inviting him to take possession of Viramgaon.

The Maratha chief was admitted to the town while the *qasbatis* who were opposed to the *desai* and had also killed Udai Karan Desai, father of Bhao Singh, were driven out.[2] During the following months, in the year 1734, Ratan Singh Bhandari, *Naib Nazim* laid siege to the city but he failed to capture it.[3]

In the year 1740, Bhao Singh finding the Maratha garrisons troublesome, engaged a body of Arabs and Rohillas and expelled the Marathas.[4] The gates were closed and provisions and war materials were collected for the city's defence. Rangoji and the then *Nazim* Momin Khan having agreed to a

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 166-7.

2. *Ibid.*, II p. 188 also *Ibid*, II p.116. Salabat Muhammad Khan was deputed by the *Nazim* to investigate the death of Udai Karan who had been murdered by a *qasbati*. But the Khan died of cholera while en route to Viramgaon. No action, even subsequently, was taken against the *qasbati* who like at Idar were at dagger's drawn with the *desai*.

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 188-9; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 452.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*(II, p. 261) states that "Bhao Singh was tired of the rascality of a batch of Marathas".

joint investment of Viramgaon proceeded with their forces to that town and the siege began. After a month's progress, Momin Khan left for collecting *peshkash* from the *Subah*. Rangoji had to carry on the operation alone. Meanwhile, the Arab and Rohilla mercenaries of the *desai* made demands for the arrears of their pay and Bhao Singh, being unable to satisfy them immediately, and fearing their desertion thought it advisable to bring the matter to an end. It was agreed with Rangoji that the fort of Patdi with several dependent villages on the Rann of Kuchh would be handed over to him while the town of Viramgaon with the rest of the *pargana* was restored to the Marathas.[1] From the year (1740) Patdi came under the Patidar family of the *desai* of Viramgaon where he ruled as Thakur.[2]

It may be seen that the *desai* who held a key position (*madar-i kaar*) in the affairs of Viramgaon and had defended the town even from the Marathas was forced by Ratan Singh Bhandari to befriend the ones i.e. Marathas, whom he had regarded as enemies. Again, as he could not pull on well with his new ally and the prevailing state of affairs per-

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 261-2; *Bombay Gazetteer*, V, pp. 348-54; M S Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 452n and 474.

2. M S Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II pp.452 and n, 474. The rule of *desai* is reported to have lasted for 200 years or so.

mitted him, he turned against both, the Marathas as well as the Mughals. The *desai* purchased the services of mercenaries and put himself in a bargaining position. As a result, he was allowed to establish his authority at Patdi, a place though fertile but not as strategic as the town of Viramgaon.

It would thus appear that the effect of changing political milieu had not been similar on all the *desais* of the region. Generally the areas which were carved out as *nawabis* from the Mughal empire and the areas wherein they had come to enjoy Maratha confidence, the *desais* appear to have managed their survival and putting the power of purse and their official position to effective use, they made fortunes. In these regions the *desais* also acquired *patelhood*. But in other areas where the Mughal authority had weakened and was not replaced by the Marathas or else by strong noble, the *desais* suffered set backs, particularly in the central parts of Gujarat and generally at *patel's* hands.

The *Muqaddam* :

Some significant changes in the *Muqaddam's* position vis a vis Mughal administration and the village community are discernable during the first half of the eighteenth century. The ***muqaddams'*** main strength lay more in their being the men of the village community than in their semi- official posi-

tion. In their capacity as representatives of village community they acted as check on and assisted the *desais*, *amils* and *amins* in the sphere of assessment and collection of revenues. With a decline in the administrative control the position of *desai* and the state officials', was rendered vulnerable which the *muqaddams* seem to have capitalized on for combining the rights to assess and collect revenues into their own hands. But the pattern of change was not uniform everywhere and at all times. Many a *muqaddam* suffered substantially in his power and position at the hands of other zamindars. In the following pages an attempt is made to highlight the changes which originated or acquired momentum during the first half of the eighteenth century.

It has been discussed in the preceding pages that some of the *desais* acquired *patelhood* in addition to holding *desaigiri* in the southern parts of Gujarat - the region which formed part of the *nawabis* of port towns and also where the Marathas' control was firmly and finally established relatively from an early date.[1] Also the *patels* seem to have suffered in the areas which passed out of direct

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1. For the *nawabi* areas please see discussion under *Nawabs* of Surat, Bharuch and Khambat, Chapter VII below; for Maratha dominance see discussion under Struggle for Supremacy, Introduction to the present study.

Mughal authority and were occupied by the zamindars.[1] For want of detailed information it is difficult to ascertain the *Muqaddam's* position in the areas which other zamindars had come to occupy. In all probability the *muqaddams* lost their independent position in these areas but appear to have continued in a subordinate position.[2]

Some piece of informations indicating the *muqaddam's* sufferings at the hands of state officials are also contained in the pages of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*.

The *muqaddams* and villagers of Dabhali lost everything, including their lives on account of a quarrel which took place (1721-22) between them and the *Subedar's* army due to 'trangression of some vagabonds' in the army. The *Subedar* put the village to fire and killed every one of them, so much so that 'there did not remain any trace of population. The *Muqaddam's* effort to avert the clash went in vain.[3]

The *muqaddams* and the *riaya* of *pargana* Dholqa had to face 'rascality' of the *amil-faujder*. Alongwith the *riaya*

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1. For the details of encroachments Chapters II and VI

2. As per the contents of the Kunbi song which was sung by the wives of cultivators (Kunbis) the *muqaddam* (*mukhi*) of the village used to call on the zamindar in connection with assessment and collection of revenues in the company of village *patwari*, known as *tallati* in Gujarat. *Rasmala* pp 543-5. Also see *Mirat* (II.p.94) for the revenues being paid by the zamindar himself during the *Subedari* of Sarbuland Khan.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 44-5

they protested against the oppressive official before the *Subedar* (1726) Mubariz-ul mulk Sarbuland Khan.[1] The *muqadams* and *riaya* of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad abandoned their villages and fled into jungles (1728) in protest against the *amil-amin-faujdar* who seems to have demanded more revenues than due.[2]

In the instances cited above the *muqaddams'* sufferings seem to have been linked with their position as representative of the village community. But the *muqaddam* of Padra (*pargana haveli* Baroda) had to save his skin from Maharaja Abhay Singh whose greedy eyes had fallen on his personal wealth.[3] The *muqaddam* of Nadiad was arrested by the *Subedar* (1743) who badly needed money and suspected that the *muqaddam* had enough money.[4] Likewise the *muqaddam* of Vasa (Baso, *pargana* Petlad) lost his wealth and life at the hands of the *Subedar's* men who had grown jealous of his wealth and emi-

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1. *Ibid* II p 94. The work does not elaborate the 'rascality' of the official.

2. *Ibid* II p 105. Though the oppressive official was replaced by another person who conciliated them by effecting proper assessment. But the *Subedar* came with an additional demand of Rs. 10,000/- even though "there was no scope for an addition on the *pargana*. The demand was met forcibly. *Ibid* II p 106.

3. *Ibid* II pp.143-4

4. *Ibid* II p 284

nance.[1]

Some other *muqaddams* also suffered as they refused to co-operate with the Marathas. During (the defacto *Subedar*')Hamid Khan's period of administration *muqaddams* of some places in south Gujarat were imprisoned by the Marathas for their refusal to pay the revenues demanded by them as ordered by the Khan.[2]

The evidence cited above though limited in quantity and scope however indicates that the *muqaddam's* was not a docile leadership for they did not obey command all the time. It would further appear from the following discussion that *muqaddams* strengthened their own hold over the countryside in consequence of their apparent endeavors to remove the watch dog of imperial interests in the villages, presumably with the support of their own power base.

It has been submitted above that the assessment of revenues gradually came to be effected by the expeditionary forces. Such a course of action seems to be the outcome of increasing and increased defiance on the part of intermediary zamindars, whether encroachers or legitimate, or both. Available evidence suggests that the *muqaddams* were amongst the defiants.

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1. *Ibid* II pp 505-6

2. *English Documents* pp 3, 15.

Commenting on the general situation prevailing during the fourth and fifth decade of the eighteenth century, the *Account* states that the *muqaddams* of villages have ousted *desais* from their respective possessions. Besides they are also reported to have assumed the positions of *amin* and effected assessment on their own.[1]

Though the evidence casting light on the ways the *muqaddams* grabbed the postions is not available.[2] However it seems that having lost the effective administrative backing the *amin* and *desais* failed to stand in their own right against the *muqaddams* who seem to have enjoyed support of the villagers under them.

Beside assuming the power to assess revenues in their own right the *muqaddams* also assumed the powers of *desais'-gumashtas* (agents) who were there to prepare and furnish detailed accounts at village level for furnishing the same

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1. *Account* f 17b For details showing *muqaddams* as assessment authority please see discussion in the following lines.

2. The *muqaddam* of Nadiad was assigned the task of assessing and collecting various illegal exactions in *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad (1739-40) without acquiring any other designation under the immediate authority of the Governor. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 260. Later on one Pani a *muqaddam* is noticed as holding the position of *amin* in *pargana* Petlad. *Ibid* II p 441

to the *desais* for onward transmission.[1] Many a *muqaddam* refused even to furnish the accounts which had thus came to be prepared by them.[2]

The *muqaddams*, it appears made a conscious effort to deprive the state of the knowledge of actual details of cultivation in the villages. But at times by stepping into the *patwari*'s shoes and furnishing the details under their own authority, the *muqaddams* seem to have endeavored to replace him and place themselves as a direct link with the state.[3]

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1. *Account* f 17a. Some *muqaddams* are noticed as furnishing accounts in actual practice. Muhammad Iraj, *faujdar-amin* of Dholqa is reported to have produced *muqaddams* and *desais* for submission of accounts before Sarbuland Khan. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 94). *Muqaddams* of Petlad are also reported to have presented themselves for inspection of accounts when the same *Subedar* was leading a military expedition. *Ibid* II p 107. See also *Ibid* II p 259. Later on the British found the village *patwaris* (*tallati*) working under the authority of village headman. *Bombay Gazetteer* (Kaira). p 80.

2. *Account* f 17a

3. The *mazruat* documents for pre-1720-21 period mention the *patwari* as the source of furnishing the same but during the post 1721 period *muqaddams* are mentioned instead of the *patwari PC* No 132; *mawza* Balad (1141 *fasli*), Palri Kochrab (1142 *fasli*), *taraf* Rakhyal *buzurg* (1142 *fasli*), *taraf* Nazriat (1144 *fasli*) *taraf* Daryapur (1144 *fasli*) R No 21, Pune. But it was not invariably the case. *Patwaris* also continued to do so; Rakhiyal Khurd (1133 *fasli*), Runhasan (1137 *fasli*), Dantyal (1148 *fasli*), Dantiyali (1149 *fasli*). Khoranj (1153 *fasli*) R No 22 Pune.Keeping in view the changed attitude of the villages torward the state they had come to be categorized, noted the Britishers, into refractory (*mehwas*) and semi-refractory (*rasti mehwas*) villages. They found the proportion of the *rasti* villages much less than the rest in Kaira region. Bombay

From the discussion in the preceding lines it would appear that the *muqaddams* made a successful bid to grab all the powers of the state pertaining to the assessment of revenues. Another piece of information, an *amal-i dastur* (1745-46) brings to light yet another significant feature in the same regard. The *dastur*, as usual, records rates of assessment of land revenue and other exactions at customary rates. The document however specifies that the rates of assessment were furnished by Banarsi *muqaddam* of *mawza* Palri Kochrab to the provincial office[1], a fact of singular importance, for the rest of the available *dasturs* were furnished other way round. But being it a lonely available piece of information any inference may not be pressed too far.

There is evidence to show that *muqaddam*'s emergence as over-powerful persons in villages seems to have led to the discontinuation of the state's well established direct contact with the peasantry which, though not invariably, appears to have passed under their authority. The documents pertaining to assessment of revenues for a number of villages of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad virtually present him as

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Gazetteer (Kaira) p 81.

1. *Amal-i dastur dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1154 *fasli bamujib* Banarsi *muqaddam mawza* Palri Kochrab *PC* No 27.

a unit of assessment with no reference to relevant details which were taken into consideration for fixing revenues during earlier period. According to a *parwana* (?) issued under the seal of the *Subedar* Rs 801/- were determined (*muqarrar namudeh*) as the revenues inclusive of *abwab* and other state demands in lump sum (*bilmuqte*) on Dev Karan and other *muqaddams* of *mawza* Behrampur for *rabi* and *kharif* crop seasons together for the entire *fasli* year 1154/1745-46 (*hama jaht sal-i tamam*). The *muqaddams* were required to remit the sum in instalments (*b'mujib iqsat dar sarkar dakhil namayand*).[1] Likewise Bhavanidas and other *muqaddams* of *taraf* Daryapur were asked to remit Rs. 801/- determined the same way for the two crop seasons together for the same year.[2] Similarly Jhanji, Goridas, Jiwanji Bhupatji and Mohanji, *muqaddams* of *mawza* Goha were informed that a sum of Rs 2171/- has been fixed as state demand in lump sum (*hama jeht*) for *rabi* and *kharif* seasons of 1154 *fasli* (1744-45) for the whole year (*sal-i tamam*).[3] In the same way *muqaddams* of many other villages were informed of the amount so fixed

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1. Naql (?) *az qarar batai b muhr Nawab* Jawanmard Khan Bahadur dt 15th Ramadhan, 29 Ry Muhammad Shah, *PC* No 79/C. cf *Naql tamassuk Nawab* Mukaramat Khan, *Fasl-i kharif* 1077 *fasli PC* No 63.

2. *Naql az qarar batai b muhr* Nawab Jawanmard Khan Bahadur 19th Ramadhan, 29 RY Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/A.

3. Not titled, date not specified, *PC* No. 79/J

and were ordered to remit the same to the Government.[1] It would therefore appear that the state fixed the amount on the village, or a part thereof and demanded the same from the *muqaddams* who were apparently left free to decide with the cultivators as to how much each one was to pay.

But then *muqaddams* do not emerge as the only assessees and the only ones held responsible for remitting the revenues determined in the above mentioned manner. According to a *parwana* (1746) the *Subedar* assured Rabhji and other Rajputs alongwith Ranchhod and other Kolis (*girasias*) beside the *muqaddams* Gobindas and Shankardas and others that he would deal, exclusively, with them, and not trouble any other for the apparent purpose of paying revenues.[2] Similarly another *parwana* (1746) issued by the *Subedar* gives same assurance to the *girasia* of Sankhej beside the *muqaddam*.[3] Like these *girasias* there were others too who continued to be assessed directly by the state as will be seen below.

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1. Naql *ganwat qarar batai*, dt 11th Shahwal RY 29, Muhammad Shah, *Taraf* Nazriat, *PC* No 263b, see also please *Ibid*, *PC* No 263a, dt 10th Shawwal; see alo similarly entitled documents for the *fasli* years 1149, 1151, 1152, 1155-9, *fasli*(1761-65), for villages of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, R No. 21 Pune. All these documents do not refer to the crops or the cropped area as also the *muqaddam*'s acceptance also is not reflected.

2. *Naql parwana bandhari*, dt 17th Rabi II RY 29, Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/E.

3. *Ibid* dt 3 Ramadhan, RY 29, Muhammad Shah, *PC* No 79/F.

One Thangi, a Kunbi of *mawza* Tajpur (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) was to pay Rs 8/- '*bilmuqte yekraqmi* (in lump sum, all the state demands compounded together) for both the crop seasons of the year 1746-47. The *muqaddam* of the village was likewise required to pay Rs 751/- the same way, obviously on behalf of the other cultivators of the village.[1] Similarly the *muqaddam* of Rakhyal *buzurg* was to pay Rs 301/- fixed the same way. The *bilmuqte muzarian* of the same village were to pay @ Rs. 1/- per *bigha* on the cropped area during the two crop seasons of the same (1158 *fasli*) year (1749-50).[2] Then we come across the *bilmuqte kashta*, *pai-bilmuqte kashta* in *mawza* Balad (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) for the first time in 1149 *fasli* 1740-41.[3] The *bilmuqte kashta* were likewise required to pay a fixed amount which was determined on the basis of area under cultivation at a flat rate with no reference to the crops actually

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1. *PC* No 236 (1155 *fasli*) read with *qistbandi mawza* Tajpur, 1155 *fasli* R No 21 Pune.

2. *Qistbandi mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*, *fasl-i rabi-o kharif* 1158 *fasli*, R No 38 Pune. The *mazruat* documents available for earlier years for the same village and cited on the preceding pages do not refer to the *bilmuqte muzarian*. Obviously they emerged sometime between 1137 and 1157 *fasli* i.e 1728-9 and 1740-41.

3. *Qist bandi mawza* Balad. *fasl-i Kharif-o Rabi*, 1149 *fasli* R No 22 cf *Ibid* for *fasl-i kharif* 1131, 1137, 1139 *fasli*; *Ibid* for *fasl-i rabi* for 1132, 1135, 1137, 1139 *fasli*, R No 22. In this village too the *bilmuqte-kashtas* appear to have emerged sometime after 1139 *fasli*.

raised.[1] The *bilmuqte kashtas* appear to be the stronger section of the peasantry that could maintain its direct communication with the state in their own right, independently of the *muqaddams* who were obviously not in a position to subdue each of the cultivators of the village. Besides, the *girasias* (in the available cases, the *banthadaran*) also stood in their own right. Apparently the *muzaddam's* increased hold over the village remained confined to relatively not so strong a section of the community.

The state was not necessarily confident of getting the amounts which had been assessed or fixed on the *muqaddams* and therefore, it procured sureties, called *mal-i zamini* for ensuring remittance of the revenues. Interesting fact in this regard is that the guarantor, in each of the available cases, happened to be a Bhat (*baad farosh*).[2]

The state demanded a summarily fixed amount (which, as pointed out earlier, declined every next year) from the *muqaddams* who seem to have developed positive apprehensions

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1. *Qistbandi mawza* Balad, *fasl-i kharif-o rabi*, 1149 *fasli*. The *bilmuqte kashta* were to pay @ 2/- per *bigha* on 350 *bighas* of land i.e. Rs. 700/- only. No amount of revenue is reflected against rest of the *muzarian*

2. *Qistbandi dehat-i pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif-o rabi*, 1160 *fasli*, R No 21 Pune; *Awarja jama wasulyabi dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif*, 1167 *fasli*, R No 22, Pune. For the Bhats' interest please see discussion below.

against the authorities who could, as they actually did[1], come with additional demands. According to a document (not titled, 1744-5) which specifies the amount fixed as state demand on the *muqaddams* for the year 1154 *fasli*, the state gave a promise (*qawl*) and, for reinsuring its word furnished surety (*bhandari*) to them to the effect that nothing like *bewra* (a cess) would be levied and that no addition to the amount settled already would be made subsequently. In view of this guarantee the *muqaddams* were advised not to have any doubt and carry on cultivation.[2] Another document (1744) issued under the *Subedar's* seal records that the *batai* had been settled as the mode of assessment of revenues on the crops raised by Kameja and the *paikashta* cultivators of *mawza* Ghayaspur for the year (1744-45) and that the same had been settled with the *muqaddams*. The document adds that nothing in addition to the agreed share would be demanded. To make the promise worth believing, it is added that word of *sarkar* is the word of God[3]! Yet another document, a *parwana-i bandhari* likewise communicates the settlement of the mode of assessment as accepted by *muqaddams* of *mawza*

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1. For details and refrences please see discussion under Introduction and Chapter VI.

2. *PC* No 79/J For details about *bandhari* please see discussion in Chapter VI.

3. *Naql ganwat az qarar batai*, dt 24th Jamadi I, 28 RY Muhammad Shah *PC* No. 64.

Aslali (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) and assures that *bewra* etc. would not be demanded. In order to make his word creditable the *Subedar* furnished two persons as sureties (*bandharis*).[1] To mention yet another instance of similar nature, the *Subedar* (1746) assured the *muqaddams* of *mawza* Behrampur that no addition would be made to the already settled amount for the whole year and the sureties were likewise furnished to ensure that the word would be honored.[2] It shows that the *muqaddams* had not only lost trust in the *Subedar's* word and credibility which apparently stood eroded, but also they had grown strong enough to force the Governor to furnish sureties which, otherwise, were like *mal-i zamini*, given by them. Since the *muqaddams* of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, the seat of provincial power, could extort guarantees from the Governor himself and were to pay obviously a nominal sum (total revenue receipts of the state declined) the situation persisting elsewhere may be assumed to have been equally good for them vis a vis the state.

It would appear from the evidence cited above that *muquddams* were pragmatic enough to make necessary adjust-

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1. *Naql parwana bandhari b'muhr..* Jawanmard Khan Bahadur, dt. 22 Rabi II RY 29 Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/D

2. *Ibid*, dt 15th Ramadhan, RY 29 Muhammad Shah, *PC* No 79/C, see also *Ibid* dt 19th Ramadhan *PC* No 79/A. For the similar guarantee given to the Primary zamindars, Chapter VI below.

ments within the community[1] and respond accordingly to the state authority. They seem to have kept a watch on the changing political milieu, paying revenues to the one who commanded sufficient strength in the immediate vicinity of their possessions.[2] The defiance on their part and their bargaining power vis a vis the state appears to have increased with the passage of time as would be borne out by the evidence cited below.

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1. The *muqaddams* too were not necessarily at peace with each other. One Badridas of *mawza* Asarwa (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad represented that his father, one of the *muqadams* of the village, had died due to the troubles inflicted by his compatriots. Badridas was also evicted out of his possessions by the same *muqaddams*. He therefore approached the *Subedar* through the *muqaddams* of *mawza* Rakhiyal *buzurg PC* No 85 of 1148 *fasli*/1739-40.

2. Renkoji, a Maratha chief defeated his rival Maratha *sardar* and the Mughal *faujdar* failed to resist him. Realizing his growing "impression" the *muqaddams* of round about' place "came to him on their own" for settling the revenue matters. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 175 ; *Ahwal-i Gaikwad* f 14; *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f 4. Later on with the successful march of Momin Khan II against the Marathas the "*muqaddams* on witnessing this state of affairs" 'learnt a lesson' and came for assessment of revenues gave hostages and (thereby) protected and defended their lives' and property '*Mirat-i Ahamadi*;II p 449 . The *Mirat* further abserves that when Momin Khan's armies met success after success the *Mugaddas*'"came foreward at all places." *Ibid*;II.pp 451-2.But the *Muquaddams* of Petlad acted more wisely for they 'satisfied' the Marathas as also agreed to pay 'with willingness to Momin Khan, a portion of revenues'. *Ibid* II pp 451-2. Once the situation started changing and Marathas pressed Momin Khan hard the *muqaddams* who had submitted before the Khan 'became anxious about evil consequences and future of their own' and therefore changed side *Ibid* II pp 504.

The *Muqaddams* used to attend the office as and when summoned during the earlier period. From the documents termed *tamassukat-i hazir zamini*[1] it would appear that the *muqaddams* would not like to attend the office until and unless a proper guarantee was extorted from them . According to the earliest of such available (1729) documents one Ram Singh, a Bhat of Baroda stood surety undertaking responsibility of producing Ramdas, Bhagwatdas, Kesoji, Premji and other *muqaddams* of *mawza* Khawa (*paragana* Kadi) before the *faujdar.*[2] Similarly Dewraj, a Bhat of *mawza* Dhamanwan, is reflected (1744) as undertaking similar responsibility on behalf of Tarangdas, Harsendas, Manohar and other *muqaddams* of *mawza* Heerpur[3] From the 27 Ry of Muhammad Shah many documents of the type are available. In each case it is invariably a Bhat who is recorded as having undertaken the guarantee.[4]

If the *Subedar* extorted guarantee for ensuring their availability, the *muqaddam* too turned bold and strong enough

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1. To procure *hazir-zamini*- a guarantee to ensure availability of the person guaranteed- from the *muqaddams* appears to be a development of the period under review.

2. *Baroda* 99, Dt 20th Jamadi II 1142 AH

3. *PC* No 269, dt. 13 Jamadi I, RY 26 Muhammad Shah

4. *Yad-dasht tamassukat hazir zamini dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad R No 37 Pune; *Awarja hazir zamini* 26 RY Muhammad Shah *Ibid*

to demand similar *bandhari* which could accordingly be provided. According to a solitary piece of information Jawanmard Khan, the governor, issued a *parwana -i qawl-o bandhari* in favour of Khanji and Banarsi *muqaddams* of *mawza* Sankej (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) assuring them that the *sarkar* would not interfere in their (unspecified) affairs. The *parwana* which seems to have been issued to summon them to the provincial capital and remove doubts (*barai rafai' waswas*) furnishes sureties (*bandharis*) to ensure their safe conduct to and from the place they were to present themselves.[1] It seems the *muqaddams* apprehended ill treatment(?). That is why they demanded and got guarantees.

The *muqaddams* of some places came to be regarded as recalcitrants and treated the same way. The author of the *Mirat* mentions that reliable surities were procured by the authorities but he identifies the Kolis or Rajputs as rebellious people, the ones who were to furnish such sureties. From a *tamassuk-i hazir zamini -o fa'il-i zamini* (1729) it would appear that the *muqaddams* of *mawza* Khawa (*pargana* Kadi) were also obliged to furnish sureties ensuring their proper conduct alongwith the Kolis and Rajput- *girasias* of the village. The documents reflecting for the first time a

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1. *Naql parwana qowl-o bandhari*, dt. 3rd Ramadhan RY 29 Muhammad Shah

muqaddam as furnishing such a surety mentions Ram Singh, a Bhat acting as guarantor on his behalf.[1] According to another document (1743) Lakhoji, a Bhat of *mawza* Kaloli undertook responsibility of right conduct of Narharidas Gopi and other, *muqaddams* of *mawza* Basonj (*paragana haveli* Ahmadabad) beside Rajputs and Kolis of the village.[2] Likewise Raghodas Bhat of *mawza* Gotlej stood as *fa'il zamin* for Ranchhod and other *muqaddams* of the same village during the same year.[3] There is a series of documents reflecting the *muqaddams* during 26th RY of Muhammad Shah as furnishing *fa'il zamini* who as per the available documents[4], invariably happened to be Bhats.[5] It therefore seems that the state had to lean

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1. *Baroda*, 99.

2. *Yad-dasht* of *afaa'l-i zamini dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad 8th Jamadi II, RY 26 Muhammad Shah

3. *Tamassukat-i fail zamini dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, RY 26 Mohammad Shah, R No 33 Pune

4. *Ibid Tamassukat-i fai'l zamini dehat pargana* Kadi, R No 37 Pune; *Tamassukat pargana* Dholqa, *sarkar* Ahmadabad, R No 25 Pune. The *muqaddams* could also be assigned the duty of watch and ward (*Chowki-o pehra*)within their villages along the Kolis and others. *Naql parwanajat*, 20th Ramadhan, 20th RY Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/f.

5. Further information about the Bhats, their strength and interests in serving as sureties is not available in the contemporary works. Later on the British also found out that the Bhats' services as sureties were generally required for connecting the *mehwasi* (i.e. *zortalab*) portion of the society with the government. Their strength lay in the belief of considering their person sacred and the threat of self-immolation could easily change the *patels'* mind who otherwise faced the threat

heavily on the assistance even of such *muqaddams* who were in the state of constant rebellion and distrusted the authority. To manage them the state's dependence on the feeble authority of Bhats all the more speaks of its helplessness.

SHARE The share of *muqaddams* in the legal sense of the term seems to have remained unchanged.[1] There is evidence showing that the *muqaddams* continued to enjoy their *pusaita*

...Continued...

of being declared outcasle. The British too could not enquire into "the legality of their acquisitions (of lands, zamindaris and other privileges) "from the horror of self immolation" which they threatened if it were attempted. Hamilton Walter *Op cit* I pp 609-11; Treaties VI p 5 & n; *Rasmala* p 340

The Bhats interest to act as sureties also finds reference in British works. They are observed to have got a fixed percentage of the revenues in case they acted as surety. Some of them were found to have charged as their remuneration upto 25 percent of the assured amounts. The British also noted that some of the sureties had been able to acquire lands,zamindaris and other privileges. Hamilton Walter *op cit* I pp 609 641 *Rasmala* p 404 *Bombay Gazetteer* II pp 148 388 496 *Ibid* IV pp 48 146; *Ibid* X, pp 147-8. For them getting state's favour please see discussion under revenue grantees Chapter V below

1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, as pointed out in the preceding Chapter speaks of fixation of their share during Akbar's reign. No change in the approved share is noticeable in any of the available sources for the later period.

lands[1] as well as got fresh favours from the state.[2] In actual practice their income must have been much different from the approved share. Because they would also appropriate the difference, in many cases, between what they actually collected from the peasantry and the amount paid to the state that fixed the revenues in lump sum. More so they encroached upon, as pointed out above, the positions of *desais* and *amins* and thus removed the administrative checks and acquired, relatively, a free hand. But because of non-availability of relevant information the position of their share in the villages where they suffered setbacks may not be ascertained.

The *muqaddams* managed to procure high administrative positions like those of *faujdar*, *amin* and incharge of affairs (*madar-i kar*) at *pargana* level.[3] They must have made

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1. Please see, particularly as representative examples the *mazruat* documents for *mawza* Aslali (1128 *fasli*), R No 21 Pune; *mawza* Mahej (1146 *fasli*), *mawza* Khatwara (1149 *fasli*) *PC* Nos 101b 162-64; *mawza* Adalej (1151 *fasli*), R No 22 Pune; *dastur-ul amal* dt 21 Shawwal, 1174 *fasli*, *PC* No 67.

2. In addition to the grants which they continued to hold as discussed in Chapter III above, please also see the following evidence pertaining to the grants made in favour of them during the period under review. *Junagadh*, SC No 225 of 1155 AH (*mahal* Junagadh); *parwana* dt. 17 Zilhaj 1156 AH; in favour of Banarsidas *muqaddam* of *mawza* Aslali (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) granting *mawza* Bastra by way of ina'm, R No 46; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p. 316.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp 144-45, 441; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad* f 5.

effective use of the high positions for serving their personal interests. The *muqaddams* were involved in the assessment and collection of illegal exactions like *bewrs* and *khichri* alongwith the authorities.[1]

It is however not known if they were allowed any portion out of the collected amount.[2] But the *muqaddams* acquired other sources of income also.

The *muqadams* contracted *ijarah* rights. As per the information contained in the document entitled '*yad-dasht-i jarahdaran*'[3] considerably a large number of *muqaddams* in the *parganas* of Kadi, Birpur, Besalnagar and Dholqa (*Sarkar* Ahmadabad) held *ijarah* rights in the villages of their respective possessions.

There were, then, the *muqaddams* who appear to have acted as sub-*ijarahdars*. Momin Khan, the *faujdar* held *pargana* Petlad in *ijara* during the year (1144 AH) 1731-32 AD. The

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 260; *Amal-i dastur dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *mawza* Kochrab, dt 1145 *fasli PC* No. 27; *Qistbandi dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *mawza* Muzaffarpur, R No. 21 Pune; *yad-dasht qabuliyat-i bewrah*, 1151 *fasli*, RNo 33 Pune.

2. But the *muqaddams* appear to have got something in return. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 260, 316 *Ahwal-i Gaekwad* ff 31, 36.

3. *Yad-dasht-i ijarahdaran* Sarkar Ahmadabad (for the *parganas* of) Kadi, Birpur Besalnagar and Dholga 1134 *fasli* R No 67 Pune. In all 107 villages in the *parganas* were held in *ijarah* by them. The document specified the villages and the *muqaddam ijaradars* with no other informations having been furnished

available document reflects the Khan as *ijarahdar* of the *pargana* whereas a number of *muqaddams* are mentioned as holding villages on *ijarah* of the same *pargana* during the same year.[1] Apparently the *muqaddams* might have been allowed to hold *ijarah* rights in the villages which seem to have been sub-farmed out by Momin Khan, the *ijarahdar* of the *pargana*.

Evidence suggests that *muqadams* also made money by subduing holders of the *madad-i ma'sh* grants. According to a *parwana* (1737) of Momin Khan (1737-43) the *muqaddams* of *mawza* (*Taraf*) Rakhyal *buzurg* had occupied *madad-i ma'sh* land belonging to one Sehuprasad during the period of *Naib Subedar* Ratan Singh Bhandari declaring that the grant had been resumed by the government. The *muqaddams* were therefore ordered to release the lands and pay back the revenues appropriated by them.[2] According to an *arzi* (1751) *muqaddams* of *mawza* Kodra had been imposing Rs. 150/- on the *madad-i ma'sh* grants of a Saiyed on annual basis for sometime past.[3] According to another *parwana* (1752) *muqaddams* of yet another *mawza* levied Rs. 151/- from the *madad-i ma'sh* lands of the

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1. *Yad-dasht pargana- Petlad ijarah, Ijarahdar* Momin Khan *faujdar-i pargana* dt 19 Muharram 1144 AH, R No 57.

2. *PC* No 71, dt 19 Rabi I, RY 20, Muhammad Shah

3. *Arzi*, dt 15th Muharram 1163 AH, R No 22 Pune.

family of some Saiyeds.[1]

For a proper appreciation of the way the *muqaddams* acquired wealth and rose into eminence during the periods of turmoil and chaos, and of the Mughal and Maratha attitude towards them the available evidence may be mentioned in some detail.

Dala, *muqaddam* of Padra (*pargana haveli* Baroda) was 'very wealthy' and desirous of assuming the position of chief of affair'(*madar-i kar*) of Baroda by furnishing sureties (*bandharis*) of eminent nobles of the region with whom he obviously maintained good relations. On the other Maharaja Abhay Singh, then *Subedar* (1730-37) wanted to arrest him and confiscate his wealth. But the *muqaddam* was shrewd as also strong enough to procure sureties, which he did before presenting himself before the *Subedar* when summoned. The Maharaja could not lay hand upon him in the presence of sureties. He therefore decided to take the *muqaddam* into the fort of Baroda where he regarded him "as an esteemed kind of confection and flyless honey". But the *muqaddam* got suspicious and fled to his place. Having thus placed himself in security and obviously beyond the *Subedar's* effective reach the *muqaddam* told the Maharaja that if he appointed man of the headman's choice as *Naib faujdar* there would be stable

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1. *Parwana*, dt 23 Jamadi I, 1163 AH, R No 22 Pune.

income otherwise not". Helplessly the *Subedar* had to leave the position of *faujdari* in *muqaddam*'s hands.[1]

Dala seems to have enjoyed support of Kolis of Baroda region. According to the *Mirat* as the Maharaja practiced breach of promise with Dala and then failed to capture fort of Dabhoi the Kolis became 'arrogant' and attacked the Subedar's camp. The *muqaddam* on the other approached the Marathas and helped them capture Baroda fort.[2] He had obviously no trust in the Mughal *Subedar* and had to ensure his safety.

Similarly the *muqaddam* of Nadiad rose high in position and acquired eminence which were apparently disproportionate to the status of a village headmen. During the period of Momin Khan's *Subedari* (1737-43) Balidas, the *muqaddam* acted as chief negotiator on Momin Khan's behalf in his dealings with the Marathas.[3] Besides, he assisted the *Subedar* in the task of levying *bewra* and fines on the *riaya* of *pargana* Nadiad.[4] At the provincial capital he acted 'as guide to

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 144-5.

2. *Ibid* II p 145 167 *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f 5;*Ahwal-i Gaekwad* ff 12-3.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 260, 284 The *muqaddam* also represented the *Subedar* in his dealings with the Marathas *Ibid* II pp 300-1, 316; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad* f 36

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 260; According to *Ahwal-i Gaekwad* (f.5) Balidas was also *amin* of the *pargana*.

other officials for imposition of *bewra* on all villages of *pargana haveli'* and is reported to have appointed *amils* in the *pargana* and recovered illegal imposts.[1]

Balidas was duly rewarded for the services he rendered to the Mughals and the Marathas. He is reported to have received amounts of money and regards from the Mughal *Subedar* and the Marathas *sardars*.[2] He was granted a few villages by way of ina'm in lieu of services (*b'sigha-i khidmatana*) which he rendered to the Mughal *Subedar* and the Marathas.[3] He was wealthy enough as to present 100 *asharfis* on the occasion of a marriage at the *Subedar's* place.[4]

In the light of the preceding discussion it may be seen that there were *muqaddams* who suffered substantially in terms of their share and position at the hands of other

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II p 260; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f 31.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 316
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid* II p 260 Around the time (1757) Momin Khan II captured Ahmadabad, Pani, the *muqaddam* of *mawza* Waso rose to new heights of power. He was assigned the position of *amin* of *pargana* Petlad. He had also acted as go-between for Momin Khan in his dealings with the Marathas. Later he was entrusted the responsibility of keeping a watch on the fortification of Ahmadabad. He is said to have recruited 1000 soldiers, attacked the Marathas out-posts and *thanas*, carried depradatiors into Maratha possessions and collected revenues . He was suspected of amassing wealth by the Mughal nobles who imprisoned and then killed him *Ibid* II pp 441 504-6.

zamindars. But a considerably large number of them gained in power and position. Their over all hold over the villages vis a vis the imperial administration had increased considerably. Their hold over the villages was undermined and contested by other influential sections of the village communities rather than by the imperial administration which seems to have yielded before them and accepted fait accompli.

CHAPTER V

THE PRIMARY ZAMINDARS

(On the eve of the eighteenth century).

Like other parts of Mughal empire the Primary zamindars enjoyed an important position in socio-economic sphere of rural life in the Mughal province of Gujarat. The Primary zamindars formed a distinct and considerably influential though not an exclusive category of the class of zamindars. A study of the forms and modes of holding rights by them brings to light an interesting instance of variation, both regional and intra-regional.[1] Holding the lowest ladder of the landed aristocracy the most numerous category of the Primary zamindars was subject to greater degree of administrative control, degree of which varied in terms of space and time.

Before examining the position and the role played by the Primary zamindars in society it may be worth while to

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1. B R Grover ("Nature of Land Rights" pp 17-25), Irfan Habib (*Agrarian System*, pp 141-43, 147-49) and N A Siddiqi (*The Land Revenue Administration*, pp 147-52) have duly taken note of the inter-regional variation. But perhaps in view of the purpose and scope of their studies they have not paid sufficient attention to intra-regional variations.

identify[1] and determine the sway of their rights. It may be attempted with the help of evidence contained in the pages of the contemporary chronicles, both imperial and regional and in the revenue documents.

To beginwith, the contemporary sources use different terms to denote various holders of the superior rights in land. The terms, it seems, find definite usage with specifiable connotations particularly in the regional documents pertaining to the *Subah* Gujarat. The way the term *'zamindar'* finds description in these sources has already been discussed at length. Beides the *'zamindar'* and allied terms examined earlier, the available documents also mention *girasia, chauthia, giras, bantha-giras, bantha-chauth-giras* and the *chauth*. In these sources the holders (*girasia, chauthia*) of the rights (*giras, chauth, bantha*)[2] formed an

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1. The Mughal practice of using the same generic term for the holders of superior rights in land has sometimes misled even the modern scholors. W H Moreland, *Agrarian System* pp 122,279; P. Saran, *Provincial Government* pp. 102-4 cf Irfan Habib, "Zamindars in the *Ain*", *Proc. IHC*, 1958, pp 320-23; For further details of the usage and connotations of the term, Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 136-39; S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindar under Mughals" p 18, Moreover, understanding of modern scholars of the terms used to denote the rights and their holders in Gujarat is partly defective and needs to be modified in the light of discussion in the following pages.

2. A section of the holders of *bantha* belonged to the category of the Superior zamindars [(Chapter I (1) (2)] and the other may be identified as the Primary zamindars. Please see the discussion below.

identifiable section of the landed aristocracy. Not only the possessors and their possessions were thus named differently from the ones of a (Superior) '*zamindar*' but also the offering (*salami*) made to the state was given a different nomenclature to distinguish it from the *peshkash-i zamindaran*. In the following pages an attempt is made to discuss broad feature of the *giras*, *bantha* and *chauth*, determine the role, position and nature of relationship subsisting between the *girasias* and *chauthia* i.e. Primary zamindars and the empire during the heyday of Mughal rule and ascertain the pattern of change, if any, by the onset of the eighteenth century.

Before the above mentioned terms and their import are examined it is worthwhile to point out that though the *girasia* and *chauthia* (i.e. Primary zamindars) enjoyed identical rights they could possess a position which might be at variance from one another. The way the terms *giras*, *banth* and *chauth* are used in the documents perhaps suggests the identity and simultaneously the persisting shade of distinction. The terms as will be seen below, have been used collectively and alternately for one and the same possession as also separately to denote the same right but held in a somewhat different form.

GIRAS :

The *giras* and its holder *girasias* are frequently men-

tioned in the sources, right from the *Ain* down to the British works. Also, some modern scholars have examined these terms but have not satisfactorily succeeded in the appreciation of the *giras* as an established claim of its legitimate holders, the *girasia*.[1] Besides, these scholars view *bantha* almost as the only form of possession of a (Primary) zamindar in Mughal Gujarat and have not examined *giras* as a legitimate claim existing, side by side with, and on a wider scale, and perhaps since times earlier than the *bantha*. In view of persisting views which do not stand the test of evidence and for a proper appreciation of these terms an indepth study of the same is warranted.

In Mughal sources of information the earliest available reference to the *girasia* is made in the *Ain*. But the *Ain*

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1. Irfan Habib does not go beyond his appreciation of *giras* as "an exaction" which right was derived "from the threat or actual use of force" as different from *bantha* which was "derived from an earlier, legally recognized right". *Agrarian System*, pp 147-48 as also *bid*, pp 142-43, 149. A R Khan first identifies and specifies *giras* among the chieftaincies and then, following Irfan Habib, regards it as an exaction, adding that *girasias* were the ones who "lived upon the exaction, *giras*." A R Khan, *op cit*, pp 95-6 and n, 116. Neither of the scholors identifies the *girasia* with *bantha*. It may be mentioned that *giras* could take form of an exaction also. But as will be seen below it was not its only form. Also the chief could also hold the *giras* but by virtue of merely being in possession of *giras* one could not acquire the status of a chief. The *giras* was Primary zamindar's right which could be enjoyed by the chiefs also (references follow). Though Irfan Habib feels somekind of 'shade of distinction between a *zamindar* and the *girasia* but he leaves the difference unspecified. *Agrarian System*, p 148 & a.

which reflects them in the caste column of the zamindars[1], seems to have mistaken *girasia* for a caste. But then, the work also specifies *'girasia-mehtar'* (lit leading *girasia*) and Rajput *girasia* in the same column.[2] As such it implies a difference between the caste (Rajput) and the *girasia*. But the fact that *girasias* find description along the zamindars and, then, have not been included in the general description of leading zamindars (i.e. chiefs) suggests that the two could carry general similarity and shade of distinction at the same time.

Making no distinction between *giras* and the *girasia*, Nizamuddin Ahmed who had himself been in the *subah* refers to them as a group of people beside the zamindars.[3] The *Mirat* mentions *giras* as a possession distinguishing it from the zamindari of a Superior zamindar. Thus during the days of Sultan Muzaffar Gujarati the Jam, Chief of Navanagar "had four hundred (entire villages as) *giras*" and "one fourth

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1. *Ain*, II.p. 120

2. *Ibid*, II, p. 121; for a similar reference to *'Rajputan-girasia'* shown as attacking a Mughal *thana*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I.p. 144.

3. Thus sultan Muzaffar fought the Mughals "with the support of the Kolis and the *giras* (? *girasia*) and other *zamindars*," and imperial army marched with the intention of "eradicating the disturbances created by the *giras*" (i.e. *girasias*). for the same and similar references, *Tabqat-i Akbari*. II pp. 381, 390; *Ibid*, III, pp 138, 184-86.

share of *zamindari* in four thousand villages".[1] Again, one Bagela-Jhala, (Superior zamindar), is shown as holding "entire *giras*" rights within his *makan-i zamindari* presumably in addition to his right as a Superior zamindar.[2] The apparent shade of distinction between *girasia* and a (superior) *zamindar* is again noticeable in the *Mirat's* reference to one Jagmal *girasia* in imperial service along with other '*zamindars*' during Aurangzeb's reign.[3] In one of Aurangzeb's *farmans* "*girasias* and *zamindars*" are, again mentioned together.[4]

The document entitled *Yad dasht: dehat* pargana Kadi places it beyond doubt that the *girasias* were legitimate holders of superior rights in land and that they were other than and different from though not exclusive of the (Superior) '*zamindars*'. Furnishing details of villages and their holders the document first specifies the villages constituting the *taalluqa (makan-i zamindari)* of each (Superior) *zamindar* in the *pargana*. Then it specifies 116 villages as

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 22 read with *Ibid*, I, p 285.

2. *Ibid*, I, p. 22 read with *Account*, ff 119a-20b, Also see please *Mirat-i Sikandari* (p. 46) when it refers to '*žamindaran-i* Gujarat Tarangdas Raja Champaner and Satrasal (Chhatrasal) *girasia* Jhalawad.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 256-57

4. *Ibid*, I, p. 279

the villages of *girasias* and others. Of these, 20 villages were held by the '*zamindars*' and the *girasias* collectively and the rest formed exclusive possession of the *girasias*.[1] These villages contained *bantha-giras* lands, evidently the *girasias*' lands.[2] As such the *girasias* were accepted holders of superior right in lands and not merely the ones who 'lived upon the exaction, *giras*'.[3] On the contrary a *girasia* was regarded as a respectable member of society[4] and could be treated as a person loyal and useful to the state.[5]

The purpose of citing evidence in some details is to remove the existing misconceptions about *giras* and *girasia* and to submit that the *giras* denoted for a *girasia* what the

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1. *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Kadi, *op. cit.*

2. *Account*, 308 b - 30a; The *Mirat-i Sikandari* quotes a Minister informing Sultan Muhhamad Gujarati, saying that *ki rob-ee mamalik-i mahrusa-i shuma ke an ra... banta mi goyand Rajputan girasia-o koliyan motasarref* and. *Mirat-i Sikandari* pp 363-64. Following it the *Mirat-i Ahmedi* also notes that *rob-ee az mulk-i Gujarat k' an ra... banta goyand Rajputan Girasia-o Koliyan motasarraf and. Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 83. It will be seen below that *giras* and the *bantha* could be different from each other in form only, in spirit the two were identical and similar to each other.

3. Cf. A R Khan, *op. cit*, pp 96n, 116.

4. See, for instance, the inscription (1615) on a temple at Ghoga recording the names of respectable persons which among other, included the emperor, *Qazi, desai, faujdar, Seth* beside *girasia*, Rai-Singh, "Historical Sketch of the town of Ghoga", *op. cit*, pp. 283-5.

5. Thus, for example, please see *subedar* Shaista Khan transfering *zamindari* of a rebel *zamindar* to Jagmal *girasia* of *pargana* Dholqa *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 230, 232.

makan-i zamindari meant in relation a zamindar.

The *giras*, it may be seen, is noticeable in almost all the *kharaji sarkars* of the *subah*. To beginwith the *Ain* notices *girasias* in the *parganas* of Bheel, Nadiad, Sarnal and Kala (?) in the *sarkar* Ahmadabad.[1] The *Mirat-i Ahmadi* and other available pieces of documentary evidence suggest the existence of *giras* in other *sarkars* of the *subah*.[2] The *giras* and *girasias* were also there in the territories which were held by the autonomous (Superior) zamindars.[3]

So far the discussion has mainly been confined to suggest prevalence and continuity of *giras* as a superior right from the times of emperor Akbar (rather sultans of Gujarat) onward. Since the revenue department was required to maintain the statement of facts concerning the *giras* (*haqiqat-i giras*)[4] some information is contained in the pages of the *Account* and in other revenue documents of the time. The available evidence casts some light on the mode of

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1. *Ain*, II, pp 120-1; see also *Tabqat-i Akbari*, II pp 381, 390; *Ibid*, III, pp 138, 184-6.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp 142, 143, 192, 230, *Ibid*, *Supplement*;p. 225 *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp 41, 44, 46, 54, 364 *Account* ff, 105b, 202b, 219a-22b, 249a, 253b, 298b; *Baroda*, 99; to mention few.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I, pp 22, 285; ;*Mirat-i Sikandari*; p. 46

4. *Account* f. 81a.

holding and meeting the *giras* claim which could be realized in more than one way.

In the parts of the *subah* the lands of which were not surveyed, the *giras* claim was met in the form of deduction out of revenue taken as a share out of the produce of the peasantry[1], as far as we can tell. In these areas the lands of the villages do not seem to have been divided on the *bantha--talpad* lines[2]; it was therefore the revenues extorted from the peasantry which were apportioned.

Within the villages and *parganas* the land of which had been surveyed, the *giras*-rights could be held in two forms. The *girasias'* possession was not apportioned in definite area units and the area of the village was left undivided. Thus the area statistics of the cultivable portion of land of *mawza* Itawra (*pargana* Kadi) may be cited to clarify the point.[3]

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1. *Yad-dasht dastur-ul amal...b' mohr Nawab* Isa Tarkhan-*dehat pargana* Idar, R.No.23. Pune. For the *polaj* land, *fasl-i kharif*, it is recorded as under: *az qarar-i bilmanasfa seh hissa sarka-o yek hissa giras waz' mi shavad*. The *dastur* available for *pargana* Mhorasa and Meghraj in the *Account* (f.353b) puts it as under: *hissa-i sarkar-o riaya Nisfa-nisf, az jumla sarkar chauthai hissa girasia waz' mi shavad.*

2. The *bantha-talpad*, during Mughal age was confined to the areas lands of which were covered by survey. For details please see discussion in the following pages.

3. *Account*, f.311b. For similar referencess please see discussion in the following pages under *bantha*

mawza Itarwa

785 *bigha laiq-i zira't mai giras.*

In such cases when the lands were the lands were not duly apportioned into *talpad* and *bantha* the produce of the village might be divided in the manner referred to above. But then ,in the second case,the *giras* could take the form of *bantha*: *mawza* Unada:[1]-

raqba laiq-i zira't	:1175 *bigha*
raiyati	:1081 *bigha*
giras	: 94 *bigha*

Evidently the lands were duly apportioned and the *girasias'giras* (*bantha*)[2] was separately recorded in definite numbers of *bighas*. In this case the *giras*, as such, takes the form of *bantha* which (division), as will be seen below, denominated divisioning and could be termed *bantha-giras, bantha -chauth-giras* or merely *bantha*.

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1. *ibid.*f.311a; for more references please see discussion under *bantha*.

2. The available *dastur-ul amal* for *pargana* Kadi speaks of the *talpad* and *bantha* or the *raiyati* and *bantha*, then, records rates, separately for the villages lands of which were held jointly, and not apportioned. In the latter case the term used are *giras* or the *girasias*. *Yad dasht dastur-ul amal-dehat paragana* Kadi, 1093 *fasli* RNo.47, Pune; For identificaion of *giras* with and the differece from the *bantha* please see discussion in the following lines. It may however be mentioned here that *bantha* appears to have been one of the mode of holding *giras* rights which in substance did not differ much from the former.

BANTHA-GIRAS:

According to the available information the *bantha* rights emerged during the reign of Sultan Ahmad Gujarati and were likewise retained under the Mughals.[1] According to available information the Sultan expelled the Rajputs and Kolis (who were in possession of the country of Gujarat) from their possessions which were taken entirely under direct control. Consequently they created situation which could not be managed by the Sultan. Finally both the parties compromised their position and effected a settlement. According to the settlement three fourths parts of land of every village were attached to the government. A fourth part of the lands was settled upon the Kolis and Rajputs. Thus divisioning (of their land) was settled *(bantha qarar yaft)*.[2] The part attached to the government was termed *talpad* and the one left with the original possessors was categorized as *bantha*.[3] Besides, the possessions of a section of them were not likewise divided which, therefore, they continued to hold intact on account of personal favours or else as a political concession dictated by the circum-

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1. *Account*, f. 106 a.
2. *Ibid*.
3. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, I, PP 173-74; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, PP 228-9.

stances.[1] Thus there emerged two forms of zamindari villages, viz; the first which they held intact and the second which were divided into *bantha* and *talpad*.

The lands which were not divided into *bantha* and *talpad* and were held intact fall into two categories, viz; the lands termed *makan-i zamindari* and held by the Rajput etc. who were called *'zamindaran'* and have already been discussed as Superior zamindars. The possessions of other section holding their lands in likewise manner were termed *giras* which were subject to the payment of *salami* by its holders who were called *girasias.*[2]

In the same way the *bantha* possessions were common both to the (Superior) *zamindars* and the Primary zamindars. The *bantha'daran* in our sources are identified as the *'zamindaran'*[3] an also *girasias'*[4] which looks ambiguous and confusing. But, then the *girasias' bantha* was subject to the payment of state's claim which is described as *bantha-sala*

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1. *Account*, FF, 106b, 173b; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, I, P 174; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, P. 190.

2. Beside the discussion in the preceeding section please see references in the following pages also.

3. The aspect has been discussed in Chapter I (A) above. Also see please *Account* (F. 106a) where it state : see also *Account* ff. 207b-32a read with *Ibid* F 307a and *Yad-dasht dehat* pargana kadi, op it nos. 2a-6a.

4. *Mirat-i Sikandari*, pp 363-64 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p, 83; *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Kadi; *op.cit* Nos 6b-7b read with *Account*. ff 308b-30a.

mi[1] and the *zamindars' bantha* was, likewise, subject to the payment but it is termed *peshkash.*[2] Thus a line of demarcation may be drawn between the two categories of zamindars holding *bantha* land.

The *bantha* denoted the portion of the possession which its original possessors were allowed to hold after the divisioning was effected.[3] In actual practice the divisioning which being confined to the area regarded as cultivable *raqba laiq-i zira't* did not cover entire area constituting the village.[4] The cultivable area thus apportioned into two distinct parts has been named differently, viz; *talpad* and

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1. *Account* f 101a, 106a. According to the source the *salami* of state on the *bantha* (*bar zamin-i bantha salami sarkar-i wala*)was settled during the period of Gujarati Sultan See also *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I. p. 174; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp. 228-29 and the reference in the following discussion.

2. It has been discussed in the preceeding Chapter I (1) and (2); see also, *Account*, f 106a

3. The term *bantha*, wanta or *banth* is taken from *vanta* (division), a noun for the verb *vantan* (i.e. to divide)j, Baden powell, *Land systems of British India*, p 278; *Bombay Gazetteer*, II p129. The *Account* (f. 106a) also says that *bantah qarar yaft*, the divisioning was settled. It may be mentioned that the *bantha* is invariably applied to the land, or a village but in no case to the produce.

4. *Account*, ff. 175b - 81b; 219 a - 20a; 308-32a;for specific instance please see the discussion that follows.

bantha[1]; *raiyati* and *giras*[2]; *raiyati* and *bantha-giras*[3] and lastly the *raiyati* and *banth - chauth - giras.*[4] The similarity and the difference between various expressions used to denote the Primary zamindar's rights will be discussed a little later. It may however be pointed out that the *giras* and *bantha* in many instances have been used alternately as

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1. *Account* ff. 82a, 162a, 172b, 249a, 298b, 336b, 339b, 339a, 405b. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 174.

2. *Account*, f 175b : area statistics of *mawza* Antrali (*pargana* Bheel) are recorded thus :--

   (Entire area) : 2646 *bigha*
   Habitations etc. (*abadani waghaira*) : 1965 *bigha*
   cultivable area (*raqba liaq-i zira't*) : 681 *bigha*

giras	*raiyati*
185-5	495-15

   For similar references, *Account* ff. 308b-29a.

3. *Ibid*. f. 176b : *mawza* Bardoli (*pargana* Bheel)

   Cultivable area (*raqba liaq-i zira't*) 900 *bigha*

bantha giras	*raiyati*
225 *bigha*	645 *bigha*

   For similar reference, *Ibid*, ff 219a-20a, 339b-40a.

4. *Ibid*, f. 176 a : *mawza* Basna Matar (*pargana* Bheel)

   (entire area) 11,180 *bigha*

   Habitations etc. (*abadani waghaira*) : 4290 *bigha*
   Cultivable area (*raqba laiq-i zira't*) : 4890 *bigha*

bantha chauth-giras	*raiyati*
1223 *bigha*	3667 *bigha*

   For similar instances, *Ibid*, ff, 177a-81b

well as in conjunction with each other to denote one and the same area of lands.[1] Besides the *talpad* too has at times been used inter-changeably with the *raiyati*.[2]

The divisioning did not end with mere categorization of land into two. It meant something more. First the available *dastur-ul amals* suggest that the rates of assessment were maintained separately for the *talpad* (or *raiyati*) and the *bantha-giras* lands in the revenue department.[3] Detailed informations regarding the area actually cropped during the *kharif* and *rabi* crop seasons were procured and specified separately for the lands under two categories.[4] Similarly the details concerning kind and quality of land, viz; *ban*

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1. The *Account* uses the expressions *bantha* and *talpad* for specifying (divided) lands of entire *sarkar* Ahmadabad but the area-in *parganas* and villages is recorded under the heads mentioned in the preceeding notes. The area of villages in *pargana* Bheel is recorded under the heads mentioned in the preceeding references but the *dasturs* carry the expressions *muzarian-i talpad* and the *bantha* only. Then, the *dastur-ul amal* for *fasl-i kharif* is recorded for *raiyati* and the *bantha* but the same for *rabi* are recorded under the expression '*raiyati*' and the *bantha-giras*. *Account* ff. 82a, 175b -81b, 182a, 333b, 339a-40a; *Dastur-ul amal*, *PC* Nos. 45-7

2. But the two did not necessarily denote the same position though at times could coincide with each other. For details please see discussion in following pages.

3. *Account*, ff.182a, 333b, 339a-40a; *dastur-ul amals* (from Shah Jahan to Muhammad Shah). *PC* Nos. 22-47

4. Docs entitled *mazruat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad. (for) *mawza* (so and so) for the years 1090, 1093, 1094, 1096, 1100, 1105, 1117, 1118, 1125 *fasli*, for the villages of Aslali, Aqilpur, Rasulpur, Sarkhej and other, R.Nos. 21 and 27 Pune.

jar-laiq-i zirat (cultivable waste), *polaj* (under continuous cultivation) and *barani* (un-irrigated) and *chahi* (irrigated) comprising *talpad* and *bantha* were duly specified.[1] Besides, separate threshing floor for heaping and threshing the produce of the *bandha* and the *talpad* were invariably maintained as also a boundary between *wanta*(bantha) and government *(talpad)* land was drawn.[2]

The divisioning seems to have been carried a little farther. The *Account* sometimes speaks of the cultivators of *talpad muzarian-i talpad* implying as if there was a distinct group of cultivators that tilled the *talpad* alone.[3] According to a work of later date *kunbis* tilled the government portion (i.e. *talpad*) alone".[4]

The documents which furnish plots and cultivator-wise details for *bantha* and the *talpad* lands for a number of villages further strengthen the possibility of divisioning existing among the cultivators.[5] A closer scrutiny of the

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1. *Dastur-ul amal, PC Nos.* 20-51; *Account.*f.25b.

2. Mr.William,*Bombay Government litho papers*, 149,9; *Selections from the Records of Baroda Government, Giras* no.II vol II, Baroda, 1914,pp 1127-8.

3. *Account* ff. 182a,336b.

4. Hamilton Walter, *op.cit*, I,pp 610,612.

5. Documents *Khasra mazurat* for the years 1090, 1093, 1094, 1096, 1099, 1100, 1105, 1109, 1113, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1126 *fasli*, R.Nos. 21, 27, and *PC* Nos.110-14, 116-21, 121-30,1 53-57.

plots which were duly named and identified in both the categories of lands; and of the cultivators who are named and further identified with their holdings reveals that neither the plot nor the cultivator was common to both the categories of lands i.e. the plots as well as the cultivators in one category were exclusive of the other.[1] Whether similar divisioning among the cultivators existed every where in the *subah* is difficult to say for the available contemporary evidence for the period under review relates mainly to *sarkar* Ahmadabad.

The practice of dividing the cultivable area into two portions appear to be a common though not the only mode of putting aside the *bantha* possessions. In some cases entire village could be categorized as the *bantha*. One Sur Singh *girasia* held the village of Maile and Khoral (*pargana* Khanbayat) entirely in *bantha*.[2] Similarly Khodasi *girasia* held *mawza* Banjral (*paragana* Dholaqa) entirely as *bantha*.[3] In brief nine entire villages in all, in the entire *sarkar* Ahmadabad are specified as the exclusive *bantha* possessions

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1. See also, *Selection from the Records of Baroda Government (Giras)*, No II vol.II, pp 1127-28 where it records that even the houses in the villages were likewise divided.

2. *Account*. f.249a.

3. *Ibid*, f. 298b.

of *girssias.*[1] As such the practice of setting aside entire villages in *bantha* appears to be an exceptional phenomenon, the common mode being the divisioning of cultivable area of villages rather than the villages themselves.[2] The state, as such, would prefer, if possible, not to allow the *girasias* to preserve and maintain clusters of villages held entirely by them.

The *Mirat* and the *Account* suggest that the *bantha* constituted a fourth portion of the area of villages.[3] There is evidence to show that *bantha* could constitute a fourth of the cultivable area but it was not invariably the case. There were 270 such villages in *pargana* Kadi lands of which were divided into two categories.[4] Amongst these the proportion of the *bantha* in 158 villages was exactly a fourth of

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1. *Ibid*, ff. 249a, 298b, 350a.

2. Even if a *girasia* held rights in many villages he was generally allowed *bantha* in every village in the form of a portion theirof. Thus, according to the *Rasmala* a Rajput chief was allowed *bantha* lands in 84 villages as distinct from one-fourth number of the villages themselves. *Rasmala* p 261. One Lekhraj *girasia* held *bantha* lands in seven villages of *pargana* Bheel. The area of the *bantha* thus spread over the seven villages, if put together, comes to 7797 *bigha* and 16 *biswa*. Area of any village containg his *bantha* was not less than 7797 *bigha*. As such the *girasia* could be allowed any of the entire village in *bantha*. Doc. *Girasiaha mawaziat pargana* Bheel, RNO 43, Pune, read with *Account* ff, 175b-80b.

3. *Account*, f. 106b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, i, pp 173-4

4. *Account*, ff. 308b-32a

the cultivable area which had been divided. But in the remaining villages, 112 in number, the *bantha* constituted either less or more than a fourth, the proportion ranging from 1/8th to 2/5th of the cultivable area. In none of the fourteen villages comprising *pargana* Piplod the *bantha* represented a fourth; it stood between 1/5 and 1/3 of the cultivable lands.[1] Similarly no exact proportion is noticeable between the *bantha* and the *talpad* portions of lands which were actually cropped.[2]

Some idea of the cultivators cultivating the *bantha* lands besides the *grasias* may be had from the documents reflecting cultivator wise details of the area actually cropped. In its association with the cultivators the *bantha* land may be classified into two. In the first place may be mentioned the cropped area which is reflected, exclusively, against the *grasia* himself, with no other person specified.[3] Such lands may be identified as the *khudkhasta* lands of the

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1. *Ibid.* ff.218a-20b

2. *Mazruat mawza* khatwara, *fasal-i kharif*, 1121 *fasli* *mazruat mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*, *fasl-i kharif* , 1127 and 1130 *fasli*, *Mazurat mawza* khoranj, *fasal-i kharif*, 1123 *fasli*, *PC* Nos. 122-26, 129,30, 141-51, 158-9.

3. Of 157 *bighas* of cultivated lands, 19 *bighas* is shown against the *grasia* himself in *mazruat* Rakhyal *buzarg*, *fasl-i kharif*, 1127 fasli, *PC* Nos. 122 - 28 a ; also see *mazruat mawza* Mahej, *fasal-i kharif*, 1149 *fasali PC* Nos 95-102 ; *Amal-i dastur PC* No 23.

grasia.[1] Another document, though of a little later date (1140 *fasli*/1732-33) describes a portion of the *bantha* lands as *bantha-sir-i girasia*.[2] The *sir* lands were the zamindari lands wherein direct assessment was imposed and the authorities collected revenues from the peasantry directly without any intermediary.[3] The *sir* lands which fall in the second category are, in the document, shown as being cultivated by specified persons other than the *girasia*.[4] There are then other documents wich specify a portion of *bantha* lands wich were cultivated by the cultivators. The documents reflecting 19 *bighas* of the cropped area of *bantha* against the *girasia* (identified as *khud kashta*) also specifies 138 *bighas* against persons, other than the *girasia*.[5] No further information having been furnished it is difficult to precisely define their position. However it seems they were in direct communication with the state that is why they find descrip-

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1. The works of later date also mention that the *girasia* carried cultivation with the assistance of '*assamis*', *halis* or *meors*. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, pp. 67, 204-5, 385; *Ibid*, (Kaira), p. 288; *Rasmala*, p 565. Locally the 'self cultivating *wanta* lands were called *ghur kher*'. *Selections from the Records of Baroda Government, Jamabandi of the villages of kodram, Indrana, and Varsude*, No. II vol. II p. 1128.

2. *Mazruat mawza* Dhamanwan, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1140 *fasli*, *PC* Nos. 93-4.

3. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*. p. 146 and n35.

4. *Mazruat mawza* Dhamanwan, *op. cit*.

5. *Mazruat mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*, 1127 *fasli*, *op.cit*.

tion in the records which were utilized for the fixation of the state demand.

Some indications of differentiation are noticeable among the peasantry cultivating *bantha* lands. The persons (other than the *girasia*) reflected in the *mazruat* documents fall in three categories. In the first place may be mentioned those who are merely named against their specified holdings with no other identity provided.[1] In the second group may be mentioned the holders who have been designated *muzare'*.[2] Thirdly there were the sub-ordinate cultivators, also called *muzare'*, but cultivated lands which did not belong to them.[3]

It may thus be seen that there were the peasants holding lands in the *bantha* and exercising some rights of un-

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1. They appear to have been the most numerous, finding description in each of the *mazruat* papers specifying *bantha* lands. In this section may also be mentioned (the non-*girasia*) *desais*, *muqaddams* and *kotwals* who also held, perhaps as peasant-proprietors, lands in the *bantha*. *Mazruat mawza* Mahej, 1149 *fasli*, *op.cit*; *Mazruat* Rakhyal *buzurg* 1126 *fasli* for *rabi* and 1127 *fasli* for *kharif PC* Nos 110-4, 116-21.

2. *Khasra Mazruat mawza* Deori, *PC* No 92 and *Mazruat mawza* Maheb, 1114 *fasli*; R No. 44, Pune. According to S. Nurul Hassan the term 'muzara' "ncluded not merely the peasant proprietor but also the tenant-cultivator" *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations*, p 20.

3. *Khasra mazruat mawza* Deori, *op cit*. The document puts them as under : Pirthiraj *muzara-i* Udai Singh; Parorkar *muzara-i* Kalla Gohel or Kalyan, *muzara-i Pusalta-i muqaddaman* i.e. so and so *muzara* of such and such person.

specified description coexisting with those of the *girasias* in their capacity as the Primary zamindars over entire *bantha*.

The *bantha* and, correspondingly the *talpad* lands were earmarked and demarcated. Besides, the *talpad* was attached to the government (*talpad mal-i padshahi qarar yaft*) and its revenues were to be expropriated by the state, its assignees or the grantees.[1] But it is yet to be seen whether the holder of *bantha* had any relationship with the peasantry of the *talpad*.

The holders of *bantha* do not find any reference in the documents pertaining to assessment and collection of revenues from the *talpad* which appears to be the concern of *muqaddams* and *desais*.[2] Therefore it seems that the *banthadar* was neither allowed a share in the revenues of *talpad* nor to have been associated with its revenue administration.[3] But his dissociation from the *talpad* may not be pressed too far, for there were the villages which contained *bantha* lands but

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1. *Account*, f. 106b; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p 174; Irfan Habib. *Agrarian Systems*, pp 142-3. Also see discussion in the following pages.

2. For details and references, Chapters I (2), and III above.

3. *Jama-o Kharif mal-i-jihat-o-Sair jihat dehat pargana haveli*Ahmadabad, *mahal nazim-i subah fasl-i kharif* 1127 *fasli* and 1130 *fasli*; *Jama-o kharj mal-o jihat-w sair jihat*, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif* 1124 *fasli P.C.*

had no *Muqaddam.*[1]

But, then, the *talpad* lands also were not held by the peasants enjoying equal status with no signs of differentiation. There were some identifiable holders of *talpad* lands enjoying a priveleged socio-economic position. Thus Rajputs, Kolis and Muslims holdings *zamin-i sarkar* (i.e. *talpad*) enjoyed exemption from paying a cess, called *mankna* which was levied from other peasants during both the crop seasons.[2] The Kolis and Muslims, likewise enjoyed exemption from paying another cess, termed *karaya* (? rent) which was levied from the peasants in *pargana* Sarnal.[3] Besides, the possessions of Kolis and Muslims in *pargana* Thamna and those of Brahmans in *pargana* Prantij were assessed at concessional rates.[4] As such the Rajputs, Kolis, Brahmans being given a preferential treatment must have enjoyed a superior status among the holders of the *talpad* lands.[5]

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1. Chapter III above. whether the *girasia* performed the duty of *muqaddam* in such villages is not known.

2. *Account*, ff.220b,349b,359b. The rates varied from crop to crop and ranged between two *annas* to two and a half *mehmudi* per *bigha*.

3. *Account*, f.302b.

4. *Ibid*, ff.202a, 222a; The Brahmans were allowed to retain two- third and Kolis and Muslims enjoyed three fifth part of the produce; common peasantry paid half of the produce.

5. See also *Account* f.220b; *Dastur-ul amal* (Isa Tarkhan). *PC* Nos. 25-6 *Mazruat* Docs; *PC* Nos. 141-50, 193-94, 210.

Whether the superior and preferential treatment thus meted out to Rajputs, Kolis, Muslims and Brahmans was designed (or kept up) to detach them from the *girasias* is a matter of speculation. There is, however, circumstantial evidence to show the State's endeavours to deny the *bantha-dar* probable chances of attracting *talpad* - peasantry for undertaking cultivation on the *bantha* which, almost invariably, contained cultivable waste also.

In the sphere of assessment of state's claim entire village comprising *talpad* and *bantha* was treated as a unit. The assessment records--crop season-wise details of the actually cropped area by individual cultivators--were prepared by the village *patwari* with the co-operation of *mugaddams* and under the supervision of the *desai* for the *bantha* the same way as for *talpad* lands. Then the state assessed individual holdings of each plot- holder in both the categories of lands without making difference and thus entered into direct communication with the cultivators.[1]

Secondly, the state maintained *dastur-ul amals* for both the lands and enforced them through the agency of *desais* and *muqaddams* who were required to ensure that the assessment was carried in accordance with the rules laid down for the

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1. This is borne out by the *mazruat* papers which are cited above as also in the discussion that follows.

bantha as well as *talpad*.[1]

Thirdly a comparative study of the rates of assessment laid down for the *talpad* and the *bantha* lands as cited above, reveals that the peasantry whether holding *bantha* or the *talpad* had to pay revenue at the same rate. These *dasturs* take into consideration the *chahi* and *barani* , *banjar* and *polaj* lands for both the crop seasons including the additional cesses levied.[2]

Fourthly, any fall in the production of the *talpad* lands would directly hurt the interests of the *desais* and the *mugaddams* who were allowed a share in the revenue collected from the *talpad* and not from the *bantha salami* offered by the *bantha*-holder, the *girasia*.[3] Obviously the *muqaddam* and *desai* would act, under normal circumstances as the watchdog of imperial interests which were thus identified with their own.

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1. The *dasturs* are available from the time of Shah Jahan to the opening years of Muhammad Shah's reign. *Dastur-ul amal*, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad; *Amal-i dastur dehat pargana* haveli Ahmadabad; *Yad-dasht dastur-ul amal* for 1091AH, and for the period of Mahabat Khan, Isa Tar Khan, Ghairat Khan, 1053 AH and 1079 AH *PC* Nos.20-6,28-61 *Account* ,ff. 182a-2b, 202a, 302b-3a;338b-40b,349a-51a, 363b-65a, 408a-10b; *Baroda*, 87.

2. In addition to the *dasturs* cited in the preceding note please also see discussion in the following pages.

3. Docs. *jama-o Kharj mal-i jihat-w sair jihat dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *op., cit*, See also Chapter III above.

Lastly, the *muqaddami* and *desaigiris* seem to have only exceptionally coincided with the position of the *bantha*-holders, the three positions were generally, (though not essentially) held by different persons.[1] The checks thus applied would have helped in the smooth working of the *bantha-talpad* system under the over all superintendence of the state.

But, as pointed out earlier, the *bantha talpad* system was not enforced to cover the entire *Subah*, The sway of the system as will be seen below, was confined to the surveyed parts of the mainland Gujarat.

Our sources do not precisely specify the limits of the area of the *bantha talpad* system. Also the modern scholars have not viewed the possibility of the zamindars holding their lands in the non-*bantha* form.[2]

The *Mirat* and the *Account* very clearly speak of the limitations of the state in the enforcement of the system to cover entire lands of all the zamindars.[3] We have already discussed that the *zamindars* of the *peshkashi sarkars*, the

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1. For details please see discussion in the preceding Chapter III.

2. Irfan Habib *Agrarian System*, pp 142-43 & n. 147, 149-50; BR Grover,"Nature of land Rights." pp 24-5, N.A Siddiqi, *op cit*, pp 23-4, 147

3. *Account*.f.106b;*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.pp 173-4.

ismis, a section of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* and a section of the *girasias* also held their lands which were not divided into *bantha* and *talpad*. But the territorial limits of the system are yet to be ascertained.[1] On a closer view of the village - wise description of 28 *parganas* comprising *sarkar* Ahmadabad and the *dastur- ul amals*; which are available for the same and other parts of the *subah* it would appear that:

The references to the *bantha* lands (i.e. *bantha-giras* or *bantha-chauth-giras*) are exclusively confined to the villages, *parganas* and *sarkars* lands of which had been surveyed.[2] Even when the land had been surveyed but the area was not divided into two portions, the *girasia's* claim is termed *giras* and not *bantha*.[3]

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1. See above Chapter I (1) & (2) ; It has been discussed in the preceding section of the present Chapter that in certain parts of the *subah giras* denoted divisioning of produce as distinct from the *bantha-giras* which stood for physical divisioning of the lands. Please also see discussion under *chauth* in the following pages.

2. *Account* .ff.163a,172b 175b - 81b 219a - 20a, 309 - 32a (for the references to the *banths* and actual divisioning); *Ibid*, ff.182a - 82b, 302b, 339a-40b, 349a - 51a, 358b - 60a, 409a for the *dasturs* specifying assessment rates for the *bantha* and the *talpad* lands; see also the *dastur-ul amals* citid above.

3. To cite two examples representing the two forms (*Account*, ff. 176a, 314a).

	mawza Badosma	*mawza Pusnota*
(entire area)	1000 *bigha*	5985 *bigha*

In the areas lands of which were not survyed (*dar paimaish nayamde*) the *bantha* doesnot find any reference. Instead the share of the *girasia* is reflected in terms of a share in the produce as distinct from the one in delineated portion of lands.[1]

It may thus be submitted that the *bantha* denoted a portrion of cultivable area (and sometime, though only exceptionally, an entire village) which was duely demarcated. The *bantha* lands were confined to areas which had been covered by the land survey i.e. the central parts of the *subah* which felt the greatest thrust of the administrative pressure.[2]

...Continued...

habitations etc. 300 *bigha* 309 *bigha*

cultivable area 2892 *bigha*

inclusive

of *giras* *raiyati* - *banthagiras*

(*laiq-i zira't mai giras*)

700 *bigha*.

2169 *bigha* 723 *bigha*.

1. *Ibid* ff.212b-13a, 214b, 227b, 353b, For specific instance plesase see discussion in the following pages. It may also be added that the documents like *tamassuks, qabuliyat, muchalka* etc. which are availablae for the *ghair paimoods* areas do not likewise, make any reference to the *bantha*. Similarly the documents reflecting actual revenue - returns mention for such area the *salami* or *giras salami* as distinct from *bantha-salami* which is specified in the *paimooda* parts only.

2. See also S C Misra, *Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat*. p. 205

CHAUTH:

The *chauth* is another expression which is also used to describe the Primary zamindar's right in certain parts of the *subah* Though by and large associated with the Marathas, the *chauth* seems to have been in vogue in Gujarat prior to their appearance on the political scene of the province.[1] The term which is left undescribed in the available sources, seems to have carried more than one connotations, viz; the possession (i.e. land) the share of a Primary zamindar in the produce and finally the state's share.

To beginwith, in its statistical account of lands and village of *pargana* Bheel (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) the *Account* uses the experession *chauth* in conjunction with the *bantha giras*.[2] Of 72 villages carrying area satistics of the apportioned lands the *Account* specifies one part of the divided

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1. *Yad-dasht-dastur-ul amal, pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i Kharif-o rabi* 1053 *fasli* (1645AD), *pesh-az julus-i padshah* Alamgir, *PC* No. 50 (f.18b). Its holder when he happened to be a *zamindar* was called *chauthia*. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f.13.

2. To cite a representative example (*Account*, f.178a)

mawza Dhamaliya

Entire area	: 2904 *bigha*
Habitations etc.	: 213 *bighas*
Cultivable area	: 2691 *bigha*
bantha *chauth-giras*	*raiyati*
672 *bigha* 15 *biswa*	2018 *bigha* 5 *biswa*

lands under *rayiat* and the other under *bantha giras* (or simply *giras* and *bantha*). Divided the same way but the apportioned lands in the remaining 58 villages have been placed under the expression *raiyati* and the *bantha - chauth - giras*.[1] Thus, the *chauth* has been added to the *bantha-giras*, features of which have been discussed above. At this stage any inference would be far from satisfactory. However in the light of evidence cited below the *chauth* would appear to be identical to the *bantha* in spirit but in form the two could also differ from each other.

When used in conjunction with *bantha* or *bantha-giras* the *chauth* seems to have denoted what otherwise the *bantha* stood for. The available *dastur-ul amal* for the same *pargana* (Bheel) and contained in the pages of the same work specifies rates for the *bantha* (and *raiyati*) having no reference to *chauth* in anyway[2], thus equating *bantha* with the rest of expressions used to denote the same portion of lands.

Another set of evidence equates *chauth* with the imperial claim on the *bantha* (of *giras*). The lands of the villages of *pargana* Kadi were categorised as *giras* and

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1. *Ibid*, ff. 174a-81b.
2. *Ibid*, ff.182a-82b..

raiyati.[1] The *dastur-ul amal* available for the *pargana* specifies rates for *bantha*[2], the expression not used to describe the relavant portion of land in any of the villages of the *pargana*. And then, the offering made by holders of the *giras* (i.e. *bantha*) lands in 14 of the villages of the same *pargana* is termed *chauth bantha.*[3] As such the *chauth* might be equated with the *bantha.*[4] i.e. *girasias'* possession and then with the state's claim on the possession. But the evidence does not help us to differentiate *chauth* from the *bantha* as and when the lands were apportioned and temed

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1. *Ibid* ff. 309b-32a.

2. *Yad-dasht dastur-ul amal dehat pargana* Kadi;1093 *fasli*, R.NO. 47, Pune.

3. *Yad dasht dehat pargana* Kadi; *PC* No.3b. The document places the specified villages as held by Malik Musalmans *Kameja-* Muslims, Rajputs, *zannardaran* (Brahmans), *badfaroshan* (Bhats), Muslims, Kolis and Charans under the following expression:
Musalmanan waghaira mutasarraf and -o chauth-i bantha b'jagirdaran midehand. Another document specifies Rs.1014/6 *annas* during *Kharif* and Rs. 907/- during *rabi* crop season under the expression:
chauth-i bantha-i Musalmanan mawza Mahej. Doc. *jama-o Kharj pargana* Dholqa, *fasl-i Kharif* ..1128 *fasli* *PC* No.9-10.

4. Please also see *Selection from the Records of Baroda Government* NO. II Vol II, p 1121 where it states that " *Wanta* lands were also known as *chauth-wanta*. Does it means that *chauth* rights could be set aside by way of *bantha* (the division) ?

bantha and the *bantha- chauth - giras.*[1]

But then *chauth* rights are also noticeable in those areas which were not covered by land survey and *bantha talpad* system. *Pargana* Birpur neither was covered by land survey nor were its lands divided into *bantha-talpad.*[2] It is however described as *chauthia pargana* in which the (Superior) zamindar of Lunawara enjoyed *chauth* claims.[3] Diwan Ranchhod ji of Junagadh also mentions the *chauthias* later in *Nawabi* territory of (*sarkar*) Junagadh.[4]

The *dastur-ul amal* available for the *pargana haveli* Ahamdabad (1643 AD) lands of which had been surveyed and accordingly apportioned places it beyond doubt that the *chauth* beside denoting *bantha*, represented the share of the state and the *giras* as well. According to the *dastur* the produce of *bantha- giras* was divided into four equal parts.

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1. *Chauth* literally means a fourth. The *bantha* as pointed out above, also stood for a fourth. But in actual practice the *bantha* could be less or more than a fourth, though it could be exactly equivalent to a fourth. The *bantha-chauth-giras* in the specified villages of *pargana* Bheel as a matter of fact, represented exactly a fourth. But then every fourth part of the apportioned lands is not termed *chauthe-bantha.*

2. *Account* ,f.215a.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f 13. In a *parwana* dated 1172 AH /1758 AD reference is also made to *chauthia-muqaddams* but no other relevant information is furnished therein. SH Desai's private collection, No 24/1172 AH.

Out of it two parts were left with the *raiyat*. Out of the remaining two parts each of which represented a fourth of the entire produce of the *bantha-giras*, one part was to be taken by the state (*chauth hissa-i sarkar*). The remaining fourth part was marked as the *girasias'* share but a portion of it was also taken by the state.[1]

It would therefore appear that the *chauth* denoted state's claim, share of Primary zamindar in the produce and, as also the apportioned part of land (*bantha-chauth*). It seems to have represented a fourth share whether in land or its produce, of the state and or that of the *girasia* or *chauthia*.

In the light of the preceding discussion it may be maintained that the Primary zamindar's was a superior right which was other than and stood above and co existed with other rights and claims.[2] Described as *giras* , *bantha* and *chauth*, the claim was legally recognised and customarily

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1. *Yad-dasht dastur-ul amal pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1153 *fasli op cit*. It puts the rate as under:
bantha giras--- az dastur raiyati nisf.
chauth hissa sarkar - aza jumla chauth juzvi b'girasia dade, juzvi dar sarkar kharch namude.
It may also be mentioned that the deduction out of the *girasia's* share of fourth was made for a short period. For details please see discussion in following pages.

2. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*. pp.139-44,BR Grover "Nature of *dehat-i taalluqa*" pp 166-9, 259, 275.

well established[1] Though the available evidence is not conclusive however it seems that the *giras* denoted the claim[2], *bantha* (division) connoted the arrangement, a way to meet out the claim and the *chauth* stood for proportion of the claim. The *chauth* and *bantha* seem to have, in due course of time, come to denote the claim itself.

But all the rights designated as *giras* did not meet the state's approval. A European traveller, F.Martin (1681-2) noticed that "all the inhabitants round Baroda are robbers... Further north in the neighbourhood of Ahmadabad there existed a tribe of robbers called *gratias.*" Unchecked by the Mughal police the '*gratias*' became so bold that they

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1. Cf. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*. pp 147-8

2. The *Account* and the *Mirat* speak of the Rajputs and the Kolis in possession of lands prior to their forcible eviction and then of the settlement allowing them to hold a portion of their original possessions by way of *bantha* under the *bantha-talpad* system which for the first time, was effected by sultan Muzaffar Gujarati. In the bardic traditions the original possessions held prior to the emergence of *bantha* lands are identified as *giras*. *Rasmala* pp 255-6, 260-4, 299, 569. Besides, the *giras* existed even within the domains of the autonomous zamindars who granted it as subsistence to junior members *(bhayads)* of their respective families following rule of primogeniture in the matter of successiion. *Rasmala,* pp 186, 586; also see for its presence in the self administered domains *Ain* II, p 120 (Idar); *Mirat-i Sikandri*.pp 363-4. *Giras* papers are available in the palaces of Bhuj, Bhaonagar and Jamnagar; *Selections From the Records of Baroda Government*, NO II, Vol. II p 853; H.W. Wilbeforce, Bell, *op cit*, pp 230-31. It may therefore be contented that *giras* claims existed prior to the *bantha* and in the areas where the latter did ot exist at all.

ventured to attack villages where they levied contributions from the villagers and hold their headman to ransom if they refused to pay.[1] The *Mirat* also speaks of the exaction levied as *giras* by the Rajputs and Kolis sometime after the *bantha-talpad* system, was effected.[2] Thus the present illegal form of *giras* also emerged but it was different from the *giras* which carried legal sanctity as discussed above. It may however be seen that the prevailance of *giras*, the exaction, speaks of limitations of the Mughal security system in the countryside.

***SHARE*:**

It has been discussed above that the Primary zamindar's share in the produce was met out, administratively, in two ways, viz; by effecting a physical division of land and putting aside a fourth part of it by way of *bantha* and, secondly, by allowing them a share directly in the revenues of the village.

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1 *Memoires de F Martin*, II, pp 315-7,351-3 *cited* in the "Piracy in the western seas in the Reign of Aurangzeb", *Journal of Universty of Bombay* Vol V pt IV No 10 January 1939 p 5. The *girasias* levied exaction *(giras)* from the travellers also. SN Sen (ed.) *Indian Travels of Thevenot And Careri*, Indian Records Series, N.Delhi,949,p.20. The two travellors call the *girasias* as robbers whom they paid 'tole' between Cambay and Baroda.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I.p.174 During the post-1700 period the *giras* acquired unmanageable dimensions for details, Chapter VI below.

The *bantha* has been identified as (Primary) zamindar's share, an equivalent of *malikana* of Northern India.[1] From the *farman* of emperor Akbar it would , likewise, appear that no *mehsul* was to be demanded from the one fourth land of Kolis and others set aside as ordered.[2] But another set of evidence strongly suggests that the state demanded a share, called *bantha-salami* out of revenue of the *bantha* lands.

According to the *Account* the *girasias* had 'acepted (to offer) *salami* on the *bantha* land to the *sarkar-i wala*' (*bar zamin-i bantha salami-i sarkar-i wala qabul namudand*) at the time the divisioning was effected during the period of the Gujarati sultan.[3] The *Mirat* also suggests that it was paid even under the Mughals.[4] But what portion of the *bantha* revenues was demanded by the state under the denomination of *bantha salami* has to be examined for ascertaining the share of Primary zamindars.

The *girasias* were required to surrender , by and large, a half of the *bantha* revenues in favour of the state by way of *bantha salami*. According to the earliest available *dastur-ul amal* (c.1642-44) the *bantha* peasantry was required to

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1. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 149-50.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 173.
3. *Account* , f.106b.
4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp.173-4; *Ibid*, *Supplement*, p 229.

surrender a half of its produce of *polaj* lands during the *Rabi* and *Kharif* seasons in *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad. The *girasia* was to retain a half of the portion thus extorted from the peasantry whereas the other was to be paid as *bantha salami* to the state.[1] Likewise two third of the produce of newly reclaimed *banjar* lands formed peasantry's share and the remaining one third was shared by the *girasias* with state on equal basis.[2] The *dastur-ul amal* which were in force during Auranzeb's reign and were not officially amended during later years for the *bantha* lands of *girasias* located in the *parganas* of *haveli* Ahmadabad, Bheel, Arharmatar, Petlad, Piplod, Khanbat Dholqa and Nadiad specify the same share i.e. *bantha* revenues were shared equally between the state and the *girasia*.[3] Instances showing variation from what appears to be the common pattern mentioned above are also noticeable in the *dasturs* which, likewise, were not amended. In some of the villages of *pargana* Munda the *salami* on *bantha* was assesssed on lump sum

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1. *Dastur-ul amal* ...b' *mohr* Isa Tarkhan, *PC* Nos. 41-2

2. *Ibid*, *PC* Nos. 45-7.

3. *Account*, ff 182 ab, 409a; *Dastur-ul amal PC* Nos. 22, 25, 31; *Yad-dasht-dastur-ul amal*, (dt.1060 *fasli* and 1070 *fasli*) (Kharif). R.No. 56. Pune.

(*bilmuqta*) basis.[1] The *girasias* holding *bantha* lands in *mawza* Tanbul (*pargana* Mehmudabad) enjoyed exemption from paying *salami* as per ancient custom. In some of the villages of the same *pargana* the *girasias* paid *naqdi salami*, rates of which are not specified.[2]

Some changes in the rate of *bantha salami* seem to have been attempted during the course of the seventeenth century. The *Account* which specifies rates as were in force during, if not earlier than the reign of Aurangzeb and stood unamended for the rest of the period, does not speak of any change in direct terms. But sometimes it does not specify the rates and, instead states that the *salami* was assessed as per the ancient customs[3] implying that changes might have been effected elsewhere. During the period of his *subedari* (1645-46) Prince Aurangzeb attempted upward revision of the rate of the state's claim on the *bantha* demanding an unspecified portion of the fourth of produce which the holder was

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1. *Account*, f.339a. In rest of the *pargana* the rate of *salami* was the same as in *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad.

2. *Ibid* f.350a; for this village the work records the rate as under:
   mawza Tabul - qanun-i qadim, salami nadarad-mua'f.
   In the remaining villages it was assessed on the usual rates.

3. Thus for a *pargana (sarkar)* Ahmadabad it records the rate as under:
   bantha salami---qanun qadim ast. Ibid f 302b.

allowed to retain under Isa Tar Khan's *dasturs*.[1] But the prince's attempt appears to have been resented strongly[2] that is why, it seems the administration restored the *status quo ante* during the period of administration of Prince Dara's *naib* Ghairat khan (1648-50).[3]

Sufficient information regarding the *girasias'* share in the villages lands of which were not divided into *bantha* and *talpad* is not available. But some idea of it may still be formed. According to the *Account* the produce of the *raiyat* in *parganas* of Mhorasa and Meghrej (lands of which were not divided) was divided into two parts (*Nisfa nisf*), called *hissa-i sarkar* and *hissa-i raiya*. A fourth of the *hissa-i sarkar* was deducted as *girasias'* claim.[4]

Whether the *girasias* of the pargana were required to part with a portion of their share is not known specifically for these *parganas*. But the *Account* mentions *girasias* as being under the obligation of paying *giras-salami*.[5] Another

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1. *Dastur-ul amal fasl-i Kharif-o rabi*, 1053 *fasli*/1645-6AD, *pesh-az julus-i Alamgiri*, *op cit* read with *Dastur-ul amal*. Isa Tarkhan, *op-cit*.

2. For other similar actions taken by the Prince and thier impact please see discussion under Revenue Grantees of the present Chapter.

3. *Naql tumar ganwat*... Ghairat Khan, *PC* Nos 46b-47a.

4. *Account* f. 353b.

5. *Ibid* f.126a.

dastur-ul amal (1050 *fasli*/1642-3AD.) however suggests that the *salami* on *giras* was nothing but an equivalent of *bantha salami*. Thus the peasantry in *sarkar* Pattan was required to surrender half of its produce of Polaj lands during *Kharif* season. Out of of the state's share (*az jumla sarkar*) which thus amounted a half of the produce, a fourth was deducted as *giras*. Out of the *giras* (*az jumla giras*) the state demanded a share called *salami* amounting to a half of *giras* in some places and two fifth in other.[1] Thus the *girasia* was left with a half or three fifth part of the fourth portion of the revenues. It comes to 6.25 and 7.25 percent of the produce excluding talpad. It may thus be seen that the *girasia's* share baring few exceptions mentioned earlier whether holding *bantha-giras* or *giras* ranged between 6.25 to 7.25 per cent of the produce (or 12.50 and 14.50 percent of the *bantha*, inclusive of *talpad*.[2]

The *bantha* revenue being not entirely retained by the *girasia* who had to share it with the state, generally on

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1. *Dastur-ul amal fasl-i Kharif*, 1150 *fasli* Nawab Radhanpur's unindexed private collection, Radhanpur. To reproduce the operative part of the *dasturs*:
Sarkar Pattan -- amal-i batai.
Zamin Polaj - az qarar bilmanasfa: yek hissa sarkar, yek hissa riaya.. az jumla sarkar chauthai giras waz' mi-shawad. Salami: az jumla giras dar ba'zi ja nisf hissa-o dar ba'zi parganat du hissa sarkar-o se hissa girasia.

2. Cf. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 142-3,147,149-50

equal basis, *bantha* may hardly be equated with the *malikana* which was an exclusive privelege of zamindar.[1] The *bantha* in the present context, bears closer identity to the zamindari which had been curtailed rather than the zamindar's share . The *salami* or *bantha- salami*[2] was collected regularly and it could be levied both in cash and kind.[3]

The sway of Primary zamindar did not cover the entire countryside of Gujarat.[4] The *Mirat* refers to the *raiyati*[5]

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1. Cf. *Ibid.* Irfan Habib has not taken into account the *salami* as a regular imperial claim.

2. N.A. Siddiqi (*op cit* p 23n 12) holds that the *salami* came to be known as *peshkash* during the Mughal age. The author has not been able to distinguish *peshkash* on *bantha* as paid by "*zamindaran*" and *salami* on the same by the *girasias*.

3. *Yad-dasht haqiqal-i paidaish mawza* Rupar, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad 1002 *fasli* R No 37, Pune, and for the years 1023, 1024 *fasli* for the same village *Ibid.* See also *PC* Nos. 14-5, *Account* ff 182b, 202b, 212b-13a, 220b-22b. 303a,339b; for the *jagirdars* collecting the share and selling it in the market, *Corpus Inscriptionum Bhaonagri, Antiquarian Deptt. Bhaonagar state,* New Delhi: 1971 pp 47-8 ; *Tamassuk*, dt. 1097 *fasl-i kharif.* RNO.37., Pune.

4. For a general view of their sway Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System,* p 141; BR Grover "Narture of *dehat-i talluqa*" p 166 But the intermediary zamindars would enjoy right even within the *raiyati* tracts.

5. The term is also used to denote the revenue paying villages as apposed to villages which refused to pay taxes and were, therefore, known as *zortalab*, *mehwas* or *mawas* in Gujarat. *Account* ff 311a,314a, 316b. In view of its submissiveness a zamindari village could be, as it was, called *raiyati Ibid* ff.225a-6b.

villages as distinct from the villaes of Primary and the Superior zamindars of the directly administered territories.[1] The available evidence casts sufficient light on the existince of the *raiyati* lands within the villages, otherwise known as zamindari (*girasias'*) villages, necessi-ating modification in the present under standing of the term *raiyati vis a vis talpad* in their association with the *bantha* possessions.

The parts of land originally termed *talpad* were, by and large, called *raiyati* in contradistinction to zamindari (*girasia*) lands *(bantha-giras)* under the Mughals. Thus the *talpad* portion of lands in each of the 82 (out of 84 vil-lages comprising the *pargana* Bheel) villages lands of which were divided, is termed *raiyati*.[2] To cite a representative example[3]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp 215-17. *Account* ff 176b,181b. According to the *Account* (ff 81b-82a) the *diwan-i subah* had to maintain detailed information regarding the *makan -i zamindari, haqiqat-i giras, raiyati* and *mehwas* and *bantha* and *raiyati*.

2. *Account*, ff . 175a-81b.

3. *Ibid*. f.178a

mawza Dhamaliya		
entire area	2904 *bigha*	
Habitations etc.	213 *bigha*	
Cultivable area	2691 *bigha*	
	: *bantha* *chauth-giras*	*raiyati*
	672 *bigha* 15 *biswa*	2018 *bigha* 5 *biswa*

Evidently the *talpad* protion of land is described as the *raiyati*.[1]

Secondly, the *talpad*, for that matter *raiyati* lands constituted part of this village otherwise called *talluqa-i girasia* (or *talluqa-i zamindar*).[2]

The detailed break up of area figures of 116 villages described as *talluqa-i mutafarriqa-i girasia* (in contradistinction to *talluqa-i zamindar*) in a document is recorded the following way.[3]

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1. For other instances, *Account*, ff. 279a-90b; 309a-32a

2. As noted earlier, *Account* and the *Mirat* state in very definite words that the lands of '*watans*' (*awtan*) and 'villages' of the Rajput and Kolis (i.e *zamindars* and the *girasias*) were divided into the *bantha* and *talpad* i.e. both the portion of land were thus there within one and the same village or villages.

3. *Yad-dasht dehat-i pargana* Kadi, *PC* Nos. 3b-4a, 6b-7b; *Account*, ff. 309a, 316a, 318b-9b, 320b-21b, 324a-25a, 327b, 330b.

	Mawza Nadri[1] (*pargana* Kadi)	Mawza Firozpur[2] (*pargana* Kadi)
(entire area)	= 725 *bigha*	= 750 *bigha*
(area under)habitations etc.	= 150 *bigha*	140 *bigha*
Cultivable area	= 575 *bigha*	610 *bigha*
raiyati	= 431 *bigha*	460 *bigha*
giras	= 144 *bigha*	150 *bigha*

It goes to establish it beyond doubt that the *raiyati* lands did exist within the *talluqa* villages. As such, the sway of the zamindar (*girasia*) did not cover the entire area even of the villages which were identified as *taalluqa-i girasia*, *taalluqa-i chauthia* or else as the *taalluqa-i (Superior) zamindar*[3] which we have discussed in Chapter I(2).

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1. *Dehat-i pargana* Kadi, *op.cit.*, *PC* No. 4a identifies the villages as held by a Bhat, a *chauthia*; read with *Account*, f. 331b.

2. *Dehat-i pargana* Kadi, *op.cit PC* No. 6a includes it in the villages of *girasia talluqa*;read with, *Account*, f. 352 a.

3. Cf. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*. pp 139-43; B R Grover, "*dehat-i talluqa*", *op.cit*, pp 166-67; N A Siddiqi, *op.cit*, pp 147-51.

It would threfore appear that the *talluqa* did not necessarily connote the exclusive zamindari possession, at least in the context of Gujarat.

Another set of evidence which furnishes details of cropped area under various titles (i.e. rights) goes to establish that the *talpad* could be identical to as well as different from the *raiyati* lands. Thus details of area statistics of *mawza* Aslali *pargana* (*haveli* Ahmadabad[1]) may be reproduced to establish the point of identity between the two --

(Total cropped area)	= 1206 *bigha*
1. *Raiyati*	= 1001 *bigha*
A - *Kameja kashta*	= 272 *bigha*
B - *Paikashta*	= 729 *bigha*
2. *Bantha-giras*	= 205 *bigha*

The entire cropped area of the village (1206) consisted of *raiyati* (1001 *bigha*) which may be identified as *talpad*, and the *bantha-giras* (205 *bigha*). In the present case the

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1. *Mazruat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad *mawza* Aslali, *fasl-i kharif* 1128 *fasli* (1720-21), RNo. 21, Pune. See also similarly entitled documents for the villages of Rasulpur (*kharif*, 1125 *fasli*). Jhondal, (*kharif* 1125 *fasli*). Jharoi (*rabi*, 1129 *fasli*), Goha (*kharif* 1131 *fasli*). R.No. 28 Pune; *PC* Nos. 153-7.

talpad may be identified as and equated with *raiyati*. Similar details available for *mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg* [1] (1714-15) may be cited to differntitate one from the other

Raqba (i.e. total cropped area)			= 647-10
1. *Talpad*		= 490-10	
(A) *Raiyati*	= 424-10		
(i). *Kameja* = 107-10			
(ii). *paikashta* = 317-0			
(B) *Napa-pusaita* = 66-00			
2. *Bantha-giras*		= 157-00	

It would thus appear that the entire cropped area of the village (647 *bigha*, 10 *biswa*) comprised *talpad* (490/10) and the *bantha-giras* (157/-). Secondly the area of *talpad* (490/10) is more by 66 *bigha*, than that of the *raiyati* (424/10) i.e. the *talpad* comprised the *raiyati* and the *Napa-pusaita* [2] which being 66 *bigha* speaks of the difference. Besides, the *raiyati* lands were constituted by the area held

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1. *Mazruat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif*, 1122 *fasli*, *mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*, *PC* Nos. 116-21; *Ibid*, 1126 and 1130 *fasli*, *PC* Nos. 110-14, 129-30; Similar documents for *mawza* Shaistabad (1125 *fasli*), Sorpur (1128 *fasli*). Sheikhpur (1131 *fasli*) and Gopalpur (1131*fasli*) for *kharif*, R.No. 31, Pune.

2. The *napa-pusaita* lands were held by the revenue grantees. For details please see following sections of the present Chapter.

by *kameja*(resident-cultivators, peasant proprietors) and the *paikasht*, non resident cultivators.[1]

It would, therefore, appear that the *talpad* and the *raiyati* alike denoted lands which did not constitute possessions of (Superior and) Primary zamindars. But the *raiyati* stood exclusive of the lands which had been set aside by way of revenue grants whether conditional upon or free of service.[2] Besides, the *raiyati* like *talpad* could be found in the villages which otherwise were identified as zamindari villages, at least within the ones lands of which were divided into *bantha* and *talpad*.[3]

It is thus evident that the sway of zamindari did not cover the entire countryside. Even wihtin the *talluqa* village Primary zamindars' economic claims could as such, be confined to the *bantha* portion alone still their association with the entire village was maintained, for the *bantha-dars*

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1. For a view of rights enjoyed by the *pais* and the *kamejas*, Satish Chandra, "Some Aspects of Indian Village Society in Northern India during the 18th century (The position of the Role of the *Khud-Kasht* and *Pahi Kasht*" Essays in *Honour of Prof. S.C. Sarkar*. (ed.) D. Banerjee, N Delhi. 1976, pp 245-6.

2. For the lands marked as *wazifa* (i.e. *madad-i' ma'sh*) beside *pusaita* being excluded of *raiyati* but included in the *talpad*, *mazruat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif*, 1127 *fasli*, *mawza* Palri Kakej, R.No. 21, Pune;.

3. But *raiyati* could also be there where *talpad* lands were non-existant.

were to keep watch and ward and police the villages of their respective possessions.[1]

To ensure that the Rajput and Kolis performed the required duty and that they did not create disturbance they were obliged to furnish reliable securities which were procured by *thanedars* and *faujdars*, and sometime by the *Nazim*[2].

Some information about the castes of the Primary zamindars is also available. A scrutiny of the evidence would suggest that though the *bantha* and *giras* lands were also held by the Jats, Ahirs, Bhats, Charans, Brahmans, Maliks and other Muslims but the Rajputs and Kolis were the dominant zamindari castes.[3] It is important to note that the clansman of the Superior zamindars and their brotherhood (*brathri*)and brethern (*brathran*) were amongst the holders of *giras* claims .They are moreover described the same way *brathran* or *brathri* in availble documents.[4] It is worth submitting that the recalcitrance is generally associated

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1. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, I.p. 174; *Account* f. 106a.

2. The *Nazim* had to ensure procurement of the securities from leading recalcitrants. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. pp. 173-4, 210, 303; *Account*, f. 106a, *Tamassuk*, Baroda, 99.

3. *Ain*, II, pp 120-4; *Account*, ff, 105b-6a, 175a-75b, 309a, 405a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp 173-74, *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 190, 211-8, 225, 228-29; *Mirat-i Sikandri*, pp. 363-64. *Dehat pargana* Kadi; *Op.cit.*

4. *Dehat pargana* Kadi; *op cit.*

and the rebellious elements are described in terms of castes[1].

The state seems to have been quite conscious of the recalitrance in its association with caste. Beside taking immediate steps of punitive nature against the rebels[2] it seems to have made preventive arrangement for controlling and containing the recalcitrants. Rebellious character of a caste seems to have gone a long way in determining the territorial extent of an administrative unit meant to enforce, among other, the law and order.[3] Then the rebellious *girasias* and their possessions could be placed under a separate administrative unit by dividing the existing one, prsumably for exerting greater pressure and maintaining

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1. Thus 'malevolent' Kolis and Kathis, *zxortallab* Jhala Rajput, 'distracted' Kolis, 'misguided' Kolis etc. are the most comman expressions used by Ali Muhammad Khan, the last *diwan-i subah*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I. pp 174, 178, 211. Also rebels from Akbar to Aurangzeb are described the same way *Ibid* I.pp. 173, 210-16, 220, 253-54, 292, 324-26, 330-343, and *Ibid* I.pp. 304, 331, 336-37, 345. It was presumably on account of close identity between caste and recalcitrance that is why caste, *mawas* and *giras* are used interchangeably as if no shade of distinction existed between them. *Tabqat-i Akbari*, II. pp. 381 390; *ibid*, III pp. 138, 184, 186; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p. 213 read with *Amal-i Saleh*, II, pp 339-40

2. See for instance, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp 190, 210-16, 220, 253-54, 292, 304, 324-26, 330-31, 333, 336-37, 343, 345.

3. *Account* f.405a The *Ain* too also specifies the *parganas* which were associated with a single zamindari-caste; please also see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp.203, 211-18.

strong vigil through the added strengh of troops.[1] Sometime additional troops were also posted to keep the Kolis and other within bounds.[2] The state also assessed the Rajputs and Kolis' personal (non-zamindari) lands at concesssional rates and granted them revenue free land.[3] Whether these favors were granted with a view to woe them is a matter of speculation. In spite of all these steps, the state does not seem to have suceeded much in managing the rebellious element, much less in changing their rebellious nature.[4] If therefore seems that the *zortalbi* had come to stay and was treated as *fait-accompli*. Since a drastie change in the caste compostion of zamindars of the *subah* could not be

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1. Thus in all 700 *sawars* were maintained to manage the Kolis of Azamabad, a small sized *pargana*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*, p. 190; for the *girasias* holding these village called *mehwasi*, *Account*, ff.175a-75b. Similarly *pargana* Jhalawar was broken into two (Viramgaon and Halwad) to contain *zortalab* Jhala Rajputs during Aurangzeb's reign. *Account* f 22a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi; Supplement*, pp.192, 219 cf *Ain* II, p, 249.

2. *Account*, f309a; *Mitatt-i Ahmad, Supplement*, pp.190, 192-3, 197.

3. *Account*, ff.202a-2b, 220b, 222a, 349b, 359b; Isa Tar Khan's *dastur*, *op.cit*; For the revenue grants please see discussion under Revenue Grantees in the following pages.

4. The villages and *parganas* wherein the state had reportedly applied coercive methods or granted concessions are continuously described as *zortalab* and generally with no revenue returns (*hasil nadarad*). *Account* ff.172a-72b, 224a-26b, 312b, 315a, 316b, 318a, 319a, 321a, 324a, 330a,. Besides the Kolis and Rajputs are continuously described the same way.

effected quite continuity in the caste-based recalcitrance is quite understandable. Under Aurangzeb incidents of recalcitrance seem to have increased further.[1]

Instead of taking a drastic step to effect change in caste composition of zamindars, Aurangzeb desperately resorted to inflicting the most severe punishment --"*girasias* and *zamindars* who are mischief mongers, rebellious and confirmed offenders should be killed".[2]

It may also be pointed out that there were also multi-caste zamindari holdings. Thus *bantha-giras* lands in village Kalba (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) were held by Ranji Koli, Saiyed Akram, Saiyed Inam, Malik Muhammad, Bhawan Parmar, Sangram Gohel and Jai Singh Jadav.[3] Similarly Charans, Bhats

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I pp. 253-4, 292, 324-6, 330-1, 333, 336-7, 343, 345; *Haqiqat-i Naziman-i Gujarati* makes the following observation for Aurangzeb's reign: *shokhi-o tamarrud an mardum (girasias) darin mulk azhar minash-shams ast.*

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p,279. It was also provided that "they could be killed on evidence against them." But the *qazi* released a number of *girasias* who had been imprisioned at the *chabutra-i kotwali*. Presumably the *faujdars* failed to bring evidence against them before the *qazi*. The emperor then ordered that. " after this confirmed (?) rebels should be confined to jail and not released" by the *qazi* (*Ibid.* p 304) They were to be detained without substantiative evidence It seems none from the villagers would take the risk of speaking against the *girasias*.

3. *Yad-dasht muqaddaman-o girasiaha waghaira mawza* Kalba, pargana *haveli* Ahmadabad. dt.1115 AH./1703 AD RNo.53 Pune.

Brahmans, Maliks and other Muslims held *bantha-chauth* lands in the villages of *pargana* Kadi.[1] But references to non-Rajput-Kolis appear only far and few between and negligible number of zamindars belonging to other castes would obviously not have affected the position of the dominant castes.

As regard the mode of possessing zamindari lands by the members of the same family, it could be held in two ways. In the first place the entire lands could be held collectively without effecting physical division of land. The share of each *girasia* in such cases was expressed in terms of *annas*.[2] But in some cases physical division of lands could be effected and each share, in such cases, recorded in terms of definite area unit.[3] Or else *pattis* (strips) of each *girasia* could be demarcated and marked.[4]

In the light of the preceding discussion it may be observed that the position of Primary zamindars in the *subah* is marked by inter-regional and intra-regional variations. As compared to the Superior zamindars, this category enjoyed a wider social base and commanded influence at grass roots

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1. *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Kadi, *op.cit*
2. *Bombay Gazetteer*, (Kaira), pp.82,89.
3. *Yad-dasht muqaddaman waghaira*, *op.cit*; *Yad-dasht bantha-daran mawza* Mehmudabad, *PC* No. 218
4. Hamilton Walter, *op.cit* I pp.640-1; *Treaties*, VI,p.267, *Bombay Gazetteer*, II p.211

level. Still it was exposed to bear the maximum of administrative burden, degree of which varied from place to place and time to time.

The Mughals attempted to reach the peasantry directly and thus contain the zamindars by reducing the area and degree of their control. The administration sought to manage them by exerting continual administrative pressure and maintaning a system of checks and balances. It also attempted to reduce their share. But it could not make effective inroads into the bastions of their power.

Though relatively docile, still the Primary zamindars were restive under the imperial hold. They tried to cash upon a favourable situation. Increasing recalcitrance could not be tackled by adopting harsh measures, much less bring about a qualitative change. Imperial attempts to exert pressure in greater degree met with appreciable success in the central part of the *subah*. But in terms of comprehensiveness over all imperial control seems to have been declining.

REVENUE GRANTEES

Like its predecessors the Mughal ruling class granted its rights in land or its usufruct to select individuals and establishments. The alienated rights were known as

milk, amlak, suyurghal and *madad-i ma'sh.*[1] There were *inam, inam-i altamgha* and *awkaf* grants which were different in name but were, in fact, very similar.[2] Still other grants were described as *pusalta, rawania, ranwatia* and *devasthan* which were indigenous in origin but had been retained by the Mughals who kept up the practice of making fresh grants under regional nomenclature.[3]

1. *IMPERIAL GRANTS*

A. *Madad-i'Ma'sh:* :

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1. For a detailed view of the terms Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p 298 & n. According to the *Ain* (I,p. 278) subsistence allowance paid in cash were called *wazifa*, lands conferred were called *milk* or *madad-i-ma'sh*. 'The two types of grants were covered by general term *suyurghal*'. N.A. Siddiqi, *op,cit* p 213.

   Later on, it seems, the suyurghal came to be replaced by *wazifa* which covered all grants, both in cash and kind. Thus the *Account* records the granted revenues and lands as under:

   Wazifa (pargana Bheel)

(a) *dams* : 203630 -	(i)	*madad-i ma'sh*	1,22,341
	(ii)	*ina'm*	61,289
	(iii)	*iwz-i rozina*	20,000

   (b) *arazi:* 4386 *bigha*, 6 *biswa* and 10 *biswansis*. *Account*, f 241a, see also *Ibid*, ff. 164a, 174bb, 183b, 203b, 218b.

2. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp 290, 312 & n.

3. The grants under regional nomenclature may broadly be categorized into (i) the *pusaita* lands held by intermediary zamindars and discussed in the preceding Chapter, (ii) the lands held by servants and artificers of village community and (iii) the ones held by persons who were regarded socially useful and influential.

   In the present discussion these grants are referred to as indigenous grants.

In view of the observation that the class of grantees "contributed in its own way towards the acceptance of Mughal authority by a considerable number of people"[1] a study of the recipients of imperial grants and their credentials appears to be imperative.

The *madad-i ma'sh* grants were not an exclusive monopoly, either in theory or in practice, of any caste and community. However these were more commonly held by Muslims and even among them by the *Sheikhs* and Saiyeds.[2] In Gujarat too the same people appear to have formed the dominant group throughout the seventeenth century. Emperor Akbar allowed the noted Shaikhs and Saiyeds to continue in their possessions granted earliar by Gujarati Sultans and also made fresh one.[3] Emperor Jahangir is percieved to have 'moderated Akbar's stern policy a little'.[4] The information contained in the *Tuzuk* and available documentary evidence goes to suggest that the Emperor showed his particular inclination towards the Sheikhs and Saiyeds of Gujarat and favoured

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1. JN Goswami and JS Grewal, *The Mughals and The Jogis of Jakhbar*, Simla, 1967, p 23.

2. *The Mughals and The Jogis of Jakhbar* pp 21-3; Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System;* pp 307 & n 39; 309n 47.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi; Supplement* pp 26-8, 233; *Junagadh, SC* No.79, Ex.1 (*mahal* Una).

4. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System* p 311.

them with *madad-i ma'sh* the lands size of which ranged from six bighas to an entire village.[1] But their fortunes seem to have touched a high water mark under Shah Jahan.

Under Shah Jahan the Sheikhs and Saiyed got *madad-i ma'sh* grants which were larger in size and also appear to be relatively numerous. The family of one Sheikh Muhammad Bukhari was recipient of villages, nine in number during his reign.[2] The Emperor also granted the same number of villages to Sheikh Fatto, *khadim-i rawza* (of?) beside 700 *bighas* of land under cultivation in 1629 and 1644.[3] One Saiyed Faizullah and Saiyed Azam were likewise granted five and two village respectively.[4] Similarly Saiyed Chand, Saiyed Idris and Saiyed Abdar Razaque were granted one village each by

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1. *Tuzuk*, I, pp, 419, 425-26, 439-40; *Junagadh* SC No 411 Ext . 1 and 2 (*mahal* Una); *Ibid*, SC No 625 Exs. 5/4 and 5/6 (*mahal* Kutiyana) *Ibid* SC No 894 Exs 12 and 14 (*mahal* Kutiyana);. *Ibid*, SC no. 1162 Ex. 1 (*mahal* Una); *Ibid* SC No 1192 (*mahal* Una); *Haqiqat madad-i ma'sh*, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1080 AH; f 9b, R No 22.

2. *Junagadh* SC No 2 Ex. 1, SC Nos 413, 420, 1137, 1162, 1192 (*mahal* Una).

3. *Ibid*, SC Nos 426, Exs 1 to 1d; 912, Ex Nos. 3,5 and 7.

4. *Ibid* SC No 425 (*mahal* Una).

the same emperor.[1] Besides, the emperor also granted lands the area of which ranged from 20 to 750 bighas to other Sheikhs and Saiyeds in large numbers.[2]

Under Aurangzeb too the Sheikhs and Saiyeds seem to have formed a dominant group but the area of land per individual-grantee appears to be less than the one under Shah Jahan. As per the available evidence the size of grant given as *madad-i ma'sh* generally ranged between 20 and 100 *bighas*, but in few instances it happened to be more than that.[3] Though Aurangzeb also granted entire village but the number

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1. *Ibid*, SC No 105, Exs 21 and 27; *Ibid* SC No 483, Exs. 22/3 to 22/7 (*mahal* Pattan Deo); *Ibid*, SC No 554, Exs, E-1, 1/2, 1/3, 2/1, 2/5 (*mahal* Una).

2. *Haqiqat-i madad-i ma'sh*, *op.cit*, ff 2a to 21b; *parwanas, chakhamas and parwanchas*, R Nos 21, 29 and 39, Pune; *PC* No 284/41G/Bharoch.

3. Area-wise break up of little more than 110 traceable grants made in favour of Sheikhs and Saiyeds of Gujarat by Aurangzeb may be summarised as under:

No. of grants	*Size of grants (in bighas)*
3	150 to 200
7	100 to 145
20	60 to 95
75	5 to 50
5	each comprising an entire village.

Junagadh, SC No. 429 (*mahal* Una); *Ibid*, SC No 1123, Ex 10; *Ibid*, SC No 1190, Ex 9/3, 9/4 (*mahal* Kutiyana); *Ibid* SC Nos 853, 893 (*mahal* Mangrole); *Sanad*, *parwanas*, R Nos. 21,23, 27; *Haqiqat-i madad-i ma'sh*, 1080 AH, *op cit*; Saiyed Sardar Haider's (Bharoch), Private Collection, un-indexed; *PC* No. 286/41/G. Please also see following notes.

of such grants comes to five[1] which as compared to Shah Jahan's reign is apparently less.

The above mentioned Sheikhs and Saiyeds were by and large, associated with the mausoleoms(*rozah*) of *sufi*-saints where *urs* were organized and the Prophet's birth day was celebrated[2], the places and occassions of public attraction. Still other Sheikhs and Saiyeds received *madad-i ma'sh* grants because of their association with the *madarsahs*, the places of higher learning where Non-Muslims also could acquire education.[3]

Besides there were other Muslims who were likewise favoured with *madad-i-ma sh* grants on the grounds of poverty, large family establishment (Kasrat-ul ayal), orphanage, unemployment and some unspecified reasons. They were continuosly favoured from emperor Jahangir to emperor Aurangzeb with grants, the size of which generally ranged between 18

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1. Aurangzeb's *farman*, dt 17 Shawwal, 18 RY, *Sajjada Nashin, dargah* Edroosia, Surat; *Mirat-i Ahmadi; Supplement*, pp 37-8,

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*, pp 68,70-2, and docs. cited in the preceding notes.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi; Supplement*, pp 31, 40, 57-8, 67-9; Sheikh Bahadur, *Haqiqat al Surat*, Bombay 1897, pp 18, 39-40, 74; KM Jhaveri, *Gujaratio-e Lakhela Farasi Grantha*, Ahmadabad, 1945. p 61; MA Qureshi, *Muslim Education and learning in Gujarat* (1297-1758), Baroda, 1972, pp 70-1; 135-7, 169-70, 233-39; N.N. Law, *The Promotion of learning in India During Muhammadam Rule*, Longman, 1916, p 188; MS Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat* II p 196.

and 60 *bighas* and in a few instances it could be as more as 100,140 and 1300 *bighas*.[1] Then Muslim women were likewise favoured with the *madad-i ma'sh* grants as direct recipients as well as under the decrees and rules governing inheritance.[2]

Non-Muslims were also favoured with the grant of *madad-i ma'sh* lands from the time of conquest down to the onset of the eighteenth century.

Emperor Akbar granted Kaiqubad, a Parsi, 300 *bighas* of land together with palm and date trees in *pargana* Navsari (*Sarkar* Surat) by way of *madad-i ma'sh*.[3] He also favoured one Somji Bhat (bad farosh) with a *madad-i ma'sh* grant comprising 30 *bighas* of land, an orchard and *mawza* Ahmadpur entirely (*dar-o bast*).[4] Emperor Jahangir also granted two

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1. *Junagadh*, SC No 554/1 (*mahal* Junagadh); *Ibid*, SC No 553 Ex. 5/3; *Ibid*, SC No 554 (*mahal* Una); *Ibid*, SC No 894, Ex 16 (*mahal* Kutiyana); *Ibid*, SC No 893 (*mahal* Mangrole); *Haqiqat madad-i ma'sh*, *op cit*, 10b; *Haqiqat-i aimma pargana haveli* Ahmedabad R No 21 to cite few representative examples.

2. *Baroda*, 57, 70-73, 75-6, 79-82, 84; *Haqiqat-i madad-i ma'sh*, ff 1b, 7a, 12a-14b; SH Desai's private collections No 16/14-2.

3. S H Hodivala, *Studies in Parsi History*, Bombay, 1920, pp. (photographic reproduction); Jivanji Jamshedji Modi *The Parsee at the court of Akbar*, Bombay 1903, pp 91 ff.

4. *Junagadh*, SC No 1201 Ex. 4/3 (*mahal* Junagadh); His desscendents were confirmed in the grant by Emperor Aurangzeb, in 1097 AH/1684 *Ibid*, SC No 263 (*mahal* Junagadh).

villages entirely to Shankar Bhat along with descendents in *pargana* Mangrole (*sarkar* Soreth); 10 *bighas* of land to Chandu Sanghvi, a Jain in *mawza* Akbarpur (*pargana* Chawrasi); 100 *bighas* of land to two Parsi priests, Mulla Jamasp and Mulla Hoshang of Navsari (*sarkar* Surat) and 15 *bighas* of land to Sukhdev Purohit for laying down a garden in the vicinity of Ahmadabad.[1]

Tradition was kept up under Shahjahan and Aurangzeb. Shah Jahan granted one Naraindas Bhat 15 *bighas* of land (1634) by way of *madad-i ma'sh* in *pargana* Una (*sarkar* Soreth).[2] Aurangzeb added 45 *bighas* of land (1670) together with a well to his possession in the same *pargana*.[3] Bhan Singh, another Bhat, was granted *mawza* Tari (*pargana* Kutiyana alias Muzaffarabad, *sarkar* Soreth) entirely and 3350 *bighas* of land in another village sometime during Shah Jahan's reign. Qutubuddin Khan Khweshgi, *faujdar* of Soreth, during the opening years of Aurangzeb's reign, resumed the grant. When the matter was brought to his notice, Emperor

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1. *Ibid*, SC No 995 Exs 11/1, 11/2; *Bhanu Chand Charitra*, pp 86-8; Muni Vidya Vijaya, *Surishwar and Samrat*, pp 388-89; "A *farman* of emperor Jahangir in favor of two Parsees of the Dordi family of Naosari" *J.B.B.R A S;* (1919-20), pp 419-20; *Naql chaknamah*, *PC* No 245. The Jain was granted land for the purpose of building a temple, laying a garden and a memorial in honour of the deceased Jain Acharya Vijyaya Sena Suri.

2. *Junagadh*, SC No 40 Ex 6/5 (*mahal* Una).

3. *Ibid*, SC No. 40 Ex. 6/4 (*mahal* Una).

Aurangzeb ordered its restoration.[1] Bhaval and Raghunath, the Bhats acquired two villages and two *mahals* of orchard from Shah Jahan and confirmatory *farman* of Aurangzeb after they had been disturbed in their possession by the local *faujdar*.[2] Aurangzeb bestowed upon Narottamdas and other Bhats the villages of Sardari and Baori and 15 *bighas* of land in 1697 by way of *madad-i ma'sh* grants.[3] One Vasudev, a Brahman, was likewise granted 15 *bighas* of land by the same emperor.[4]

The bulk of the *madad-i ma'sh* grants were conferred without imposing any condition in return.[5] But some grants were conditional which though called *madad-i ma'sh* were,

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1. *Ibid*, SC No 1009 (*mahal* Kutiyana) ; The Emperor added yet another village, Choolyana, to his possession. *Ibid*, SC No 996A, Ex A/1 (*mahal* kutiyana)

2. *Ibid*, SC No 995 Exs 11/1, 11/2, 11/5, 15/1 (*mahal* Kutiyana).

3. *Ibid*, SC No 992 (*mahal* Mangrole).

4. *Ibid* SC No 70 and 171, (*mahal* Sutrapara); All these grantees are noticed in their possessions as late as 1880-90. Also see please SH Hodivala, *Studies in Parsi History*, p 178. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p 311 & n 55.

5. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System* p 311.

however, different from the ordinary grants.[1] Significant among these grants was the one held by a physician. The grant consisting of 100 *bighas* of land was conditional '*mashroot*' upon his service of treating the patients (*Khidmat-i mualja-i marizan*).[2] Then Emperor Aurangzeb also granted village and hills of Palitana to Satidas jeweller, a Jain, in his capacity as a leading member of the sawak (Jain) community with the provision that the grass and timber etc. which was found on the hills would 'belong to the sawak community and that 'whosoever' would 'guard the hills and the temple (*devasthan*) should be entitled to the income of Palitana'.[3]

B-INA'M

The *ina'm* grants appear to have been less numerous than the *madad-i ma'sh* and unlike the latter were generally held

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1. The *qazis*, *muftis* and the *muhtasibs* were ex-officio holders ofthese grants. But these lands were not counted as part of *madad-i ma'sh, ina'm* etc. which were granted free of obligation. *Account* ff. 174b read with 96a; *Ibid*, ff 213a, 214a 338a read with, ff 96a, 97b. The official positions tended to be hereditary and therefore the lands too came to be held likewise. *Ibid*, ff96a-100a.

2. *Ibid*, f 97b; The physician could also be granted *madad-i ma'sh* lands free of condition in recognition of their service of treating "the poor and indignents". Hodivala, *Studies in Parsi History*, pp 167, 188; Likewise Khan Muhammad who was engaged in teaching in *pargana haveli* Pattan was granted *madad-i ma'sh* lands. *Account* f 97b.

3. MS Commissariat, *Imperial Mughal farmans in Gujarat*. plate No XX.

by Non-muslims.[1] Emperor Shah Jahan granted (1634) a piece of *chahi* land measuring 15 *bigha* in the vicinity of Delwara (*pargana* Una, *sarkar* Soreth) to Naraindas, a Bhat.[2] The Emperor also confirmed Bhavanidas and Narottamdas (1638) in the *ina'm* possession of *mawza* Sarhari and Baori and 150 *bigha* of land (*pargana* Mangrole) which their deceased father had held on the basis of *sanads* issued earlier.[3] Likewise the Emperor confirmed Shantidas, Ratanji and Lakshmi Chand in the *ina'm* possession after the death of Vardhman and Panju who held it alongwith their sons since 1628.[4] Similar-

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1. Of the known recipients of *ina'm* lands only five belonged to Muslim community. *Junagadh*, SC No 105, Exs 21,27 (*mahal* Sutrapara); *Ibid* SC No 481 (*mahal* Una); *Ibid*, SC No 853 (*mahal* Kutiyana); *Baroda*, 65; Hakim Ruhulla Bharochi was given villages of Than, Sarvadi (*pargana* Oklesar) and Kukrawada (*pargana* Bharoch) by way of *madad-i ma'sh* after the physician had correctly diagnosed emperor Jahangir's cause of illness and treated the empress Nur Jahan. The Empress granted these villages by a *hukm*, dt 22nd julus/1627 AD, of her own. Village of Chawaj was given as *ina'm* by the emperor vide his *farman* dt. 24 Rabi, I, 1032 AH/1623AD. After the physician's death in 1649-50 his sons were granted the three *madad-i ma'sh* villages by way of *ina'm* vide Prince Murad's *hasb-ul hukm*. These documents are available with Sardar Saiyed Haider *Inamdar* of Bharoch. Copies of the same are there in Bharoch commission's Report of 25 Aug 1805, District Record office, Bharoch.

2. *Junagadh*, SC No 406 Ex 6/4 (*mahal* Una).

3. *Ibid*, SC No 992 (*mahal* Mangrole) Aurangzeb added 45 *bighas* of *chahi* land alongwith a well in 1670. *Ibid* SC No 406 Ex 6/5 (*mahal* Una).

4. M S Commissariat, *Imperial Mughal Farmans*, Plate Nos VIII and VIIIa.

ly another Bhat- family held *mawza* Bhadora (*pargana* Kutiyana) by way of *ina'm* from sometime before 1654.[1] The same emperor had also granted *mawza* Ramlori (*pargana* Petlad) to Barsa and Jatlan, Charans on condition of keeping vigil etc (*b'shart-i muhafat-w khabardari-i rah-w daf'mutamarridan*).[2]

Emperor Aurangzeb had ordered (1672-73) the "resumption of all grants held by Hindus"[3], and thus, it is observed, 'completely reversed Akbar's policy'.[4] Following the order the above mentioned *mawza* Ramlori granted by Shah Jahan was resumed.[5] But on the Charans' representation the grantee was allowed to retain the same.[6] But the same emperor granted *mawza* Rakhyal *khurd* (pargana *haveli* Ahmadabad) by way of *ina'm* to Naraindas.[7] Likewise Bikhudas and Jagjiwandas were granted *mawza* Asja (*pargana* Mangrole) sometime during Shujat Khan's period of *subedari* (d.1701) confirmed in their possession in 1703 and are noticed in possession in 1729.[8]

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1. *Junagadh* ,SC No.894 (*mahal* Kutiyana).
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, I,p* 288.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System* p 311 and n 55.
5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I,p. 288.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Haqiqat-i aimma pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *op cit* f 72.
8. *Junagadh* SC No 286 Ex. 'A' (*mahal* Mangrole).

In 1704 the same emperor granted 200 *bighas* of *chahi* and *barani* land by way of *ina'm* to Mohanji and Raghunath.[1] Also the Kolis of Chunwal, Amar Singh Bhat of *mawza* Ropra (*pargana* Idar) and Kanhaji Brahman of Mogdi (*pargana* Idar) are noticed in their *ina'm* possession from Aurangzeb's times to the reign of Muhammad Shah.[2] Non-Muslims who had been granted lands from Akbar to Aurangzeb in *sarkar* Soreth under whatever nomenclature and refered to in the present discussion, continued to hold the same as late as, if not later than, 1880-90.[3] Aurangzeb's above quoted order may, therefore, be regarded as a' statement of policy'[4] which was hardly followed even by himself.

There were other grants which, though not given any name, were however identical to the ones mentioned above. Emperor Akbar granted (1592) hills of Sidhanchal, Girnar, Taranga, Abu etc (*subah* Gujarat) to Hirvijya Suri, Acharya

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1. *Ibid* SC No 668 Ex 8/4.

2. *Yad-dasht dehat tappa* Chunwal, *amla pargana* Jhalawar *PC* No R-1; *Account*, ff 170b, 171b.

3. All the *Junagadh* Settled case files and documents stand testimony to this fact.

4. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p 311 & n 55. The only available instance of resumption of grant held by a Non-muslim is the one already mentioned.

of Jain Swetamber community.[1] The Emperor also granted (1595) 30 *bighas* of land and an orchard to Somji, a Bhat in *pargana haveli* Junagadh (*sarkar* Soreth).[2] Emperor Jahangir granted 15 *bighas* of land to the sons of Sukhmal Purohit.[3] Emperor Shah Jahan granted 39 *bigha* and 15 *biswas* (1651) of land under cultivation to Raizada Gopaldas (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad).[4] The Emperor also bestowed 39 *bighas* of land and a well upon Bhakar and Mordas.[5]

The nature of rights enjoyed by the grantees seems to have been qualified by the composition of the lands so granted. The grantee was not invested 'with any rights not claimed previously by the state'.[6] The state merely 'transferred its rights over the revenues of the area thus alien-

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1. For the fascimile of the *farman* see *Memorial of the firm of Sheth Anandji-Kalyanji as the Representative of the Jain community in India in reference to their grievances about certain rights Re the Shatranjya Hills.* The Times of India Press, Bombay, n.d.pp. 25-6.

2. *Junagadh* SC No 263 (*mahal* Junagadh); *Ibid.* SC No 1201, Ex 4/3.

3. Chakhamah, dt 22 safar, 1061 AH/1650, *PC* No 245. Since part of the grant originally demarcated had been covered in habitations, the grantee was given the land at another place under Shah Jahan's orders.

4. *PC* Nos 86.

5. *Ibid*, No 273; for similar grant by Aurangzeb *Junagadh*, SC No 893 Ex 1 (*mahal* Kutyana); *Ibid*, SC Nos 838, 847 Ex 2 (*mahal* Kutiyana).

6. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p.299.

ated in grants'.[1] The grants generally consisted of the cultivable waste and the lands already under cultivation.[2] The state was 'the proprietor of all the jungles, unreclaimed and unappropriated waste land" whereas the appropriated land 'was owned by certain categories of the *riaya*'.[3]

The grantee enjoyed the right to develop the waste land on their own, or get it cultivated with the help of hired labour or the tenants. Such tenants would not be evicted so long as they paid the stipulated share regularly to the grantee.[4] But the land developed by him would be retained by the grantee even after the grant was resumed.[5] In the lands already under cultivation the rights of the grantee for the revenues and the 'land owner ship rights' of the self-culti-

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1. BR Grover," Elements of continuity and change..." p 14.

2. Emperor Akbar had provided to give half of the area already cultivated and the other half in cultivable waste, called *ufta-dab*, *banjar-Laiq-i zira't*. (*Ain*, I p 179). But the rule was not strictly adhared to. The general trend appears to have been to alienate the minimum of revenue-paying (*mazrua*) lands. *Junagadh*, SC Nos. 79, 89,842, 894 (*mahal* Una); *PC* NO.284 /Bha/ 41g; *Junagadh*, SC NO. 849, 894 Ex 3/3 (*mahal* Kutiyana); *PC* No 273.

3. BR Grover, "Elements of continuity....". p 8.

4. *Tamassuk* dt. 1082 *fasli*, Sardar Saiyed Haider's private collection. Unindexed; BR Grover. "Elements of continuity...." p 16.

5. *Mazruat wazifa mawza* Khatwara. *PC* No 152; *Tamassukh* 1082 *fasli*, *op. cit*; *Khasra mazruat taraf* Rajpur, 1149 *fasli* *PC* No 163, see also *PC* No 93b; BR Grover "Elements of Continuity," p 16.

vating *riaya* co-existed.[1]

Secondly, the grantee's claim over the revenues *vis a vis* the state was also qualified by the nature of ablienated area. In the first place, the cultivable waste (*banjar-liaq-i zirat* or *uftadah-laiq-i zirat*) is described as *kharif az jama* i.e excluded from the *jama* (not assessed for paying revenues) at the time of making grants. From the available evidence it appears further that the *uftadah* lands even after they had been reclaimed but continued to be held in grant, were not assessed for fixing the *jama*.[2] On the other the *mazrua* portion of granted land stood already assessed. The individual-grant and grantee-wise *jama* was ascertained

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1. *Khatabandi* Palri Kochrab, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad. *PC* NO 77; BR Grover "Elements of Continuity." pp 15-6; see also *PC* Nos 163 and 93b, *op cit*.

2. The *Ain* specifies the '*jama* alienated under *suyurghal*, obviously the revenue otherwise demanded by the state from the lands already under cultivation.

   The *Mirat* specifies (a) *Jama* in *dams* (b) area of land (not covered by the *jama* and (c) the amount given in cash. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 25-6). The area with no *jama* obviously is of the *uftadah* lands which remained unassessed. It goes without saying that the grantees did bring the *uftadah* lands under cultivation after the grant had been made.

   One Saiyed Tahir was granted 45 *bighas* - 15 *bighas* already under cultivation and 30 *bighas* out of *uftadah* lands - as *madad-i-ma'sh* sometime during Shah Jahan's reign. The position in regard to *jama* in 1081 *fasli*/ 1673 is stated as under:

   30 *bigha* - *dam nadarad*
   15 *bigha* - 3150 *dam*
   Haqiqat madad-i-ma'sh, ff 9a and 7b. RNo 22, Pune.

after the *chak* had been demarcated. The same was recorded alongwith the area of land, assessed revenue and the *hasil* (*baqaid-i jama-o hasil*).[1] Since the state is understood to have alienated its 'rights over the revenues', the question whether the state granted a specified *jama* or else the grant stood independent of the (revisible) amount of *jama*, may be answered with the information contained in the document entitled *haqiqat-i madad-i ma'sh*.

The grantee's claim over the grant seems to have been qualified by the amount of *jama* and the *hasil* of the granted land. Thus one Saiyed Saeed was granted 125 *bighas* and 14 *biswas* of *mazrua* land sometime before 1071 AH/1660 AD. Its *jama* was worked out and it stood at 50,000 *dams* Conquent upon the upward revision (1081 *fasli*/1673 AD) the *jama* of the same land was fixed at 53027. The grantee paid Rs 56/- against the difference (3027-dams) of the amounts of *jama*.[2] To cite another representative example, a grantee was given *mazrua* lands which initially carried a *jama* of 71500 *dams*. Later the *jama* was revised and fixed at 1,60,000 *dams* some-

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1. The Revenue Department maintained details of the alienated *jama* for the grantee, village, *pargana*, *sarkar* and then for the entire *subah*. *Account*, f 100a;. The document which carried grantee and village-wise details for each *pargana* was called *haqiqat-i madad-i ma'sh*. *Ibid*; One such document is available in the Pune collection. *op cit*.

2. *Haqiqat-i madad-i ma'sh* op *cit* f 223a.

time before 1673 AD. The grantee was allowed exemption (*izafa muaf shude*) from paying the revenues against the enhanced *jama*.[1] The state did not necesssarily realize the revenues against the difference. Instead the area of land corresponding to the difference (*arazi bazyaft*)[2] in *jama* was realized.

In some cases the difference in the amounts of *hasils* originally granted and the increased one at later stage could likewise be realized.[3]

But, then, all the grantees do not appear to have enjoyed rights which were qualified by specified *jama* and/or *hasil*. Such grants were therefore described and held as *bila-qaid-i dami-o hasil*. The principle of resumption (*baz yafti*)was not applicable to them and the grantees not required to pay any amount of revenues to the state.[4] Besides, the grantees who held villages 'entirely' (*dar-o bast*) were

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1. *Ibid* f 219 a see also *Ibid* ff 167a-69b.

2. *Ibid* f 211a see also *Ibid* ff 115a-23b

3. Thus a person was granted a piece of cultivated land the *hasil* of which stood at Rs 394/4 *annas*. By the year 1673 the *hasil* figure rose to Rs 642/10 *annas*. The difference which being Rs 293/6 *annas* was realized by the state. *Ibid* f 56a see also *Ibid* ff 88a-92b

4. *Ibid*, f 97a see also *Ibid* ff 86a-89b. It may however be pointed out that part of the possession could be resumed at the time of confirmation in the inheritted possessions. All the available instances pertaining to the *ina'm* lands record the grant under the expressions, *bila qaid jama-o hasil*. *Ibid* f 15.

required to surrender a portion of revenues and therefore not allowed to enjoy the whole of revenues taken from the peasantry.[1]

The state maintained detailed account of the cropped area for both the crop seasons of the alienated lands presumably to effect detailed assessment through its own revenue machinery.[2] Also the *sadarat* maintained its *mutasaddis* to ensure that the *mutasaddis* of *diwani* would not levy taxes exemption from which had been granted.[3] Sometime the *faujdars* and the *subedars* resumed the grants which had to be restored after imperial intevention.[4] The grantees, by the closing years of Aurangzeb's reign, had grown bold enough as they are reported to have defied the *diwan's* orders and did not "produce their *sanads* for inspection".[5]

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1. *Ibid.* ff 23a-9b ; please also see *yad-dasht-haqiqat-i paidaish pargana* Dholqa *sarkar* Ahmadabad fasl-i kharif.. 1130 *fasli* (*PC* Nos 14-17) which separately specifies '*jama b mae bazyafti aimma*' (*Ibid*, 14b), collection from the *dehat-i-aimmadaran* (*Ibid* 15b) under *mal-o jihat* and then *bazyaft iaimma waghaira* under *sair jihat* (*Ibid*, 16a).

2. The *mazruat* documents cited in the preceding discussion stand testimony.

3. *Account* ff.100 a & b

4. Junagadh, SCNo 1009 (*mahal* Kutiyana); *Ibid* SC No 995 Exs. 11/1 to 11/4, 15/1 (*mahal* Kutiyana)

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi;I* p 335. The *diwan* therefore appproached the emperor who issued a *farman* asking the grantees to produce their *sanads*. *Ibid*.

In the year 1690 Emperor Aurangzeb issued a *farman* declaring that thereafter "the lands of the grantees would be retained completely and fully, without loss or reduction by the heirs of the deceased grantee generation after generation".[1] Still the state maintained rules governing succession. As per these rules the grantees' descendents were not necessarily allowed to in- herit the possessions entirely though it was not invariably the case.[2] Whether these rules which stood unamended were actually enforced is not known. Aurangzeb's order had however placed the grantees on equal foolings with the Primary zamindars.

INDIGENOUS GRANTS

Contemporary and near contemporary sources also refer to other revenue-grants which were known as *pusaita*, *shasun*, *nakru*, *rawania*, *ranwatia*, *haria*, *halia*, *dharamdeva* and *devasthan*.[3]

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1. Emperor Aurangzeb's *farman cited* in Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System.* p.306 & n36

2. *Account*, ff, 100b-101a

3. The terms stand for the grants which the Britisher categorised as 'personal' (*jat inam*) and the 'institutions'. Among the former were the *haria* (given to the family of a person who died fighting for the village); *ranwatia* (given to the 'warriors' family who died in an attack on the enemy), and *halia* (tombstone field) given for support of a tomb in memory of some Charan, Bhat or Brahman who had killed himself in the interest of the village. The other category comprised the grants which were meant for the maintenance of temples (*devasthan*,

Granted by the native chiefs and the village communities 'according' to the ancient customs' to patronise families and persons of various description regarded 'useful to the community.[1] These custom-based grants were honoured by the Mughal administration also. However these grantees were generally meted out a differential treatment and their grants were not equated with the imperial grants discussed above.[2]

The *pusaita* lands were found almost in every part of the *Subah*. On the basis of their holders the contemporary documents categorise the *pusaita* into *pusaita apa* and the *pusaita na'pa*.[3] The two forms were meted out different treatments.

...Continued...

dharamdeva or *dharamdan*), mosques and tombs, The *pusaita* which were more common and identical to zamindari lands, will be discussed below. It may be pointed out here that in Kaira region *pusaita* was known as *nakru* and in Idar it could be called *shasun*. In other parts *haria*, *yachuk* and *nakru* could be applied to the *pusaita* itself. *Bombay Govt. Rev. Sel.* XXXIX, New Series, p. 23; *The East India papers*, III. p. 708; *Tarikh-i Soreth*, ff. 205-6; Baden powell, *Land System of British India*; III, PP. 300-2.

1. *Rasmala*, pp. 306, 321; *Bombay Govt. Rev. Sel*, XXXIX, New Series, p. 23; Baden Powell, *Land System of British India*, III. pp. 301-2.

2. These grants were neither recorded with nor counted as part of *madad-i ma'sh* etc. Also there were separate *dastur-ul amals*, as will be seen below, for the *pusaita* etc.

3. *Dastur-ul amal* of Isa Tar Khan's period of *subedari* *PC* Nos. 45-6; *Mazruat* Docs. *mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg* *PC* No. 114; *Account*, ff. 340, 350a.

The *napa-pusaita* lands were held by the *ahl-i khidmat*[1] (the service rendering pepole) and the ones other than the serving pepole (*siwai ahl-i khidmat*).[2] Beside the artificers the other holders of the *napa-pusaita* are identified as the Jogis, Brahmans, Bhats, Charans, Kolis and the persons attached to the mosques and tombs of saints.[3]

There were then the *pusaita* lands which, on the basis of its holders' caste, bore caste-appellations. Thus we come across *pusaita-i Koliyan, pusaita-i zinnardaran* and *pusaita-i badfaroshan*.[4] Later on the British found the Gosains, Bairagis, Brahmans Bhats, Saiyeds, descendents of 'noble'

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1. Among the *ahl-i khidmat* are mentioned the *pagi* (the tracker), *qasid* (the village messenger)' *halalkhor* (scavanqer) *hajjam* (the barber), *bhagalia* (?) and *dehdan* (?) *Dastur-ul amal* (Prince Aurangzeb). *PC* No. 49; also the references cited in the preceeding note. These serving people seem to have held these lands conditional upon service and may not be regarded as revenue grantees. Later on the British also regarded them as "the inferior class of village servants" who were regarded as part and parcel of the village community. *Bombay Govt. Rev. Sel*; III. p. 649. The *Account* (f.302) describe them as *lazim-i abadani-i deh.*

2. Among the artificers are mentioned tailor (*Khabbat*) carpenter, (*darudqar*) iron-mith (*ahangar*) potter (*Kazar*) shoesmaker (*mochi*), *rebari* (?) and *Kalal* (?) *Account* ff 339a, 340a; *Mazruat* Docs, *PC* NOs. 99, 114, 120, 125-126, 128, 146, 149, 164, THe present section held the lands obviously for the professional indispensible services rendered by them to the village community.

3. *Account*, ff.182a, 302, 339a-40a; *PC* NOs 99, 120 126, 128, 146, 149-50, 164; *dastur-ul amal* (Ghairat Khan), *PC* Nos 47; *Ibid* (Aurangzeb) , No. 51.

4. *Mazruat* Docs. *P.C.* Nos 94, 98, 9, 146, 159; *Account* ff. 339a, 340a

Hindu and Muslilm families in possession of the *pusaita* lands from earlier times.[1] As such these lands were held, among others, by the members belonging to high caste, the ones associated with the high caste people and the Kolis--the caste which was particularly singled out for its refractory attitude.[2]

The *apa pusaita* lands were held by the Kolis, Upadhyai, Mehta, Brahmans, Bhats, Muslims and others.[3] The basis of holding these lands is however not known.

The *devasthan* lands were similarly spread over the villages. From the detailed statiscal account of the lands of villages of *pargana* Kadi (*sarkar Ahmadabad*) it would appear that 105 out of 282 villages had the *devasthan* lands area of which ranged between 1 and 25 *bighas*.[4]

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1. *Bombay Govt. Rev.Sel.* III, p.649; *Bombay Gazetteer* II, p.49.

2. For the references about Kolis please see the discussion in the preceding pages.
According to the *Rasmala* the influence of the Bhats and Charans was very powerful. (p 572.) They were closely connected with the Rajputs (*ibid*, p.558); They were in "some places cultivators, in other bankers, but their more legitimate occupations are those of acting as securities and recording the genealogies of their Rajpoot clients". Person of Bhat and Charan was held "sacred". *Ibid*.

3. *PC* Nos 146.

4. *Account* .ff. 309a - 32a.

The *pusaita* grants were made by the Mughals also. One Mahadji was granted 45 *bighas* of land (*mawza* Pastwara, *pargana* Somnath Pattan) by way of *pusaita* in 1629 AD to put a well into use for irrigation purposes. He was also granted exemption from paying irrigation cess (*mehsul-i chah*)under the same grant.[1] Two Charans, Lekha and Rana were granted (1668) 20 plots (*gita's*) of land from *mawza* Batwa (*pargana* Batwa) and 16 plots of land in *mawza* Badola (*pargana* Man-grole) by way of *pusaita* out of *Khalsa* lands on condition of performing watch and ward (*b'shart-i khidmat chowki-o pehra dehat*).[2] Similarly a son of the *desai* who had been murdered by a *patel* was granted 85 *bigha* of *chahi* and *barani* lands and a well by way of *pusaita* by emperor Aurangzeb.[3]

The holders of *pusaita* rights were not necessarily the cultivators themselves. Like the *madad-i ma'sh* lands the *pusaita* could be *khudkasht* as well as the one held and cultivated by the peasants.[4]

The *pusaita* lands could be subject to payment of a portion of revenues to the state and therefore the grantee didnot enjoy full exemption. During Isa Tar Khan's period of

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1. SH Desais private collection NO 14/(1)2.
2. *Junagadh*, ScNO 224 (*mahal Mangrole*)
3. SH Desais private collection, Nos. 14/1 (5) and 14/1 (6).
4. *FC* Nos. 164b, 210-11.

subedari holders of the *naps pusaita* enjoyed complete exemption from paying revenue to the state.[1] But prince Aurangzeb demanded two third of revenues and eight *annas* per *bigha* on the *napa pusaita* of Brahmans and Bhats; entire revenue from the *pusaita* of village artisans and half of the revenues from the ones of village-servants.[2] Ghairat Kahn, prince Dara's *naib* granted full exemption to the *ahl-i khidmat*, demanded only two third of revenues from the artisans and the Bhats and Brahmans but they were allowed exemption from paying 8 *annas* per *bigha* as demanded under Aurangzeb.[3] The prince also demanded two third of revenues from the rest of the holders of *napa pusaita*. Ghairat khan fixed the state demand @ Rs. 1/4 *annas* per *bigha*.[4]

The holders of *apa-pusaita* were to pay a third of the revenues of the reclaimed *banjar* and two third of the same of lands already under cultivation during both the crop seasons under Isa Tarkhan.[5] But prince Aurangzeb demanded

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1. *PC* Nos. 42a; The same position continued during the reign of Aurangzeb and later on in *pargana* Arharmatar and Kadi *Account* ff 182a,302a-b.

2. *PC* No. 51.

3. *Ibid*, No. 47b.

4. *Ibid*. Nos. 47b, 51.

5. *Ibid* Nos. 41b, 45b, 46a.

entire revenues during the *rabi* crop season.[1] Ghairat Khan restored the status-quo ante. [2] The rates as enforced by Ghairat khan seem to have remained unchanged.

In brief it may be seen that the Mughals not only continued the grants, extended due patronage to the regional customs by keeping up the old grants and making new grants in the local fashion. Regardless of their usefulness for the Mughal state, the grantees appear to be the persons having social roots which, apparently, forced the Mughals to renew the old grants and make fresh one, The Mughals however did not allow the grantees to acquire administrative hold over their possessions which continued to remain under direct hold of the state. Still the grantees grew bold enough to defy the state that had granted them the rights in the first place and had stood as protector thereof.

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1. *Ibid* No. 51.

2. *Ibid* Nos. 47a-7b. In some *parganas* the grantees were to pay @ 8 *annas* per *bigha*, one *mehmudi* per *bigha*, something on *bilmuqte* basis or one to two mehmudis per *bigha*. *Account* ff. 182a, 302a, 339b-40a, 350a.

CHAPTER VI

PRIMARY ZAMINDARS

(1700-50)

A definite change in the position of the Primary zamindars vis a vis the provincial authorities as also the peasantry is discernable in the available sources. Under the prevailing situation the Primary zamindars endeavored to shake off the loosening grip of the administrative apparatus, and extend and intensify their own hold over the sources of revenue. Simultaneously a section of them suffered setbacks and lost its position to other contestants. Besides, the prevailing situation also facilitated emergence of new rights identical to those of the Primary zamindars. Even though specific information casting light on the overall impact of the emerging pattern of zamindar-peasantry relationship is hard to come by, some idea of the problem may be formed from the available evidence which, by and large, represents the imperial point of view.

The author of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* furnishes brief, though valuable information concerning the position of the *bantha-daran* (i.e. the Superior and the Primary zamindars) during the sixth decade of the eighteenth century. As noted in detaile in the preceding Chapters (II, IV), the Mirat

states that the *bantha-daran* had occupied *talpad* portion of land which they had formerly surrendered to the state under pressure of arms, encroached upon the *raiyati* lands, the *Nazim* had to lead military expeditions to collect *peskkash*, procure sureties and ensure remittance of revenues (*mal-i wajib*) from the *bantha-daran* who had made encroachments.[1] Elsewhere the same work notes that the *Nazim* 'visited every *pargana*' for effecting assessment which he did 'according to his own strength and exigency of situation'.[2] As such possessions of the *bantha-daran* and others could be assessed for revenue purposes and the remittance thereof could be ensured under the immediate pressure of arms and, apparently, not through the routine administrative apparatus which seems to have been rendered ineffective.[3] The *bantha-daran*, it would appear, also seem to have acquired intermediary positions, for they are shown as undertaking responsibility for remitting land-revenue(*mal-i wajib*).

The observations of the *Mirat* as they come from and apparently for the sixth decade of the eighteenth century

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp. 173-4, Hamilton Walter *op.cit.* I, p 609; Alexander Rogers, *The Land Revenue of Bombay.* I, London, 1890, p 14.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement* p. 227.

3. For similar observations, *Rasmala* p. 545, *Bombay Govt. Revenue Records,* 1821 II p 638; *Bombay Gazetteer,* IV, p 142

need to be examined closely for ascertaining the growth and dimensions of the reported recalcitrance and acts of wide-spread encroachments upon the state's share. Moreover, the *bantha-daran*, it may be recalled[1], consisted of the Superior as well as the Primary zamindars. It has, therefore, to be ascertained if the reported developments were related, exclusively, to the Superior zamindars i.e a section of whom offered '*peshkash*' on its *bantha*-possessions. Or else, the Primary zamindars who were required to offer '*salami*' had been able to rise in social status as denominated by the reported offering of *peshkash*, instead of the *salami*. Before arriving at a safe conclusion it seems pertinent to examine the observations of the *Mirat* and other relevant points with the help of detailed evidence contained in the same work and other documentary evidence available for the period.

The process of acquiring control over the *talpad* and, for that matter the non-zamindari lands, appears to have started on a noticeable scale as early as, if not earlier than, the period of *subedari* of Shahamat Khan (1713). According to a news report the Khan led military expedition for evicting the Kolis out of a number of villages of *parga-*

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1. Neither all the Primary zamindars were the *bantha-daran* nor all of the latter were the Superior zamindars. (Chapter II and V above). The *Mirat*, here, does not take note of the Primary zamindars who did not enjoy their rights in the form of *bantha*.

na Baroda which they had forcibly occupied.[1] Later, Daood Khan Panni (1713-15) took steps against the Koli (*girasias*) of the same *pargana* and in the adjoining Mahiwara region for ensuring their ouster from the villages which they had occupied by force.[2] Another document specifies a number of villages in *pargana* Viramgaon which the *girasias* had occupied during Daood Khan's period of *subedari* and later refused to pay revenues on their new acquisitions.[3] Similarly Somji and Anandji, *girasias* of *mawza* Deloli (*pargana* Kadi) had, sometime before the *subedari* of Mubariz-ul mulk (1724-30) occupied 350 *bighas* out of 967 *bigha* and 10 biswas of *talpad* land of the same village.[4] In such and similar instances the *girasias* are noticed in possession of a part of the *raiyati* lands which for reasons not known, was not encroached upon entirely.[5] From 1727 onward the *girasias* are increasingly noticed in possession of entire villages which

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1. *Akhbarat*, dt 15th Shawwal, 4th RY, Farrukh Siyar, No 1442 (new).

2. *Ibid*, 5th and 23rd Shawwal, 3rd RY Farrukh Siyar, No. 2312, 2350.

3. *Yad-dasht dehat* tappa Choonwal, *amla pargana* Jhalawar, *PC* No K-1.

4. *Ibid*; Kadi, R.No 61 Pune read with *Account* f 319 a.

5. For the area occupied by the *girasias* (*girasia mutassarrif* or *dar tasarruf-i girasia*) *Mazruat mawza* (so and so) *waghaira amla pargana* (such and such) *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, *babat fasl-i kharif*, 1130 *fasli* and 1133 *fasli* R No 37 Pune.

otherwise contained *talpad* or simply *raiyati* lands.[1]

The Primary zamindars and others seem to have found the prevailing atmosphere increasingly congenial to go their own way and make acquisitions. According to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* "some of the Rajputs and Kolis and others, in course of time, had acquired a little strength, raised disturbances in the *raiyati* villages, far and near, lifting cattle and killing the cultivators. The peasants of those places were thus compelled to gratify them by giving them, in some places, a fixed amount of money every year, or one or two cultivable fields. This exaction is known as *giras* and *wol* (or *udal*). This custom has become well established in this region and owing to the weakness of the Governors has become universal (lit 'reached perfection'). There is hardly a place in the *parganas* where a group of Rajputs, Kolis and Musalmans have not got their *makan* or *giras* and *wol*". It adds that "now owing to the absence of (imperial) control" these people "have settled in certain places and are seizing (not only) the whole of the *talpad* or the part under the government but in addition many (other) villages to meet

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1. *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Kadi, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, R No 61; *ibid*, *parganas* Bheel, Baroda, Idar, Viramgaon, Mhorasa, Mekhrej and Piplod, R No 64.

their (claim of) *giras*".[1]

What emerges from the long statement cited above is that the Rajputs and Kolis (i.e the established land holders of long standing) were joined in also by others in their all out attempt to make acquisitions by capitalizing the pre-vailing situation; that the acquisitions were made not only at the cost of the state but also the *riaya*, that stood unprotected, was likewise bullied down for making conces-sions to the encroachers; that such exactions, more inter-estingly, were also known as *giras* i.e an extension of the legally established right of the zamindars under the same nomenclature.[2]

Further information is not available in the contempo-rary records but works of later date cast some light on the form of rights which emerged during the period.

The officials of the East India Company noticed many such rights which emerged during the eighteenth century and found their way into the nineteenth. Thus, in addition to the 'legitimate' *giras* claims, the British came across the *giras* which "meant a sum paid to powerful neighbour for

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp. 173-4, see also *Ibid*, Ssupplement *pp 228-9.*

2. Vide Chapter V above. Irfan Habib (*Agrarian System*, pp 142-3, 147) discusses only the emerging form of *giras* and does not pay attention to its legal form. Please see detailed references in the following discussion.

protection and assistance" or "to an unruly village as the price of forebearance" and "to please dangerous neighbourers (*Kothali giras*).[1] It could also be termed *abania* which meant "land acquired either by usurpation or encroachment".[2] There was then the *tora* (also called *toda*) *giras* which was a 'blackmail imposed in cash' to 'gratify the avarice of the strong' one.[3] The *giras*, in whatever form was the claim which once established "never becomes defunct".[4] As such the zamindari rights were created and sought to be extended through fair and foul means.

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1. *Bombay Gazetteer* (Kaira) pp. 82-3

2. *Ibid* pp. 83, 91; *Selections from the Records of the Baroda Government* No II vol II, (*giras*), pp 590, 1122; For the difference drawn between the *giras* as an exaction and *giras* as a legal claim, *Memorandum* submitted to the Bombay Government *Ibid*, pp 1171-77.

3. *Treaties*, VI, p. 305; Hamilton Walter, *op cit* I p 607.

4. Hamilton Walter, *op. cit*, I p 608. There were then the rights called *ugaria, Kothali, Kapal, 'pagla', 'baria', Kolapi* which also were in the nature of black mail. *Bombay Gazetteer* (Kaira) pp 82, 93,315. *Ibid* II pp 495-6 An interesting instance as to how the *giras* claims originated is related in the *Bombay Revenue Selection,* (p 725). A *girasia* woman, while at the village of Dungri, was delivered of a son, and on the occasion received a little dry ginger, and molasses from the headman of the village. When the child grew up, he claimed this grant as a right and after some dispute, it was settled that, in its stead, he should receive a yearly allowance of Rupee one and eight *annas;* For a detailed view of the *giras* in its various legal and blackmail form, Lallubhai Pranvallabhdas Parikh (ed.) *Hand book of giras*; (Being a compilation of Decrees & c on questions regarding *giras*, *wanta* and the guaranteed rights) pp 7, 10,25,35,61,82 *Selections From the Records of the Baroda Government*, No II, Vol II,' (*Giras*), pp 588-655, 853-901, 1121-27.

But it does not mean that all the Primary zamindars were invariably the gainers in the game. The stronger zamindars captured lands of the *girasias.*[1]

As a result there emerged the "*mool-girasias*" i.e. originally the *girasias* who had come to terms with the stronger ones who had established over them and by surrendering a portion of their lands to them, had retained the remainder as '*giras*.[2] Thus the insecurity prevailed for both the *raiyat* as well as the zamindars. The prevailing insecure state of affair, apparently, might have obliged, rather forced, the zamindars and the *raiyat* to ensure their safety in their own right.[3]

The Primary zamindars also sought to acquire additional rights. They contracted *ijarah* rights and making use of the

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1. *Treaties* VI pp. 9-10; *Rasmala* p 567; *Bombay Gazetteer* IV pp 147, 150; *Ibid* VIII, pp 115-16; *East India Papers* p 720;For a generalised view to the same effect; S Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars Under The Mughals", p 28.

2. *Treaties* VI, p.4; *Ibid*, VII p 9. The *girasias* surrendered the major part of their share in perpetuity (aghat) or for a fixed number of years (*savad*) *Rasmala*, p 567; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, pp 147-50.

3. In the year 1804 it was noticed that "every *gracia* village is in itself a fortification and every village is surrounded by a mud wall, many of these having in the centre a high stone tower to guard against the attack of their neighbourers". *Report* from Mr HW Diggle to Liet Col A Walker, Resident at Baroda, 10 May 1804"; *Selection From Bombay Government* No XXXIX Appendix, pp 30-34. Please see also Hamilton Walter, *op cit*, I p 652; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p 104, RD Chowksey *op cit*, p 14.

state's declining power to collect revenues, continued to retain the position. Thus, the administration could not ensure their eviction and, helplessly, accepted them in the new role which the prevailing situation had facilitated them to acquire. According to a *parwana* (1747) then *Nazim* assured Rabhji and other Kolis (i.e. *girasias*) of village Kasandra that the revenue of the village would be demanded from them only and that the *riaya* would not be troubled for making direct payment on any account.[1] Apparently the *girasias* had stepped in as intermediaries.[2] Some *girasias* of a number of villages (*pangana* Piplod) seem to have stepped into the shoes of the *muqaddams* sometime between 1723 and 1726. The available *tamassuks* for the year 1723-24 (*kharif* 1131 *fasli*) mention the *muqaddams* as undertaking responsibility for the collection and remittance of the assessed revenues for the villages, 11 in number. But three years later (*Kharif* 1134 *fasli*/ 1726-27) the *girasias* are shown as undertaking the

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1. *Naql parwana bandhari;* dt. 17 Rabi II, 29 R.Y. Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79E.

2. The *riaya* seems to have been forced into the arm of the *girasias* by the oppressive acts of the administration and the plundering raids of the neighbouring villagers. For details please see the following discussion. For a reverse position i.e. intermediary zamindars depressing the status of Primary zamindars, S Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars under the Mughals", pp 28-9.

responsibility in seven of the 11 villages.[1]

Increasing hold of the Primary zamindar on the village is further suggested by another piece of information coming for the year 1743-4. The *girasia* of *mawza* Borvi (*pargana* Bheel) which contained 2550 and 850 *bighas* of *talpad* and *bantha* lands respectively, was assessed at Rs. 701/- for the *rabi* and *kharif* crop seasons of the year 1151 *fasli*. The assessed amount is reflected as *bilmuqte yekraqmi sal-i tamam* (single amount fixed in lump sum for the whole year) together for the *bantha* and the *talpad* without reflecting the cropped area and the holders of land.[2] It goes to suggest that the distinction between *mal-i wajib* (*talpad*) and *salami* (*bantha*) had been done away with, details of assessment were not taken into account and the *girasia* was regarded as assessment unit.[3] There is also evidence to show that the *girasias* who, at one or the other stage, had acquired

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1. *Tamassukat* for the *fasli* years 1131 and 1134 (*fasl*-i Kharif) for *dehat*-i *pargana* Piplod. R No 27, Pune. Particularly see the *tamassuks* for the villages of Bhalona, Seholi, Ondni, Baori, Jalondra, Rukhal and Kesarpur for which the *girasias* furnished undertaking. For the rest of villages i.e. Santri, Ankobhlo, Baroda and Manjak the *muqaddams* furnished undertaking for both the years.

2. *Yad-dasht khasra mazruat mawza* Borvi, *amla* pargana *Bheel*, Sarkar *Ahmadabad*, fasl-i kharif-o Rabi, *1151* fasli, *R No 32 read with* Account, *f 176 a*.

3. Also see th similar documents for the villages of Barej, Patri Kochrab, Palordra, Bhudah and Santej, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad for the years 1152, 1155 and 1156 *fasli*, R No 35 read with *Account* ff 414a-15b.

the position for paying revenues on lump sum basis later (1729-30) refused to pay it at all.[1] But it must not be taken to imply that the *girasias* had acquired hold over the entire *talpad*, for that matter the *raiyati* tracts of lands and done away with the distinction between them and the *bantha* possessions which, the evidence suggests survived even after the extinction of the Mughal rule from the *Subah*.[2]

It has been discussed in the preceding Chapter that the imperial administration had endeavoured to correlate its claim (*salami*) on the Primary zamindars with their actual paying capacity by treating the individual peasant and his holding as assessment unit and by regulating the process of assessment through the routine revenue administrative machinery. But during the period under review the whole system seems to have undergone a vital change.

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1. *Mazruat mawza* Maheem, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif-o rabi* 1127 *fasli* read with *Yad-dasht-khichri-o bewra dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1160 *fasli* R No 43. Pune.

2. Documents entitled *Khasra mazruat* for various villages of *pargana haveli*, Ahmadabad for the *fasli* years 1117-21, 1126-31, 1134-46, 1148-71 R Nos 21 and 27 Pune; please see also similar documents *PC* Nos 110-14, 116-21, 122-8 129-30, 141-51, 153-57, 158-59; *Jamabandi of the villages of Kondram, Indrana and Varsada: Selections from the Records of Baroda Government*, Baroda 1915, pp 21-3;. *Selection from the Records of Baroda Government*, No II Vol. II (*giras*), pp 588-90; Mr. William, *Bombay Govt. Litho Papers*, 149, 9; Hamilton Walter, *op cit* I pp 610-12.

The expeditionary forces led by the *Nazims* gradually came to replace the routine administrative machinery for assessing *mal-i wajib*, including *salami*. In this regard observations of the *Mirat* for the sixth decade of the century have already been noticed. From a closer view of the available evidence it would appear that the aforesaid development had acquired momentum as early as, if not earlie than the third decade of the century. Though the military expeditions were led even during the seventeenth century but for a different purpose.[1] From the year 1711-12 the military expeditions came to be led for collecting *peshkash* on a wider scale.[2] Later from the year 1720-21 these expeditions seem to have been led regularly, the choice of time and area being determined mainly by the extent and magnitude of Maratha presence and internal politics of the Mughal nobili-

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1. The expeditions were led for making administrative arrangements, procuring *muchalkas* and *bandharis* from leading recalcitrant, ensuring remittance of *peshkash* from the noted recalcitrants and re-enforcing local administration where and when needed. These expeditions were generally preventive and sometime punitive in approach. *Account*; ff 15a, 16a; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I pp 168-9, 177, 188, 192, 210, 290-1, 303, 324-5, 330, 334.

2. *Ibid*, II pp. 10-1, 32-40, 41, 43, 45 54-5, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f 58; Wilberforce, *History of Kathiawad*, p. 132.

ty.[1] If we go by the observations of the *Mirat*, it would appear that from the same year the expeditionary forces came to be led for "making assessment", "assessing *parganas*" in addition to taking bonds (*muchalkas*), 'establishment of order' grasping *peshkash* and procuring sureties.[2] As such the expeditionary forces stepped into the shoes of the assessment-machinery. It would also appear that the hurriedly passing armies required to cover entire *subah* might not have been able to effect detailed assessment the way it was done during the preceding days by the routine administrative machinery.

Other set of evidence also suggests that the details of assessment were generally ignored. It has been mentioned above that the state could demand a single amount in lump sum for the whole year from the *girasias* without any reference to the area actually cropped and the individual holdings. The available *mazruat* documents for a number of villages of the *parganas* of Bheel, (1723-24), Kadi (1725-26)

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 10, 32, 37, 40-1, 44-6, 51, 55, 57, 82, 87-8, 92-3, 97, 99, 105, 265-6; For the presence of recalcitrants, B.N. Reu, "Some imperial *farmans* addressed to the Rulers of Jodhpur," Proc *IHC* p 353; For the Marathas affecting the leading of expeditions. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 91-4, 102, 132, 183, 275, 297, 387-90; *Rasmala*, p 360.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp. 43, 46 50, 55, 57, 82, 92, 167, 243-4, 257-8, *Mukhtarar Tarikh-i Gujarat*. ff 87-9

and Petlad (1727-8) do not carry cultivator-plot-crop wise details for the *bantha* portion as was usually done earlier. Instead, the entire area with no other details is shown against the *girasia* himself.[1] Then, the documents recording actual collection of *salami* reflect a lump sum (*bilmuqte*) amount for the entire year for both the crop seasons together.[2] It would therefore, appear that the Primary zamindars, in such instances replaced the individual peasants and his holding and acquired the position of, and themselves emerged as, the assessment unit. Obviously, the zamindars were left free to settle details with the peasantly.[3] As such the

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1. Please see documents entitled *Yad-dasht muzruat mawza* (so and so), *amla pargana* (such and such). *fasl-i kharif* for the *fasli* years 1131, 1133 & 1135. R No 37 Pune. However in certain villages of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, the *salami* continued to be assessed on the basis of area actually cropped by individual peasant. *Mazruat mawza* Balad and Odhab, *fasl-i Kharif*, (1150 *fasli*), and Faizabad (*kharif* 1145 *fasli*) R No 21 Pune.

2. The very title of the documents *Tumar Taskhis mawza* Harkhij *waghaira amla pargana* Jamusar *babat-fasl-i kharif-o rabi*, sichqan Il 1127 *fasli*, *hama jeht sal-i tamam bilmuqta* (R No 37, Pune) is suggestive. Also see, *yad-dasht-paidaish pargana* Dholqa, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif* 1129 *fasli* (R No 29 Pune) which records the amount as under: *bantha salami* Rs 5525/- *bilmuqte sal-i tamam*.

3. Later, the British noticed that the *bantha* lands of the *girasias* were subject to the payment of somekind of quit-rent which was a fixed amount. Moreover, according to them, state did not enjoy any right to interfere into the affairs of the *bantha*. Apparently, the British who came across the position that emerged during the days of decline of Mughal rule, erroneously considered it as the practice introduced and kept up by the Mughals during the hey day of the empire. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II (Surat,Baroda) pp 387, 482, 495-6, *Ibid* (Kaira) pp

state's policy of reaching the peasantry directly was reversed by the Primary zamindars along with the other zamindars as discussed in the preceding Chapters. Another set of evidence indicating a fall in the power of administration to force the Primary zamindars for paying the *salami* and the latter's increasing power to resist the payment, is also available. *Girasia* of village Kota (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) paid the *salami* the volume of which went on declining. Thus during the year 1719-20 the *salami* amounted to Rs. 641/- which figure fell to Rs 500 and *annas* 6 in 1720-21. During the following ten years, the *girasia* paid nothing.[1] Likewise the Primary zamindar of village Kasandra of the same *pargana* paid Rs 261/- and 231/- during 1719-20 and 1721-22 respectively by way of *bantha-salami*. During the years 1722-23 to 1731-32 no amount by way of the *bantha salami* from the village could be collected.[2] Similarly, the amount of *salami* collected from the entire *pargana* Dholga in the year 1720-21 stood at Rs 10122/- but the following year

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81, 88; Ragers *op cit* I, pp 3-4; *Treaties*, III, p 119; *Ibid.* IV p 213; *East India Papers*, III pp 720n. Lallubhai Pranvallabhdas Parikh, *Handbook of Giras*, pp 61, 82.

1. *Mawaznah-i dehsala, dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, R.No.26, Pune.

2. *Ibid.*

it dwindled to Rs 4585/- only.[1] As compared to 1714-5 entire receipts from *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad dwindled to 6.95 percent in 1751-52 .[2] In 1750-51 total revenue receipts, including *salami* from the entire *subah* under the *Nazim*'s control amounted to Rs. 400,000/- only.[3] The dwindling volume of income clearly speaks of the declining power of the administration.

The sharp and well evident fall in the revenue receipts inclusive of the *salami* may not be explained away by referring to the territorial losses to the Marathas because the volume of revenue-returns dwindled in the areas which were under the direct control of the *Nazims*. Moreover, fertility

1. *Yadasht- paidaish pargana* Dholqa, *sarkar*, Ahmadabad, *fasl-i kharif* 1128 *fasli* ff 4-17 ; *Ibid* (1130 *fasli*) ff 8-14 *PC*. It is worth mentioning that the *Account* mentions 96 out of 244 villages of *pargana* Bhil, and Chunwal (Viramgaon) with no *hasil* figure (*hasil nadarad*) for the year 1725-26. Each of these villages contained zamindari lands. But on the other hand each of the village which was entirely *raiyati* has been furnished with the *hasil* figures. *Account* ff 167b-69a 175b-81b, 236b-37b, 244a.

2. *Taqseem Mawaziat-mahal pargana haveli* Ahmadabad dated 1161 *fasli*, R No 42. Pune. The document specifies income from each village for the years 1122 *fasli* (1714/15 AD) and 1160 *fasli* (1751-52 AD). For calculating percentage we have taken into account only such villages as were held by the Mughal *Subedar* at the exclusion of the ones held by the Marathas.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, pp 396-7. It may be seen that the total revenue returns of the *subah* (excluding *sarkar* Surat) amounted Rs. 1,20,000,00 in a perfect (*kamil*) year and Rs 77,000,00 in a normal year during the heyday of Mughal rule. *Account* f 14a

of the soil too does not seem to have eroded.[1] Therefore the causes of fall in the volume of revenues have to be found out somewhere else.

The necessity of leading expeditions for revenue purposes might have arisen out of the emerging ineffectiveness of the normal machinery of administration in its dealing with the zamindars effectively and failure to ensure remittance of revenue through the regular process.[2]

Then the military establishment and expeditionary forces which once acted as a watchdog to ensure smooth flow of revenues, themselves acquired the form of assessment and collection making machine thus making the collection dependent upon leading of expeditions. The military expeditions, as pointed out above, were not and could not be led regularly. Moreover, the armed resistance put up by the zamindars

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 316. But then the movement of armies, particularly of the warning ones, might have done damage to the standing crops. *Ibid*, II p 145.

2. Increasing and increased recalcitrance necessitated increase in military strength. But the available income was found insufficient for the purpose. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi* pp 306, 360-1 *Ibid* II pp 9, 57, 245-46, 316, 396). Increasing necessity of additional forces followed by paucity of funds led to further decline in their strength and failure against the rebels. (*Ibid* I pp 307, 345, *Ibid* II pp 133, 163-65, 172-4, 245-49, 256-57, 351. Please see particularly Anonymous, Apparao Bholanath collection MS No 245 Pt.II, f 4 where it states that under Mubariz-ul-Mulk the *faujdars* had assumed the charge but had no power to come out of the fortresses and effect assessment. The *faujdars* *taqat-i sinazori-i tashkhis nadashte, b'dushwar chahar diwari-i qila ra nigahdashte.*

as will be seen below, further hindered the movement of the forces rendering the task of assessment and collection all the more difficult.

Though the incidents of armed resistance were not wholly wanting during the preceding days, from 1725-6 and particularly from 1731-32 such incidents seem to have become common, indicating the zamindar's increasing strength and determination to evade payments or, at least, bargain the amount.[1] It is worth mentioning that the *girasias* among other, put up armed resistance even in the villages of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, seat of power and successfully evaded payments of revenue for many years.[2] Leading nobles of the region like Safdar Khan Babi and Jawanmard Khan Babi found it difficult to effect assessment and collection in south Gujarat and, therefore, withdrew from the field.[3]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 133, 144-5, 163-5, 186, 212, 244, 246-8, 257-60, 265-6, 297, 301, 307-12, 319, 323; *Rasmala* pp 393-4. Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah (*Subedar*) would not like to retain Viramgaon in his conditional *jagir* (1723-24) as it was noted for its recalcitrance which was on the increase. *Ibid* II p 48.

2. *Majmua-i Qawanin* MS No 297, ff 19-20, *Ruqqat-i Harkaran* pt II MS No 249, ff 35-6; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 262,307-12.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 107, 186, 245-6 *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f 83

Under the prevailing circumstances, the *Nazim* whenever strong assessed with heavy hand[1] but at times had to be contented with "more or less" because of the exigency of situation (*b'mutaquza-i halat-i waqt*).[2] It would therefore appear that the irregularly collected amount was fixed more by the zamindar's power to resist at the moment rather than by his ability to pay.[3] Since the *Nazim*'s power to exert pressure was conditioned by a number of adverse factors, he could extort less and less.

A significant change in the position of Primary zamindars is discernable from the nomenclature used to denominate the offering made by them. Thus one Subhag Singh, *girasia* of *mawza* Leth (*pargana* Piplod) and Rambhai, *muqaddam* of the village undertook responsibility of paying *salami* and *mal-i wajib* respectively in 1723-24. In 1726-27, the *girasia* is

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 454-5, *Ibid* II p 244.

2. *Ibid* IIpp 258-9, 397-8; *Ibid*, *Supplement* p 258

3. *Ibid* II pp 37, 258-9, 275-6 Rogers, *op cit* I pp. 63, 82; *Rasmala* pp 394-5. The impact of strength under *Nazim*'s command and of the severe action taken may, to a great extent be gauged from the incident of Dabhali. As a result of the *Nazim*'s severe action "the *zamindars* and *malguzars* of the nearby places came on their own accord" and since he was powerful enough he "managed the Kolis as he wished". *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 43-4; For the impact of weakness, *Ibid* II pp 143-4, 162-4 as also *Ibid* I p 174 *Ibid* II pp 133, 164, 247, 305, 351, 353.

shown to have paid the *mal-i wajib* also.[1] In the year 1734-35 the *girasia's* offering is specified as *peshkash*.[2] One Ajba Singh who had offered Rs. 567/- by way of *salami* in 1719, later (1727) is shown to have paid Rs 501/- by way of *peshkash* to the expeditionary forces.[3] From the year 1731 instances of *girasias* making offerings as *peshkash* instead of *salami* appear more frequently and seem to have become quite common.[4] Then some other *girasias* paid *khichri* (which otherwise was levied from the *raiyati* tracts of lands)[5] instead of *mal-i wajib* and *peshkash* in lieu of *salami*.[6] Still others paid a single amount (*yek raqmi*)on lump sum (*bilmuqte*) for the whole year (*sal-tamam*). Such an offering is not placed under any of the routine head of account. Thus

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1. *Tamassukat* for the *fasli* years 1131 and 1134 *fasli* for *dehat-i pargana* Piplod, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad R No 59, Pune.

2. *Fa'il zamini* for the year 1142 *fasli*, *dehat pargana* Piplod *sarkar* Ahmadabad R No 51.

3. *Yad-dasht paidaish dehat-i pargana* Jhalawar (Viramgaon) for *fasli* years 1127 and 1135, R No 70 Pune.

4. *Yad-dasht--peshkash-o khichri waghaira subah* Gujarat, R No 63. Pune. The document notes the *peshkash* exacted from the *girasia* separately from the one paid by the zamindars of *pargana* Jamusar and Kaparbanj.

5. For details please see discussion in following pages

6. *Yad-dasht-Khasra Mazruat Mawza* Borvi *op cit* *Tumar Tashkhis mawza* Harkej *op cit*. *Yad dasht-Khasra mazruat mawza amla pargana* Mamurabad *fasl-i-Rabi-o-Kharif* 1151 *fasli*, R No 32 Pune. Also the similar documents for the villages Akhrol, Okla and Uledra (*pargana* Munda), *Sarkar* Ahmadabad; *Haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash zamindaran waghaira subah* Gujarat *taraf* Mahi Kantha, RNo 28, Pune.

the distinction between *mal-i wajib*, *khichri*, *salami* and *peshkash* was getting blurred.[1] The social distinction as denominated by the nomenclature that used to denote the payments was likewise changing. For all practical purposes a section of the Primary zamindars came to enjoy a Superior zamindar-like position, simultanously holding the intermediary position and enjoying rights of the Primary zamindars.

The preceeding discussion indicates that the state apparatus gradually ceased to act as a power that once regulated the affairs concerning the revenue by keeping a check on the zamindar peasantry relationship. The administration seems to have failed to check the Primary zamindars, like the Superior zamindars from extending their territorial sway and hold over the sources of revenue. The administra-

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1. From the observations of the works of later date it would appear that the position of *banthadars* within the *bantha* possessions and vis a vis the *talpad* had undergone a drastic change. The *girasias*, according to these works, claimed in many places proprietory rights over their *bantha* possession and over the entire villages which contained their *giras* rights. Secondly, the once duly assessed *salami* acquired the position of quit rent', a nominal fixed rental (*udhad Wanta*); thirdly, the *banthadar* claimed and asserted full autonomy within the *bantha* possessions; Fourthly some of them claimed that their *bantha* possession were exempt (literally relief, *rahat*) from paying any 'rental', so they called it *rahat wanta*. Finally there were the *girasias* who had acquired *ugaria wanta* i.e share exacted in return for succor (*ugaru*) given to the weaker against the stronger ones. *Bombay Govt. Selections*, New Series, 23; *India Litho Papers* III p 708, Bombay Gazetteer, II pp 495-6; *Ibid* VIII pp 315-9; *Ibid* (Kaira), pp 81-3.

tion, it would appear, compromised its position by accepting the *fait-accompli* without making a concerted effort to put the affairs back in order.[1] However, some pieces of available information appear to be worth considering.

The *Khasra* documents mention the *girasias* enjoying revenue free lands at least from the year 1738. Thus a *girasia* is reflected as holding 37 *bighas* of cultivated land by way of *napa* (free of obligation) in *mawza* Balad (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) during the year (1149 *fasli*) 1741-42.[2] In village Odhab of the same *pargana* a *girasia* is shown as holding 18 *bighas* of cultivated area under the title of *pusaita* i.e grant conditional upon village service.[3] In *mawza* Mahej (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad)) 14 *bighas* and 15 *biswas* of land is reflected as *bantha-raiyati'* during the *kharif* season of the year 1146 *fasli*(1738).[4] The land shown

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1. It has been observed in the Introduction and Chapter II that the state assigned the executive as well as financial powers to one and the same person. Whether it was an effort consciously made to strengthen hands of the local officials to enable them to deal with the recalcitrants effectively, or else a concession given by the weak centre to strong nobles, or both is difficult to ascertain.

2. *Mazruat mawza* Balad, *fasl-i kharif* 1149 *fasli*; *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, R No 23, Pune. The similar document for the year 1141 *fasli* (*kharif*) does not reflect the area as such. R No 22 Pune.

3. *Mazruat mawza* Odhab, *fasl-i kharif* 1149 *fasli*, (R No 42 Pune) read with *Ibid* for 1140 *fasli* R No 63 Pune.

4. *Mazruat mawza* Mahej *fasl-i kharif*, 1146 *fasli* and 1149 *fasli* (*PC* No 107) read with *Ibid* 1127 *fasli*.

as '*bantha-raiyati*' seems to have been carved out of the *raiyati* portion of land.[1] It is not known as to when and how the *girasias* acquired these rights. Since the office records reflect them in the above mentioned position, it seems to have carried approval of administration.

Besides, the available evidence also suggests the emergence of new rights termed *salamiyah* and which, for all practical purposes, appear to be identical with those of the Primary zamindars. In a document (1726-27) coming for *mawza* Lubha 85 *bighas* of cultivated area is shown as held by *salamiya* Rajputs. The area seems to have been taken out of the *raiyati* portion. In the year 1719-20 the *raiyati* land was specified 715 *bighas* whereas in 1726-27 its area is recorded as 630 *bighas* i.e. less by 85 *bighas* which is equal to the area shown under *salamiyah* Rajputs.[2] Another document dated 1724-25 (1132 *fasli*) reflecting land under actual cultivation shows 115 *bighas* under *salamiya*. The area, again, seems to have been taken out of the *raiyati* portion of land.[3] Likewise *salamiya* Kolis are shown as holding 210

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1. *Ibid*; see also for the presence of *bantha-raiyati*, *mazruat mawza Mahej*, *fasl-i kharif*, 1146 *fasli*, *PC* Nos. 98 and 101.

2. *Muzruat mawza* Lubha - *pargana* Thamna *fasl-i kharif*, 1127 *fasli* and 1134 *fasli* R No 60 Pune.

3. *Yad-dasht Khasra mazruat mawza* Jamalpur *pargana* Thamna *fasl-i kharif* 1129 and 1132 *fasli* R No 63 Pune.

bighas in *mawza* Rulia (*pargana* Thamna) during the year 1727-28 (1135 *fasli*). The area, again, seems to have been carved out of the *raiyati* area which fell by the same figure as compared to the year 1719-20 (1127 *fasli*).[1]

Nature of rights of the *salamiyas* being unspecified in any detail, it is difficult to precisely ascertain their position. However, according to an *amal-i dastur* the *salamiya* lands were assessed the way the *bantha* lands were assessed.[2] Thus:

Salami Salamiya

- produce divided into four parts (*chahar hissa*):

	: *raiya* - two parts (*raiya du hissa*)
share of the government	: one part (*yek hissa sarkar*)
Salamiyah	: one part (*alamiya yek hissa*).

Moreover, the state claim levied on the *salamiya* lands was called *salami*. From the view point of share and its proportion in the produce of the peasantry, the *salamiyas* appear to have enjoyed the position which was identical with those of the Primary zamindars. It is however not known as to why and how the priveleged position was bestowed upon or

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1. *Yad-dasht Khasra mazruat mawza* Rulia. *pargana* Thamna *fasl-i kharif* 1127 and 1135 *fasli*.

2. *Amal-i dastur--dehat-i pargana* Thamna 1135 *fasli* R No 38 Pune.

else grabbed by a section of the agrarian community.[1] It may be presumed that the state sought to create an influential class of people (or else, sought to appease it) to counter the power of the already strong Primary zamindars.

In spite of emergence of the rights which stood parallel and were identical to the Primary zamindars, the influence and increasing hold of the *girasias* over the villages under them might not have been eroded, a fact which will be discussed a little later. It may be pointed out here, that the Primary zamindars also interfered with the established section of the village community presumably to subserve their own interests.

The *paikashtas* who were not so deeply rooted in the community of the villages of their cultivation, appear to have been hit at easily. According to a *parwana* (July 1731) some *paikashtas* of *mawza* Chhatral (*pargana* Kadi) had lodged a complaint stating that Dhanna Singh *girasia* of the village had evicted them out of their irrigated (*chahi*) plots which

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1. In some instances we also come across the *bilmuqte kashta* (whose possessions were assessed on a lump sum basis), *bilmuqte kameja* (the peasant proprietors who were assessed likewise) or such and such person '*bilmuqte*. *Yad-dasht-i mawza Khrab fasl-i kharif* 1148 *fasli PC* No 139; *yad-dasht mawza* Rakhyal *buzurg*, 2 *fasl-i kharif* 1148 *fasli*, *PC* No. 135. It seems that in some villages the administration directly assessed and fixed the amount of revenues on lump sum basis and allowed them to pay to the state directly without the intercession of the *girasias* or *muqaddams*.

he had distributed amongst the members of his own brotherhood (*brathri*). They had brought the matter to the notice of the *desai* but he showed his helplessness. The administrator of the *pargana* (*sarbarah-i-pargana?faujdar)* too did not take any action against the *girasia*. Therefore, Maharaja Abhay Singh, then *subedar* (1730-37) directed the *faujdar* to enquire into the matter and restore their lands which they had been holding from the times of their ancestors.[1] Another *parwana* (September, 1738) likewise orders the *faujdar* of *pargana* Petlad to oust the *girasia* from the irrigated lands which he had forcibly occupied by evicting the *paikashtas*.[2] Yet another document (November 1742) records that the *girasia* and his brerthern had taken possession of the lands which were formerly held by the *paikashtas* who had been ousted from their possession.[3]

Another set of information suggests that the *girasias* also tried to detract the *paikashtas* cultivating *raiyati* lands of the state and attract them for undertaking cultivation on their *bantha* possessions. According to a *muchalka*

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1. *Naql parwana* dated 3rd Safar, 1144 *Hijri*, R No 70 Pune.

2. *Naql parwana*, dated 11 Jamala II, 1151 Hijri, R No 70 Pune.

3. *Yad-dasht dehat pargana* Bhil, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, 1150 *fasli*, R.No. 61, Pune.

(1727) the *muqaddams* of *pargana* Mamurabad are shown to have given an undertaking to the effect that they would not allow the *girasias* to take the *paikashta* of the *raiyati* lands for undertaking cultivation on the *bantha* lands.[1] A *tamassuk* (1728) likewise records the *muqaddams* of *mawza* Muzaffarpur (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) undertaking responsibility to the same effect.[2] Another document coming from the period of Momin Khan's *subedari* (1737-43), mentions that the *girasias* of the villages of *pargana* Thamna forcibly (*biljabr*) took *paikashtas* cultivating *zamin-i sarkar (raiyati)* to undertake cultivation on the *bantha* lands. The document notes that as a result cultivation on the *talpad* could not be undertaken and a part of it went out of cultivation (*ghair mazrua' gashte*).[3] Still another document (May 1748) states that one Ramji *girasia* and his caste members (*brathri*) destroyed standing crops of the *paikashtas* of *mawza* Bharodra (*pargana* Nadiad, *sarkar* Ahmadabad) on their refusal to undertake

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1. *Naql muchalka* , dated 15 Rabi I, 1140 executed by the *muqad dams* before the '*Sarkar*' R No 53, Pune.

2. *Naql tamassuk*, dated 15 Safar 1141 AH, R No 37 Pune.

3. *Yad-dasht dehat amla pargana* Thamna, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad *mustatab sarkar-i Nawab* Momin Khan Bahadur Najm-ud dawlah.

cultivation on his *bantha* lands.[1]

From the evidence cited above, it would appear that the *girasias* endeavoured to promote their interests by bullying the *paikashtas*. In this affair the caste-factor seems to have been the main instrument which the *girasias* utilized against them. The *girasias*, it appears, tried to occupy prized lands -- the irrigated ones-- and ensure that their lands were cultivated, presumably in to. The effort, for all practical purposes, was intended to consolidate and strengthen the *girasias'* power base, socially and economically at the cost of the state and weaker section of *riaya*.

Not that the *girasias* endeavoured to strengthen their position and consolidate hold over the villages by utilizing caste and family bonds. But also, and more particularly, the increasingly oppressive acts of the administration (which had also closed down the channels of redress) where and when it could succeed, seem to have driven the *raiyat* into the zamindar's arms all the more. It would appear from the following discussion that the *riaya* was increasingly and consistently exploited from the first decade of the eighteenth century.

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1. *Naqi* (?) dated 15th Jamadi II, 1160 A.H. The document does not carry any title. It seems to be a representation submitted by the *muqaddam* of *mawza* Bhadodra for inviting attention of the administration.

A considerable section of rural and the urban society must have increasingly felt the incidence of new imposts and the enhanced dozes of the taxes already in vogue. To begin with, new imposts were levied on certain agricultural and allied items like fodder, grain, vegetables, *ghee* etc. on their entry into the city from rural side from the year 1708-10 onward.[1] The impact of the imposts which were leived at a 'nominal rate' initially, seems to have increased with the passage of time.[2]

Khichri was another impost which, according to the *Mirat*, was extorted from the *raiyati* tracts by the *Nazim* while leading military expeditions for exacting *peshkash.*[3] Introduced for the first time by Maharaja Ajeet Singh (1715-17) and subsequently retained by his successors, the *Khichri* was levied on enhanced rates.[4] The *khichri*, moreover, seems to have been levied in addition to, and over and above the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 389-91 404-5.

2. The income from the new levies swelled up into huge sums of money. Two separate *mahals* for the same were formed. *Ibid* I pp 390-91, 405.

3. *Ibid* I p 174; *Account* ff 164a, 167ab.

4. Raigobindas Kayath, MS No 15, *op cit*, ff 58, 79-80, The work notes that Raja Ajit Singh *bid't-i taza ikhtara' namudand sal b'sal ihtmam-i ziyada talbi-o izafa kar-dand; Haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash-o Khichri waghaira zamindaran-i subah* Gujarat *PC* No.9-39.

mal-i wajib also.[1] But at times the *khichri* was also levied in lieu of *mal-i wajib*[2] from the *riays* who had refused to pay the *mal-i wajib*'. The *Nazims* demanded *khichri* on annual basis but its actual collection evidently depended on their ability to enforce it.[3]

Yet another levy which was repeatedly exacted by the *Nazims* and other officials from 1724-25 onward was the despised *bewra*.[4] From the description of the *Mirat* it would appear that the *Nazims* levied *bewrah* on not less than 21 occasions during the second quarter of the eighteenth century.[5] The *Nazims* exacted it from the *seths*, *mahajans*, silk merchants, other traders, the Bohras, 'from all sections of

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1. The Khichri was also levied on the *Jagirs* by the *Nazims*. (Raigobindas, op. cit., f 58). The relevant documents record the amount collected as (a) *mal-i wajib* (b) *peshkash* and (c) *khichri* separately. *Account*, ff 164a, 167ab, 174a 203ab, 213a, 214, 228a, 236b, 241a, 278a, 290b, 295a; *Haqiqat-i-nazar-i-peshkash*, op. cit, *PC* No 9-39; *yad-dasht-haqiqat-i sarkar-i* Soreth *PC* No p 23.

2. *Account* ff 164a, 167b, 174a, 203ab, 213a-14a, 221a, 236b, 290b; *Haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash PC* No 20, 26.

3. MS No 15 *op cit* ff 89,91

4. According to the *Mirat* (II p 68) *bewra* was an innovation of Hamid Khan, the *naib-subedar* under Nizam-ul-mulk (1723-24). But *peshkash* papers (see particularly *Haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash PC* Nos. 20 and 26) mention the amount collected as *bewra* and *khichri* together during Maharaja Ajit Singh's *subedari* (1715-17) from *parganas* of Pattan and Kutyana (*Sarkar* Soreth).

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 68, 78, 95, 106, 136-137, 163, 165, 170-71, 190, 192-3, 195-6, 243, 244, 245, 250, 260, 323, 351, 381

people', Hindus and Muslims alike on 'various excuses', separately as well as collectively.[1] The bewrah was exacted from professional groups, individuals, family establishments by head-counting (*sar-shumari*) and house-counting (*khana-shumari*).[2] The *Kotwals*, *faujdars* and the *mutasaddis* emulated the *Nazims* and exacted the *bewrah* accordingly.[3] Levied at times alongwith *Khichri*, the *bewra* was levied once, twice and even thrice a year.[4] The last of the *subedars* levied the *bewrah* @ Rs. 3.50 per head fom the populace of Ahmadabad.[5]

The burden of *bewrah* was not felt by the town folks alone. There is evidence to show that it was collected from the rural populace of *sarkars* of Soreth, Nadot and Ahmadabad

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1. *Ibid*. It was also exacted from the *baqqals* of the town. *Yad-dasht haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash PC* No 26. Here it may be pointed out that the *seths* of Ahmadabad had some kind of relationship with the zamindars of villages. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 171-72

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 106, 113 136-37 163, 193, 260, 318, 323; *English Documents*. letters dated 4th May and 6th May 1725; 20th May 22nd May 1743 *ibid* pp 7,45-6,

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 163, 318; *English Documents* , letters dt 4th and 6th May 1725, 20th and 22nd May 1743.

4. Raigobindas, *op cit* ff 79-80; *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 68, 78, 95, 106, 136-7, 163, 165, 170-1, 190-3, 195-6, 243-5, 250, 260, 323, 351, 381; *yad-dasht--nazar-i peshkash waghaira PC* No 9-29.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 323. Hamid Khan had levied it @ Rs 12/- per house but then reduced its rate to Rs 5/- per house. *English Documents*, letters dt. 4th May and 6th May 1725.

and then it was collected in all the *Kharaji sarkars*, excluding *sarkar* Surat details of which region are not available.[1] The *bewra* was an exaction which was levied in addition to the other imposts and usual demands.[2] The *bewrah* on the agrarian community seems to have been levied at the rates which were revisible.[3] Though the relationship between *mal-i wajib* and *bewrah-o khichri* may not be ascertained for want of specific evidence, but the two demands appear to have been related proportionately, particularly for counting the latter.[4] In *pargana* Dholga *khichri-o bewra* were calculated @ Rs. 7.50 per cent of the *mal-i wajib* assessed on the *khalsa* villages.[5] But in the *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad collections of *khichri-o bewra* amounted to 6.5% of the *mal-i*

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1. *Yad-dasht nazar-i peshkash, op cit PC*; *Haqiqat paidaish pargana* Dholqa, *op cit*.

2. *Yad-dasht--nazar-i peshkash-o khichri waghaira, op cit PC* Nos p5, 11b, 16b, 18b, 18b-19a, 20a, 29sb, 37b, read with p 21-24b and p 41. *yad-dasht bewra-o khichri dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, *fasl-i-kharif-o Rabi*, 1134 *fasli PC* No 172; read with *mawazna fis-sinwat subah* Gujarat *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, *pargana haveli op cit.*

3. When refering to the rate of *bewra* for *pargana* Dholga the document entitled '*yad-dasht abwab pargana* Dholga mentions that it was levied at the rate of the preceding year (*muwafiq sal-i guzishta*). *PC* No 282.

4. *Yad-dasht abwab pargana* Dholga *op cit*.

5. *Ibid*

wajib collected during the year 1726-27.[1] By all means incidence of *bewra* and *khichri* on the tax-payer must have been quite burdensome.

The *raiyat*, moreover, was also exposed to bear the burden of land revenue which, where and when possible, seems to have been fixed arbitrarily. The *riaya* of *pargana* Dholqa, according to the *Mirat* was 'displeased at the rascality' of *faujdar-amil*, Muhammad Iraj during Sarbuland Khan's period of *subedari*.[2] The next *faujdar-amil* during the period of the same *subedar* exacted' sum by harassment beside the *mal-i wajib*.[3] The *riaya* of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad had to flee on account of over-assessment of revenue by the *amin-faujdar*.[4] Sarbuland Khan replaced him but the new incumbent 'harassed and tyrannised' the *raiyat* and demanded 'additional sums' with the *Nazim*'s approval even though there "was no scope for additional demands".[5] The *Nazims* and *faujdars* oppressed the *raiyat* in many ways, plundered villages and crops for

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1. During the year 1134 *fasli* the collection of *mal-i wajib* amounted to Rs. 2,620091 and that of *bewra-o khichri* stood at Rs 17000/- *yad-dasht nazar-i peshkash-o khichri waghaira op cit* read with *yad-dasht-mawazna fis-sinwat subah* Gujarat *op cit*.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 94

3. *Ibid* II p 97

4. *Ibid* II pp 105-6.

5. *Ibid*

providing food, fodder and salary to the army establishment.[1]

The exploitative acts and high handedness of the officials who enjoyed immunity from imperial action, did not all the time go unprotested. According to the *Mirat* the *seths*, merchants and Bohras at Ahmadabad resisted imposition of *Bewra* but to no avail.[2] The traders remonstrated and went on strike in the imperial capital to register their protest against the oppressive act of the *naib-subedar* in-charge.[3] The *raiyat* of Khanbat misbehaved with the oppressive officials and 'pelted stones' on them while they came out after surrendering the charge.[4] The *raiyat* of Dholga lodged complaints before the *Nazim* and that of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad fled but was pursuaded to resume cultivation but for bearing additional doze of taxation again.[5] The *desai* of Viramgaon and *muqaddam* of Padra joined hands with the

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1. Thus, for the oppressive behaviuors of the officials and imposition of illegal taxes at Khanbat *ibid* I pp 403-4; for the *naib-subedar* in-charge practicing immoderation and levying illegal extortion *Ibid*, II p 11; for other instances of similar nature *Ibid* II pp 34-5, 75, 139, 143, 164-65, 179, 184, 284, 286; for taxes on fords and passages *Ibid* II p 106; *Nazim* plundering people of Baroda on false accusations, *Ibid* II p 179, for *faujdars* engaged in similar kind of activities. *Ibid* II pp 165, 286, 334-35;

2. *Ibid* II p 113

3. *Ibid* II pp 195-6.

4. *Ibid*, I, pp 403-4

5. *Ibid* II pp 94, 97, 105-6.

Marathas which led to the loss of Viramgaon and Baroda.[1]

The prevailing tendency to extort money increasingly [2] over and over again on various grounds and excuses from the vulnerable sections within easy reach, seems to have led to the erosion of credibility of the administration. It is reflected from the way the sureties and securities came be furnished.

The *faujdars* and the *thanedars* were required to procure reliable sureties from the persons of doubtful integrity i.e. the recalcitrants, the *girasias* and the Kolis for ensuring their right conduct and guarding against the possibilities of their rising in rebellion and for ensuring their availability as and when summoned.[3] Moreover, the *zamindars* were required to furnish bonds for not levying the illegal

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1. *Ibid* II pp 167,186-7, *Ahwal-i Gaekwar*, ff 12-3 *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat;* f.5.

2. The document entitled *yad-dasht-abwab pargana* Dholga, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad (*PC* No 12 to 13) specifies 29 *abwab* of various kind which were extorted from the rural society during the third decade of the eighteenth century.

3. *Account* ff 14a, 15a; *Tamaesuk hazir-zamini*, *Baroda* 99. The sureties, called *fa'il zamin*, were to undertake responsibility of right conduct and performance of the assigned duties of watch and ward. The *hazir-zamini* were to ensure availability of the person concerned. Please see *Tasmassukat-fa'il zamini* and *hazir-zamini* for the *parganas* of *haveli* Ahmadabad, Piplod, Bharauch, Kadi, Viramgaon and Petlad for the years 1667-1741, R Nos 27, 63, 67, 70, Pune.

casses.[1] The *faujdars* and the *thanedars* were to ensure procurement of the sureties but where and when it was not within their competence, the *Nazim* stepped in.[2] Though the practice of procuring sureties was not dropped altogether, but it seems to have undergone a drastic change during the period under review.

From the period of Maharaja Abhay Singh's *subedari* (1730-37) the Governor himself is shown to have furnished sureties[3] on behalf of his subordinate appointtees as well as for himself. Thus, Dalla, *muqaddam* of Padra and in-charge of revenue matters of Baroda, apprehending ill-treatment at Maharaja's hand obliged him to furnish strong men of the region like Momin Khan, Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni, Sher Khan Babi, Jawanmard Khan Babi, Faiyaz Khan and others as

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1. *Account* ff 14a, 15a.

2. Of the *tamassuks* referred to on the preceding page No (1667-1741) 107 were procured by the *faujdars* and the *thanedars*. During the period 1683 to 1701 only 19 were procured by the *Nazims* from the *girasia* Rajputs and Kolis of Jhalawar region (*pargana* Viramgaon), a *zortalab* area and assigned in the *jagir* of the *Nazims* who had to lead military expeditions (1683-1701) for the purpose. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 324, 326, 330, 344, 394-95.

3. In Gujarat the sureties furnished for a person of doubtful integrity and ensuring his proper conduct, were called *bandharis* and those who acted as surety were designated *bandharan* (sing., *bandhar*). For the prevalence of the institution and its sanctity in the *subah* from the time of emperor Akbar, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I p *Ibid* II pp 138, 144, 146, 166-7 see also *Handbook of Giras* p 10.

bandharis. Only then the *muqaddam* came to see the *Nazim*.[1] Likewise the *desai* of Viramgaon forced the Maharaja to furnish *bandharis* at the time of appointment and entry of new *faujdar* into Viramgaon.[2] The *muqaddam* and the *desai* appear to have grown strong enough to force the *Nazim* for furnishing *bandharis*.[3]

From a careful examination of the documents entitled *parwana bandhari* it would appear that the administration not only had gone powerless but also, and more particularly seems to have lost credibility.

The earliest of the available *parwanas* (1739) was issued by *subedar* Momia Khan, (1737-43) to assure Dhanji *girasia* and *raiyat* of village Jagatpur (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad). The *subedar* assured them that they would not be troubled for paying *bewra* and that no addition would be made to the agreed share in the produce. Assuring them further not to entertain any doubts, the *subedar* asked them to resume cultivation. In order to add credibility to his word he furnished *bandharis* who would ensure enforcement of the

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1. *Ibid* II pp 144, 146.

2. *Ibid* II pp 166-7.

3. *Ibid* II pp 146, 166, 168, It may be pointed out that appre hensions of both of them who are stated to have feared "deceit and artifice" (*khad'-o makr*), came true. *Ibid* II pp 146, 167.

subedar's word.[1] Another *parwana bandhari* which is addressed to Rabhji Waghara and descendants of Ranchhorji (*awlad* Ranchhodji, Kolis), *girasias* of village Kasandra (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) assures the *raiyat* that none other than the addressees would be required for paying revenues. The *Nazim* furnished *bandharis* for removing their apprehensions.[2] It seems the *raiyat* had taken shelter under the *girasia* to guard against the imposition of additional demands. Yet another *parwana* issued by the *Nazim* assured the *kameja* and *paikashta* of village Ghayaspur (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) that the revenue would be determined on divisioning basis (*amal-i batai*) and that no extra demand would be made (*darin bab zayadah talbi-w- safaqat n'khwahad shud*). Stating further that the 'word of *sarkar* is the word of God' the *Nazim* as such asks the *riaya* to believe him and undertake cultivation without having apprehensions.[3]

The representative documents cited above suggest that the Primary zamindars and the *raiyat* had, on account of

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1. *Naql parwana bandhari*, dt 17 Rabi II, 20 Ry Muhammad Shah R.No 37 Pune; see also *parwana bandhari* 6th *Rajab* 29 RY Muhammad Shah PC No 79/1. Particular note may be taken of the assurance that *siwai an bewrah-o izafa b'ahwal anha mazahim n'khwahad shud* and that *b'hichwajah waswas b'khatir rah n'dehand.*

2. *Naql parwana bandhari*, dt. 17 Rabi II, 29 R.Y. Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/E.

3. *Naql-i ganwat*, dt 24 Jamadi I 1153, *fasli*, *PC* No 64.

their past experience, developed apprehensions and therefore, mistrusted even the highest official that was once regarded as the fountain-head of justice in the *Subah*. The above indicated mistrust and distrust seems to have been the direct outcome of the unending exploitation of the *raiyat* (vulnerable and within easy reach) and closing down of the channels of redress. A further view of the increasing and increased strength of the zamindars into whose arms the *riaya* seems to have been driven by the prevailing insecure state of affairs, may be formed from the following discussion.

The burden of procuring sureties particularly from the year 1720-21 seems to have passed on to the *Nazims*. The inference is based on two corroborative sets of evidence. The military expeditions which had become a common feature from 1720-21, as pointed out earlier, were led for procuring sureties also.[1] The necessity of leading these expeditions by the *Nazims* denominates ineffectiveness of the *faujdars* and *thanedars* in procuring sureties. Secondly, of the available *tamassuks* coming for the post-1720 period, 87 were furnished to the *Nazims* and only 11 to the *faujdars* and

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 20, 27, 46-9, 92, 102, 107, 164, 257, 271, For the incapacity of the faujdars *Ibid* II pp 97, 105, 172-3, 185-6. *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f 4 *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* ff 17-8 21,58,89, 123.

thanedars.[1] It may therefore be seen that the zamindars had grown relatively stronger to resist the local administrators and thus force the *Nazims* to do what otherwise the *faujdars* and *thanedars* were required to do.

Then even the *Nazims* sometime on account of indifference and at other times due to preoccupations could not procure the sureties consistently.[2] The available evidence increasingly mentions the committing of dacoities, plundering of caravans and treasury, raids on and looting of towns and villages, attacks on officials and 'commotions' created by the Kolis and recalcitrants from the second decade of the eighteenth century.[3] From the description of events in the *Mirat* and other contemporary sources it would appear that the lives and property of the people had become insecure. Such a state of affair, it may be presumed, would naturally oblige the weaker section to seek protection of and align themselves with the stronger ones.

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1. *Tamassukat fa'il zamini* and *hazir zamini* for the *parganas* of Bharuch, Kadi, Piplod, Viramgaon, Petlad and *haveli* Ahmadabad *op cit.*

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I pp 412-3, *Ibid,* II p 164.

3. *Ibid*, I p 174; *Ibid* II pp 27, 102, 133, 144, 163, 164, 247, 249, 258, 265-66; *Tamassukat-dehat pargana haveli* Ahmadabad etc. *op.cit; Tamassuk*, 26 RY Muhammad Shah *PC* No 268; *Yad-dasht haqiqat-i nazar-i peshkash waghaira*, *op cit PC* No p2; *Ruqqat-i Harkaran, op cit* ff 35-6; Raigobindas Kayath, *op cit* f 73; *Akhbarat*, Nos 2312 dt 5th Shawwal, 5th Ry Farrukhsiyar, No 2350 dt 23rd Shawwal, 5th RY Farrukhsiyar No. 2506, 23rd Shoban, 3rd RY Muhammad Shah; 2707 dt ? Ramadhan 4th R.Y Muhammad Shah.

Because of its apparent helplessness in maintaining law and order the administration as well as the people who had thus been exposed to live under the chaotic conditions, seem to have turned to the Kolis and Rajputs who were collectively regarded as recalcitrants and held responsible for the prevailing chaos. According to a news report (1723) the *naib-faujdar* of Bahadarpur maintained only a single horseman and four footmen and was a failure against the recalcitrants who used to raid the houses of the people. The people, therefore, employed Kolis, 40 in number and paid them out of their own pocket. Instead of lending a helping hand, the *naib-faujdar* harassed the populace and the Kolis.[1] Likewise the *muzarian* of Navapur (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) paid the Kolis of a neighbouring village Rs. 40/- per month for seeking protection from the inroads of some unidentified recalcitrants[2] Ratan Singh Bhandari, *naib-subedar* had asked the Kolis and Rajput *girasias* of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad to maintain 'watch and ward' (*chowki-o pehra*) and enjoy revenues of the *jagir* which otherwise was conditional (*mashrut*) upon the *thanedari* of the place.[3] The Bhandari also assigned

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1. *Akhbarat*, No 265, ? Zilhaj, 4th RY, Muhammad Shah.

2. *Pawranah* of Ratan Singh Bhandari, dt 15th Muharram 1147 AH, R No 25 Pune.

3. *Parwanah* of Ratan Singh Bhandari dt 12th Jamadi II 1148 AH R No 29. Pune.

thanedari of *mawza* (? *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) to Yadji, a Koli for maintaining law and order.[1] Similarly Momin Khan, next *subedar* and his successor Jawanmard Khan Babi entrusted the Kolis and Rajputs with the duties of protecting villages and highways, maintaining *chowki-o-pehra*, stopping robberies and thefts and plundering of caravans and travelers.[2]

Even though the Kolis and Rajputs had been favoured with administrative assignments but they too seem to have developed strong apprehensions and lost trust in the word of administration for the reasons not known to us. According to a *parwana bandhari* (1740) *subedar* Momin Khan furnished sureties (*bandharis*) to the *girasia* of village Hirapur (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad). *The girasia* had some reservations and, therefore, reluctant to come to the provincial capital as summoned. The *subedar*, therefore, furnished *bandharis* assuring him of his safe conduct from his village to the provincial capital and back and for removal of doubts

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1. *Tamassuk*, dt 27th Jamadi II, 1148 AH, R No 53, Pune. The Bhandari while besieged (1736-37) at Ahmadabad by *subedar* designate Momin Khan, had employed Kolis of Chunwal, (the region noted for Kolis' recalcitrance) for supplying fodder and act as spies. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 179,212,221

2. *Parwanas* dt 15th and 20th Ramadhan, 19 RY Muhammad Shah; 29th Shawwal, 21RY Muhammad Shah R No 53 Pune; *Parwana* of Nawab Jawanmard Khan Babi, dt 7th and 19 Rabi I, 9th and 14 Rabi II 26 RY Muhammad Shah R NO 47. Pune.

(*barai raf-i waswas*) concerning thereto.[1] Likewise Jawanmard Khan Babi issued a *parwana-i qawl-o bandhari* in favour of Hiraji *girasia* and others of village (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) when they were summoned to the court. By issuing the *parwana* and furnishing *bandharis* the *Nazim* assured them of safe conduct and non-interference into some matters (*b'abwab anha mazahem n' khwahad shud*) which have been left unspecified.[2] Presumably the *girasias* apprehended some kind of ill-treatment and felt it unsafe to visit the provincial capital.

Further, the Primary zamindars performing the duty of watch and ward, or else those who were especially entrusted with such duties, were apprehensive of interference of unspecified nature. *Subedar* Jawanmard Khan Babi, therefore, asked Udaibhan and other Kolis of village Harsa (*pargana* Kadi) to maintain watch and ward in *mawza* Kaopur of the same *pargana* assuring them by furnishing the *bandhari* to add credibility to his word (*qawl*) for non-interference in this

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1. *Naql parwana bandhari*, dt. 15th Shoban, 21 RY Muhammad Shah R No 67.

2. *Naql parwana-i qawl-o bandhari* dt 3rd Ramadhan, 29RY Muham mad Shah *PC* No 79F.

matter on any ground.[1] Like-wise Bhola, Ranchhod and other Kolis of village Kasandra were favoured with the issuance of a *parwana*. The *Nazim* asked them to maintain watch and ward without fear (? of molestation) for the removal of which suspicion the *bandharis* were furnished.[2] The evidence cited above is quite limited, rendering it difficult to make a general statement. But the significance of the fact that it comes for the environs of the provincial capital, may not be lost sight of. Evidently the Primary zamindars(of the environs of Ahmadabad) had grown strong enough to extort sureties and dictate their own terms to the Governor. The situation as might have prevailed elsewhere is not difficult to imagine.[3] It may thus be seen that the administration seems to have lost all of its control over the countryside and the Primary zamindars who were successfully consolidating their hold and emerging as the leaders of *raiyat* whose direct communication with the state had been broken off

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1. *Naql parwana bandhari*, dt 20th Ramadhan 29 RY Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/F; Also see the similar *parwana* dt 11 Ramadhan, 29 RY Muhammad Shah issued in favour of Jetha, Bena and Ranchhod Kolis *PC* No 79/E.

2. *Naql parwanah bandhari* dt 6th Rajab, 29 RY Muhammad Shah *PC* No 79/I.

3. It seems that those whose possessions were situated far off the seat of provincial power would not like to co-operate even this much.

The government continued alienating its share in the produce of society in favour of individuals and institutions during the first half of the eighteenth century also. In principle no change, whatsoever, in regards to granting and holding the alienated rights is reported to have been effected. However, fortunes of grantees passed through many vicissitudes during the period of declining imperial hold over the province and its administrative apparatus. Some of them lost their means of livelihood whereas the other had to bear the burden of illegal exactions and encroachments. But on the whole the class of *madad-i ma'sh* holders showed tenacity to survive these vicissitudes.

With regard to the grantees remaining in possession of their grants the author of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* has made some observations. Commenting on their position during the closing years of Maharaja Abhay Singh's period of *subedari* (1730-37) he remarks that "their affairs have reached such a pitch that they are in need of bread at night as well as a *dam*".[1] He has also commented on their conditions during the closing years of Mughal rule in the *subah*, saying "there is no trace of such persons getting means of livelihood (*madad-*

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 141.

i ma'sh). They gave up claims with turpitude and entreaties. They got scattered for want of livelihood and hardship" of the situation.[1] These remarks though exaggerated, yet refer to a real situation of hardship as would be borne out by other evidence. Of course not every *madad-i ma'sh* holder was reduced to utter penury as we have instances from the *Mirat*, other documents and works of later date mentioning *madad-i ma'sh* holders in possession of the grants, it is holder of cash-stipend who lost their means of livelihood from 1748-49 when these grants finally seased following *Nazim*'s order.[2]

The *Mirat* elsewhere mentions some eminent *Sheikhs* and *Saiyeds* holding their *madad-i ma'sh* lands and villages which they were granted during the seventeenth century by the Mughals and earlier by the Gujarati sultans. These grantees were in possession of their lands even after the extinction of Mughal rule from the *subah*.[3]

Likewise the grantees of Junagadh and Surat regions seem to have continued to hold their possessions even after

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1. *Ibid* II p 381.

2. *Ibid*

3. *Ibid Supplement* pp 11, 14, 28, 32-4, 38, 44, 58-63, 65, 70, 75, 91-2, 94, 105, 126 particularly for *Sarkar* Ahmadabad; and for further references please see discussion in the following pages.

the extinction of Mughal rule from the *subah*.[1] The Marathas too appear to have confirmed the Mughal grantees in their possession during the process and after the conquest of the *subah*.[2]

Besides, the Mughal emperors and the Governors continued to bestow *madad-i-ma'sh* grants during the period (1700-50) and the grantees continued to hold the same even during later years. Emperor Bahadur Shah granted *mawza* Kasandra (*pargana Haveli*) to a Saiyed for defraying expenses on the Propnet's birthday ceremonies beside the village Mehta (*Pargana* Kadi) and Ranwasan (*pargana haveli* Pattan) bestowed

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1. The grantees who had continued to hold their possessions under the *Nawabs* of Surat were, later on, likewise confirmed by the administrators of the British East India Company. In 1862-3 the British Crown confirmed them afresh and issued confirmatory orders which are summarily recorded in the *Alienation Register*, Record office (fort), Surat. Similarly *Nawabs* of Junagadh confirmed the grantees in their possessions. Later (1880-1) the *Nawab* tried to levy some taxes from the grantees which they contested before the British officer by submitting *farmans*, *hasb-ul-hukms*, *parwanas* etc. Copies of the same categorized as *barakhali settled cases* are preserved at District Record Office, Junagadh.

2. For the Marathas allowing the grantees to continue in their possessions after making enquiry into the legitimacy of their claim, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 245; For the permission granted to a specified grantee to retain his rights, DB Parasnis (ed), *Selections from the Satara Raja and the Peshwa Diaries*, I, Document Nos 63 p 36; *Ibid*, p 63; For the general order allowing the holders of '*inam*, *wazifa* and *devasthan*' lands granted by the Mughals, *Historical selections from Baroda state Records*-I (1724-68) Documents Nos 30, 36, 127 pp 22, 32, 121; For actual continuity, *Baroda*, 57, 84, 97; For further continuity under the British, *Bombay Gazetteer*, II p 318 *Ibid* (Kaira), 81-3.

upon the same person as *madad-i ma'sh!*[1] Children of Sheikh Ali Sarhindi (d 1729) were granted villages of Kochrab, Sanhel and Rahnas by emperor Muhammad Shah.[2] One Sheikh Muhammad Saleh got *mawza* Mahej as *altamgha* from the same emperor in addition to village *Tajpur* (*pargana* Viramgaon) already possessed as *madad-i-ma'sh.*[3]

From the evidence cited above it would appear that the Sheikhs and the Saiyed continued as the state's favorite beneficiaries of the grants.[4]

The state kept up its policy of extending favours to select Non-muslims also. *Subedar* Daood Khan Panni added five more villages to the *ina'm* possessions of the Kolis of Chunwal (*pargana* Viramgaon).[5] Sons of Parmanand Bhat were granted a village (1716) in *pargana* Kutyana (*sarkar* Soreth) in addition to the villages, two in number, which they already held by way of *madad-i ma'sh.*[6]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement* p 58.

2. *Ibid* p 105.

3. *Ibid* pp 58-9. The Sheikh also got Rs 2000 each from emperor Farrukhsiyar and Muhammad Shah when he visited the court.

4. Please see also *Ibid* pp 15-6, 28, 33-4, 38, 44, 58-63, 65-70, 75, 94, 105, 126; *Junagadh* SC Nos 983 (*mahal* Junagadh); *Ibid* SC No 443 (*mahal* Una); *Ibid*, Sc No 409, (*mahal* Balagam).

5. *Yad-dasht-tappa Chunwal*, op cit *PC* No k1

6. *Junagadh*, SC No 995 (*mahal* Kutyana)

One Jiwandas Bairagi got *mawza* Chandwana (1720) by way of *khairat* for feeding medicants.[1] One Vasudev Brahman was granted a few more plots (1723) in apppreciation of his services as physician.[2] One Bawa Lakhmidas, a Bairagi was granted *mawza* Samroli in *Khairat* during Muhammad Shah's reign.[3] Yet another Non-muslim, Purshottamdas was granted (1748) a village by way of *madad-i kharch* for defraying expenses on the *bhog* of Srinath (?) in *pargana* Mangrole by Sher Khan Babi, the *faujdar* turned *nawab* of Junagadh.[4] As such the Mughal State and officials kept up the policy of granting revenues during the period on almost the same pattern continuously.

Though very limited in quantity and scope there is however evidence to show that some of the grantees prospered enough to make further investment during the period. Mir Amanullah, a holder of *madad-i ma'sh* lands in Surat, mortgaged 35 *bighas* of land of one Rewa of *mawza* Nabol (*pargana* Chorasi, *sarkar* Surat) for Rs 200/- in 1711.[5] The following year he bought two plots (*du qiteh*) of land from the *desai*

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1. *Ibid*, SC No 1042 Ex No 5, 13/3 (*mahal* Seel)
2. *Ibid* SC Nos 170, 171 (*mahal* Sutrapara)
3. *Ibid* SC No 359 (*mahal* Sutarpara)
4. *Ibid* SC No 364A (*mahal* Mangrole)
5. *PC* NO 280/Bha/41A dt. 27 Muharram, 4th RY Bahadurshah.

of *mawza* Barot (*pargana* Chorasi) for Rs 205/- only.[1] In 1722 he bought 10 *bighas* of land for Rs. 55/- from Kanwarji and Siyamji, sons of Ram Kishan *desai*, and Bhim and Kalyan Mahadev *muqaddams* of Nabo (*pargana* Bulsar, *sarkar* Surat).[2] Sibghatullah, another grantee, bought twelve and a half *bigha* of land along with 24 mango trees for Rs. 125/- from Nathu and others of *mawza* Katorgaon in 1724.[3] Yet another grantee, Sheikh Murtaza, raised orchard on his 45 *bighas* of *madad-i ma'sh* lands in *pargana* Mangrole (*sarkar* Soreth) between 1735-37.[4]

But all the grantees do not appear to have prospered the same way. The evidence available particularly for *sarkar* Ahmadabad shows the grantees suffering at the hands of Governors who levied illegal exactions from their possessions. The first to do so was Daood Khan Panni (1713-15) who is reported to have exacted a levy, called *chhuttaman* (literally release, also termed chhuttawan) from the holders

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1. *PC Tamassuk*, dt 17 Safar 1124 AH
2. *PC* No 287/Bha, dt 20 Rabi II 1135 AH.
3. *PC* No 481/Bha/41B dt 11 Ramadhan, 1137 AH
4. *Junagadh*, SC No 1155 Ex. Nos 5, 1142 *fasli* and of 1144 *fasli* (*mahal* Mangrole).

of allowances and *madad-i ma'sh.*[1] The impost was levied during both the crop seasons and demanded in addition to the routine claim of the state as discussed in the preceding Chapter.[2] During the *subedari* of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) when all the 'former innovations' (?) are reported to have been revived and the *madad-i ma'sh* grants of 'noble' Saiyeds, and holy saints as well as 'deserving persons' were subjected to some discount' of unspecified descriptions. Separate *amins* and *tehsildars* were reportedly appointed for its collection.[3]

Holders of the *madad-i ma'sh* lands were forced to pay other imposts levied at *Nazim*'s convenience. The *Nazims* as we have seen in the preceding discussion under Primary zamindars, levied *bewra* from the rural populace every year from 1725 onward. Whether the *bewra* was imposed on the grantees also during pre- 1742 period, is not known. In the year 1742 Momin Khan, the *Nazim*, extorted Rs 2171/- as *bewra*

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II p 364. The matter was brought to the notice of the emperor but to no avail. *Ibid.*

2. *Yad-dasht-haqiqat-i paidaish, pargana* Dholga, *Sarkar* Ahmadabad, 1130 *fasli PC; yad-dasht abwab, pargana* Dholga *PC.*

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 141-2. For a similar trend in the region of Awadh, Muzaffar Alam, "Some Aspects of the changes in the position of the *Madad-i ma'sh* Holders in Awadh, 1676-1722", Essays in *Medieval Indian Economic History*, Satish Chandra, ed; Delhi- 1987 pp 77-8.

from the persons holding *madad-i ma'sh* lands in 23 specified villages of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad.[1] During the years 1747-48 the persons holding *madad-i ma'sh* possessions in the same villages were exposed to bear the burden of improsts levied separately as well as jointly by the Mughal Governor and the Maratha chief at Ahmadabad. Thus Rs 2121/- were extorted by way of *bewra* by the *Nazim*.[2] He extorted some amount as part payment (*alal hisab*) of some unspecified imposts.[3] Again, Rs 1555/- were extorted as *ghasdana* by the *Nazim* and the Marathas together.[4] Then the *Nazim* and the Marathas each extorted Rs 741/- the same way from them.[5] A sum of Rs 2190/8 *annas* each were levied by both of them by way of *nazrana*.[6] In 1750-51 the Marathas extorted *bewra* from the grantees again. These imposts and levies were extorted in addition to the nacked loot which was resorted to by both

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1. *Yad-dasht bewra dehat-i wazifa pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1150 *fasli PC* No 82

2. *Ibid*, 1155 *fasli PC* No 81.

3. *Yad-dasht tafrig-i dehat-i wazifadaran, pargana haveli* Ahmedabad, *b'sigha-i alal hisab*, 1155 *fasli PC* No 76.

4. *Yad-dasht-gahdana dehat-i wazifadaran pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1155 *fasli PC* No 74.

5. *Ibid*, 1155 *fasli PC* No 73.

6. *Haqiqat-i nazrana-i dehat-i wazifa pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1155 *fasli PC*.

of them whenever it was possible.[1]

Magnitude and impact of the above mentioned levies might have been unbearable for at least some of them. The *Mirat* observes that the villages held as *madad-i ma'sh* which were in a 'flourishing state' were 'ruined'.[2] The statistical information which is available for such villages of the same *pargana* (*haveli* Ahmadabad) partly substantiates the *Mirat's* assertion.[3] Also the agricultural activities even in the villages described as 'populated' (*abadan*) seem to have been at a low pitch during the same period.[4]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II pp 160-61, 245, 323. Whether the authorities could adopt the same attitude towards the grantees in the other parts of the *subah* is not known. *Pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, it may be recalled, had been exposed to bear burden of extra levies, particularly because of its vulnerability.

2. *Ibid*, *Supplement*, pp 15-6.

3. In the year 1709-10 out of 40 villages held by the grantees only one is described as 'desolate' (*weeran*). The number of desolate villages shot up to 20 out of 45 such villages in 1747-48. *Yad-dasht dehat-i wazifa*, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad. dt 1122 AH, RNo 35, Pune; *Yad-dasht tafrique-i dehat-i wazifadaran*, 1155 *fasli*, *op cit*, *PC* No 76.

4. *Haqiqat-i wazifa farzandan-i ...* Sheikh Mohd Ghaus '*zamin-i wazifa dar dehat-i pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1156 *fasli*, PC.

Villages	Entire area held as *madad -i ma'sh*	Area under cutivation (*mazrua'*)	Area out of cultivation (*uftadah*)
Neharwala	35-0	4-15	30-5
Balad	148-0	5-0	143-0
Kasandra	300-0	4-0	296-0
Ghayaspur	45-0	---	45-0
Karad	228-10	4-0	224-10
Saiyedpur & Nehrwala	20-0	---	20-0
Total	776-10	17-15	258-15

Thus in the year 1747-8 of the entire cultivable area held as *madad-i ma'sh* by the sons of Sheikh Mohammad Ghaus, only 2.29% was under actual cultivation.

It may however be pointed out that the crops were raised on the *madad-i ma'sh* lands in other villages of the same *pargana*.[1] But due to the non-availability of the necessary area figures proportionate relationship between the

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1. For example please see *Khasra mazruat mawza* Mahej, *fasl-i-kharif*, 1146 *fasli*, PC Nos 95-9; *ibid*, Dhamnon, 1140 *fasli*.

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area actually held and the one cropped may not be worked out.

But there is other set of information which shows that from the year 1748-49 the process of going more and more village as desolate had been arrested. Thus[1]

No. of villages in *madad-i ma'sh*	No of villages described 'desolate'	No. of villages described populated	Year
40	1	39	1709-10
45	20	25	1747-8
45	15	30	1748-9
45	14	31	1749-50

Evidently the number of desolate villages which had risen from one (1709-10) to 20 (1747-48) came down by 5 (1748-9) and again fell by one more (1749-50) the following year. Whether the same trend (i.e. rehabilitation of the desolate villages) continued during the later years is difficult to explain for want of required evidence.

The available evidence though too scanty to draw a viable conclusion however suggests that the grantees' over

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1. *Yad-dasht dehat-i wazifa*, 1122 AH *op cit*; *Yad-dasht ta frique-i dehal-i wazifadaran*, *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, 1155 *fasli* PC No 76; *Ibid*, 1156 and 1157 *fasli* R No 37, Pune.

all relationships with the intermediary zamindars were not necessarily cordial. According to a *parwana* (1739) *muqaddam* of *mawza* Rakhyal Khurd (*pargana haveli* Ahmadabad) had encroached upon an orchard, measuring 10 *bighas* belonging to Sivparsad, a grantee sometime during the *subedari* of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37). On the representation of the aggrieved grantee, *subedar* Momin Khan (1737-43) ordered for restoring the orchard and recovering the misappropriated revenues.[1] Whether the *subedar's* order could really be enforced is not known. Later on the Marathas also entertained a complaint against the *desai* of Baroda who had imposed *salami* on the *wazifa* lands.[2] The *qasbati* professional soldiers who acted as *ijarahdars* also made some kind of interference into the *madad-i ma'sh* possession of one Nazar Miyan in *mawza* Dher, *pargana* Una (*sarkar* Soreth) sometime before 1750-51.[3]

But, then, all the grantees do not appear to be so docile as to submit before the Mughal officials with ease. Of the 25 villages described as 'populated' the administra-

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1. *Parwana* (Momin Khan) dt. 19 Rabi I, 20 R Y Mohammad Shah.

2. *Historical Selections From Baroda State Records*, I (1724-68), Doc No 127, p 121.

3. *Parwana* dt. 15 Rajab, 1164 AH, *Junagadh* SC No 419, Ex. No 2 (*mahal* Una); For similar developments in Awadh Muzaffar Alam, *op cit* pp 76-7.

tion could levy exactions only from 18 villages. Of the seven villages which enjoyed virtual exemption from paying the additional cess, one is categorized as *zortalab* i.e. refractory.[1]

From the preceding discussion it would appear that the fortunes of a number of grantees passed through many vicissitudes. The Mughal state that created and patronized the grantees during the hey-day of its rule, also victimized them during the days of worsening financial crisis and political chaos. The state fell upon its own 'army of prayers', (*lashkar-i duaqoyan*) or else the instruments of creating a 'social base' for the empire.

It may however be seen that the grantees as a distinct category of people holding superior rights in land or its usufruct survived the eclipse of its patron, the Mughal empire.[2] They simultaneously continued to acquire additional resources and add new members to the category, though over all social formation seems to have remained unchanged. Though it is difficult to ascertain their role in precise

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1. *Haqiqat nazrana: dehat-i wazifa pargana haveli* Ahmadabad, Nawab Jawanmard Khan, PC No 83. The *zortalab* village is further identified as 'hilly' (*Kohi*) i.e. located in a hilly tract.

2. Similarly the holders of indigenous grants also managed their survival. *Bombay Gazetteer*, II p 319; *Ibid* (Kaira) pp 81-3; *Historical selection from Baroda State Records*, I (1724-68) pp 25, 30, 37-8.

terms in the society but the fact that they managed their survival even after their original patrons had gone, suggests that they were not so insignificant group of people that might be eradicated outright.

CHAPTER-VII

NEW ZAMINDARIS - SOME CASE STUDIES

The complex forces let loose by the wars of succession, economic crisis, Maratha pressure and constant convolutions at the imperial court as well as provincial politics determined the political behaviour of many of the nobles of the *Subah*. The explosive impact of these forces aroused the daring hopes of ambitious military adventurers to carve out independent principalities for themselves.

In their bid to retain and perpetuate delegated position, power and a hold over revenue some of the Mughal nobles and officials strove incessantly and the efforts of some of them met with success. As a result the first half of the eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of a number of petty "states" carved out of the Mughal empire by the Mughal nobles and officials themselves. Possessors of such lands known as *nawab*, *diwan*, *thakur*, *raja* etc. in our *subah*, enjoyed Superior zamindar-like position but with a difference. Their position was not legally sanctioned, even though it was virtually recognized. Theoretically they did not dissociate themselves from the Mughal Empire, but practically they broke it up into fragments. The ***nawabs*** even sought legal confirmation of their position as Mughal officials

which they had virtually converted into zamindaris but as a matter of fact the Mughal Emperors acted only as rubber stamp. Such zamindars enjoyed hereditary rights, claimed a share in the revenue and surrendered a part of it to the provincial authorities only whenever forced. In the following pages we propose to discuss some of such zamindaris which emerged during the first half of the eighteenth century in the *subah*.

I *MAIN LAND GUJARAT :*

A. *Diwans of Palanpur:*

A study of *faujdari* of Palanpur[1] and Deesa which remained confined to the well known Jalori family from 1697 to the close of our period provides a significant example of the emergence of a zamindari out of the *faujdari*. The process of conversion of official position into a zamindari commenced with the death of Bahadurshah and reached its culmination in Mohammad Shah's reign.

At the time Emperor Aurangzed took away the *pargana* of Jalor from the Jaloris in 1697, he also confirmed *diwan* Mujahid Khan Jalori as *faujdar* of Palanpur, Dantiwara and Deesa. In addition to the revenues conditional (*mashrut*) on

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1. Situated in North-eastern part of Gujarat, Palanpur was a *pargana* in *sarkar* Pattan. Because of the turbulent nature of the populace, the *pargana* was provided with 28 *thanas* dependent upon *faujdari*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*, p.201

faujdari, Mujahid Khan was also granted *tankhwah jagir* out of the revenues of the aforesaid *pargana* against a *mansab* of 1500/1500.[1] The rest was settled as *jagir* of the *jagirdars*. Mujahid Khan, besides his duties associated with *faujdari* within the *pargana*, was also commanded to serve the *Nazims* at the head of specified contingents.[2]

The author of *Mirat-i Ahmadi* tells us nothing about Mujahid Khan Jalori after 1697. But at the time of assumption of *faujdari* by *diwan* Firuz Jalori alias Ghazni Khan(1715), our author records that "he (i.e. Ghazni Khan) occupied (Palanpur and Deesa) from the beginning(?) of revolts as zamindar" and "abstained from royal service and occupied by force some of the places in the neighbourhood and brought them under his control".[3] In the *pargana*-wise description of *subah* Gujarat he remarks that "earlier (?) they assisted *Nazims*. Now (i.e. sixth/seventh decade of the eighteenth century) the *Subedar* leads an expedition and captures *peshkash* according to his power and strenght. They have divided the *mulk* among themselves like zamindars (*b' tariq-i zamindaran*) and they (i.e. Jaloris) do not behave

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* I, pp. 341-2; *Tarikh-i Palanpur* pp. 195, 201-2; *Hadiqat-ul hind*, f.33

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 342; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, p.200

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 341-2; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp.201-2

well"[1] though the post of *faujdari* was held by them till the book was being written.[2]

From the detailed statements of the *Mirat* quoted above it may be inferred that the Jaloris occupied the *parganas* like zamindars, conquered the lands not belonging to them, did not perform the functions attached to their office, divided the lands among themselves, turned *zortalab-peshkashi* but continued as imperial *faujdar*. Before reaching a final conclusion, it would be better to examine in detail the available evidence not merely for checking the statement of the *Mirat* but also for a better appreciation of the new dimensions being added to the position of the *faujdar* that had been held on a hereditary basis by the same family.

According to the author of *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, the family history of Jaloris, Mohammad Kamal Khan Jalori had occupied *pargana* Tehrad sometime between 1711 and 1712[3] -- the first undesirable action on the part of a *faujdar* from the point of view of imperial authority. *Diwan* Ghazni Khan, the next *faujdar* (1715-29), extorted *peshkash* from Rana Pac-

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I pp. 341-2; *Ibid.*, Supplement, pp. 201-2 The *faujdar* of the place therefore, came to be described as the 'rebel' (*faujdar baghi*) *Account*, f. 46.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 341; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 200-01

3. *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, p.212

hanji, zamindar of *pargana* Wao soon after he assumed the office of *faujdar*.[1] Sometime later the Khan incorporated the said *parganas* into his possessions.[2] Similarly he forced the zamindars of Kakosi, Kedonar, Rohu, Dabhela, Dhaner, Malana and Sorbhakri to pay *peshkash*. In the subsequent years the zamindars of these places met the fate of Rana Pachanji.[3] Firuz Khan alias Ghazni Khan is also reported to have forced the *jagirdar* of Kakrej to offer "*peshkash* and *nazrana*" to him and some time later he annexed the entire *pargana*.[4] Ghazni Khan's successor, *diwan* Karimdad Khan extorted *peshkash* from Bajodhodi of Nagor, invaded Danta and occupied the place.[5] Rana Amar Singh of Danta was forced to offer his daughter in marriage to the Khan in return for his possessions.[6] Jaloris are also reported to have occupied the *jagirs* of Sherwanis some time in the year 1742-43.[7] Thus *Mirat*'s observation that Firuz Khan had occupied some of the

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1. *Ibid.*,
2. *Ibid.*,
3. *Ibid.*, p. 213
4. *Ibid.*,
5. *Ibid.*, pp.227, 237, 239-40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 240
7. *Ibid.*, p. 241

neighbouring territories by force is borne out by corroborative evidence.

The *Mirat*'s observations that the *faujdari* of Palanpur and Deesa was held by Jaloris, at least during our period, is also corroborated by detailed evidence. As we have noted earlier Mujahid Khan Jalori was confirmed as *faujdar* of Palanpur and Deesa in 1697.[1] At his death, his eldest son, Mohammad Kamal Khan assumed the office even without seeking the approval of the emperor. Farrukhsiyar appointed Rahim Yar Khan (1715) who arrived at Palanpur to take charge. But Ghazni Khan who had, in the meantime, assumed the charge asserted his right, gave a battle and did not allow him to occupy the office.[2] But in order to seek imperial confirmation of his *de facto* position, he "sent presents, and *peshkash* to His Majesty and with an offering of money obtained the *farman-i bahali* to continue at the same post."[3] He was so confident of the continutity of the position that during his life time itself he divided the territory among his sons thus assigning Deesa to his younger son and the rest to the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.342; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* (f.83) describes him and his successors as *watandars* of Palanpur. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 132

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 342; *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, p.214

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 3; *Ibid.*, *Supplement* pp.200-1

eldest one, Karimdad Khan, who succeeded him at his death.[1] Karimdad Khan Jalori lived for about two years and died in 1730 at Ahmadabad while serving Maharaja Abhay Singh, the *Subedar*. The *Subedar* is reported to have got *diwan* Mohammad Pahad Khan Jalori confirmed in the rank and position of his deceased father.[2] Mohammad Pahad Khan was succeeded by his uncle, Bahadur Khan (1744) who held the office for the rest of our period.[3] It is, therefore, evident that the principle of hereditary succession to the office of *faujdar* had virtually been established and it was enforced through the use of sword, diplomacy and the purse. The imperial authority acted merely as regularising authority.

The *Mirat*'s assertion that *diwan* Firuz Khan alias Ghazni Khan and his successors did not serve the *Nazims* is only partly borne out by other evidence for we notice Ghazni Khan, and later on his son at *Subedar's* service. Ghazni Khan served Maharaja Ajit Singh during the latter's tenure as

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1. *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 214-6; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.342
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 119, 132-3.
3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 341-2, 373, 413, *Ibid.*, II, pp.119, 132-3, 321-2; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 83

Subedar (1715-17) of Gujarat.[1] *Diwan* Karimdad Khan (1729-30) accompanied Maharaja Abhay Singh while the latter passed through Palanpur to take charge of the *subah* in 1730.[2] However, none of the *faujdars* of Palanpur after Maharaja Abhay Singh's withdrawal from the *subah* seem to have served any of the succeeding *subedars*.

It is important to note that the assumption of office by Ghazni Khan in 1715 and his son Karimdad Khan in 1729, almost coincided with the posting of Maharaja Ajit Singh and his son, Maharaja Abhay Singh as *subedars* in 1715 and 1730 respectively.[3] That the Jaloris served only these two *subedars* may not be regarded as a matter of mere conincidence. The Two Rajput princes were the immediate hereditary and strong neighbourers of Palanpur.[4] For Jaloris it might be politic to maintain good relations, or at least not to allow any suspicion to arise in the minds of their neighbours.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi.*, II, pp. 18, 20. The Khan was invited to assume the office of *Naib Subedar* by Dawood Khan Panni when the latter left for Deccan. But before the arrival of Maharaja, Ghazni Khan had left for Palanpur. It must be remembered that the Khan did not serve Daood Khan. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 413; Also Ghazni Khan served as Maharaja's *naib.*, II, p. 20

2. *Ibid.*, II pp. 119, 132, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f.71

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 3, 119, 132-3,

4. For details M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 560 and n.

Secondly, Ghazni Khan in 1715 had opposed the officially appointed *faujdar* and was waiting for the award of *sanad-i bahali* from the imperial court.[1] Fear of armed action and the hope of securing recommendation of the Maharaja might have compelled Ghazni Khan to render service. Partly his desire to be confirmed in his position might have motivated him to serve the Raja. Lastly, both the princes-*subedars* passed through Palanpur at the head of strong continghents while the other *subedars* had adopted the other route.[2] Maharaja Abhay Singh's march was directed against Sarbuland Khan Mubariz-ul mulk, then *subedar* in office, who had concluded treaty with the Marathas and against the latter who had imposed *khandni* upon the Jaloris.[3] Obviously the Jaloris might have visualised a strong general in the person of the Maharaja who could provide protection against the Marathas and put an end to the *subedari* of Sarbuland Khan who had let

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 3, 119, 133; *Ibid.*, I, p.342

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 3, 16-8, 119, 132-3, 193, 240. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 70. Moreover, Pahad Khan Jalori was also favoured with the office of *naib-faujdar* of Pattan under Bakht Singh who had accompanied the Maharaja. B.N. Reu, "A letter from Rajadhiraj Bakht Singh of Nagor (Marwar) dated Oct. 10, 1737", *Proc. IHC*, 1949,

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 99-100, 102-03; *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 222, 228-9

the Jaloris suffer at the hands of the Marathas.[1] The very next year (1731) the Jaloris were again exposed to Maratha impositions and the Maharaja could do nothing about it. The Maharaja could not protect even Ahmadabad well.[2] It might have proved an eye opener to the Jaloris. At this stage the Jaloris might have with reason decided to look after their own possessions instead of rendering service at Ahmadabad. Hence they fortified Palanpur, raised strong fortifications[3] and after 1733 never came to serve the *subedar*.

The *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, as mentioned above, has reported that as the *faujdars* did not come to serve the *Nazim*, the latter led expeditions and extorted *peshkash* from them "according to his strength and capacity.[4] We have seen that the Jaloris rendered service for the last time in 1732-33. The first reported expedition for *peshkash* from Jaloris was led in 1734-35 by Ratan Singh Bhandari, the *naib* of Maharaja Abhay Singh.[5] Three years later, Momin Khan extorted

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1. For Maratha imposition on Jaloris, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 99-100, 102-03; *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 228-9. *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f. 16

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 157-61, 235-6, *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f. 16

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 200-01.

4. *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 201-02 *Account* f. 46a

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 190., *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f. 15

peshkash from Jaloris who offered it through Sher Khan Babi.[1] The last expedition under Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de facto subedar*, was led in 1748.[2] Thus the Mughal *subedars* who could not extort regular military service from the Jalori *faudjars*, decided to extort occasional *peshkash* at least, as in the case of Superior zamindars of long standing.

It is, therefore, evident that the Jaloris who held *faujdari* of Palanpur and Deesa, acquired the position of Superior zamindar who not merely ruled within the territory like autonomous chiefs but also behaved like independent rulers. With expedient use of the power of sword, diplomacy and purse they converted the *faujdari* into zamindari within the empire in violation of the established rules.[3]

B. ***Raja of Idar***[4]:

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 245; for Jaloris' close association with the Babis, the founder of the *Nawabis* of Radhanpur and Junagarh, please see *Ibid.*, II, pp. 16-8.

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 403-04; *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f.21

3. Even then the Jaloris continued to recognize the Mughal emperor as their sovereign. Please see them seeking and getting favors from the court, Basheeruddin Khan (ed.) *Faramin-i Salatin-i Hind*, pp. 160-6; also *Parwana* dated 15 Jamadi II, 22 RY of Muhammad Shah in possession of Hamiduddin Amir Miyan, *Shehr Qazi* of Palanpur.

4. Situated in Eastern part of the *subah* on a hillock and duly fortified, Idar was a *pargana* of *sarkar* Ahmadabad.

The history of the etablishment of what came to be known as "Later Rathor dynasty"[1] at Idar is an interesting episode of the gradual transformation of *jagir*, acquired virtually by force, into zamindari. The disturbed state of affairs helped the two Rathor brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, in their endeavours to acquire Idar and subsequently to retain it by the force of arms, diplomacy and money-though at times the process was also hindered by the forces at work in the region.

The episode of the establishment of the hold of Anand Singh and Rai Singh, the younger brothers of Maharaja Ahbay Singh, over Idar had its roots in the family feud that followed the death of Maharaja Ajit Singh in 1724 for the *gaddi* of Jodhpur.[2] Maharaja Ajit Singh's younger sons, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, raised the standard of revolt against Abhay Singh who had been recognized as the ruler of Jodhpur

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1. Prior to 1678, Idar was held by the Rajput zamindar of Rathor clan. In 1678, this territory as a result of the confontration between the Rathors and Aurangzed, was incorporated into *Khalsa* lands. For detaids, Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 2, 10, 49n, 178; K. Kamdar, "Conquest of Jamnagar", p. 215.

2. Maharaja Ajit Singh was believed to have been poisoned by his son Bakht Singh at the instigation of Abhay Singh; after his death, Ajit's sons were dfvided into two rival groups, viz., Bakht Singh and Abhay Singh, and Anand Singh and Rai Singh. For detail G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas (1724-1843)*, Jodhpur, 1968, pp. 26-30; B.N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas (Hindi)*, *Jodhpur*, 1968, I, pp. 328-33; by the same author, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 1943, pp. 127-29.

by Mohammed Shah.[1] The two brothers, having failed in Marwar, retired to Gujarat and made an attempt to capture Idar which Maharaja Abhay Sigh held as *jagir*.[2] In order to strengthen their position the Rathor brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, allied themselves with the Marathas who began their onslaught on Idar in the middle of 1725.[3] Though the Rathor brothers failed to weaken Abhay Singh's hold on the territory, their "regular incursions runined sources of revenue".[4]

On the other hand, *desais* and other zamindars who are reported to have formed one group, were at daggers drawn with the *Qasbatis* -- the professional soldiers and money-lenders.[5] Members of the extinct ruling house of Idar also

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1. B.N. Reu, "Mr Forbes and the House of Jodhpur", *Indian Antiquity*, LVIII, 1929, p. 60; G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 26; B.N. Reu, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathor*, pp. XL-XLII.

2. A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Jai Singh, dated March 31, 1726; *Kharita* from Jai Singh to Abhay Singh, September 29, 1725 *cited* in Parihar's *Marwar* and the *Marthas*, pp. 21, 26-8; B.N. Reu, "Maharaja Ajit Singh of Marwar", *Journal of Indian History*, XII, No, 1, Madras, April, 1933, pp. 85-6. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 83; *Vir Vinod*, p. 968.

3. A *Kharita* from Jai Singh to Abhay Singh, September 29, 1725, *cited* by Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p.30.

4. A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Jai Singh, September 23, 1726, *cited* by Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 30-1.

5. *Rasmala*, pp. 340, 346, 450.

were active in the politics of Idar.[1] In addition to the havoc caused by Maratha forces, Idar, even internally, did not enjoy peace at the moment.

Maharaja Abhay Singh devised a plan to deal with his brothers. He designed to hand over the *jagir* of Idar to the Maharana of Udaipur on condition that the Rana would get both the brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, murdered.[2] But the Rana did not lay hands on the two brothers. On the other hand the Maharana entertained overtures from Anand Singh for a compromise between the brothers. Abhay Singh did not like the move.[3] In the meantime Pilaji and Kanthaji, the two Maratha generals, invaded Marwar and looted the area of Jalor which was then held in *jagir* by Bakht Singh, the brother of Maharaja.[4] On the other side, Anand Singh and Rai Singh took possession of Idar (1728) which by then was

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1. *Ibid.*, pp.345-6.

2. A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Jai Singh, 31st May, 1727 *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 31 *Vir Vinod*, p. 967, *Kharita* dated August 1724 written by the ruler of Jodhpur declares Idar as "part of Marwar" *Ibid.*, pp. 968-9

3. A *Kharita* from Jai Singh to Abhay Singh, 6th August, 1726, *cited* by Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 31-32. *Vir Vinod* pp. 969-70

4. *Marwad Khayat*, p. 131 *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p.32

included in the *jagir* of Abhay Singh.[1] The Maharaja did not oppose their action probably keeping in view of maintaining undisturbed peace in Marwar. Even the then *subedar* of Gujarat, Sarbuland Khan seems not to have taken note of this incident. Virtually forced by circumstances, Maharaja Abhay Singh agreed to the proposal of Maharana of Udaipur to close down the long struggle with his brothers by agreeing, in August 1728, that Idar might be granted as *jagir* to Anand Signh and Rai Sigh by the imperial court.[2] Thus Anand Singh and Rai Sigh who started the struggle with their eyes on the *gaddi* of Jodhpur succeeded in acquiring Idar as a political concession from Abhay Singh.

The *jagir* of Idar so acquired was retained by the Rathor brothers by using force, bribery and diplocmacy. Jawanmard Khan Babi, then *faujdar* of Viramgaon, resolved to secure possession of Idar with the help of Akraji, the Koli zamindar of Katosan and Amra Koli, the zamindar of Ilol Kanrah (*pargana* Ahmadnagar) to compensate losses which he had suffered in his *ijara* lands. He marched against Idar in

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1. B.N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas*, p. 355, *Rasmala*, p. 346; B.N. Reu, 'Ajit of Marwar' pp. 85-7; *Bombay Gazetteer*, V, pp. 404, 406; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 213-16.

2. A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Raja of Udaipur, 10th August 1728 *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 33-5; B.N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas*, p. 335; B.N. Reu, "Maharaja Ajit Singh of Marwar", *Journal of Indian History*, Madras vol. XII, No. 1, April 1933, pp. 106-07; *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, pp. 404-06.

1734. It so happened that at this time two Maratha generals, Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindia, were proceeding to Malwa. Messengers for help were accordingly sent by the Rathor brothers and it was readily granted. Idar, because of this timely help was saved.[1] But the Rathors had to part with half of the Idar revenue as *chauth* to Damaji Gaekwad some time between 1734 and 1741.[2]

In 1742, the Rehwar Rajputs in league with *qasbatis*, the professional soldiers and money lenders, attacked and took Idar, killing Raja Anand Singh. On hearing of the disaster his brother, Rai Singh, taking leave of the *Nazim*, Momin Khan went to Idar.[3] With the help of *desais* and zamindars and his clansmen he drove out the Rehwars and killed many *qasbatis* who had supported them and reoccupied Idar.[4] The Mughal *subedars* all through those years neither lent any support nor intervened in the affairs of Idar. It was due to the effort of Rathor brothers themselves that they succeeded

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 172-5; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 449. The Rathors had to pay the cost of assistance they had acquired. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f. 83; Ms. No. 191/1. f. 13

2. *Rasmala*, pp. 424-33; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat* II, p. 450.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 265, 269-71.

4. *Bombay Gazetteer*, V. pp. 406, 409; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 450; For the presence of *desais* in *pargana* of Idar, *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 236.

in retaining their possessions against the potential threat both from within and without.[1]

The Rathor brothers are in our sources nowhere reported to have been rendering military assistance to the then *subedar* Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37). Expediency seems to have dictated the Maharaja not to press his brother for service.

But during the years 1738-42 the Rathor brothers are reported to have served the then *subedar*, Momin Khan (1737-1743). They came to Momin Khan's camp when he visited the area. After matters about the payment of *peshkash* had been settled, the elder brother returned to Idar while Rai Singh remained with the *Nazim*.[2] Sarjit Singh, zamindar of Mohanpur paid *peshkash* to the *Nazim* through Rai Singh.[3] At the time Momin Khan laid siege to Viramgaon in 1740, Rai Singh was present in the *Nazim's* camp.[4] Two years later (1742), Rai Singh, for the last time, is noted in the company of the

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1. Ratan Singh Bhandari, deputy to Abhay Singh, the *Nazim* of the *Subah* acted as silent spectator while Idar was beseiged by Jawanmard Khan Babi. Nor even Momin Khan came to help them either against Marathas or the Rehwari Rajputs.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 224-5.

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 247-8

4. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 261-2

Nazim, Momin Khan.[1]

Raja Rai Singh was summoned by Fakhruddawla, the *Nazim*-designate (1743), to assist him against Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de facto subedar* (1743-53). The Raja joined Fakhruddawla near Kapadwanj (*sarkar* Patan) as a mercenary general. Since the *Nazim*-designate did not meet the expenses of his troops on the pleas of his holding the *jagir*, he abandoned his camp and joined hands with Jawanmard Khan who had readily agreed to bear the expenses.[2] Until the year of his death (1750) Rai Singh took an active part in the shifting politics of the time, allying himself indiscriminately with other Mughal nobles, with Rengoji, with Fakhruddawlah, with Sher Khan Babi, the first *Nawab* of Junagadh as it suited his purpose and ambition.[3]

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1. *Ibid.*, II, p. 265. Rai Singh took leave of the *Nazim* to settle affairs at Idar in 1742. The next year (1743), the Raja did not come to help and remained busy at his and his brother's *jagir* -- Idar.

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 314-26, 327-31, 395-6; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 493-9.

3. Raja Rai Singh joined with Fakhruddawlah, the *Subedar* designate, in 1743-4. Since the *subedar* failed to pay him, the Raja deserted him and joined hands with Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de facto subedar*, who undertook to pay him for his services. Again, Raja Rai Singh left Jawanmard in 1744-5 and allied himself with Renkoji, the Maratha chief against the *de facto subedar*. Since Renkoji failed to meet his claims, the Raja deserted him and left for his *jagir*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 269-71, 327-8, 328-30, 334-6, 355-6, 358-69, 394, 402-12; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 270-4.

At the death of Raja Anand Singh at the hands of some local Rajput -- probably a zamindar -- his son Shiv Singh who was only six years old succeeded to the *gaddi* of Idar in 1742.[1] His uncle Rai Singh who died in 1750 acted as in-charge of affairs.[2] After 1750, Raja Shiv Singh enjoyed a long period of rule at Idar till his death in 1791.[3]

It may be seen, then, that the Rathor brothers who had acquired the *jagir* of Idar by virtue of conquest, retained it in a likewise manner. From the year 1742 they rendered neither service nor paid *peshkash* mainly because the power of collecting the revenue had almost gone. The prevailing state of affairs proved them helpful not merely in acquiring the *jagir* but also converting it gradually into zamindari with virtual hereditary claim on it.

C. ***Nawab of Radhanpur****

Jawanmard Khan Babi, a leading member of the well known

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 265; *Rasmala*, II, pp. 424-33; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 450.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 265, 483-8; Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, pp. 494, 496-7.
3. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 450-1.

* *pargana* Radhanpur (*sarkar* Pattan) is located in the North-west of Ahmadabad on the route leading to and adjoining the Rann of Kutch.

Babi family[1] and de facto Governor (1743-53) of Gujarat established himself firmly, by carving out a *Nawabi*, at Radhanpur. Though he failed to retain the provincial capital but succeeded in retaining and transforming the positions of *faujdar-watandar-jagirdar* and *ijaradar* assigned to him and other members of Babi family into hereditary *nawabi* which he and, later, his descendants continued to hold even after the extinction of Mughal rule from the *subah*. The ability of Babis in general and that of Jawanmard Khan in particular to

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1. For a brief view of the Babis who played a significant political role during the first half of the eighteenth century, Ms Commussariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 169-70, 212, 432n and 435.

   The family tree of Babis who established *Nawabis* during the period is as under;

Safdar Khan Babi
(d.1725)

- Salabat Mohammad Khan Babi (d.1730)
  - Bahadur Khan (Sher Khan Babi) (d.1758) — I *Nawab* of Junagadh
    - Mahabat Khan — II *Nawab* of Junagadh (1758-79)
    - Sardar Mohammad Khan — I *Nawab* of Balasimor.
- Jawanmard Khan Babi (Senior) (d.1728)
  - Kamaluddin Khan (Jawanmard Khan - Junior) — I *Nawab* of Radhanpur
  - Mohammad Anwar (Safdar Khan)

muster resources by making effective use of their nativity and acquaintance with the region seem to have enabled them to acquire and retain positions under the prevailing situation.

The first assignment of significance to the Babis during the eighteenth century was made during Emperor Farrukhsiyar's reign. The Emperor granted Jawanmard Khan Babi (died 1728) the *watandari*[1] right, and as also assigned him in *jagir* the *pargana* of Radhanpur, the place which formed the seat of the *Nawabi's* power.[2] Later on the Babis not only succeeded in retaining Radhanpur but also made valuable acquisitions in terms of administrative assignments and territorial sway.

From the time of Hamid Khan the *Naib-subedar* under Nizam-ul mulk every succeeding *subedar* ensured to acquire services of the Babis who in their turn were accordingly rewarded. In order to ensure active support of the Babis, Hamid Khan appointed (1726) Salabat Mohammad Khan as *faujdar* of Viramgaon.[3] But as the Babis' moves for extending support

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1. Precise nature of the *watandari* rights is not known. However, it seems, the *watandari* right implied grant of some financial benefits for, according to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, (*Supplement* pp. 202-3) the *jama* of the *pargana* was reduced at the time of his appointment as *watandar*.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 202-3

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 78

to the incoming *subedar* became evident, the *faujdari* was taken away.[1] The incoming *Subedar*, Mubariz-ul mulk, ensured Babis' support against Hamid Khan by promising, beforehand, *faujdari* of the same place to Salabat Mohommad Khan Babi and that of Pattan (*sarkar* Pattan) to Jawanmard Khan Babi (d.1728).[2] In appreciation of their valuable services which they rendered against Hamid Khan and, presumably, for ensuring their active assistance in future, the *subedar* appointed Jawanmard Khan Babi as *faujdar-amin* of *pargana* Petlad also.[3] At his death in 1728, the *subedar* proposed the award of *khitab*, (Jawanmard Khan) and *mansab* (700/?) for his eldest son, Kamaluddding Khan thus ennobled as Jawanmard Khan Babi (junior), and *jagir* in the *parganas* of Sami and Monjpur. The younger son, Mohammad Anwar Khan, (ennobled Safdar Khan) got the *mansab* of 500/? and the *faujdari* of Radhanpur along with its dependency, Terwara.[4]

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1. *Ibid.*, II, p. 81

2. *Ibid.*, II, p. 86 Salabat Mohammad Khan died in office (*Ibid* p. 116) at the time of Maharaja Abhay Singh's arrival.

3. *Ibid.*, II, p 105; for their support against Hamid and for assistance to Maubariz-ul mulk *Ibid.*, II, pp. 79-80, 83, 86, 88, 92, 93, 98.

4. *Ibid.*, II, p. 106 He had also contracted *ijare* right on *pargana* Petlad, but died before the completetion of the stipulated period. *Ibid.*, II, p. 112,

With the arrival of *subedr*-designate Maharaja Abhay Singh and determination of Mubariz-ul mulk to resist his ouster, Jawanmard Khan opted for rendering active support to the former.[1] In view of his active assistance and for compensating the apparent loss of Pattan, the *maharaja* procured for Jawanmard Khan Babi an addition to *mansab* and *watandari* of Badnagar.[2] Later (1731) the Babi chief acquired *parganas* of Kadi, and Vijapur on *ijara*.[3] His brother, like-wise acquired *parganas* of Munda, Matar (Arharmatar) and Nadiad.[4]

Jawanmard Khan Babi reoccupied *pargana* Pattan at (*Subedar*-designate) Momin Khan's instance who needed his support for ousting Ratan Singh Bhandari (*naib-subedar* in office) and therefore assigned *faujdari* of the *pargana* before hand to align the Babi with him.[5] Jawanmard Khan also

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 119-20.

2. *Ibid.*, II, p. 133; In the meantime, *faujdari* of *pargana* Pattan had been granted to Raja Bakht Singh, brother of the *Nazim* by the imperial court. *Ibid.*, II, p. 193.

3. *Ibid.*, II, p. 168. Sometime before 1753 Kadi was lost to the Marathas; MS NO 191/1 f 13.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, p. 183. Of these *parganas*, Nadiad could not be retained.

5. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 196-7. The *faujdari* of the *pargana*, as pointed out in a preceding note, had been assigned to Raja Bakht Singh, the brother of *maharaja*. The Babi chief seems to have been hurt and was therefore to get it back which he did by expelling the Raja's *naib* forcibly. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f.83.

obtained from Momin Khan *pargana* Kheralu for his brother, Zorawar Khan.[1]

It may thus be seen that Jawanmard Khan emerged beneficiary after every change in the *subedari*. The Babi chief almost consistently remained 'loyal' to the *Subedars*-in-office rendering them active assistance.[2] Once the *subedar*-in-office was dismissed, he threw his lot with the Governor-designate after his arrival in the *subah* for ousting his predecessor by force of arms.[3] The Babi chief extended his support and extorted one or the other official position which, barring exceptions already mentioned, he and members of his family continued to hold. Then in 1743, a little

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1. He was assigned *pargana* Prantij for paying ransom money to the Marathas who held Zorawar Khan, his brother as hostage. Later, he got Kheralu instead. Even after his brother's release, the *pargana* was retained by them, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 205,-6, 239,

2. Please see particulary, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48-9, 54-5, 62-3 69-70, 73,78, 81, 82 against Muizuddawlah and under Nizam-ul mulk and his deputy, Hamid Khan: *Ibid*, II pp. 79-80, 83, 86, 88, 92-3, 98, 107, against Hamid and under Mubariz-ul mulk; *Ibid*, II, pp. 119, 120, 144, 159, 161; against Mubariz and under Maharaja Abhay Singh and his deputy Ratan Singh Bhandari) *Ibid.* II, pp. 191, 196-7 200-1, 236, 239; 242-3. 248-9, 261-2, 272, against Bhandari and under Momin Khan.

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48-9 (with Nizam-ul mulk and against Muizuddawlah). *Ibid.*, II, pp. 83, 86, 88 (with Mubariz-ul mulk against Nizam-ul-mulk's Deputy Hamid Khan); *Ibid*, pp. 119-20 (with Maharaja Abhay Singh against Mubariz-ul mulk). *Ibid*, II, pp. 191, 196-197, 200-1, 236, 239 (with Momin Khan against Maharaja's *naib* Ratan Singh Bhandari).

after Momin Khan's death Jawanmard Khan occupied *Subedari* which he made instrumental for ensuring continued possession of Radhanpur.[1]

Despite holding *faujdaris*, enjoying *mansab, jagir* and *watandari*, Jawanmard Khan Babi ceased to render services at least from the time of Momin Khan's period (1737-43) of *subedari*. Instead, he served as a mercenary charging "an amount of money by way of daily expenses of his troops" for rendering service which the *nazim* procured every year.[2] Since the amount charged by him was found "to be heavy", Momin Khan chose to engage his brother, Zorawar Khan, who also held *pargana* Kheralu in '*jagir*' on an agreement of less expenses,[3] as a mercenary. Evidently the services of Babis' in general and those of Jawanmard Khan in particular seem to have become virtually indispensible for the *subedars*. From the time of Hamid Khan each *subedar* was keen to ensure their

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1. Having entered into an agreement with the Marathas, he surrendered Ahmadabad to them in 1753. As per the terms and conditions settled between them Jawanmard Khan was to retain entirely and exclusively (*dar-o-bast bila shirkat*) the *parganas* of Pattan, Badnager, Sami, Munj-pur, Baisalnagar, Tharad, Kheralu, Radhanpur, Terwara, and Vijapur. Moreover his family members were to retain one third of revenues of *qasbah* Matar, Kheda, Vasna and Munda entirely beside the villages which they held in *jagir*.

2. *Ibid.*, 257

3. *Ibid.*

support and, procure their services for taking possession of the *subah*, dealing with the Marathas, running the administration and effecting assessment and collection of revenues and extorting *peshkash* from the *zamindars.*[1] Jawanmard Khan Babi, like his father and other member of the family, seems to have established good rapport with some of the leading magnets of the region[2] The Babis were capable of mustering support for assisting the *Nazims* as well as for fighting them.[3] It may particularly be mentioned that the '*zamindars*', *girasias*, Kolis and other recalcitrants were among the ones who assisted them against the *Nazim.*[4] The Babis who were duly recognized as natives of the region[5] might have,

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1. Please see for instance, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48-9, 54-5. 62-3, 69-70, 78-83, 86, 88. 92-3. 98. 101-2, 105-7, 119-20 ,144,157, 159, 161, 179, 191, 196-7, 200-01, 236, 239, 242-3, 248-9, 257, 261-2, 272; Ms No. 191/1, f.21.

2. *Ruqqat-i Alamgiri*, letter no. XIX (1706), pp. 24-6; For the Babis enjoying confidence of the leading element of the region, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 40-1,78-81, 144, 170-1; Jawanmard Khan Babi for being hailed as man of the region (*ham watani*) by the Gujaratis , *Ibid.*, II, p. 312

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 40-1, 172

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, II, p. 312

* Located on a hill and having strong fortification, Junagadh was headquarter of *sarkar* Soreth, the peninsular Gujarart.

presumably, been better placed to consolidate their position with the cooperation of local element.

II. *The Peninsula Gujarat*:

D *Nawabi of Junagadh** :

The last *faujdar* of *sarkar* Soreth, Sher Khan Babi[1] consolidated his position at Junagadh during the days of the decline of Mughal rule in the *subah*. Having tried his luck on the mainland where he could not make much headway, Sher Khan Babi retired to the peninsula and established himself at Junagadh. With Junagadh safe in his hands, Sher Khan re-entered the main field of provincial politics but with a new approach and changed purpose. The distasteful, as also not so appreciable an experience there, forced him to retire to Junagadh to consolidate his achievements in the climate of political uncertainty. Our main point of concern, therefore, is Junagadh; however, for a better appraisal of the whole development a study of Sher Khan's achievements, failures and strategy on the main-land seems to be pertinent.

To beginwith, Sher Khan Babi, during the early years (1719-37) of his career had endeavored to acquire and hold a

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1. Ennobled as Sher Khan Babi, Mohammad Bahadur Babi was son of Salabat Mohammad Khan Babi (500/250), the *watandar* of Balasinor (Barasinwara). His father came to lime light during Aurangzeb's reign and played an active role in the provincial politics during later years. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 169-70, 212, 432n and 435.

position on the main-land, except for a short duration (1728-30)[1]. According to the available evidence he began his career as *faujdar-i gird* (1719) of Ahmadabad, the position which he retained under *naib-subedar* Mehar Ali Khan.[2] In 1721, *naib-subedar* Shujat Khan (1721-22) who bore enmity towards the Babis threatened him and his father in their respective possessions but their grievances against the Khan's humiliating behaviour were redressed by *Subedar* Muizuddawlah Haider Quli Khan (1721-22) who appointed him *thanedar* of Sadra and Birpur, managed award of *mansab* and confirmation in the *jagir*.[3]

But Sher Khan Babi was deprived of the above mentioned *thanedari* within an year and with the death of his father (1730) he was left in his sole (*watandari*) possession of Khera.[4]

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1. Sher Khan held Junagadh (1728-30) as deputy of his father who had been appointed *naib-faujdar* of the place by the dying *faujdar; Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 101, 103

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, p. 22

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 41-2. *Mirat-i Mustafabad* pp. 259-60. He was awarded a *mansab* of 500/270 and *khitab* of Sher Khan. His father ws, likewise, allowed to hold Barasinwra as *watandar* and Sher Khan to continue in the *watandari* of Khera.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 48-9, 69-70. His father was continuously favoured and then, disfavoured by Nizam-ul mulk, Hamid Khan and Sarbuland Khan. But at the time of his death, he held Barasinwra as *watander* and Ghoga as *faujdar* and manager of the king's mother who held it in *taiyul* (i.e. *jagir*), *Ibid.*, II, pp. 10, 21-2, 48-9, 69-

Sher Khan Babi managed, at the recommendation of the than *subedar* to acquire Barasinwra, *watandari* of his father, and port of Ghoga after his father's death.[1] The imperial court rejected the *Nazim's* proposal and deprived him of Ghoga, an easily manageable and prosperous port-town on the peninsula.[2]

Sher Khan's fortunes witnessed fluctuations in his other assignments also. Maharaja Abhay Singh appointed him *faujdar* of Baroda (1731) but soon (1733) it was captured by the Marathas when Sher Khan was in Barasinwra.[3] Similarly he was appointed *faujdar* of Viramgaon (1733) by the *naib-subedar* but the imperial court assigned it to Behram Khan. At the instigation of the *Naib-Subedar*, Sher Khan Babi fought the new incumbent to finish. But then, the *naib-subedar* himself replaced him by another person of his liking for

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...Continued...

70, 78, 81-2, 86, 116

1. He was allowed to retain his father's *mansab* and *jagir*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 132, 165-66, *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, p. 191

2. Instead, Behram Khan was assigned Ghoqa. He ousted Sher Khan's younger brother by force. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 165-6. *Mirat-i Mustafabad* pp. 261, 263, 267.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 144, 162, 167.

some ulterior motives.[1] As such, of the many areas at one or the other time at his disposal, he was left only with his *watandari* possessions of Barasinwra and Khera.[2] It may thus be seen that Sher Khan Babi was generally beneficiary of the *subedr's* favours[3] and each time a looser at the hands of the imperial court. It may further be seen that except the incident of Viramgaon-- the strategically significant fortified town between the main-land and Soreth -- Sher Khan, by and large followed the imperial command peacefully. Moreover, he was continuously at the service of *Nazim*.[4] But the *Nazim* too seems to have gradually lost its credibility as the source of providing favours and therefore Sher Khan Babi

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1. The *faujdari* was granted to him because he maintained cordial relations with the *desai* without whose cooperation management of affairs was a difficult task. *Ibid.*, II pp 168, 179, 184, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 264-5.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. pp. 106, 115, 161, 184, 276. *Ibid. Supplement*, p. 191, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 259-61, 263-66, 267. It may be pointed out that Salabat Mohammad Khan Babi, his father, had raised fortification around Barasinwra and named it Salabat Nagar before his death.

3. The Babis, in general, acted as mediator between the *peskash* collecting expeditionary forces and the zamindars. As such their utility for the *subedars* need not be over emphasised. The favours, moreover, sometime came in view of political compulsions as mentioned in the preceeding note.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 41-2, 48-9, 86, 101, 103, 318

was, as will be seen a little later, with reason obliged to proceed accordingly.

Sher Khan Babi, as early as 1728, was reluctant to surrender Junagadh to the *naib* of the *faujdar* appointed by the imperial court. Sher Khan held the place since 1727 as *naib* of the *naib-faujdar* Salabat Mohammad Khan under *fuajdar* Asad Quli Khan, who died in 1727. The next *faujdar*, Ghulam Muhiudding Khan also appointed him his *naib*. In 1728 Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan, with royal consent, deputed Mir Ismail in Sher Khan's stead. But Sher Khan did not let him assume office.[1] Mubariz-ul mulk, then *subedar*, recommended (1729) that Sher Khan be allowed to continue by way of *ijarah-i nayabat*.[2] But the following year (1730), Sher Khan, for reasons unknown, vacated the office for Mir Ismail Khan.[3] Nevertheless Sher Khan's interest is evident from his early action. In the year 1736 at the time he had been deprived of all his positions except ones in Barasinwra and Khera, Sher

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1. *Mirad-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 101, 103; *Mirat-i Mustafabad,*, p. 260.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 103, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p.260

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 117; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p.259. By this time Maharaja Abhay Singh had assumed charge of the *subah* and the Babi had not even called on him. Moreover, his father Salabat Mohammad Khan also died (1730). Apparently Sher Khan Babi would not like to annoy the *Subedar* and the court at the juncture when he needed imperial favours.

Khan Babi was appointed *faujdar* of Petlad by *Naib-i-subeder*, Ratan Singh Bhandari. The Bhandari in spite of proceeding with a firm determination (*azm-i musammam*) however, failed to install Sher Khan Babi by ousting Momin Khan, the *ijarahdar* of Petlad.[1] The incident which reflected the weakness and inability of the highest provincial authority, seems to have proved on eye-opener for Sher Khan. Before analyzing evidence and developments for the ensuring years, it will not be out of place to have a retrospect of the preceding developments --- Sher Khan's obvious endeavours to hold some position on main-land which had resulted in almost a fiasco.

On the basis of available evidence it may be submitted that until the year 1736-37 Sher Khan had associated himself with the *subedars* and obviously he seems to have seen an identity of interests with those of the latter i.e. the *Nazims* of the *subah*. In principle, no doubt, he was bound to serve the *subedars* in his various official capacities but he did, in this association, something more even apart from and also in violation of the rules and regulations. It was at the instigation of Ratan Singh Bhandari, the *naib-subedar* incharge of the *subah* that Sher Khan fought the *faujdar*-

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 192-94. Momin Khan, the first *nawab* of Khanbat was also a strong noble having roots in the soil of the land. For details please see discussion under khanbat in the following lines.

designate of Viramgaon to the finish.[1] Moreover, he was, generally, with the *subedars* in their *peshkash* collecting expeditions. It was, apparently because of his association with the *subedars* that since the days of Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-21) almost every *subedar* favoured him by making assignments, recommending *khitab* and increase in *mansab* and on two occasions favours came in violation of imperial regulation and rules.[2] But such favours neither proved lasting nor even secure. As pointed out above Sher Khan was deprived of all his positions, excepting the *watandari* of Barasinwra and Khera by the year 1736. Even Barasinwra was exposed to Maratha inroads twice in 1733 and 1736. It could be retained only by offering a huge sum by way of *khandni* (security money).[3] As such, Sher Khan might have observed that while the *subedars* could assign positions and make grants, it was the recepient alone who cold retain these by virtue of his own strength. Moreover, inability and failure of Bhandari against Momin Khan highlighted the fact that the highest authority of the *subah* was neither capable of ousting a

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 103, 133-4, 192-4 *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 163, 246-7, 265

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 103, 144, 168; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 260-1

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 191

determined official nor, therefore, in a position to bestow favours even on its favourites. The conditions of insecurity and instability were further created, at least for Sher Khan, by the *subedars* themselves. Ratan Singh Bhandari took *faujdari* of Viramgaon from him. To all appearances Sher Khan's strategy i.e. acquiring and retaining position through the good offices of *subedar* by helping them in the *subah*, failed to meet the desired aim.

With regard to his field of action - the mainland - it may be submitted that it was like the hunting ground of Maratha armies. Beside extorting *khandni* they had successfully aimed at territorial acquisitions, as distinct from their policy of collecting only *khandni* from the peninsular Gujarat.[1] The mainland was relatively vulnerable and within easy reach of Marathas as well as the Mughal *subedars*. Above all, since he failed to retain his positions on the mainland, therefore, he would welcome a change in the area of operation. Hence forward (1736), Sher Khan seems to have decided to act independent of the state authority to acquire as well as consolidate his position in his own right.

The long armed struggle (April 1736 to May 1737) that started between Momin Khan (the future *subedar*) and Ratan

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1. *Ibid.*, II, p. 27; Wilberforce, *op. cit.* pp. 121-34. Hamilton, *op.cit*, I, p. 615, *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p. 116.

Singh Bhandari (the *naib-subedar* in charge) for the occupation of Ahmadabad provided Sher Khan an opportunity to act. Instead of taking sides, Sher Khan Babi utilised the opportunity to expel state officials and occupy Dehgam and Korwa which were located in the vicinity of Barasinwra.[1] Having acquired tacit approval of the new *subedar* who did not disturb him in his new acquisition, Sher Khan Babi called on him (September 1737) and served him for sometime.[2] In the meantime situation at Junagadh took a favourable turn for the Babi chief.

Hazbar Khan, *faujdar* of Soreth, deputed two *naibs* -- Sher Mohammad Khan and Mamur Khan -- one after another to take over Junagadh from Mir Dost Ali, the *naib*-in charge in office. With a design to capture Junagadh, Sher Khan Babi proceeded to Ghoga (which was situated on the peninsula and had already been occupied by him) and instigated the unpaid Gujarati soldiers of Mir Dost Ali who was simultaneously threatened in his position by the *nabis*-designate and , moreover, short of funds too. The soldiers "were internally in concord with Sher Khan Babi" and "that helpless man (i.e. Mir Dost Ali) was entangled in the snare of their

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 198

2. *Ibid.*,, II, pp. 243, 245

stategam". Mir Dost Ali was forced to invite Sher Khan Babi "on an agreement of half to half" for collecting revenues. Having thus entered the citadel of Junagadh, Sher Khan Babi occupied the place for himself without partnership of any-one.[1] A little later the imperial court appointed Himmat Ali Khan, nephew of *subedar* Momin Khan, as *faujdar*. But in view of Marath's presence and Sher Khan Babi's strength (for he was entrenched in the strong citadel of Junagadh) the *subedar* could not even venture to act against him.[2] Sher Khan therefore continued to hold the place uninterrupted.

During the years 1738-43, Sher Khan confined his activ-ities to Junagadh and took no part in politics on the main-land.[3] Because of the paucity of evidence nothing can be stated with confidence, however, according to the author of the *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, Sher Khan, during these years, subdued the recalcitrant elements there.[4] In all probability Sher Khan Babi might have utilised the time to consolidate his position at Junagadh. That his wives, Ladli and Amani, succeeded in administering the region during the years of

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 245-7 He expelled the *naib* after his entry into the citadel.

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp 246-7

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp 247-8, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 267-8. Apparently he did not serve the *Nazim* too.

4. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 268.

Sher Khan's absence (1743-45 and 1746-47) is indicative of the degree of success he had attained.[1] During the period Sher Khan Babi confirmed the holders of the *madad-i ma'sh, in'am, pusaita* and other grants in their possessions.[2] There is evidence to show that he made new grants in favour of Bairagis, *sadhus, faqirs,* Saidyids and the *desais.*[3] Also, he is reported to have made a grant of four villages in 1741-42 to a local zamindar.[4] It seems that during the period he had tried to win strong and influential local persons to his side.

Sher Khan re-appeared on the political scene of the mainland in 1743-45. He came at the invitation of Maratha chief, Rengoji who had promised him deputy Governorship of the *subah* under Marathas.[5] Finding no room for materializing his objectives of getting deputy-Governorship, he plundered

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1. *Ibid.*, p.274, MS Commissariat. *History of Gajarat,* II pp. 314-27; 395-6.

2. Each document concerning *Settled cases* (Junagadh) cited in Chapter V and Chapter VI above testifies the undisturbed continuity of the grantees in their possession. Besides, the files related to *mahal* Junagadh precisely cite Sher Khan Babi's order dated 1153, 1154 and 1155 AH. to that effect.

3. Please see, for instance *Junagadh* SC No. 993, (*mahal* Mangrole); EX A/1, Ex A/3 and A/5; SC No. 362, (*mahal*-Seel) Ex. No. 4

4. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS.) f. 17.

5. *Mirat-i Ahmadi,* II, pp. 286,289,290,293

villages and then joined hands with the then Mughal Deputy-Governors[1] as mercenary against the Marathas.[2] But his endeavours to ensure installation of Fida-ud-Din Khan and then Fakhruddin in the seat of power were successfully thwarted by his cousin, Jawanmard Khan Babi who aspired for and succeeded in capturing the office of *subedar* for himself.[3]

Once Jawanmard Khan Babi captured Ahmadabad, Sher Khan Babi endeavoured to consolidate his position by occupying Kapadbanj and Thamna, the territories adjoining Barasinwra, which was held by his son, Sardar Mohammad Khan.[4]

Sher Khan, it may be seen, had by now abandoned the policy of association with *subedars* and remaining aloof from the politics of the *subah*. Between 1743 and 1745 Sher Khan took an active part in the shifting politics of the time allying himself indiscriminately with the *subedar*, with other Mughal nobles, with Rengoji and other Maratha *sardars*; with the phantom *subedar*, Fakhruddawlah and with Rai Singh, the *jagirdar*-chief of Idar according to convenience. During

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1. After the death of Momin Khan, the charge of the *subah* was held by Fakhruddin and Fidauddin jointly as deputy Governors. They were engaged in a struggle with Renkoji who wanted to oust them.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 289-90, 293

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 290, 293, 295-8, 311, 317.

4. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 311.

all these years his only permanent ally seems to have been Rai Singh, the man with identical interests.[1] In 1745-46 finding no possibility of adventure on the mainland and having strengthened his position at Barasinwra he retired to Junagadh where his wives had carried the management of affairs.[2]

Post 1746-48 developments show Sher Khan acting as an independent ruler. Available evidence, though little in quantity, is significant for the light it casts on Sher Khan's ways of asserting and consolidating position.

Sher Khan shifted to the policy of opposing Mughals in case he was disturbed, and earning confidence of the local elements. The very position of *faujdari*, as pointed out

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1. Sher Khan with Raja Rai Singh of Idar warmly welcomed Fakhruddawlah, the *Nazim*-designate in 1743-44 but within few days he deserted the *Nazim*-designate and joined hands with Potaji, the Maratha chief who alongwith Jawanmard Khan Babi was opposed to Fakhruddawlah. In the year 1744 Fakhruddawlah attacked Sher Khan's camp but could not achieve success. Sher Khan, subsequently entered into league with Rengoji, the other Maratha chief in the *subah*. The new alliance forced Fakhruddawlah to open dialogue with Sher Khan. But Sher Khan could not be desisted. In the struggle between Jawanmard Khan, the *de fecto subedar* and Rengoji, Sher Khan supported the latter but during the following year, he deserted Rengoji who was fighting Khanderao, another Maratha chief. While the struggle for supremacy between Rengoji and Fidauddin Khan was on, Sher Khan changed his sides twice. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 286, 289, 290, 293, 296-8, 314-25, 327-30, 334-8, 355-6, 395-6, 402-11, 502-12, *Mirat-i Mustafabad* pp. 270-4.

2. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*. p. 274, Barasinwra, under Sher Khan Babi's son, also acquired the status of *Nawabi*.

above, was gained by him by seizure rather than by sanction. Also, he continued to hold it without having legal approval and against the wishes of the Emperor. During the closing days of 1746, Sher Khan opposed and fought Fakhrud-dawlah, the *subedar* at Banthli, 10 miles east of Junagadh.[1] At Khere and Barasinwra, Sher Khan's son and deputy resisted imposition of *peshkash* by the *subedar* but was forced to offer it twice.[2] Sher Khan's son agreed to share revenues of Barasinwra with the Marathas, under the pressure of arms.[3]

Sher Khan in an apparent effort to growing roots in the soil granted certain concessions to the local zamindars. He granted them exemption from paying *salami* on their *chauth* rights.[4] As such the possessions of the *chauthias* were made free of the main monetary obligation. One Weera Kathi of Jeetpur was permitted to raise fortification at the same place. He was also granted a *jagir* in the *pargana* of Jeet-

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1. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 278-9. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 353-4. In 1742, Momin Khan, the *Subedar* occupied Ghoga. But Sher Khan remained indifferent.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 40-1, 145, 258-66.

3. *Ibid.*, II. pp. 562-5.

4. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 284-85. The loss in terms of revenues must have been quite considerable because there were, in all, 400 such villages as contained *chauth* possessions and the exemption was not withdrawn. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f.7.

pur.[1] Besant, a Rajput, was granted the revenues from the Panchala village.[2] The *mahant* of Koili was granted revenues of the village Koili in the *pargana* of Banthali.[3] Dholqa was assigned to the *gasbatis* -- wealthy-soldierly class -- who had killed the Mughal *faujdar* of the town.[4] Town of Una was likewise granted to the local *qasbatis* as *watan*.[5] He also assigned *talluqa* of Bantwa and Sardargarh, also known as Gidar, to his younger brother.[6] He did not disturb the zamindar of Porbandar in his new acquisitions, instead demanded *peshkash* only.[7] On the whole he seems to have maintained cordial relations with the old as well as newly emerging zamindars.[8]

In spite of ruling Junagadh like an independent chief, Sher Khan never broke his relations with the Emperor till

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1. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f.37, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 285.

2. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 280

3. *Ibid.*, p.286

4. *Ibid.*, p. 351

5. *Tarikh-i Soreth*(Junagadh MS) f.70

6. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p.286

7. *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f.69

8. For his relations with Pahad Khan Jalori (chief of Palanpur) and Raja of Idar, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. p. 245; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 261-2, 272-4; with *muqaddam* of Padra and the *desai* of Viramgaon, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.144, 162, 168, 179, 184

his death (1758). He liked to be addressed as *Nawab* Sher Khan *Bahadur Fidwi-i Badshah*.[1] However, he did not share revenues with the Mughal Emperors.[2]

To sum up, Sher Khan Babi, the founder of the *Nawabi* of Junagadh, first unsuccessfully tried his fortune on the mainland and attempted holding positions with the consent and support of the *subedar*. Since he failed to retain any position of significance with the *Nazim's* help and had to part with his positions on the mainland,[3] he consolidated his position at Junagadh by acquiring support of the local zamindars. The period of uncertain political conditions thus provided opportunity to one more Mughal noble to carve out an independent principality.

III. *SOUTH GUJARAT*: THE PORT-TOWNS

D. *Nawabi of Surat*:

Tegh Beg Khan, who appeared as compromise candidate in the political game initiated by Mulla Mohammad Ali, the

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1. Britishers worngly assumed that Sher Khan Babi assumed the appellation of *Nawab* and *Bahadur*, see *Bombay Gazzetteer*, VI, p. 99, Wilberforce, *op.cit* p. 129; *Treaties*, VI, pp 84-5. The *Khitabs* were granted by Empror Muhammad Shah, see *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 259, 261-2, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 132, 144. Even his grand son was addressed with the same title see *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 285.

2. *Account*, ff. 10b, 18a

3. However his son continued to hold Barasinwra and Kheda on the mainland even after extinction of Mughal rule from the *subah*.

umdat-ul tujjar, to acquire ascendancy over the economically important sea-part of Surat, emerged out of strife as the practically independent ruler-- the *Nawab*- of the place. The capture of power by Tegh Beg Khan and later on by other adventurers and the related developments constitute an interesting episode in the history of unscrupulous politics.

The history of this episode may be divided into three broad phases: the first phase when Tegh Beg Khan succeeded twice in capturing the *mutasaddi*'s office displacing Behram Khan, the officially appointed *mutasaddi*, with the help of Mulla Mohammad Ali, the trader and Begler Khan, the *qiledar*; the second phase when having been officially appointed *mutasaddi* of Surat, Tegh Begh Khan attempted to consolidate his position and power, and the third phase when, after the death of Tegh Beg Khan, a new game began in which the *mutasaddigiri* changed hands more than once.

Umdat-ul tujjar Mohammad Ali[1] an ambitious rich merchant of Surat, "gave up his ancestoral ways due to abdu-

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1. Mulla Muhammad Ali was the son of Mulla Abdul Ghafoor the *umdat-ul tujjar*. At the death of Mulla Ghafoor, the then *mutasaddi* (1716-18) Haider Quli Khan confiscated his property. Beside precious material and articles he is reported to have left a fabulous sum of Rs. 80,00,000/- in cash. After making arduous efforts, Mulla Muhammad Ali was allowed to take back his father's belongings. For details see, Zahiruddin Malik," The Rise of Tegh Beg Khan" (1733-46), *Islamic Culture*, XXXVI, 1972, pp. 57-8.

nance of wealth" and laid the foundation of a palatial fort-cum-port at Athwa island, three miles off Surat. Behram Khan, the then *mutasaddi*, forbade (1729) the trader from carrying out his unauthorised work of construction.[1] Humiliated but resolute in his designs, the trader, with big power of purse at his command, resolved to dislodge Behram Khan from his office. With a lucrative offer of securing *sanad* for the post of *mutasaddi* for *qiledar* Beglar Khan's brother Tegh Beg Khan, the merchant purchased the loyalty of the Khan to execute his designs of expelling Behram Khan from the office (1729-30).[2] Tegh Beg Khan, thus, appeared on the political chessboard; previously he held no post in the Imperial administration.

To translate their political ambitions into reality Tegh Beg Khan gave out that he had recieved a *sanad* for the post of *mutasaddi* of Surat. Having brought about a keen controversy around Behram Khan the two brothers dragged him into conflict and gave him battle. Under the terms of agreement concluded through the peace making mission of interested traders of Surat, Behram Khan vacated the office and waited for the arrival of a new *sanad* in his name. Tegh Beg

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II pp. 103-4 *Account*, f.70a.
2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 103-4; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f.77

Khan entered the official palace (*darbar*) and began to rule over Surat from 1730 as a *de facto* ruler with no legal right to rule.[1]

The agreement came under a strain soon after the merchant recommenced the work of building his palatial-fort-cum port without procuring the *sanad* of confirmation for the post of *mutasaddi* in the name of Tegh Beg Khan from the imperial court. Tegh Beg did not permit him to proceed until the *sanad* had been procured. The snubbed trader turned to Behram Khan -- the *mutasaddi* out of office. Mohammad Ali, the trader, assured him of the *sanad* of confirmation; in turn Behram Khan undertook to allow the merchant to accomplish his object. The trader spent a sum of Rs. 180000/-, procured *sanad* for the new ally and thus enabled him to reoccupy the official palace of *mutasaddi* after a lapse of ten months (1731). Muhammad Ali, then, put his design into effect and built a palatial fort-cum-port at the island of Athwa.[2]

Even the newly formed alliance did not last long. Mulla Muhammad Ali assumed princely ways: he appointed his own *qiledar* and *kotwal*, kept retinue, put cannons on the fort

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 104-5, 109. *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.39

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi.*, II, pp.109-10, 142 *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.40; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat.* f.70;

and above all succeeded in attracting the merchants to the newly developed port. The new port registered very rapid growth at the expense of Surat. The *mutasaddi* could not and would 'not suffer the pecuniary loss in terms of revenues' nor political prestige.[1] In order to protect his interests, Behram Khan appointed *faujdar* at Athwa to supervise the trade. The action was sharply objected to by the merchant-prince.[2] With the help of the trading communities and 'an amendable religious leader' Syed Muhammad Ali Waiz, the merchant prince gave the issue 'a sectarian fervour' which led to a big tumult.[3] Behram Khan, however, succeeded in overcoming the problem with a firm hand.

Mulla Muhammad Ali pursuaded his abandoned allies, Beglar Khan and Tegh Beg Khan, to resume the task of expelling Behram Khan. In addition to his promise of securing the *sanad*, the trader by advancing the required amount of money and providing the ammunition, demonstrated the sincerity of his intention.[4] In his revengeful mood, he sought the as-

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 109-10, 142, 147.

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 147-8

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp.69, 147-8. Syed Muhammad Ali Waiz who had bribed the *qazi* also, declared that Tegh Beg Khan had not kept his word, cheated the trader and thus acted against the *Shariat*. Z.U. Malik, "The Rise of Tegh Beg Khan", p.59.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 148-9; *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.61.

sistance of the Dutch, the English and the Marathas.[1] The *mustasaddi* gave a long battle but could not succeed. Hence Tegh Beg Khan was reinstalled as the *de facto mutasaddi* (1731-32).[2] The trader resumed the princely ways and busied himself with enhancing the trade at Athwa. Tegh Beg Khan, alongwith his brother-ally Beglar Khan, the *qiledar*, ruled over Surat.

Apparently Mulla Muhammad Ali did not remain content with what he had achieved till then. To keep Tegh Beg Khan on tenterhooks, the Mulla made no effort to procure the *sanad* from the court for the Khan. instead he secretly arranged for seeking a grant of *mansab* of 3000 with a title of Fakhruddin Khan for his younger son and the *sanad* of the post of *mutasaddi* exclusively for himself with the specific request that he be allowed to appoint any one of his choice as his deputy.[3] Apparently he wanted to acquire the legal supremacy at Surat so as to perpetuate his gains at Athwa or

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1. *Surat District Gazetteer*, p 135; *Bombay Gazetter*, VI, pp. 109, 111. The *Mirat* does not mention of Europeans's participation in the struggles but notes Devji Nagvir Martha supporting the trder as a mercenary general at the head of ten thousand soldiers, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 149-51. The trader had himself collectd 10000 horse-men and footmen to strengthen his ally. *Ibid*., II, p.147.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 148-54; *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.61 *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f.81.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.153.

at least to make the position of Tegh Khan vulnerable. To translate his desire into action he sent a *hundi* of Rs. 60,000/- to Hafiz Khidmatgar, the favourtite of Emperor Muhammad Shah.[1]

But the merchant's scheme of attaining a position of legal eminence did not succeed. His court-bound messenger fell into the hands of Tegh Beg Khan. Tegh Beg Khan changed his strategy and embarked upon a policy of cleansing the stage of his foes so as to consolidate his position there.

The *de facto mutasaddi*, without revealing the news of arrest of the trader's messengers decided to outwit him. He invited the trader to a feast and put him under arrest in 1732 and sometime later, (1733-34) deprived him of his life.[2] Mulla Muhammad Waiz who had sided with the trader was also assassinated.[3] Ahmad Chalpi who had also tried to create a rift between Tegh Beg Khan and the British was put

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1. Khawfi Khan *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, pp.103-05. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.154-5, 168-9, *Selection from the Peshwa Diaries*, III, Letter No. 185. According to *Mirat* (II, pp. 153-6) the *mutasaddi* confiscated all his property and razed the Athwa complex to ground. He further informs us that Asaf Jah had asked Tegh Beg to spare the life of the trader. But Tegh Beg Khan actually killed him while making public that the trader had been released.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.177.

to death (1735), at the instance of the former.[1] Thus the port was cleared of his known opponents. Then 'he breathed of authority and absolutism with tranquility'.[2]

As yet Tegh Beg's position by the year 1732 was neither regularised nor had he sought legal confirmation from the Emperor. The cricumstance however made it necessary. Mulla Muhammad Ali had, earlier (1732) attempted destabilisation of his position. On the other hand, the imperial court appointed Momin Khan as the *mutasaddi* of the port. Simultaneously Tegh Beg Khan was ordered to take charge of *faujdari* of Cambay. Tegh Beg Khan paid no heed to the imperial decree. Instead he retained his position by putting armed resistance to the new incumbent.[3] Nor did he proceed to Cambay. At the moment he might have thought the obtaining of the *sanad* of confirmation an expedient way out of the situation. Hence he deputed some reliable messengers to the court. By offering costly presents, seven Arab horses and 10,000 *asharfis*, he was confirmed (1737) in the position he already possessed by virtue of conquest.[4]

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 175-6; *Bombay Quarterly Review*, IV, p.203

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.177

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 153, 156-7. Momin Khan's deputy could not succeed against Tegh Beg Khan. *Hadiqad-ul Hind*, f.62

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.156-7.

Having obtained legal confirmation, the *mutasaddi*, without seeking due permission, appointed his younger brother Safdar Mohammad Khan as *naib-mutasaddi* and put the city under his charge.[1] The *qiledari* of the port was still held by the *mutasaddi's* elder brother, Begler Khan. For all practical purposes the principle of division of power had ceased to operate.[2] Not content, Tegh Beg Khan discarded the official designation of *mutasaddi* and styled himself as *Nawab*.[3]

That Tegh Beg Khan had assumed a position of practical independence is also borne out by other facts. He is reported to have imposed new taxes on the populace of Surat.[4] He concluded treaty with Damaji Gaekwad, a Maratha sardar. According to the terms, Damaji undertook the responsibility of assessing and collecting revenues of the *mahals* dependent

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1. *English Documents*, I, pp. 16-7; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 157, 340. *The Surat District Gazetteer*,, pp. 141-2.

2. After Beglar Khan the *qiledari* was held by his son, Aibak Khan who was succeeded by his son-in law, Waqar Mohammad Khan, the son of Safdar Mohammad Khan. As such the *mutasaddigiri* and *qiledri* both, were held by the same family. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 340, 352, 362-3.

3. *English Documents*, pp. 16-7, *The Surat District Gazetteer*, pp. 140-2. It is not certain as to whether the title was bestowed by the Emperor or assumed by himself. The British works also speak of the assumption of the title of '*Nawab*' by Sher Khan Babi (Junagadh) though it was granted by the Emperor.

4. *English Documents*, pp. 16-8, *Surat District Gazetteer*. pp. 139-41; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VI, p. 116-7.

on Surat agreeing to pay a fixed sum to the *mutasaddi* per annum.[1] In this way the *mutasaddi* pacified the Marathas who had been enjoying a predominant position on the land in South Gujarat and particularly in the *sarkar* of Surat.[2] As such he placed himself, relatively, in a safer position both on land around and inside the port. In his next step he refused to pay *Sidi*, the incharge of Mughal Fleet, the usual amount of money out of the revenue of Surat.[3] According to the British work Tegh Beg Khan, prior to his coming into open hostility with *Sidi*, had concluded some agreement with the British at Surat.[4] It will not be out of place to note

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1. The Maratha ascendancy in *sarkar* Surat had been established by Pilaji Gaekwad during the ***mutasaddigiri*** of Behram Khan. Deprived of the land revenue the *mutasaddi* closed city-gates for the *riaya* for selling its produce in Surat, the only available market. The Marathas, in their turn, blocked up routes for the town-folk. The dead lock ws resolved with the *riaya* agreeing to pay a share of their produce to the ***mutasaddi***. Later, Damaji Gaekwad (1734-57) agreed to pay Rs. 2, 36,000/- as his share in the revenues annually. Soon, a cleavage developed and the Marathas refused to pay at all (November 1735). Finally in December 1735 the crisis was resolved when the '*Nawab*' (Tegh Beg Khan) agreed to accept less than the stipulated amount. *English Documents*, pp. 16-8; *Ibid.*, letters dated 2nd and 26th Novemeber, 1735 and 28th December 1735; ***Mirat-i Ahmadi*** II, pp. 363-4; *Bombay Gazetteer (Surat. Bharuch, Cambay)*, p.117

2. *Historical Selections from Baroda state Records*, I, (1724-68); Letter No. 28, p. 19, ***Mirat-i Ahmadi***, II, pp. 132-3.

3. *Treaties*, VIII, pp. 353, 369; *Bombay Gazetteer* IV pp. 117-18.

4. *Treaties*, VIII, pp. 353; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p. 117.

that the zamindar of Cheharmandvi (the *zortalab* one) had supported Tegh Beg Khan against the marchant prince.[1]

From 1732 until his death (1746) Tegh Beg Khan was practically an independent ruler of Surat. He was succeeded by his younger brother Safdar Mohammad Khan, the incharge of port. Safdar Mohammad Khan also sought the *sanad* of confirmation (1747) from the court and spent a sum of 10,000 *asharfis*, besides other precious presents, to obtain it.[2]

But Safdar Mohammad Khan was not destined to enjoy the position uninterrupted. His *bakhshi*, Saiyid Muinuddin Khan alias Achhan[3] acting under Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah's instructions, ousted Safdar Mohammad Khan out of port and the fort. In a sudden move the *Bakhshi* captured the fort and placed the *qiledar*, Waqar Mohammad Khan who was taken by surprise, under arrest (November 1747).[4] Determined to capture the port also, Saiyed Achhan acquired services of Madhav Rao

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 155, *Selection from Peshwa Diaries*, III, Letter No. 185, p. 129

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 339-40; *English Documents* Letter dated 17th April 1747. *Treaties*, VIII pp.352-3

3. The Saiyid was brother of Saiyid Mithan, a religious man who was held in esteem by Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah. The *Nizam* had hatched a plan to oust Tegh Beg Khan earlier by working on Achhan (the *bakhshi*) through Mithan but to no avail. After Tegh Beg Khan's death, the *Nizam* renewed his effort, hence the present struggle. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 356-8

4. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 357-8, *English Documents*, letter dated 23 Novemebr, 1747.

Maratha who was invited into the fort.[1] Equally determined to retain his position, Safdar Mohammad Khan obtained support of another Maratha *sardar*, Khanderao.[2] But the traders, wealthy men, the British the 'nobles and ignobles' of the town who were vexed with the *mutasaddi* lent support to Achhan.[3] Having smelt general opposition and apprehending mass uprising against him, Sadfar Mohammad Khan vacated the post.[4] Thus Saiyed Achhan who assumed power and made proclamation in the name of *Nizam* came to occupy (December 1747), the *mustasaddigiri* as well as the *giledari*.[5]

But within a month of his exit, Safdar Mohammad Khan found a treasure trove and resumed the struggle (February

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 358-9,363; *English Documents* letter dated 10 December, 1747. His services were acquired for Rs. 1100,000 with the understanding that he would enjoy one third share in the revenues until the stipulated amount was paid. But the *sardar* was slain while the struggle ws still on. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 358-9, 363.

2. His services were acquired for Rs. 300,000 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 364.

3. They were all opposed to Safdar Mohammad Khan and disliked him since the days of his deputy-*mutasaddigiri*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 359-60, *English Documents*, dated 18 December, 1747; For his oppressive attitude under Tegh Beg Khan and reaction of the traders, *English Documents* dated 22 January, 24 January, Ist February, and 10th February 1734.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 359-60. He seems to have run short of funds also.

5. *Ibid.*, II, p. 360; *English Documents*, letter dated 18th December 1747

1748) to meet, this time, still stiffer opposition.[1] Saiyed Achhan approached and acquired active support of the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese and Hafiz Masud Khan (*Wakil* of Yaqut Khan of Danda Rajpuri, in-charge of Mughal Fleet).[2] He was joined by the wealthy men, traders and common populace. Apprehending ill treatment which might be meted out if Safdar Mohammad Khan succeeded they "on their own entered into an agreement together among themselves not to allow Safdar Khan, or any other person in future, to seize government (of Surat) and that they would prevent and obstruct him".[3] Also Nizam-ul mulk endeavoured to ensure support of leading men of Surat in favour of Achhan by promising them favours.[4] Safdar Mohammad Khan finding himself not capable to meeting the challenge, withdrew and left for Sindh.[5] With this, Saiyed Achhan started ruling Surat by assigning *qiledari* to his son, Saiyed Hafizuddin and ***naib-mutasaddigiri*** to

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 360, *English Documents*, letter dated 12th February 1748. Safdar Mohammad Khan acquired support of the Kolis also. *Ibid.*, dated 12th February 1748. Damaji Gaekward also stood by him. *Ibid*, dated 17th February 1748.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.361.

3. *Ibid.*, *English Documents*, letter dated 18th December 1747

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. p.361.

5. *English Documents*, letter dated 4th March, 1748. *Mirat-i Ahamdi*, II, pp. 361-2

Ali Nawaz Khan.[1] Nizam-ul mulk, patron of Saiyed Achhan, procured imperial *farman* confirming the Saiyed in the position and granting him *mansab* and *khitab*.[2]

But the revenues of the port which he did not share with the imperial centre, were not appropriated solely by Saiyed Achhan.[3] The Marathas sometime between December 1747 and February 1748 succeeded in extorting a share of one-third in the port revenues. Alongwith them, Hafiz Masud Khan also enjoyed equal share. The *mutasaddi* and *bakhshi* together were left to enjoy the remaining one-third part of port revenues.[4] As such from the point of view of shares in the

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 362, In the meantime leading men of Surat sent a petition requsting the court to appoint the Saiyed as *mutasaddi*. The Court, however, appointed Sadiq Ali Khan, a close friend of Hafiz Masud Khan. Sadiq Ali Khan approached his friend for help. But in view of the pact referred to above the Hafiz refused. *Ibid*.

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 360,362

3. *Account* ff. 15a, 18a

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 363-4. The logic put forward by the Marathas in justification of their share is intersting to note. As pointed out above, Safdar Mohammad Khan had procured Khanderao's help for Rs. 300,000. But the Khan was defeated. Khanderao, then, approached Saiyed Achhan, sying "if Safdar Khan had succeeded--he would have paid the stipulated amount of money. Now that he (i.e. Achhan) had assumed the charge of government, he must pay the amount.". To press it further, he blocked up the roads of transport and communication for merchants and travellers. Saiyed Achhan could not meet the demand immediately. He, therefore, assigned one-third of the port's revenue till he paid off Rs. three *lakh*. But even after the amount had been paid, the *mutasaddi* could not expel the incharge of the Maratha

revenues, the *nawabi* of Surat emerged as a collective-holding of the three partners in the revenues.

But Saiyed Achhan too failed to retain the trust and support of his allies in the port and consequently lost the position, acquisition of which had been facilitated by the *Nizam* and regularised by the Emperor. In the prevailing atmosphere of mis-trust and distrust Saiyed Achhan developed suspicions against his ally and partner, Hafiz Masud Khan, and antagonised him.[1] The Saiyed then planned to confiscate property and wealth of Wali-ullah Khan and Kali who had served under Safdar Mohammad Khan, the ousted *mutasaddi*.[2] Then attributing their escape to and shelter in the *dargah* of Saiyed Edroos to *Naib-mutasaddi* Ali Nawaz Khan, he ordered him too to quit.[3] Ali Nawaz Khan brought Safdar Mohammad Khan's son, Waqar Mohammad Khan into the port with the assistance of *Sajjadah Nashin* Saiyed Abdullah of the *dargah*.[4] Proclaiming Waqar Mohammad Khan the leader and

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share. *Ibid.*

1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 382-3, 385.

2. *Ibid.*, II, p. 384

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 382-4. The present struggle started in May 1749. Ali Nawaz Khan was sister's son of Saiyed Achhan and son-in law of Safdar Mohammad Khan.

4. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 384-5. Waqar Mohammad Khan was brother-in-law of Ali Nawaz Khan and son-in-law of Beglar Khan. He had been *qiledar* under Tegh Beg Khan.

declaring to bring Safdar Mohammd Khan back, he joined hands with Hafiz Masud and attracted around him pro-Safdar Khan and anti-Achhan element.[1] Hafiz Masud Khan also won over the traders who lent him active assitance.[2] Syed Achhan's *bakhshi* deserted his master and joined hands with Hafiz Masud.[3] But the Saiyed enjoyed active support of the British whereas his opponents acquired support of the Dutch.[4] By November 1749, the fort had passed into the possession of Hafiz Masud and the port (*darbar*) had been occupied by Waqar Mohammad Khan who brought Safdar Khan back from Sindh and installed (1750) him in the position which had likewise been lost.[5]

The inability of the Emperor in protecting Surat region against Maratha inroads and making effective interference there seems to have motivated the merchant prince to turn adventurer. By the year 1728-29 the routes between Cambay,

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 383-5.
2. *Ibid.*,
3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 386-7
4. *Ibid.*, II, p. 387-9.
5. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 387-90. But then Sayed Achhan resumed the struggle with the support of the British who finally emerged as the real master of the port.

Bharuch and Surat had been occupied by the Marathas.[1] Thus the city was isolated from the rest of the Mughal Empire. Therefore, the developments at Surat went unchecked though not un-noticed. Under such circumstances it was the turn of adventurers who might take risks and make their fortunes by the dint of intrigue and sword. Tegh Beg Khan at the instance of the trader and Syed Achhan at the instance of Nizam-ul mulk, turned ones such, carved out a principality out of Mughal empire and listed themselves among the *Nawabs*.

E *Nawabi of Bharuch*[2]

By an expedient use of sheer diplomacy Abdullah Beg, the *faujdar-amin* of *pargana* Bharuch succeeded in establishing his personal rule and in carving out a principality. The process of emergence of the *Nawabi* at Bharuch furnishes an interesting instance of how a prudent and shrewd Mughal official could succeed in defying the authority by aligning

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 132, 239, 363-4, 521, V.G. Dighe, *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, pp. 20-30; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p. 109

2. Bharuch, a well known port-town, is situated in Southern Gujarat between Surat and Baroda. Situated on comparatively an easy route for Deccan, the town was strongly fortified. Its fort was known for its "impregbanility and solidarity". *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 445; Hamilton, *New Act*, I, p. 49; Munshi Abbas Ali *Qissa-i Ghamgin*, Baroda, 1975 couplet no. 74, p.5. Administratively, the town was *sarkar* and *pargana* head-quarter of the same name. The port was however the administrative concern of the port officer of Surat. But the *sarkar* and *pargana* were the administrative charge of the *faujdar*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 205.

himself with and placing himself under the political protection of another strong defiant, Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah of Deccan.

Abdullah Beg was appointed *faujdar and amin* of *pargana* Bharuch by *subedar* Mubariz-ul mulk at the recommendation of his son, Khanzad Khan (1725).[1] Prior to his appointment, the *pargana* had been hit by the Marathas and their claim for *chauth* accepted by Hamid Khan, and later on, renewed by Mubariz-ul mulk himself.[2] Subsequent to his appointment the Marathas cut the land routes which connected Bharuch with Surat, the seat of the Port-officer, and Ahmadabad, the seat of provincial authority.[3] Then, the Port-officers of Surat came to be locked up in internecine wars with the *qiledrs* in

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1. The *pargana* still formed part of *jagir* of Nizam-ul mulk. Mubariz-ul mulk had encroached upon the *khalsa* and *jagir* lands in the *subah*. The appointment of *faujdar* to the *sarkar* was an imperial prerogative which too had thus been usurped by the *subedr*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, p.91

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 55, 89, *English Documents* please see letters dated 23rd December 1772 which summarises the developments concerning Bharuch, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*. f.65; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f.10.

3. Thus the *mutasaddi*-designate of Surat, Mustafid Khan (1726) could not go to Surat from Ahmadabad through land route. He reached Khanbat (Cambay) and thence reached Bharuch by sea route. Since he 'had no boldness to cross the river Narbada so opened communication with Pilaji Gaekwad' and agreed to surrender *chauth* of Surat for ensuring his safe arrival there. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 132. For Maratha occupation of Baroda (1727) and Dabhoi (1726-7), the towns situated between Ahmadabad and Bharuch, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 95-6,

addition to fighting defensive battles against the Marathas.[1] Thus neither the *subedar*, nor the *mutsaddi* had an easy access and a free hand to take any effective interest in the affairs of Bharuch whose *faujdar* thus would act the way he deemed fit for himself.

With the assumption of *subedari* by Maharaja Abhay Singh and his successful march against the Marathas as far as Baroda, the situation seems to have taken an alarming turn for Abdullah Beg. The Beg like his master Mubariz-ul mulk, who had already been expelled from Ahmadabad, apprehended his own ouster from Bharuch by the new *Nazim*.[2] In order to ensure his continuity in office and do away with the fear of expected action, the Beg "with foresight approached" Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah (technically still *jagirdar* of Bharuch), the strongest defiant of the empire. Asaf Jah granted him

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1. The struggle that went unabated, started in 1726. For details please see *Nawabi* of Surat, above.

2. Abdullah Beg had stood neutral in the battle that took place between Mubariz-ul mulk who resisted his ouster and Maharaja Abhay Singh. As such he managed his survival. But the Maharaja who had taken hold of the *jagir* and *khalsa* lands, could obviously occupy Bharuch as it was held by the Beg as *faujdar* under Mubariz-ul mulk. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 132). By occupying Baroda, the *Raja* had shown his ability to reach Bharuch also. Above all, the court had appointed one Saiyid Azmat as *faujdar* and he had come with the Raja to assume charge of office. *Ibid.*, II, p. 133.

sanad-i nayabat, a *mansab* and title of Nek Alam Khan.[1] Having thus placed himself under Asaf Jah, the Beg and his descendants continued to hold Bharuch and there is, moreover, no evidence showing interference either by the imperial centre or the provincial authoritiesl.[2] Not that, Bhatruch was considered as hereditary *jagir* of the successors of Asaf Jah.[3]

The Marathas appear to have been the major disturbing factor for the *Nawabs* of Bharuch.[4] Pilaji Gaekwad and later his son, Damaji Gaekwad, attacked and besieged Bharuch. In view of increased as also increasing Maratha pressure, Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah intervened and agreed to surrender half of the revenues of the port and the *pargana*. Later on,

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1. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 132, 135 *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, ff.68-9; For the place being Asaf Jah's *jagir* *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 48-9, 103 *Haqiqat-ul Hind* ff.43-5.

2. For the continuity of Abdullah Beg and his descendents under the protection and with the approval of Asaf Jah and his successor, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 264, 380-81, 399, *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 4, *Gazetteer of India, Gujarat State*, Bharuch, p. 70. *Majmua-i Danish*, pp. 3-9, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*. ff. 43-5

3. When the imperial court asked (1749-50) Nek Alam Khan to remit Rs. 10,000/- he answered that the *pargana* after the death of Asaf Jah belonged to Nasar Jang and his permission was necessry for the purpose. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 380-1.

4. *Qissa-i Ghamgin*, p. 6 couplet Nos. 96-7. These couplets also refer to the *mawassis* i.e. recalcitrants as having been fought by the *Nawab*

Damaji was allowed 3/5th part of the revenues.[1] It seems the *Nawab* had made it a point to live in peace with the Marathas even at the cost of open hostility with the Governor.[2]

Nek Alam Khan II broke off his relationship with Nasar Jang, son and successor of Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah also. When Nasar Jang, instructed Nek Alam Khan II to remit his share in the port revenues, he approached the imperial court for the award of *mansab* (2000/500), *Khitab* of Nek Alam Khan and *sanad-i pargana*, which he was accordingly granted. Thereafter he appropriated "the whole amount of revenue without partnership" of Nasar Jang and the imperial court. He prepared detailed accounts for equating expenditure with the income, submitted with the office of *Khalsa* and 'prospered'.[3]

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1. *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f. 26, *Tarikh-i Maratia dar Gujarat* f. 4, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f.65, *English Documents*, dated 23rd December, 1772, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 263-4. For the Nizam's successful pursuation of the Marathas for non-interventron, *Historical Selections from Baroda State Records*, I (1724-68), Baroda, 1934. pp. 3-4, 90, 185-86.

2. Nek Alam Khan II "either throguh fear or at the instance of" Maratha *sardar* came into open against *subedr*-designate in 1743-44 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.320.

3. *Ibid.*, II, p. 399 *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, ff. 43-5 The *Nawabi* after passing through a long drawn struggle over the question of succession among the family members, was finally captured by the British in 1772. *Gazetteer of India*; *Gujarat State*, Bharuch, p. 70. The *Nawabs*, it may be mentioned, continued to regard themselves in theory, as the imperial servant and their possession as part of *khalsa* land. *Qissa-i Ghamgin*, p.10 couplet Nos. 168, 174.

F. *Nawab of Khanbat*[1]

The *mutasaddi* of Khanbat was another Mughal official of a port town to establish his personal authority and family rule over the place thus adding yet another *nawabi* to the chain of chieftaincies which were being carved out of the shattering Mughal Empire. A study of the process of conversion of the official position into a family rule significantly brings to light the way Momin Khan[2], founder of the *nawabi*, made the offices of *mutasaddi* and the *Nazim* instrumental for consolidating his hold over Khanbat.

Having been appointed the *mutasaddi* of Khanbat, and *bakhshi* and chronicler of the *subah*, Momin Khan reached

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1. The port town of Khanbat, also called Cambay, situated at a distance of 32 *Kuroh* south of Ahmadabad, was also *pargana* head-quarter of Chorasi Khanbat. For administrative purposes the offices of *mutasaddi* of the port and *faujdar* of the *pargana* were combined into one. The official was sub-ordinate to the *diwan-i subah*, and appointed directly by the imperial court. The port town had a strong fortification around it and was easy to defend. JW Watson, (ed) *Statistical Account of Bhaonagar*, Rev. edn, 1883. p. 24. *Account*, ff 240a.

2. Momin Khan was son-in-law of Momin Khan Dehlami, the *diwan* of Gujarat (1725-27). His original name was Fidauddin Khan and was honoured with the title of Mirza Mohammad Najm-i Sani (1725) and Najmuddawlah Momin Khan Bahadur Dilawarjang in 1738. Commonly known as Momin Khan, he was the *mutasaddi* of Khanbat (1730-43) and *subedar* of Gujarat (1737-43) until his death(1743). ***Mirat-i Ahmadi***, II, pp. 87, 118, 195, 242, 271, ***Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat***, f. 84. For further details, Kamaluddin Husain Rizvi Shirazi, ***Hasbanama-i Khandan-i*** *Momin Khan Sani Bahadur Wali-i Gujarat*, Bombay, n. d. pp. 3-7, 29.

Ahmadabad(1730) with *subedar*-designate Maharaja Abhay Singh.[1] The *mutasaddi* seems to have remained steadfast in his duties until the year 1734-35 when a definite cleavage developed between him and Ratan Singh Bhandari, then *naib-subedar*.[2] From 1735 onward the Khan did not report for duty even though, he had been summoned by the *naib-subedar*.[3]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 118. It may be mentioned that Momin Khan's services as petrolling *faujdar* of the environs of Ahmadabad had earlier been terminated by Sarbuland Khan. Momin Khan was, therefore, obliged to repair for the court. (*Ibid.*, II, p.110) Since Momin Khan also enjoyed some respect locally, his association with Maharaja Abhay Singh who was required to oust Sarbuland Khan from the *subah* is, evidently, meaningful. *Hasbnama-i Khandan-i Momin Khan* pp. 29-30, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, ff. 33-4.

2. For the services rendered to the *subedar, Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 128-30, 131-5, 136-9. *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, ff. 12-3. But in the year 1733 Momin Khan had tried to provoke Nagar Seth Khushhal Chand who was harassed by the *Naib-subedar* to stir up trouble in Ahmadabad. Though the Khan promised him help but because of exigency' did not help the *seth*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 170-1. However, he extended him shelter at Cambay when the *seth* was forced to leave Ahmadabad. *Ibid.*, II, 172. Momin Khan was accused of supporting the cause of Behram Khan who had fought the *Naib-subedar*. Both Behram Khan and Momin Khan were political allies of Amire-ul umrah, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp. 183-95. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 207-10, 222-6.

3. The author of the *Mirat* attributes the cause of Momin Khan's disobedience to the 'fraudent nature' of Bhandari: since Momin Khan "felt unsafe from his fraud" (*Oo chun kidrash itminan' n' dasht*) therefore, he did not turn up. *Ibid.*, II, p.191. It must however be kept in mind that the author had himself suffered at the hands of Marwaris whom he hated whereas he happened to be a family friend of Momin Khan. See also *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f. 16.

Naib-subedar Ratan Singh Bhandari does not seem to have been bold and strong enough to take action against Momin Khan who commanded respect locally and enjoyed patronage of Amir-ul umrah, the strongman at the court. Determined however to expel the Khan from *pargana* Petlad which he held on *ijara*, Ratan Singh Bhandari pursuaded Jawanmard Khan Babi to join his camp and assigned the *pargana* to Sher Khan Babi "who bore displeasure" with Momin Khan.[1] With a firm resolution to expel Momin Khan from Petlad, the Bhandari directed Sher Khan Babi to march against him and himself started for extending moral and material support to the Babi.[2]

Momin Khan who seems to have perceived the consequence of his act of defiance, in the meantime, strengthened his position. He undertook repairs of the fortress and made it 'strong enough' to face attacks.[3] Then he avoided confontration with the Marathas who were quite active in the surrounding areas. First, he 'entertained' Kanthaji in the vicinity of Khanbat.[4] Since Kanthaji failed to assert

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 191-3. The Bhandari wrote off Jawanmard Khan Babi's debt for ensuring his support.

2. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 192-3. The *naib-subedar* terminated Momin Khan's *ijara* of Petlad before the expiry of the stipulated period. But Momin Khan refused to vacate it on one or the other pretext.

3. *Ibid.*, II. pp. 193-4.

4. *Ibid.*, II, p. 185.

against Renkoji, another Maratha leader, the Khan allowed the latter to appoint *naib* for collection of *chauth* form the port.[1] Soon after Ratan Singh Bhandari and Sher Khan Babi's march, Momin Khan won over Renkoji's support to use him as a shield against the inevitable threat which he thus avoided.[2]

To counteract Ratan Singh Bhandari's moves further, Momin Khan approached his political patron, *Amir-ul Umrah* and, at his instance, undertook to oust Bhandari from the office of *subedar*. In order to ensure success against Bhandari, he acquired Maratha support by surrendering half of the revenues of the *subah*. To retain Khanbat entirely for himself Momin Khan left *pargana* Viramgaon entirely with the Marathas in exchange for their share in the revenues of the port.[3] With the appointment of Momin Khas as *subedar* and issuance of the *farman* long after he had entered into agreements with the Marathas, the imperial court thus put the

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1. *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 318, 398. The claim of *chauth* in the revenues of the port had been established as early as 1725. Danniel Innes to John Courtrey, Cambay, dated 6th April, 1725, and Danniel Innes to John Courtrey, Cambay, dated 29th September, 1725, *English Documents*, pp. 4 and 6

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 193-4. Because of the Maratha's presence there, the Bhandari could not march at Petlad. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f. 83.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 198 200, 203, 206, 208, 212, 219-20, 318, *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat* f. 5; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, ff. 17-8, 22,23, *Mukhtasar Tartikh-i Gujarat*, ff. 84, 86

seel of approval on his action.[1]

Momin Khan utilised his position as *subedar* for furthering his interests at Khanbat. Sher Khan Babi held the port of Ghoga, a feudatory of Khanbat[2] and still laid claim to the *faujdari* of Pettad. Momin Khan expelled the Babi from Ghoga and 'gave in writing several villages' of Petlad to Renkoji, the Maratha chief, of his choice.[3] He terminated services of the *darogha-i bandar* and in sheer violation of the *Diwan*'s prerogative appointed, instead, a man of his own choice.[4] Having effected administrative changes the Khan put the economy of the port in proper order.[5]

Thus before his death (February 1743) Momin Khan had successfully consolidated his position in Khanbat. It goes to his credit that he did not come into confontration with the imperial centre and simultaneously avoided hostilities with the Marathas whom he utilised to defend his position

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 198, 242, 273 *Hasbnama-i Momin Khan*, p. 29

2. Large vessals directed for Khanbat were sent to unload at Ghoga whence the cargo was sent in small crafts to Khanbat. JW Watson, "Historical sketch of the town of Ghoga" *op,cit*, p. 283.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 274, 276, *Ahwal-i Gaekwad* f. 29, JW Watson, *Statistical Account of Bhaonagar*, p. 21 *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 91.

4. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 261.

5. *Ibid.* Moreover, he did not remit any revenues of Khanbat to the court. *Account*, f. 18a.

against the *subedar* and then oust him from the office though at a big cost. Moreover, he made the port free of Maratha interference and established his sway over Ghoga.

After Momin Khan's death the port was held uninterrupted by his descendents, the imperial authority simply put the seal of approval on the succession to power.[1] Though his successors were not disturbed by the imperial authority they however faced difficulties on other counts and failed to retain the entire inheritance intact.

The struggle for the *subedari* that ensued after the death of Momin Khan put his successor and the Marathas in opposite camps. Renkoji, a Maratha *sardar* exerted pressure on the *mutasaddi* with the design to capture Khanbat. Najam Khan, son-in-law and successor of Momin Khan yielded and "purchased Renkoji's friendship by allowing him half the revenues" of the port.[2] During the post-1743 period, the *mutasaddis* faced Maratha forces on more than one occasion, each time defending the place successfully but yielding to pay dictated, or else bargained sums of money levied under

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 352-3, 366, *English Documents*, letter dated 22nd October, 1743; *Hasbnama-i Momin Khan*, pp. 30, 32, 36-40; *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 7 Kishoredas Munshi, *Majmua-i Danish*, pp.viii, 2-9.

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 277-84, 286, 288-9, 300-1, 306-18, *English Documents*, Letters dated 31st May, 8th June, 12th and 18th Septemeber and 18th October 1743, *Hasbnama-i Momin Khan*, p. 32.

one or the other pretexts, to the invading *sardars.*[1] The *mutasaddis* entrenched behind the strong fortifications could defend the port with ralative ease but the land routes leading to and from the port passed through the open lands of the *pargana* Chowrasi Khanbat where the Marathas enjoyed predominant position.[2]

Because of the surrender of *chauth* to the Marathas, imposition of a *dakhla* (entry) fee on the merchandise and exactions levied by them and, then, disturbed political condition affecting trading activities adversely and finally increased expenditure on the military establishments rendered the financial position of the *mutasaddis* so precarious that they could not come out of the vicious circle and continued to face difficulties.[3]

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 398, 418, 423-4, 449-50; *Ahwal-i-Gaekwad* f. 38, *Precis Relating to the History and Affairs of the Nawabs of Combay*, Bombay, 1864, p.5 The levy so imposed is termed '*ghas-dana*' (grass and grain). It was a military levy which could be exacted not only from the hostile territory but also from the territories included in the Maratha domain. It was imposed arbitrarily and exacted forcibly. "The fear of whole-sale plunder and destruction, and not the free consent motivated the payment of *ghasdana* tax." HB Vashishta, *Land Revenue and Rublic Finance In Maratha Administration*, Delhi 1975, pp 13-7

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, pp. 438-41, 448, *Precis*, p.5 *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, ff. 44-5, 53-4.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 438, 448-50, 535, 538. *English Documents*, letters dated 6th, 7th, 11th, 15th, 19th April and 4th May, 1725; 9th February, 1730, 20th May 1740, 16th Septemeber, 1743, 18th October 1743.

Having been confronted with financial difficulties the *mutasaddis* resorted to oppressive acts. Momin Khan's immediate successor captured the goods of silk merchants, imposed additional taxes on the town-dwellers and 'plundered the merchants of Khanbat in May 1743.[1] A few months later, the traders of the port were again forced to pay Rs. 100,000/-.[2] Illegal extortions led to the desertion of the port by traders, who reached Borsad and Jamusr, thus reducing the income of the port.[3] Some of the traders who had deserted the port early in 1744 developed strong suspicions against the *mutusaddi* and could agree to return only after some influential persons at the port became "securities of Nizam (i.e. Najam) Khan's mild behaviour" towards the merchants.[4] Thus Momin Khan's successors lost the faith and trust of the real masters of the source of their financial strength---the traders/tax payers.

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 286, *English Documents*, letter dated 22nd May 1743 states that "the *Nawab* has begun to plunder the merchants giving an obligation by way of borrowing". He extorted a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- *Ibid.*, letter dated 24th May 1743

2. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 318. ; *English Documents*, letter dated 16th September, 10th and 22nd October 1743 and 16th February 1744.

3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 452.

4. *English Documents*, dated 8th April 1744 and reply to it.

CONCLUSIONS

The resurgent class of zamindars was inheriting the disintegrating Mughal empire and it may be regarded as the most-distinguishing characteristic of the ongoing restless period (1700-50) in the history of *subah* Gujarat. During this period the zamindars replaced the declining Mughal authority by their own in the countryside. But the process of inheriting the imperial authority was neither smooth nor free of internal or external constraints. It was marked by a multiple struggle for acquiring supremacy over the sources of revenue. The struggle, as regards the zamindars, looked more individual in nature as almost every zamindar due to persisting disunity amongst them, had to fight the government individually. But in effect the resistance was collective in nature--despite being disunited and fragmented the class (vis a vis the Mughal government) had uniformity of outlook and interest which, under the prevailing circumstances, seem to have forged a kind of uniformity of approach among them. Thus without coming closer to each other or evolving a common strategy, the zamindars moved about and reacted the same way. But the struggle was simultaneously marked by inter-class and intra-class as well as inter-strata and intra-stratum conflicts which in turn had their own qualifying effects on the process.

In spite of commanding vast resources and superior military might the empire had its own limitations to deal with the ubiquitous class of zamindars. Topographical barriers, position of zamindaris in the imperial-provincial strategy, political character, caste and clannish affiliations, socio-economic roots and other sources of zamindar's strength in terms of men and material beside productivity and manageability had qualifying effects on the empire's capacity to acquire and retain complete hold over each one of them and, or, strike uniformity in all aspects of its pattern of relations with each segment of the class. Proceeding pragmatically the Mughal state took these ground realities into account and then, accepted and continued the general pattern of relations with the zamindars earlier established by the provincial kingdom[1] which was subsequently absorbed within the Mughal empire.

The empire could not do away with the existing variations, whether inter-regional or intra-regional and inter-strata or intra-stratum. Rather it sought to regularise and accommodate them into its over-all administrative framework. Therefore one comes across the class of zamindars

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1. These factors might have a bearing on the Sultan-zamindar relations also. S.C.Misra, *op cit*, pp. 204-6. It also seems that the mode of relationship as established under the Gujarati kingdom, might have acquired somekind of acceptability with the passage of time.

having definite signs of differentiation and a well marked order of gradation which, among other, manifested in the mode and proportion of share in revenues and relative hold over the sources theirof. The gradation is further reflected from the way different nomenclature and varied appellations having definite connotations are used to designate the holdings, their holders and imperial share in the revenues. The same may be regarded as the salient features peculiar to the zamindars of *subah* Gujarat.[1]

The Mughal state laid a definite claim to a (major) share in the revenues of zamindaris and sought to utilise zamindars' men and material for promoting and preserving its interests. The zamindars were assigned a well defined position vis a vis the state, as also among themselves, a position regulated by the dual policy of assuring them a (subordinate) share in the revenues and forcibly checking any attempt on their part to transgress the limits set by the state. This had created a 'balance of interests' between the state that sought to maintain it by exerting continual administrative pressure and the ubiquitous class of zamindars which was basically averse to a rigid control.

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1. Whether such or similar variations existed in other parts of the empire is difficult to answer. Its study however, may constitute an interesting subject of research.

With a view to calculating its proportionate claim in the produce and ensuring smooth flow of revenues and simultaneously regulating zamindars' shares, the empire endeavoured to reach the peasantry directly. In this way, the empire sought to contain the sphere of zamindars' influence and to control them. In this, the empire met with considerable success. Still the degree of success i.e. magnitude and extent of imperial control over the zamindars and resources at their command, widely varied, ranging from thorough subjugation of zamindaris to a nominal command.

During seventeenth century, particularly its later half, the empire made arduous efforts to tilt the 'balance' more in its favour.[1] It attempted to intensify its direct control over the sources of revenues. The administration made a determined bid to enter into direct dealing with the *riaya* and thus to reduce the zamindars to size. The imperial move amounted to curtailing the zamindars' influence in the revenue matters and regulating, even reducing their actual share. Besides, the state dislodged some zamindars, dismembered other zamindaris and super-imposed on some of them the others who were duly vested with superior (such as *watand-*

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1. For an empire-level observation to the same effect, see Satish Chandra, *The 18th century in India: Its Economy and the Role of the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and the Afghans*, Revised edn., Delhi, 1991, p. 21.

ari) rights over and above the existing zamindari rights. Despite these attempts which were made increasingly, though within logical limits and, on a limited scale, the empire could not erode socio-economic base of zamindars to an appreciable extent. The policy of seeking thorough subjugation of the zamindars by bringing extra-pressure to bear from above without making equally effective inroads into the bastions of their power, failed to bring a qualitative change. The empire, in a way sought to reduce the zamindars to, and assign them a position which doesnot appear commensurate with their strength. The move was bound to invite retaliation.

Some significant changes in the position of zamindars vis a vis the Mughal state (as also the *riaya*) took place as a result of the inter-action of two forces representing mutually inconsistent interests and operating in diametrically opposite direction, the latter seeking to acquire greater control and the former struggling to repel it. The process led to a thorough subjugation of a number of zamindaris, relatively vulnerable, more productive and easily manageable ones. These zamindars were virtually pushed a little lower on the ladder of social gradation, though the nomenclature denoting the status was by and large retained. On the contrary some other zamindars who commanded greater

resources and enjoyed more favourable geo-social position successfully repelled the administrative pressure, thus forcing the empire to concede greater autonomy and freedom to deal with the peasantry under them. Technically retaining still the same old position, these zamindars moved upward the social ladder and thus effected a virtual change in their position. Consequently the features that distinguished one stratum of zamindars from another tended to be blurred and the intra-stratum signs of differentiation gained roots, and the existing one became more prominent.

Imperial attempts to bring extra-pressure, in a way, proved counter productive. The zamindars reacted increasingly and thus forced the empire to over-stretch its resources.[1] As a result rigidity and non-compromising attitude gave way to compromises and leniency. Gradually the empire showed signs of fatigue and loss of vigour.[2] Although the administrative grip over the zamindars appeared to be

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1. During this period of time emperor Aurangzeb was too involved against the Marathas and else where in the task of suppressing uprisings to spare resources and energy for dealing with the emerging situation in Gujarat effectively.

2. Please see Prof. S.Nurul Hasan's observation that "the numerous measures adopted by the Mughal government to resolve these contradictions worked well, but only for a time. Gradually the government had become too weak to maintain the equilibrium between the conflicting interest". S.Nurul Hasan "Zamindare under the Mughals" p.29

quite strong, but actually it had started deteriorating before the onset of the eighteenth century.

The process of decline of imperial control was still in nascent stage and confined to select zamindaris. It looked as though it had set in for the period that followed.

The swift movement of events and the changes that took place during the first few years of the eighteenth century acted as a catalyst, providing added momentum to the ongoing process. The process went on unabated and soon acquired unmanageable proportions. Reversing the trend of acquiring greater hold over them in their favour, the zamindars repelled the administrative control of empire over the countryside almost completely.

The new pattern of state-zamindar-*riaya* relationship emerged speedily but in and, at times, over-lapping stages, and in consonance with the strength and position of the different strata of the class of zamindars. The lead was provided by the stronger and more resourceful of them; viz, the Superior zamindars, in the same order of gradation (i.e. *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkahsi*, *zamindaran-i ismi* and the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin*) which they enjoyed vis a vis state and each other. Then the primary zamindars who were less resourceful and less powerful but more ubiquitous

followed the pattern. The intermediary zamindars were the last to join the fray.

In their determined bid to come out of the imperial net the zamindars refused to share their military might and serve the empire. The step met with complete success.

In spite of disunity the zamindars' stand for withdrawing military assistance to the empire reveals the uniformity of their outlook and interests beside indicating a kind of relationship between resourcefulness and the act of defiance. Since it met with complete success, it had significant potential: It reduced the military capability of the empire, rendered meaningless the highly systematized institution of *watan* and *tankhwah jagir* as linked with the military assistance and virtually undid one of the basic conditions of holding zamindaris.

The zamindare, then, attempted not to volunteer their services as intermediaries between the Mughal government and the *riaya* under them. They thus, displayed their determination to withhold payment and stop remittance of revenues to the treasury[1], or at least bargain the amount and pay less than due. The administration could not cope with the emerging situation systematically, much lees successfully. The

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1. For a similar trend at the level of empire, S.Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars Under the Mughals" p.27.

state turned to *ijarahdars*. Of them most of the officials-turned *ijarahdars* and other outsiders failed miserably. The ancient hereditary zamindars in their own right, or else the ones of them who acted as sub-*ijarahdars* appear to have emerged as the beneficiaries at the cost of the *ijarahdars*.[1]

The *peshkash* and, then, *mal-i wajib* which were duly assessed and demanded regularly, came to be exacted only now and then. Gradually the state's demand acquired the character of a casual claim, enforced by the actual use or show of force. On their part the zamindars offered it as the price of forebearance, rather than as a duly established claim of the state. The amount of *peshkash*, *salami* and *mal-i wajib*, the distinction between which claims gradually and increasingly was becoming extinct, came to be determined in accordance with their relative strength as distinct from the actual capacity to pay. The capacity of the administration to enforce its claim came to be inversely related with the resourcefulness of zamindars, i.e. the stronger and more resourceful the zamindar the lesser the magnitude of state demand. Zamindars' own resourcefulness and capability to

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1. N.A. Siddiqi's observation that "the total effect of the practice (i.e. *ijarahdari*) on a large scale was the ruin of a large number of ancient hereditary *zamindars*" (*Land revenue Administration*, p.139) doesnot stand the test of evidence available for the *subah* of Gujarat.

resist emerged as a prominent factor in deciding the amount and chances of making or evading payments.

Then, the stronger of them happened to be the first to cease as economic partners of the empire. The others followed suit.

The capacity of the administration to effect collections deteriorated rapidly in direct proportion to the zamindars' resistance and evasion of payments and it increased rapidly and consistently. Hence the administration could extort less and less. This development must have had damaging effects on the provincial administration which, on its part, had encroached upon all accessible sources of revenue.

The zamindars also endeavoured to acquire complete autonomy and to consolidate their position internally. In this direction their efforts met with appreciable success. The zamindars could successfully replace the hold of the administration over the villages with their own. The zamindars terminated the direct state-*riaya* relationship which the Mughals could establish after making long and arduous efforts and themselves assumed the position which otherwise was held by the state officials. They thus emerged as the authority that effected assessment and collection of revenues, dealing with individual land-holders independently of

the state. Helplessly the administration accepted them in their self-assumed position as the unit of assessment, the agency of collection, and in brief, as the de facto head of the *riaya* under them. Under the emerging situation the Mughal administration had to depend increasingly upon the zamindars.

But the zamindars donot appear to have succeeded in their attempt to establish them as the sole authority over the whole of village(s) under them. Any perceptible challenge, came from within. In this, relations of hostility developed between the zamindars and the *riaya*. The zamindars seem to have succeeded against the relatively vulnerable sections of *riaya*, particularly the *pais* whose resources the zamindars utilised to consolidate their socio-economic base. But they seem to have compromised their position and made tacit adjustments with the relatively, presumably prosperous and stronger stratum of the *riaya* that sought to acquire zamindar-like (such as *salamiyah*) position and restrained the otherwise over ambitious zamindars from having a free hand within the village. This stratum of peasantry, probably the *khudkashtas* rose in the social scale. Affluent and strong ones of the countryside might have gained in strength and stood in their own right. In any case the sphere of

imperial control shrank rapidly both in terms of intensity and extent.

Alongwith their endeavour to acquire hold over and autonomy within the villages of their possessions and/or their own possessions, the zamindars also sought to gain freedom of action in matters external. They sought, with considerable success, to destroy and occupy symbols of imperial control that were increasingly becoming ineffective and replace them with their own ones. This step completely reversed the process of acquiring and retaining control over them and all the achievements made in this direction were undone. Again the process was initiated by the stronger and more resourceful of them and carried on further by the rest.

The phenomenon of 'sub-infeudation'is also noticeable during the period. The zamindars sought to extend the boundaries of their possessions and the sway of their rights which came to be determined by their capacity to strike. The empire miserably failed to extend protection to relatively weaker zamindars beside the *raiyat* and govern inter-zamindar relations. The zamindas thus came to enjoy virtual freedom to make encroachments and go their own way. They fell upon each other. The weaker of them were obliged to purchase protection and accept a sub-ordinate position under the stronger ones of them. In the anarchy that prevailed a

number of zamindars lost their rights out right and other passed under some others' control.[1] The situation thus facilitated the rise of sub-infeudation on an increasing scale.

This development led to the emergence of certain new zamindari positions and rights. Moreover, it blurred the features that distinguished one stratum of zamindar from another all the more. Alongwith it the intra-stratum signs of differentiation gained deeper roots and became quite prominent. In fact, inter-strata and intra stratum mobility was a characteristic feature of the period--position of many old zamindar families underwent a drastic change, every-where;bold, adventurous and resourceful men with or without any title to land and or to power were forging ahead.

No less, if not equally important feature of the period to note is that despite the ongoing uncontrolled process of change and fluctuations, each category of zamindars emerged out of the strife and continued to survive. Changes did take place, both within and without, affecting the positions of

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1. Particular mention may be made of the *desais* who hardly enjoyed a social base to fall back on. They seemed to have depended on the state's patronage for their position. During the period under review they maneovoured to acquire patronage and protection of stronger zamindars, or else the power that be, for ensuring their survival. Similarly the out-siders who acted as *ijaradars* failed to ensure their survival for want of a power base.

individual zamindars directly and indirectly. Even then no category as such, did become extinct.

Particular mention may be made to the distinct section of the holders of *madad-i ma'sh*, most of whom were planted as holders of superior rights in land from outside. The section, for all practical purposes, seems to have gained sufficient resilience to be able to cope with the effects of the extinction of Mughal authority. The grantees suffered at the hands of other zamindars and almost collectively were exposed to bear the burden of illegal extortions levied by their own patron, the Mughal government. But as a distinct category holding superior rights which had virtually acquired the position of zamindaris, the revenue grantees managed their survival. Obviously, they had acquired roots in the soils of the land.[1]

Here it seems worth mentioning that in the ongoing multi-cornered struggle the contestants had their own limitations. The zamindars who virtually emerged as a monolithic block of power against the Mughal state, remained a divided lot, indulging in infighting which cut across family, caste,

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1. For a similar tenacity shown by the grantees elsewhere, see, Muzaffa Alam, "Some Aspects of the changes in the position of the Madad-i Ma'sh Holders in Awadh, 1676-1722" *Essays in Medieval Indian Economic History*, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 72-80.

clan and community barriers. They could not forge unity among themselves at any stage of Mughal rule in the region. In the struggle among themselves and against others (viz, Mughals, Marathas, defiant state officials the peasantry in particular), they tried not to pull the matter to extremity and sought to accommodate one another. Vis a vis the Mughal state and its defiant official th zamindas' obvious preference were the latter who, like them, were equally interested in coming out of the imperial administrative net and localising power.[1] The phenomenon of converting official positions into hereditary ones marks the entrance of a new element - the Mughal officials--into the category of (Superior) zamindars. Following the policy of conciliation and coercion towards the other contestants, the defiant officials volunteered concessions to the locally influential and powerful segments of society. Above all they identified themselves with the prevailing trend and grew roots in the soil of the land. Local elements' prejudice against the Mughals and predilection for the local officials turning zamindars seem to have been one of the bases of the latter's strength.

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1. Did this represent a regional or popular reaction against the empire's centralising tendency? Satish Chandra, *The 18th century in India*, p.21. But it hardly appears to be the uprising of peasantry.

Even after the inception of the revenue--grantees and Mughal officials in the class of zamindars and the emergence of new rights, its over all social composition doesnot appear to have changed radically. These changes were confined to the castes which already held zamindaris'. Though here and there they passed under the control of new entrants and the stronger ones among themselves, the Rajput-Koil combine still continued in the dominant position. It is also evident that no caste or community lost the rights out right.

It may also be seen that the Mughals at no stage of their rule in the *subah*, could manage to avoid their dependence on and undermine the institution of zamindari. Instead they continued to lean heavily and increasingly on their support. The emerging pattern made the Mughal all the more dependent upon them.[1] They accepted them in their new position and changed role rather helplessly, as fait accompli. Further the Mughal administration sought to build new bridges to re-establish its weakening, breaking and broken links with the zamindars. Here the state sought to utilise the services of some as *ijarahdars* but they could not succeed. It then fell back upon its own locally influential officials who were pressed into service as go-betweens

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1. S. Nural Hasan, "Zamindars under the Mughals" p.29.

between the administration and the zamindars. In their turn these officials endeavoured to carve out their own principalities and identify themselves with the zamindars. And lastly, the administration found in the 'sacred' person of Bhats and Charan the ray of hope and through this feeble agency which was equally beyond its effective control, it sought to reach the zamindars.

It is also evident that the Mughal state did not make any tangible efforts to resolve the crisis, or else to come out of the tangle. The state could not go beyond allowing its officials rather conceding them the right to corner more than one official positions into one hand. The process of downward devolution of power (viz, sub-ordinate officials grabbing the powers of their superiors) solved hardly any problem and created more for the empire. Those who had thus grabbed power at the provincial and lower levels, oppressed, whenever possible, the *riaya* within easy reach with impunity.[1] Well devised system of 'checks and balances' was rendered defunct. Channels of redress otherwise available were closed down. These developments added further momentum to the on going process of deterioration of administrative

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1. Please see also Harbans Mukhia's 'Extoritons from peasantry, Artisans and Menials' in *Perspectives on Medieval History*, N.Delhi, 1992, pp.206-16.

control, and, to cap it all, to the erosion of its credibility.

The process of downward devolution of power seems to have stopped at the level of the zamindars at the village level. A significant feature of the process and the crisis that followed appears to be that every echelon of the ruling class remained part of the same struggle, the same confusion that the crisis was leaving behind. None seems to have come out of the cage. The zamindars who had seized the initiative against the empire, emerged as the largest single but badly divided group of beneficiaries, still remained a part and continued to stick to the same socio-economic pattern.

Thus replacing the Mughal authority by their own, the zamindars succeeded, to a significant degree, in assuming independence by stepping into the shoes of imperial government at local level. Long before the extinction of Mughal garrisons from Ahmadabad, they had pushed the Mughals out of the interior of the province where they had come to establish their own authority.

The break up of Mughal empire was a momentous event in the history of India and as such it was certain to touch all aspects of contemporary life. Its effects on society were as multifaceted as the causes of its decline were diverse. In many ways the class of zamindars possessed those critical

elements which could have allowed it to emerge in triumph from the crisis that had overtaken the empire during the first half of the eighteenth century. The zamindars had a permanent and hereditary title to their lands and all their rights; any enhancement of agricultural production would have been in their long term interest. In large number of the cases, a caste affinity tied the peasants to the zamindars. Their local roots were of an enormous advantage to them. They also possessed the resources necessary for investment in land. There was neither a scarcity of cultivable land, nor of labour, though between the two the latter was slightly less easily available. The subsistence level in India being very low, the cost of labour was almost ridiculously cheap. Land, on the other hand, was extremely fertile.

As the mighty hand of the Mughal empire, which had kept the zamindars on a tight leash, was loosening its grip, this class was perhaps capable of evolving a new mode of agricultural production altogether--hiring wage-labour, producing for the market and reinvesting the surplus. However, what it really did was not to break away from the old political and economic system but only to strengthen its own bases within the existing system at the cost of other sections of the ruling class. Its conflict with the ruling class could

never acquire any shape other than the conflict between sections within the same ruling class. During heyday of the empire the zamindars held a dual position within the ruling class: as revenue collectors and as tribute and/or revenue payers. It was not an inter-dependent position which was the reason why the zamindars had always remained a very turbulent part of the ruling class. So they wished to shake off the latter part of their relationship with the empire. In this, they had succeeded within the first half of the eighteenth century as the empire collapsed and they felt no need to go any further. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the new states founded by the zamindars, as amongst the provincial states inherited from the collapsing empire, there was a remarkable continuity of the Mughal institutions.[1] The zamindars provided a leadership that remained essentially conservative from the point of view of long-term social and economic change.

But then it is a moot question whether any element in Mughal society was capable of taking it forward to a new stage of development.[2]

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1. Satish Chandra, *The 18th Century in India*, p.5.

2. See Irfan Habib, "Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in Mughal Economy", *Enquiry*, Fall, 1971; Harbans Mukhia, "Peasant Production and Medieval Indian Society", in T.J.Byres and Harbans Mukhia, eds., *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*, London, 1985, pp. 228-51

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2. Diwan Ranchhodji Amarji — *Tarikh-i Soreth*, S.H Desai, Junagadh ... (Original MS);, and BBRAS (Central library) Bombay M.S. No.10

3. Anonymous — *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, Apparao Bholanath Collection No. 129 Ahmadabad. An abridgement of *Mirat-i Ahmadi* containing additional information about Marathas and some zamindars.

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6. Anonymous — *Majmua-i Qawanin,* Apparao Bholanath collection No 297, Ahmadabad. The MS. is a collection of imperial orders, other letters, *arzdashts* etc. It contain some information which is not available in the *Mirat-i Ahmadi.*

7. Anonymous — *Tarikh-i Mumalik-i Hind* K.R. Cama Institute (Rehtasek IV) Bombay M.S. No 15. It seems to have been compiled in 1196 A.H and copied in 1240. Its last part is missing and the work, as of now, terminates with Humayun's reign.

8. Anonymous — *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat,* Apparao Bholanath collection, MS. No. 255 B, (new) Accession No. 147 Ahmadabad. By and large it is an abridged version of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; However it contains some valuable information about the Marathas and Mughal officials in Gujarat.

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10. Anonymous — M.S. No. 245. pt.II, Apparao Bholanath collection, Ahmadabad. (Title page missing) A late 18th century work. It seems to be a summarised version of MS No. 191/1.

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	Faujdars and emerging *Nawabs*. It was prepared sometime during the eighth decade of twelth century A.H. The work furnishes some useful information about the Marath's entry into Gujarat. At times it furnishes some informations which is not available in the *Mirat*.
12. Altaf-ur Rehman Bakhtawar (Bakhtawar Khan)	*Tarikh-i Mirat-ul Alam* MS (old [illegible] accession) No 2348 Jama Masjid ([illegible]htawar Khan) Bombay. It was written sometime during post Aurangzeb's period but before the death of Muhammad Shah. Basically it is a treatise on astronomy, containg useful remarks on geographical conditions.
13. Sheikh Muhammad Baqa	*Mirat-ul Alam*, K.R. Cama Institute M.S. No 155 Bombay. Identical to Bakhtawar Khans's *Mirat-ul Alam*
14. Ali Muhammad Khan	(No title), MS No 227. (*diwanu khatanu pustak, i.e. Diwan's book of Account)*, Apparao Bholanath Collection Ahmadabad. The most useful documentary work beside the *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement*. (For comment please see Introduction.)
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17. Rai Gobindas Kayath Mathur — M.S No 105 Apparao Bholanath Kayath Mathur collection, Ahmadabad, (Title page missing) It seems to be a late 18th centuay work, containing useful information about the Marathas and Mughal officials for the first half of the 18th century.

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VI RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS INCLUDING COLLECTANDEA

A (i) Records preserved by State Agencies

1. ***Baroda Record Officce, (Gujarat), Baroda. (Farsi daftar)*** The collection consists of a *farman*, sale deeds, *dastaks muchalkas*, *chaknamas*, some personal letters and other documents concerning grants. A few documents belong to the 16th 17th centuries, but most appertain to 18th century.

2. ***District Record office Bhaonagar.*** _ The collection mainly consists of personal letters, *Vanshavli*, a *dastur-ul amal*, treaties concluded between Bhavnagar and the E.I.C.

3. ***District Record Office Junagadh*** The documents are available in Files, known as Settled Cases (*Barakhli*). These files contain copies of *farmans*, *hasb-ul hukms*, *nishans*, *parwanas*, *arzdashts*, *dastur-ul amals*, Sale-deeds, documents concerning land grants, *desaigiri muqaddami* and other zamindari rights. A few documents belong to the 14th century, most of these appertain to the 17th - 18th centuries.

4. ***District Record Office Palanpur*** There are available a few documents concerning *muqaddams'* perquisites and appertain to the 18th century. We have particularly consulted *Liki Rawli parwanas*, Huzoor office Files Numbered WTN/SR/627;F. F.14,22; *Aghat parwano* and *Ravli parwanas*.

5. ***District Record Office (Fort) Surat*** The *Alienation Register* is the only important document which furnishes summarised information about the revenue grants which were made by the Mughals and later on by the *Nawabs* of Surat. There are also available a few files which contain a few documents concerning land grants which have summarily reproduced in the Alienation Register.

6. ***District Museum Bhuj*** Mr. D.K. Vaidya (Curator) is in possession of a copy of *Ruqat-i Harkaran* belonging to one Sh. Munshi of Bhuj. There are also preserved the coins from the period of Gujarat Sultans down to the British days. Also, the collection contains *mahi-o marathies* and a drum which the Mughal *Subedar*, Sarbuland Khan was forced to leave behind.

7. **Maharashtra State Archives** (formerly Peshwa Daftar) - Pune (Farsi daftar): The collection is very rich. It contains *farmans*, *hasbul hukms*, *nishans*, *muchalkas*, *dastaks*, *wajib-ul arz*; *raqba-bandi*, *qist bandi* documents *rahnnamas*, sale deeds, *dastur-ul amals*, *naqlganwat*, *mawazna-i subah*, *mawazna-i dehat*, *mawazna-i deh sala*, *jama subajat*, *jama-o kharj*, *awarja jama-o kharj*; *yad-dasht*, *haqiqat* and *nuskhas* of various decription, *fard-i hisab*, *khasra mazruat*, accounts of *jagirs* and other documents from the level of Governor/*Subah* down to the level of zamindar-cultivator / villages. These documents appertain to the 16th -18th centuries and are of great use for a sutyd of agrarian relation for Mughal Gujarat and other parts of the empire. The documents are bundled together in Roomals (1-71) and have yet not been classified/catalogued.

8. ***Rajkot Record Office (Gujarat) Rajkot*** There are available a few (Persian) documents concerning land grants from the period of Gujarati sultans to the Maratha days. These documents are arranged in a poor manner rendering it difficult to trace one.

9. ***Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner*** Well known *Akhbarat-i darbar-i mualla* and *Vakil* reports.

(ii) Institutions/Establishments: Private

10. ***Apparao Bholanath Collections,*** B.J. Institute, Ahmadabad The collection contains a number of sale-deeds, private leters, mortgage deeds. Most important of these is the MS No. 227 which is a systematic compilation of various documents covering almost every aspect of revenue

matters. It is an extremely rich source of information for a study of zamindars in general and the *sarkar* Ahmadabad in particular for the Mughal period. Documents and other MSS are systamatically arranged and preserved.

11.(a) ***Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*** (presently Central Library) Bombay,

(b) ***Forbes Gujarati Sabha***, Bombay

(c) ***Jama Masjid Bombay Library***, Bombay,

(d) ***K R Cama Institute*** (formerly Mulla Firoz Library and Parsi Panchayat Library collection), Bombay.

(e) ***Pir Muhammad Shah Library*** Ahmadabad collection contain good deal of documents our Mughal Subah of Gujarat.

(f) Excepting the 11 (a) where it is difficult to locate even the duly catalogued documents, rest of the collections are systematic and well preserved.

(iii) *Private Collections (Individuals)* Some *farmans*, *nishans*, *hasb-ul hukms*, *hukm*, *parwanas* *tamassuks*, *dastur-ul amals*, *chaknamas*, sale-deeds, *rahan-namas*, and other documents concerning land-grants and revenue matters are also available with—

12(a) Hamid-ud-din Amir Miyan, *sher qazi* (jama Masjid), Palanpur.

(b) Kale Khan pathan, Radhanpur,

(c) *Karparbhari*, *(nawab)* Palanpur,

(d) *(Maharao)*, Sarad Palace, Bhuj (Secty of)

(e) (*Nawab*) Sultan Alam Khan, Surat.

(f) (*Nawab*) Radhanpur. (Karparbhari of)

(g) (*Rawal*) Bhaonagar palace. Bhaonagar (secty of).

(h) SH Desai (last secty of Junagadh state) Junagadh.

(i) *Sajjada nashin*, dargah Edroosia, Surat.

(j) *Sardas Saiyed Haider* Inamdar of Bharuch

(k) (*Thakur*), Dharangdhara palace. Dharangdhara

13. *Private (present researcher's)* collection. While on the study trip the present researcher procured a number of documents - *Yad-dashts, khasra mazruat, haqiqat-i peshkash, nukha-i pesh-kash, tamassuks, parwana bandhari raqba bandi* documents, *mawazan-i dehsala, mawazna-i dehat, arz-dasht, ganwat dastur-ul amal* and other documents concerning grantees, and revenue matters - from a number of individuals, particularly from a petty junk dealer (Sidhpur) who had bought the same as part of junk form the Radhanpur palace (i.e present decendent of Jawanmard Khan, the last Mughal Governer of Gujrat). Procured at an extermely nominal, as also free of cost these documents one exactly similar to those of the Pune Archives and the ones indicated in MS No 227. of Apparao Bhoalanath collection.

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